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Abstract 
 
 This thesis investigates the information content of different types of variables in 
the field of financial distress/default prediction. Specifically, the thesis tests empirically, for 
the first time, the utility of combining accounting data, market-based variables and 
macroeconomic indicators to explain corporate credit risk. Models for listed companies in 
the United Kingdom are developed for the prediction of financial distress and corporate 
failure. The models used a combination of accounting data, stock market information, 
proxies for changes in the macroeconomic environment, and industry controls. 
Furthermore, novel finance-based and technical definitions of firm distress and failure are 
introduced as outcome variables. The thesis produced binary and polytomous models with 
enhanced predictive accuracy, practical value, and macro dependent dynamics that have 
relevance for stress testing. The results unambiguously show the advantages, in terms of 
predictive accuracy and timeliness, of combining these types of variables. Unlike previous 
research works that employed discrete choice, non-linear regression methodologies, this 
thesis provided new evidence on the effects of the different types of variables on the 
probability of falling into each of the individual outcomes (e.g., financial distress, corporate 
failure). The analysis of graphic representations of changes in predicted probabilities, a 
primer in the field of risk modelling, offered new insights with regard to the behaviour of 
the vectors of predicted probabilities following a given change in the magnitude of a 
specific covariate. Additionally, and in line with the main area of study, the thesis provides 
historical evidence on the types of variables and the information sharing mechanisms 
employed by American and British investors and financial institutions to assess the 
riskiness of individuals, businesses and fixed-income instruments before the emergence of 
modern institutions such as the credit rating agencies and prior to the development of 
complex statistical models, filling thus a crucial gap in the credit risk literature.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The development of financial distress/bankruptcy prediction models has been of 
significant interest to a wide range of financial actors over the last four decades. Given the 
dynamic nature of the characteristics of financially distressed and bankrupt firms over time, 
it is essential for regulators, practitioners, and academics, to periodically test and enhance 
the performance of existing financial distress/corporate default prediction models. This is 
notably important as the areas of application of such models have been broadened to 
include: the monitoring of the financial situation of institutions by regulators, the 
evaluation of the financial viability of corporations by auditing firms, the measurement of 
the riskiness of portfolios, the pricing of credit derivatives and other fixed-income 
securities, among others. Very recently, the financial crisis of 2007-08 highlighted the 
shortcomings of risk management practices within the lending environment and risk 
assessment at the micro level (Probability of Default estimation). Lenders and other 
investors in the corporate sector along with regulators require timely information on the 
default risk probability of corporates within lending and derivative portfolios. For banks, 
developing effective 'Internal Rating Systems' (IRB) for corporate risk management 
requires building probability of default (PD) models geared to the specific characteristics of 
corporate sub-populations (e.g., SME's, private companies, listed companies, sector specific 
models), tuned to changes in the macro environment, and, of course, tailored to the 
availability and timeliness of data.  
 
The present thesis develops new risk models for listed companies that predict financial 
distress and corporate failure, employing new and enhanced finance-based definitions of 
these outcomes. The novelty of this thesis is that, unlike previous research works, the 
estimated models use a combination of accounting data, stock market information and 
proxies for changes in the macroeconomic environment to investigate whether a model 
containing these three types of variables is able to enhance the predictive accuracy, 
goodness-of-fit as well as the timeliness of prediction models. Moreover, through the use 
of relevant transformations to the output generated by multivariate regression analysis as 
well as graphical representations of the behaviour of vectors of predicted probabilities, the 
models are intended to be of use to gain a better understanding of the individual effects of 
the different types of variables on the probability of financial distress and corporate default. 
The purpose is thus to produce models with practical value through flexible and sound 
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methodologies resulting in improved predictive accuracy and macro dynamics that have 
relevance for stress testing. In accordance with this field of study, the present thesis begins 
by tackling a conspicuous gap in the credit risk literature that is directly relevant to the use 
of different types of variables to assess risk through time. It investigates, for the first time, 
the types of variables and the information sharing mechanisms employed by American and 
British investors and financial institutions to assess the creditworthiness of individuals, 
businesses and fixed-income instruments before the emergence of modern institutions 
such as the credit rating agencies (or credit reference agencies) and prior to the 
development of complex statistical models, filling thus a crucial gap in the literature. 
 
1.1. The historical evolution of risk assessment and credit information 
sharing in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
 
As suggested by Wilson (2008), it is clear that the granting of credit is made 
possible by the flows of information on projects, businesses and borrowers, and “in 
difficult times it gravitates towards the established information networks.”1 In effect, there 
is a very ample body of literature suggesting that asymmetric information is the main 
obstacle between borrowers and lenders exchanges and that it can therefore prevent the 
efficient allocation of credit in a given economy. Historically, lenders have tried to 
overcome information asymmetry problems by collecting information on their own 
borrowers and their businesses through long term business relationships on the one hand, 
and on the other, by establishing contractual mechanisms of information sharing based on 
the principle of reciprocity. Nevertheless, there is still a very important gap in the literature 
that could provide a better understanding of the role of the different types of variables and 
the information sharing mechanisms on the assessment of credit risk: to the best of my 
knowledge, there are no historical studies that directly relate to the evolution of information 
sharing organisations or the type of credit information that individual lenders and 
organisations used to assess the riskiness (creditworthiness) or the likelihood of 
default/timely payment of borrowers. The present study’s aim is to fill this gap: employing 
a historical approach, it traces the types of credit information that lenders used to assess 
borrowers’ risk through the evolution of credit information sharing organisations from the 
nineteenth century, where the main antecedents of modern institutions can be found.  
 
                                                        
1 Wilson (2008), p. 13. Section 1. Background.  
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Moreover, the promised study utilises a comparative procedure and documents the 
evolution of credit sharing information in two of the most historically relevant financial 
centres: the United Kingdom and the United States. In modern days, there are various 
methods to judge on the creditworthiness of individuals, businesses, and fixed-income 
instruments. Credit scoring models are the prevailing tools used in order to assess the 
creditworthiness of the various financial actors. Scoring models utilise payment histories, 
accounting data, financial statements, and even non-financial information as their primary 
inputs to assess the ability of existing and potential recipients of credit to make timely 
payments of contracted financial obligations. Credit grantors obtain credit information 
through information sharing devices, such as credit rating agencies or credit reporting 
agencies, whose main role is to gather relevant knowledge and distribute it to subscribers of 
their services. The output frequently takes the form of ordinal scales of creditworthiness or 
written reports that allow credit grantors to make informed business decisions. However, 
this kind of credit information, whose collection is now facilitated by the willingness of 
obligors as well of obligees to voluntarily share it, was not easily obtainable in the 
nineteenth century in the United Kingdom and in the United States, where credit 
experimented a very fast expansion due to the exponential growth of trade stemming from 
the Industrial Revolution and later with the development of public corporations issuing 
debt in the form of securities. The present thesis contributes to the literature by providing 
evidence on the question of the types of variables and credit information sharing methods 
employed to assess credit risk in a period where the antecedents of modern organisations 
can be found. 
 
1.2. The relevance of accounting, market, and macroeconomic variables in 
bankruptcy and financial distress prediction models.  
 
The thesis tests, for the first time in financial distress prediction models for quoted 
companies in the United Kingdom, the relative contributions (individual and as groups) of 
three types of variables to the predictive accuracy of the model: financial, macroeconomic 
and market variables. Prior research has tested the ability of market variables to predict 
bankruptcy employing methodologies such as the Black and Scholes contingent claims or 
option-based approach (Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Hillegeist et al., 2004; Reisz and 
Perlich, 2007; and Vassalou and Xing, 2004). However, the results obtained from these 
models (that entail numerous restrictive assumptions) have been controversial. In a recent 
paper, Agarwal and Taffler (2008) perform a comparison of market-based and accounting-
based bankruptcy prediction models, and find that traditional models based on financial 
Chapter 1: Introduction 4 
ratios are not inferior to KMV-type, option-based models for credit risk assessment 
purposes. Hence, many efforts have been carried out to demonstrate the superiority of 
market-based models over accounting-based models and vice versa.  
 
To this point, the default prediction literature is characterised by a competing 
approach, where there is a clear division line between market and accounting variables. The 
present thesis adopts a different approach where the use of these types of variables is not 
mutually exclusive. It tests whether the market variables (dependent, in some measure, 
upon the same financial information) add information that is not contained in financial 
statements and therefore act as complement in financial distress/default prediction models. 
Clearly, the inclusion of market-based variables in accounting-based models is appealing on 
several grounds: first, market prices reflect the information contained in accounting 
statements plus other information not in the accounting statements (Agarwal and Taffler, 
2008), making them a comprehensive mix potentially useful for the prediction of corporate 
default. Second, the inclusion of market-based variables can considerably increase the 
timeliness of prediction models; while financial accounts are available in the United 
Kingdom on a quarterly basis, at best (prior research have used annual data 
conventionally), market prices are available on a daily basis. Third, market prices might be 
more appropriate to predict bankruptcy, as they reflect future expected cash flows 
(accounting statements, in contrast, reflect the past performance of the firm). And fourth, 
market-based variables can provide a direct assessment of volatility, a measure that could 
be a powerful predictor of bankruptcy risk and that is not contained in financial statements 
(Beaver et al., 2005). Additionally, the thesis tests the relevance of the incorporation of 
industry effects as well as time variant data into credit risk models that captures changes in 
the macro-economic environment. 
 
1.3. A finance-based definition of firm’s distress and a technical approach of 
corporate failure. 
 
Most of prior default prediction models for quoted companies employ a definition 
of the criterion event that is contingent upon its ultimate legal consequence: bankruptcy. 
However, this legal definition of default is not without issues. For instance, insolvency can 
be a lengthy legal process and the ‘legal’ date of failure may not represent the ‘economic’ or 
the ‘real’ event of failure. Analysis of UK companies demonstrates a considerable time gap 
(up to three years or 1.17 years in average) between the period that a firm enters a state of 
financial distress (that caused the firm to default) and the date of legal default/bankruptcy. 
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This evidence is consistent with the finding by Theodossiou (1993) that firms in the United 
States stop providing accounts approximately two years before the bankruptcy filing. The 
implication is that a firm in this situation is already in serious financial distress at some 
point two years before the legal bankruptcy event. Moreover, it is possible that a firm in a 
state of financial distress does not change the legal status that a bankruptcy filing would 
entail (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2004). Moreover, changes in insolvency legislation, (e.g. the 
Enterprise Act 2004 in the UK or Chapter 11 in the US) which have attempted to create a 
‘rescue culture’, have changed the nature and timing of the legal bankruptcy process. 
Wruck (1990) states that there are several stages that a firm can go through before it is 
defined as dead: financial distress, insolvency, filing of bankruptcy, administrative 
receivership (in order to avoid filing for bankruptcy), for instance. Moreover decline can be 
managed by the sale of assets (pre packs) and eventual dissolution rather than formal 
bankruptcy.  
 
The present study tests for the first time, for quoted companies in the United 
Kingdom, the advantages of a finance-based definition of firm distress. This development 
has been highlighted as important in the academic literature (Pindado et al., 2008; Barnes, 
1990; and Barnes, 1987) and is justified by the fact that the failure of a firm to meet its 
financial obligations does not inevitably lead to a filing of bankruptcy. The thesis follows 
Pindado et al., (2008) and classifies a firm as financially distressed whenever: i) its earnings 
before interest and taxes depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) are lower than its 
financial expenses for two consecutive years; ii) the firm suffers from a negative growth in 
market value for two consecutive years. Additionally, the thesis follows Christidis and 
Gregory (2010) and classifies a firm as bankrupt when its status in the 2012 London Share 
Price Database is defined as: suspended, in liquidation or voluntary liquidation, when its 
quotation has been suspended for more than three years, when the firm is being held by a 
receiver (in receivership), in administration or in administrative receivership, or when there 
has been a cancellation or suspension of the firm. 
 
1.4. The estimation of marginal effects and changes in predicted 
probabilities for the interpretation of financial distress/corporate default 
prediction models. 
 
The parameters estimated from binary and multinomial response logit models, 
unlike those produced by linear models, cannot be directly interpreted because they do not 
provide useful information that fully describes the relationship between the independent 
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variables and the outcome (Long and Freese, 2003). Previous financial distress and 
corporate failure prediction models constructed using binary response methodologies 
invariably focus on the overall discriminating and/or predictive accuracy of the models and 
very rarely do they provide an interpretation of the relationship between the predictor 
variables and the binary/multinomial outcome. Such studies report solely the estimates 
obtained from binary response models and provide an interpretation of the direction of the 
relationship based on the sign of the estimate. Nevertheless, the basic output (the 
coefficient estimates) obtained by performing binary/multinomial response logit models 
cannot fully explain the effects of the individual variables on the model’s outcomes because 
of their non-linear nature. It is posited that marginal effects and changes in predicted 
probabilities are appropriate tools to treat this issue. The thesis intends to fill an important 
gap in the default/financial distress prediction literature, where the measurement of 
expected instantaneous changes in the response variable as a function of a change in a 
specific predictor variables while keeping all the other covariates constant, has been 
overlooked.  
 
Furthermore, the thesis argues that the applications to finance of the multinomial 
logit methodology have not been explored enough, and that the literature on financial 
distress and corporate failure could significantly benefit not only from the analysis of its 
output in the form of prediction accuracy results (of three possible outcomes), but also 
from the new insights that can be obtained through appropriate transformations of the 
multinomial function coefficients in order to provide a direct interpretation of the effects 
of individual covariates on the likelihood of a firm moving into one of the three possible 
states. Leclere (1999) argues that a potential reason for the underutilisation of these types 
of models “is that the interpretation of the model coefficients in a bivariate probit or 
logistic regression already differs substantially from OLS regression. When the models 
move from a dichotomous to an n-chotomous dependent variable, the interpretation 
becomes more complex. Compounding this difficulty, the typical coverage in an 
econometric text fails to provide readers with a systematic approach to the interpretation of 
model coefficients.” To fill this gap in the financial distress literature, marginal effects, 
defined as the partial derivative of the event probability with respect to the predictor of 
interest, and derived from the output of the polytomous response model, are estimated and 
interpreted in detail in the present thesis. Moreover, graphic representations of the changes 
produced in the vectors of predicted probabilities by a change in the level of a specific 
covariate (while keeping all other variables constant at their means) are presented to further 
analyse the individual effects of all types of variables in the models, providing thus 
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additional insights on their patterns of behaviour as well as additional support to the 
interpretation of the marginal effects. 
  
1.5. Structure of the thesis. 
 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2, through a comparative analysis, 
provides historical evidence on the types of variables and the information sharing 
mechanisms employed by American and British investors and financial institutions to 
assess the likelihood of default/timely repayment of individuals, businesses and fixed-
income instruments before the emergence of modern institutions such as the credit rating 
agencies and prior to the development of complex statistical models, filling thus a crucial 
gap in the literature. Chapter 3 presents new binary logistic models for the prediction of 
corporate default for quoted companies in the United Kingdom using a novel definition of 
failure that was built using the widely available information provided by the London Share 
Price Database. Chapter 4 develops binary logistic prediction models that use a finance-
based definition of firm distress and a technical approach of corporate failure, and tests, as 
in the previous chapter, the advantages of combining accounting, market and 
macroeconomic data for the prediction of financial distress. Chapter 5 offers polytomous 
response logit models that consider corporate default as a dynamic process by including 
three possible financial states in a single model that incorporates accounting, market, and 
macroeconomic data as well as industry effects. All of the empirical chapters present the 
models and exploit the output generated by binary and multivariate logit models by 
deriving marginal effects and changes in predicted probabilities to interpret individual 
effects of the variables, and by offering more appropriate and flexible methods to evaluate 
the overall predictive accuracy. Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of the thesis’ main 
findings and contributions as well as suggestions for further research. 
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2. A Historical Study on the Evolution of Risk 
Assessment and Credit Information Sharing in 
the United States and the United Kingdom in 
the Nineteenth Century 
 
2.1. Introduction. 
 
 The use of credit as a practice that allows borrowers and lenders to exchange 
goods and services on the promise of future payment has evolved through history and has 
existed as long as trade itself. As discussed by Kermode (1991) and Bennett (1989), credit 
was essential to the performance of trading activities in the United Kingdom during the 
Middle Ages. In one widely cited dissertation on debt and credit in the urban economy of 
London in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Bennett (1989) argues that sales on 
credit “accounted for more than half of all credit transactions.” 2   Referring to the 
commercial activity in the fifteenth-century Yorkshire, Kermode (1991) states that: “The 
art of commercial survival was to keep ventures and credit in a state of constant 
motion…” 3  Moreover, Hoppit (1986) suggests that in the eighteenth-century England 
“Trade credit was crucial to the functioning of exchange… many firms had more of their 
assets tied up in credit than in capital.”4 Now, as suggested by Wilson (2008), it is clear that 
the granting of credit is made possible by the flows of information on projects, businesses 
and borrowers, and “in difficult times it gravitates towards the established information 
networks.”5 In effect, there is a very ample body of literature suggesting that asymmetric 
information is the main obstacle between borrowers and lenders exchanges and that it can 
therefore prevent the efficient allocation of credit in a given economy. If lenders have no 
access to information on borrowers’ characteristics or on the riskiness of their projects, 
there is a high probability that they will be making loans to high-risk businesses or 
individuals, ultimately leading to losses due to bad loans (adverse selection). Furthermore, 
lack of information also prevents lenders from controlling the actions of borrowers once 
they grant a loan (moral hazard). Thus, it is expected that the less information a lender 
possesses on a business or borrower, the more reluctant she or he will be to grant a loan (a 
                                                        
2 In Wilson (2008), p. 13. Section 1. Background.  
3 Kermode (1991), p. 480-481.  
4 Hoppit ((1986), p. 64-66. 
5 Wilson (2008), p. 13. Section 1. Background.  
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higher level of credit rationing). Credit information plays therefore a crucial role in the 
practice of credit.  
 
Historically, lenders have overcome information asymmetry problems by collecting 
information on their own borrowers and their businesses through long term business 
relationships on the one hand, and on the other, by establishing contractual mechanisms of 
information sharing based on the principle of reciprocity. The choice of one or the other 
methods of producing information have depended upon the scale and scope of their 
business: as trade grows in size and geography, the method of information sharing 
becomes more appropriate, as borrowers can benefit from economies of scale. As 
discussed by Jappelli and Pagano (2002), there is a portion of the academic literature that 
considers the first option (screening and monitoring their own borrowers) as the only way 
lenders can overcome informational problems. On the other hand, there is also a very 
extensive theoretical literature on the effects of information sharing. One of the most 
influential theoretical works (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993) finds that information sharing 
decreases defaults, improves the pool of borrowers, and decreases the average interest rate. 
Furthermore, this already vast theoretical literature has been complemented with an 
empirical study that statistically tested the impact of information sharing on default rates 
and lending activity, and documented the public and private information-sharing 
arrangements around the world (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002).  
 
The considerable importance accorded to the impact of information-sharing 
mechanisms was augmented by the debt built up prior to 2007 and the role of the credit 
rating agencies in the financial crisis in the United States, as well as the rise in household 
debt in Britain since 2005, when, for the first time, it rose to over £1 trillion (by the first 
quarter of 2007, the level of outstanding debt was around £1.4 trillion). In addition, the 
year 2005 was marked by a surge in payment arrears in the United Kingdom, specifically, 
but not exclusively, on unsecured lending products. This trend continued through 2008 and 
peaked in the first quarter of 2010. Now, even if it started to experience a marginal 
decrease from the third quarter of 2010, was still in 2012 at a historical height and, given 
the negative outlook for most economies after the global financial crisis, is, unfortunately, 
not likely to recede in the short-term. But the interest in information sharing mechanisms 
and organisations is not circumscribed to the cases of the United Kingdom and the United 
States, recent studies document the developments of the credit reporting industry at an 
international level: Djankov et al. (2007) analyse data for 129 countries and show that the 
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number of countries with a public credit registry as well as those with at least one private 
credit bureau has more than doubled over the 1978-2003 period.  
 
The above academic literature and the recent financial developments in a wide 
range of countries confirm the importance of credit information sharing to the efficient 
allocation of resources in a modern financial system. In summary, up to the present day, 
there is a vast theoretical literature that has served as a guide to better understand the 
effects of credit information sharing; on the other hand, several practical/empirical studies 
have used data to provide more insights on the public and private organisations (public credit 
registers and private credit bureaus, respectively) that act as intermediaries between lenders for 
the sharing of credit information: these studies document their differences across countries 
and their effects on lending and default rates. Thus, it is clear that many efforts have been 
made to understand the effects of credit information sharing and the organisations that act 
as intermediaries in order to create and/or improve organisations, strategies and policies 
that enhance the allocation of credit. This applies for both developed and developing 
countries: the latter can benefit from new insights to enhance the information sharing 
mechanisms and policies, and the former could use the knowledge from past or current 
experiences to build appropriate organisations for efficient sharing of credit information. 
Nevertheless, there is still a very important gap in the literature that could provide a better 
understanding of this issue: to the best of my knowledge, there are no historical studies that 
directly relate to the evolution of information sharing organisations or the type of credit 
information that individual lenders and organisations used to assess the riskiness (or 
creditworthiness) of borrowers. In order to address this gap in existing literature, this paper 
analyses historical credit and lender information using contemporary techniques.  
Employing a historical approach, this study traces the types of credit information 
that lenders previously used to assess borrowers’ risk through the evolution of credit 
information sharing organisations from the nineteenth century; where the main antecedents 
of modern institutions can be found. Moreover, the promised study utilises a comparative 
procedure and documents the evolution of credit sharing information in two of the most 
historically relevant financial centres: the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
There are very few historical comparative studies regarding the evolution of the 
methods employed to assess credit risk in the United Kingdom and the United States. Such 
studies can provide important insights in order to better understand the context that 
allowed the emergence of modern institutional forms of credit information providers in the 
present day, such as the credit rating agencies, regarded by both practitioners and scholars 
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as being one of the most salient forms of information sharing devices in contemporary 
financial markets6, as well as credit bureaux or credit reference agencies. The history and 
evolution of the main credit rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch) has 
been very well documented in a number of studies7; nevertheless, the question of the 
historical background that allowed their emergence and explained their evolution as major 
credit information providers for a wide range of financial actors, has been somewhat 
overlooked in the literature. Moreover, even if extant studies present important insights 
relating to some specific historical practices whose main purpose has been to overcome the 
information asymmetries among borrowers and lenders, there is not a comprehensive 
analytical study that aims to provide a general framework explaining the current state of the 
credit information providers from a historical perspective. The first objective of the present 
study is to fill this major gap in the literature. 
 
As Richard Sylla (2001) points out, by the time John Moody published the first 
bond credit ratings in 1909, bond markets had been functioning for about three centuries 
in the Netherlands, two centuries in the United Kingdom and one in the United States, 
without using formal bond ratings (provided by independent agencies) in order to assess 
the riskiness of the numerous enterprises in need of finance. It is evident that investors in 
these countries were willing to lend money because of level of confidence they granted to 
the borrowers’ ability and willingness to make timely payments in the future. Now this level 
of confidence stemmed from their assessments of creditworthiness based on acquired 
information on the state of the business of the borrower or commercial partner. 
Nevertheless, reliable information with regard to the businesses investors chose to put 
money in, was not as easily obtainable or straightforward as it is in the present day, mostly 
because accounting information was very rarely available, and when available, it was neither 
reliable nor complete. The question about the methods through which they acquired 
information on different types on investment opportunities has been rarely undertaken and 
thus remains a crucial topic for research. This subject is treated through a historical 
approach in order to present a general portrait of the evolution of credit information in the 
nineteenth century that provides us with a better understanding of the current state of the 
industry. Hence, given the magnitude and historical importance of the United Kingdom 
and the United States as global financial centres, and as the countries where the most 
important developments in information sharing took place, the second objective of the 
present study is to present the evolution of the methods used to gain access to credit 
                                                        
6 See White (2001) and Partnoy (1999) for a discussion of the influential role of credit rating agencies in financial markets. 
7 See Cantor and Packer (1994) and Langohr and Langohr (2008), for a description of the industry, and a summary of 
studies related to its functioning 
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information in both countries in the nineteenth century, when the antecedents of 
institutional forms of credit information can be found. 
 
From a historical viewpoint, credit information can be roughly divided in three 
categories: information on consumer credit, information on business (trade) credit, and 
information on corporations and specific debt instruments (fixed-income securities for 
example). The methods used to gather information on these main categories are evidently 
different in nature and have evolved over time; however, as it will be showed, they tended 
to be highly interrelated and acted as complements in most cases. In effect, from the early 
nineteenth century, in both the United States and the United Kingdom, personal 
information on a businessman was collected by granters of credit in order to infer the 
future possibilities of profit in that particular business and make an informed decision on 
whether it was wise to invest their money or not. Similarly, the current status of a business 
on a particular industry was used, in part, to evaluate the creditworthiness of a given 
security. The evolution of the methods used to acquire information by merchants, investors 
and large banking houses will therefore be studied through a comprehensive historical 
approach with the aim to provide new insights to a very rarely studied subject though of 
crucial importance.  
 
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of the main 
mechanisms through which credit information sharing can provide a solution to the 
problem of asymmetric information as well as its main benefits. With reference to 
theoretical work on credit information sharing, Section 2 provides the motivation for the 
historical analysis, of both, the evolution of credit sharing information and types of credit 
information employed to assess individual risk profiles. Section 3 explores the historical 
origins of the first forms of credit information sharing organisations in the United 
Kingdom, their main focus (protection against fraud) as well as the subjective nature of the 
types of information employed to assess customers’ creditworthiness. Section 4 discusses 
how the first organised forms of information sharing, primarily focused on the protection 
against fraud, evolved into the first efforts to produce ratings systems by the mercantile 
houses employing personal and business characteristics in the United Kingdom in the first 
half of the nineteenth century. Section 5 examines the case of the emergence of the first 
forms of profit-seeking information sharing organisations in the United States, such as the 
credit reporting agencies, and advances the reasons that explain the institutional differences 
between the two countries. Section 6 investigates the evolution of the types of information 
(such as specialised publications and statistics) used to estimate the creditworthiness of 
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corporations and securities in the United States and the United Kingdom in the second half 
of the nineteenth century and offers arguments that explain the reasons for the existing 
differences between the two countries. Section 7 provides final thoughts on the historical 
analysis and concludes.  
 
2.2. The Role of Credit Information Sharing as a Solution to the Information 
Asymmetries between Borrowers and Lenders. 
 
The origins and evolution of modern and institutionalised information providers, 
such as the main credit rating agencies, credit bureaux or credit reference agencies, can be 
traced to the historical functioning of financial markets and explained by the existence of 
information asymmetries embedded in the investor-borrower relationship. Lenders screen 
and evaluate the creditworthiness of potential borrowers in order to price loans 
accordingly. Theoretical studies suggest that, in a perfectly efficient market, the risk profile 
of a borrower always reflects the interest rate on a loan; in other words, the higher the risk 
profile of an individual borrower, the higher the interest rate of the loan. Therefore, in 
theory, financially sound borrowers should always be able to obtain low interest rates on 
loans, whereas high-risk borrowers should always either be charged a very high interest rate 
or be rejected from obtaining funding altogether. Information plays therefore a 
fundamental role to assess individual risk profiles.  
 
According to Jappelli and Pagano (2000), this information can originate from three 
sources: First, a lender (or a bank, as in Jappelli and Pagano, 2000) might already be in 
possession of information relevant to the assessment of individual risk (risk profile), which 
was acquired through an investment in a long-term relationship with a specific customer 
over time. Small banks, for instance, employ longstanding relationships (relationship 
banking) to obtain soft information and evaluate the profile of individual borrowers through 
‘multiple interactions with the same customer over time and/or across products.’8 Second, 
a lender can obtain the information directly from readily available public records, by 
interviewing the potential borrower and/or visiting her or his business. The acquired 
information can then be processed (qualitatively and/or quantitatively, through statistical 
risk management methodologies) in order to take decisions about loan granting and to 
price it according to the individual risk characteristics. Lastly, the third way to get 
information on a potential credit candidate identified by Jappelli and Pagano (2000) is to 
                                                        
8 Boot (2000), p. 10. 
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acquire it from other lenders who have previously performed business with the specific 
credit seeker and therefore possess valuable information. In return, the provider of the 
credit-relevant information requires a reciprocal obligation from the receiver to share her 
or his own information about potential borrowers when needed. Thus, an information 
sharing arrangement is essential between lenders.  
 
Nevertheless, studies suggest that the real economy is characterized by imperfect 
information; that is, borrowers have a superior knowledge regarding their own 
creditworthiness (or their ability and willingness to pay their financial obligations within a 
previously agreed specific schedule) than lenders9. Furthermore, asymmetric information 
may inhibit the efficient allocation of resources through lending (Jaffee and Rusell (1976), 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)), and increase credit rationing. Akerlof (1970) describes a market 
in which a seller possesses more information than a buyer on a particular product, and 
shows that the existence of a given level of information asymmetry might work to the 
disadvantage of good quality sellers, thus giving rise to an adverse selection problem: in a 
capital market characterized by creditworthiness uncertainty, investors would not be able to 
differentiate between bad and good investments, resulting in an interest rate that does not 
reflect the underlying risk of borrowers. Thus, the benefits of the reduction of the 
information asymmetries in financial markets can be derived: the common knowledge of 
positive past credit performances should turn to the advantage of financially sound 
borrowers in the form of lower interest rates and more access to credit at lower costs. On 
the other hand, the reduction of information asymmetries could also take the role of an 
incentive for risky borrowers to try to improve their credit performances in order to obtain 
more advantageous credit terms. Overall, the enhancement of public information regarding 
the creditworthiness of borrowers should lead to a more efficient allocation of capital in a 
given economy, in accordance to both public and private interests. Analogously, an 
efficient bond market requires the information asymmetries to be reduced.  
 
Extensive research has been performed on the role of information sharing in the 
reduction of information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, and it is important 
for a number of reasons: first, information sharing can prevent the previously discussed 
adverse selection problems. In the absence of information relevant to the assessment of the 
specific risk profiles of potential credit candidates, there is a high probability that lenders 
end up granting credit to risky individuals, the most likely to accept the elevated price of 
loans stemming from the prevailing uncertainty with regard to the underlying 
                                                        
9 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
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creditworthiness of market participants. Using a theoretical framework, Pagano and Jappelli 
(1993) show that information sharing, the exchange of information among lenders through 
information brokers (private credit bureaus), can reduce information asymmetry between 
lenders and borrowers leading to an increase in aggregate lending when adverse selection is 
so extreme that financially sound borrowers drop out of the market. Jappelli and Pagano 
(2002) employ a new purpose-built dataset on modern private and public forms of credit 
information sharing institutions (private credit bureaus and public credit registries) and 
show that bank lending is higher in countries where information sharing is an established 
practice among lenders. Similarly, other empirical works such as Brown et al. (2009), Love 
and Mylenko (2003), Galindo and Miller (2001) and Powell et al. (2004) present evidence 
suggesting that the level of aggregate lending is positively associated with the existence of 
credit information sharing institutions.  
 
Second, information sharing counters moral hazard. As discussed by Jappelli and 
Pagano (2002), ‘information sharing can reinforce borrowers’ incentives to perform, either 
via a reduction of lenders’ (or banks’) informational rents or through a disciplinary effect.’10 
With regard to the first mechanism to enhance the borrowers’ incentives to perform, via a 
reduction of lenders’ rents, Padilla and Pagano (1997) show (using a theoretical framework) 
that when lenders (or in this specific case, banks) commit to share with other lenders their 
private information about the creditworthiness of their customers, banks can encourage 
borrowers to perform better. When lenders have an informational monopoly about their 
borrowers and are therefore able to charge excessive or ‘predatory’ rates in the future due 
to an increase in their market power, borrowers have less incentives to perform, leading in 
turn to higher probabilities of default and increased overall interest rates. In other words, in 
the absence of credit information sharing, if borrowers perceive that the bank is able to 
appropriate a high proportion of their future investment’s returns through excessive 
interest rates stemming from an informational advantage (and the resulting monopolistic 
position that gives rise to a hold-up problem), they will very likely exert lower efforts to 
perform. Therefore, the sharing of information between lenders about the creditworthiness 
of their customers limits the ability of the former to engage in opportunistic behaviour and 
extract informational rents through excessive interest rates on loans. This increases 
borrowers’ incentives to perform better and results in a decrease of the likelihood of 
default of individual customers and an increase in overall aggregate lending.  
 
                                                        
10 P. 2019. 
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In relation to the second mechanism to reinforce borrowers’ incentives to perform, 
the disciplinary effect, Padilla and Pagano (2000) show that credit information sharing not 
only reduces (ex ante) adverse selection problems but also diminishes (ex post) moral hazard 
via a disciplinary effect. If lenders share default information about their borrowers, the 
latter must consider that default on one lender will negatively affect their reputation with all 
other future potential lenders, making credit more expensive through higher loan interest 
rates or even cutting her or him off from credit altogether. Therefore, the disciplinary 
effect arising from the existence of credit information sharing organisations should, 
theoretically, provide a stronger incentive for borrowers to exert a higher level of effort to 
perform, decreasing the probability of default of individual customers and ultimately 
increasing lenders’ returns by reducing losses from bad debt. Conversely, without credit 
information sharing, borrowers might be tempted to repay their financial obligations only 
when they plan to maintain a longstanding relationship with a lender (Brown and Zehnder 
(2007)). 
 
Nevertheless, the effects of information sharing as a disciplinary device on the 
behaviour and performance of borrowers are also dependent upon the type of information 
shared11: sharing customers’ information about past defaults yields different results than 
sharing information about their quality. More specifically, the disciplinary effect materialises 
only when the exchange of information is exclusively focused on defaults. As shown by 
Padilla and Pagano (2000), divulging information about the borrowers’ quality (instead of 
information about borrowers’ past defaults) can reduce the disciplinary effect of 
information sharing, leaving the level of default and interest rates unchanged: in the 
banking context, if ex ante competition discards potential informational rents, then the level 
of loan interest rates cannot be diminished further. Therefore, ‘when information about 
their quality is shared, borrowers have no reason to change their effort level, and 
equilibrium default and interest rates stay unchanged.’ 12  Furthermore, if lenders share 
information about both past defaults and borrower characteristics, the disciplinary effect of 
information sharing is diluted: a high-grade borrower will not have a stronger incentive to 
perform or avoid default if she or he is aware that lenders will disclose her or his high 
intrinsic quality in addition to a previous event of default. This might be explained by the 
fact that the borrower can be certain that other lenders will not interpret default as a sign of 
low quality (Padilla and Pagano (2000)). Consistent with these findings, Doblas-Madrid and 
                                                        
11 This is the main reason why the present study, employing a historical approach, focuses not only on the evolution of 
credit information sharing but also on the type of information that lenders shared and used to assess potential borrowers’ 
creditworthiness. 
12 Jappelli and Pagano (2002), p. 2020. 
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Minetti (2013) show that information exchange has a positive effect on the payment 
behaviour of firms, especially in the case of young and small firms that have a reputation to 
be less informationally transparent.  
 
In practice, modern forms of sharing information organisations such as the main 
credit rating agencies, for instance, claim that they help reduce the asymmetries among 
lenders and borrowers through an established and defined ranking system (credit ratings) 
that reflects the ability and willingness of an issuer of fixed-income securities to make full 
and timely payment of amounts due on a given security over its life. The ranking system 
used by credit rating agencies to assign ratings is based on calculations that should reflect 
the underlying probability that the financial obligations (principal and interest) will be met 
according to a defined schedule, on the one hand, and the rate of recovery should the firm 
go into default, on the other.  
 
2.3. Origins and Evolution of the First Forms of Credit Information Sharing 
in the United Kingdom: Mutual Societies for the Protection of Trade and 
the Subjective Assessment of Risk. 
 
 As initially discussed, the use of credit as a practice that allows borrowers and 
lenders to exchange goods and services on the promise of future payment has evolved 
through history and has existed as long as trade itself. There is, nevertheless, substantial 
debate among historians and economic theorists with regard to the importance of credit to 
the practice of trade in early historical stages such as the Middle Ages in the United 
Kingdom13. In his pioneering study on medieval mercantile credit, Postan (1928) argues 
that the extent to which medieval trade was based on credit has been understated and that 
the common depiction of credit as being in an incipient or embryonic stage of 
development in the Middle Ages can be explained as follows: ‘If mercantile credit was one 
of the basic principles of our economic civilization, then every successive stage of 
economic evolution made some contribution towards it, and therefore the further back we 
went the less important the function of credit became, until we reached a time when there 
was very little credit or none at all. Hence the prevailing notions of the absence or the 
undeveloped state of credit in the Middle Ages.’14 Essentially, the dominant perception 
before Postan’s (1928) historical study was that the level of commercial trade in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was not important or sophisticated enough to require 
                                                        
13 See Postan (1928) 
14 P. 234. 
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the use of complex forms of credit, that early exchanges were therefore carried on primarily 
in bullion (transactions were mainly based on ready payment), and that the miscellaneous 
and sporadic lending and borrowing that took place in the Middle Ages was employed 
mainly by wealthy men only for consumption, emergencies, or to finance a war. Thus, 
according to this view, the primitive forms of lending and borrowing cannot be used as 
evidence of the importance of credit. Bücher (1901) provides one example of this notion of 
the use of credit in the Middle Ages: ‘The amount of loan and consumption capital is 
exceedingly small. It may even be doubted whether in mediaeval trade credit operations can 
be spoken of at all. Early exchange is based upon ready payment; nothing is given except 
where a tendered equivalent can be directly received. Almost the entire credit system is 
clothed in the forms of purchase.’15 Thus, it can also be inferred that commercial trades, 
such as purchases and sales as well as other common transactions at the time, were 
employed to disguise medieval loans, which in addition, were used not for production but 
for consumption. 
 
 The novelty and importance of Postan’s (1928) study lies in the evidence presented 
that shows that, contrary to the general notion, credit was not only present but was even 
common practice in medieval trade. The analysis and discussion are based on a number of 
historical documents that corroborate the use of several specific forms of credit that played 
an individual and distinct economic role of their own. The most substantial part of the 
evidence can be found in historical records of debt such as ‘recognizances,’ or debts 
acknowledged before judicial tribunals and entered upon their roles; entries and documents 
relating to pleas of debt such as the petitions on debts among the early chancery 
proceedings at the public record office (among other types); and the surviving merchants’ 
(national and foreign) documents dealing with debts and credits but not relating to their 
registration, enforcement or adjudication. There are, of course, other sources where 
medieval forms of lending and borrowing (different than those directly related to 
mercantile credit) are mentioned or described16, however, Postan’s (1928) objective was to 
prove that there was a systematic use of credit and that it was essential to the performing of 
trade between merchants in a number of economic areas. This is, arguably, the main reason 
that his study focuses on the historical evidence that directly relates to mercantile credit, of 
which the most notable types are: ‘sales credits,’ or credit that consisted primarily of 
deferred payments for goods sold or advances for future delivery; short-term loans, whose 
                                                        
15 P. 128-129. 
16 It is worth noting that many loans were not enrolled or officially registered, especially in the early Middle Ages. It is not 
until 1283, after the passing of the Statute Burnell, and especially in the second half of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, that mercantile credit was officially registered, through recognizances, on special rolls kept by the authorities.  
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main purpose was to satisfy the instantaneous liquidity requirements of merchants (early or 
unexpected recall of loans from creditors, late payments from borrowers using sales/trade 
credit, are just some examples of the recurrent circumstances that required the use of 
additional credit as a source of cash); and investments in the form of partnerships whose 
main function was to finance enterprises that required greater amounts of capital than one 
individual was able or willing to commit.  
 
 Furthermore, analysing the cases of two important commercial regions in the 
United Kingdom, Middle-Age Yorkshire and London, Kermode (1991) reveals how 
fundamental medieval credit was for mercantile activities at the time. Her study confirms 
that credit in general, and trade credit in particular, was essential to the functioning of 
medieval commercial exchanges in England. In addition to the widely used forms of 
borrowing and lending such as sales credit or deferred payment analysed in Postan (1928), 
she argues that bills of exchange were also a very important financial instrument at the time. 
Bills of exchange were considered a safe method to transfer cash or settle a debt in a 
distant location; a merchant could buy them from a ‘drawer’ who had her or his own in the 
location where the payment was to be made. Furthermore, in order to mitigate the 
underlying risk of a credit operation, a merchant could act as a pledge for another 
merchant’s loan by means of a previous reciprocal agreement. In Kermode’s (1991) words: 
‘When a loan was negotiated, the borrower had to find mainpernors, or pledges who would 
act as surety against payment. A wealthy and successful businessman, with the confidence 
of its creditor, might not always need pledges, but a relative newcomer or someone with 
neither property nor  reputation, or someone needing an exceptionally large loan, would be 
dealt with according to the solvency of his pledges.’17 Kermode’s (1991) study, and this 
statement in specific, is very important because on the one hand, it confirms the systematic 
use of credit and its importance to commercial activities in England since the Middle Ages; 
and on the other, it provides us with historical evidence that can be used as a tool to better 
understand the first methods employed by creditors to make a credit decision based on the 
riskiness of a borrower. In effect, in this early historic period, most of the evidence on the 
performance of credit operation is static and, in some cases, incomplete: according to 
Kermode’s (1991) study, ‘virtually all of the evidence for medieval credit comes from 
records of defaulting debtors.’18 Thus, there is no direct and/or systematic evidence on the 
methods employed by borrowers to assess creditworthiness. However, through the 
evidence presented, it is possible to infer and highlight the main lines. 
                                                        
17 P. 492. 
18 P. 481. 
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 There is therefore important evidence suggesting that medieval credit was widely 
used throughout English economy,19 and that a large proportion of loans advanced to 
borrowers used some form of collateral, such as bullion, rents or mortgages, as surety 
against payment in the absence of information on the underlying risk of the enterprise of a 
borrower. Moreover, the use of collateral in order to secure credit was also essential when 
trade was performed among merchants in distant locations. However, from the previous 
Kermode’s (1991) citation that depicts the use of mainpernors in credit transactions, the 
words ‘confidence’ (of creditors) and (borrower’s) ‘reputation’ clearly stand out as the first 
qualitative criteria employed to discriminate between high-risk and sound borrowers. In 
this way the reputation of a merchant could influence the loan decision (and the size of the 
loan) along with the viability of the venture or the quality of the collateral. Financial 
networks, largely determined by the geographical scope of the trade and the importance of 
cities as commercial centres, were thus essential to the level of credit, and the use of 
qualitative criteria (such as borrowers’ reputation) to assess the creditworthiness of 
potential borrowers. The evidence advanced by the previous historical works, extremely 
rich and useful to the study of credit through a historical approach, has nevertheless some 
limits with regard to the methods used by merchants to evaluate the risk profile of 
borrowers, and it is not until the 18th century that we can find documents that directly 
relate to the first systematic attempts to uncover the underlying risk of borrowers and 
businesses and share this information by means of institutions.  
 
One of the first institutionalised and formal methods of acquiring credit 
information emerged in the United Kingdom in the form of mutual societies for the 
protection of trade. This institution can be thought of as one product of the Industrial 
Revolution in the eighteenth century, period in which not only average income and 
population grew in an unprecedented manner, but that also affected human society in 
almost every aspect and transformed the economic and business activities of a great 
majority of countries. In this period, production was greatly increased through more and 
more efficient methods, and the division of labour brought expanded opportunities for 
trade between individuals, firms and nations; the amount of credit grew therefore at an 
unprecedented pace and, with this, the need to assess the ability and willingness of those 
receiving it. This constituted a large transformation in the way business was performed 
before the Industrial Revolution, as commerce generally took place within very limited 
geographical areas and credit was thus granted on the basis of personal knowledge.  
                                                        
19 See also Bennett (1989) 
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Nevertheless, with the increase in credit granting, the cases of people systematically 
and intentionally deceiving creditors also augmented. Fraud was not uncommon, and some 
people that received credit in one place moved to another in order to borrow again without 
honouring their previously contracted obligations20. In order to protect themselves from 
these practices, traders used to gather informally at local inns or coffee houses where 
information on the names of fraudsters as well as the different deceitful practices were 
orally transmitted. Additionally, these gatherings provided an opportunity for the traders to 
exchange experiences and knowledge on the mutual businesses, the status of the industry, 
and even gossip on different subjects of interest and potential customers with whom it was 
dangerous or safe to do business or to whom it was not advisable to grant credit. Cuthbert 
Greig suggests that the first mutual credit reference agencies of this kind in the United 
Kingdom date back to the early seventeenth century; however, as discussed by Cameron 
McNeil Greig, records that could help ascertain the precise date of inception are now lost21. 
However, extant documents with regard to the codes and rules of the British society The 
Guardians or, Society for the Protection of Trade Against Swindlers and Sharpers allows to trace this 
kind of institution as early as March 25, 1776, the date when it was established22.  
 
The first society for the protection of trade, for which records are available, was 
thus the Society of Mutual Communication for the Protection of Trade (later renamed 
Mutual Communication Society and referred to as “ the MCS”), founded in 1801 at the 
British Coffee House, Cockspur Street, Charing Cross, London WC. This society 
specialised, unlike subsequent ones, in a particular area: it was mainly concerned with the 
provision of credit information for the protection of those supplying the “carriage trade” in 
the West End of London. The way in which information was disseminated among the 
members did not vary from its inception to its peak, when the society counted 2,000 
members approximately: the associates had weekly meetings in order to exchange and 
update the information on the names of the people identified as fraudsters as well as the 
techniques they used to deceive creditors. Furthermore, the MCS had strict rules that 
members were compelled to follow if they wanted to continue being members of the 
organisation: first, the names of people identified as swindlers, recorded in the Books of 
                                                        
20 See Greig (1992). 
21 Greig, C. Commercial Credit and Accounts Collection, First Edition. In Greig (1992). Greig’s work is one of the most useful 
sources of historical information on mutual societies for the protection of trade in the United Kingdom and a very 
detailed account of the history of UATP-Infolink in particular. 
22 UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS. The Guardians: or, Society for the protection of trade against swindlers and sharpers. Established March 
25, 1776. [n.p.], [1780?]. The Making of the Modern World. Gale 2010. Gale, Cengage Learning. University of Leeds. 23 
August 2010 Available at: http://0-
galenet.galegroup.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/servlet/MOME?af=RN&ae=U3601844161&srchtp=a&ste=14 
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the Society, were not to be divulged to non-members; second, the members were 
completely free to use the information at their discretion when deciding to grant credit or 
refuse it; third, members must always provide accurate information and restrain from 
taking part in any “malicious or slanderous intent.” These were the basic rules to follow in 
order to be a member of the MCS, and other associations that emerged throughout the 
United Kingdom later adopted them. Additionally, the MCS provided, in Rules I and IV of 
its Constitution, the foundations of all subsequent organisations of this type, which serve 
to illustrate the methods of exchange of credit information as well as the funding system: 
 
I. Every Member is bound to communicate to the Society without delay, the Name 
and Description of any Person who may be unfit to trust, for the security and 
satisfaction of the other Members; and shall, on all occasions, impart, without 
reserve, any information that may be solicited by any of the Members. 
 
IV. All expenses, whatever for the support, use, or advantage of the Society, shall 
be equally borne by its members and paid out of the fund. 
 
Rule IV is important in the sense that it highlights the main organisational 
difference, as shall be discussed, with regard to the independent, profit-seeking credit 
reporting agencies in the United States. 
 
After the MCS, other more general organisations for the protection of trade 
followed. In 1823, under the initiative of Mr John Smith, proprietor of the Liverpool 
Mercury, a new mutual society was built. As reported by Greig (1992), the main focus of 
the new organisation was the exchange of information, and its Rules stipulated, “As mutual 
protection is the first principle of the Society, it is imperative upon every member to give 
information of… Swindlers and Sharpers.” The same principles were established for the 
“Manchester Guardian Society for the Protection of Trade” in 1826, also through the 
initiative of Mr John Smith. That same year, the “Bath Society for the Protection of 
Persons and Property from Felons, Receivers of Stolen Goods, Swindlers, etc.” was 
formed. In 1827, the “Hull, East Yorkshire and Lincolnshire Bankers, Merchants and 
Traders Association for the Protection of Trade and the Prosecution of Felons, etc.”, 
followed. The London Association for the protection of Trade was established in 1842, 
followed by another in Leeds in 1848, Leicester in 1849, and Glasgow in 1852. 
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As can be observed, mutual societies for the protection of trade were dedicated to 
the dissemination of information regarding existing swindlers and their activities so as to 
prevent creditors from being the object of fraud. This information was circumscribed to 
members of the organisations, who in turn had the obligation to provide accurate reports 
of other dangerous people or fraud practices. In the case of the Manchester and Salford 
Protection Society, this information was communicated through a Monthly Report, and the 
extant documents provide highly illustrative examples of the credit information at the time. 
An example of a 1849 description of a particular fraudster in the Monthly Report is 
reproduced below, followed by another describing a specific form of deception:  
 
GILMOUR T. P. This arch imposter recently visited Manchester under the 
assumed guise of a converted Jew; he was immediately recognized and being 
followed by a crowd who threatened him with personal violence retreated into a 
newsroom where he remained for three hours; on his exit he was assailed with floor 
bags, soot bags, etc. and took refuge in a warehouse in Tulse-alley. He represented 
his object in visiting Manchester to have been chiefly of a religious character and 
that he was in the frequent habit of going into the country to pray (Query, prey?) by 
himself not wishing to be seen at his devotion. It is believed he took advice of Mr 
Beswick and retreated from Manchester early the following morning23. 
 
Also in 1849, the Monthly Report of the London Association for the Protection of 
Trade reported that fraud had been carried out by way of advertisements:  
 
in The Times and other papers offering a payment of 5s. or upwards to inform 
servant of suitable situations; they likewise advertise… for clerks and messengers at 
salaries from 20s. to £3 per week and immediate engagement is offered on an 
amount of cash, varying from £10 to £50, being lodged in the hands of the 
employer as security, to be returned on either party wishing to discontinue the 
engagement. An agreement is drawn up, and… the defrauding advertiser gives a 
receipt for the money advanced thereby making the affair a debt transaction and 
escaping the punishment the law provides for obtaining money under false 
pretences24. 
 
                                                        
23 Greig (1992), p. 81. 
24 Greig (1992) p. 96. 
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The mutual trade protection movement flourished throughout the nineteenth 
century in Great Britain as one source of acquiring credit information on customers. In 
1848 the National Association of Trade Protection Societies (NATPS) was created, which, 
by 1939 counted some seventy societies. However, from the last years of the nineteenth 
century, and later with the outbreak of World War II, the rapid changes in information 
technologies and the advent of profit-seeking, centralised credit reporting agencies, the 
movement lost in influence and gradually eroded. In the United States these kind of 
organisation did not evolve, most likely because of the differences in geography and the 
derived high mobility of its population25.  
 
2.4. Consumer and Business Credit Information Sharing in the First Half of 
the Nineteenth Century: Mercantile Houses in the United Kingdom and 
the Emergence of the First Rating Systems based on Personal and 
Business Characteristics. 
 
In the early nineteenth century, businesses in the United States could rely on letters 
of recommendation for information on the creditworthiness of their commercial partners 
given the small-scale nature of the existing trade credit exchanges. Recommenders could be 
either local or distant business partners (suppliers) with whom a borrower had performed 
some transaction in the past, and who therefore possessed sufficient knowledge about the 
customer’s past payment behaviour. This method based on personal ties, which early 
nineteenth century American merchants relied upon, was characterized by a long-term 
business relationship; in other words, the men with which trade was performed were 
personally very well known to either the creditor or the recommender26. Recommenders 
could also be, although less frequently, “respectable members of his or her community”, 
such as lawyers or bankers 27  because of their personal knowledge of the customer in 
question. However, lawyers and bankers, by nature, could only have knowledge of people 
limited to the locality in which they performed their activities. This information is thus 
dependent upon the proximity of personal ties. Their influence as providers of credit 
information can be thus traced to the beginning of the nineteenth century, which started to 
deteriorate from the 1820s, when the United States commercial activity, and therefore the 
volume of trade credit, was rapidly increasing.  
 
                                                        
25 See Olegario (2001) and Sylla (2001). 
26 It is worth noting that this kind method of obtaining credit information was also very familiar in the United Kingdom 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
27 Olegario (2001). 
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As it could be inferred, the geographical scope of trade credit was also expanding, 
which created the necessity to obtain better credit information on a growing number of 
potential and existing customers, operating in very distant territories, which in turn made 
the prevailing system of letters of recommendation inadequate and in many cases, of 
unreliable content. One solution to this problem was the hiring of agents by the concerned 
businessmen seeking credit information28; these agents had the task to travel to a particular, 
or even various places, in order to acquire information on the standing of the businesses of 
potential and existing business partners. Nevertheless, as this was a very costly way of 
obtaining information, it was restricted to very large firms only. Some business houses in 
the United States explored the possibility of relying on travelling salesmen to acquire credit 
information on distant customers in an effort to develop more formal methods as a 
solution to their lack of knowledge. However, as reported by Madison (1974), the main 
problem related to this method of knowledge about distant customers was the fact that 
these travelling men, too eager to expand their trade through the extension of credit, 
provided biased reports thus impairing the quality of their reports. 
 
In the United Kingdom, in order to obtain credit information, large mercantile 
houses also used the method consisting of hiring local agents since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. However, their role was not confined to the national sphere; houses 
such as Baring Brothers and Company, given the prominently international scope of their 
activities, hired agents to conduct credit investigations on their American business partners, 
given the magnitude of trade and finance carried out with the United States. Furthermore, 
given the fact that the City of London had acquired the first position in the world as the 
most advanced and sophisticated money and financial centre by the end of the Napoleonic 
wars (Dickson, 1967), mercantile and banking houses saw their business greatly expanded 
especially with North American associates. Therefore, as in the United Sates, the methods 
of personal ties and letters of recommendation for acquiring credit information became 
insufficient to provide an accurate portrait of creditworthiness in a very rapidly changing 
economic and financial environment with a fast growing number of correspondents whom 
these houses made business with. 
 
After 1826 the financing of trade and marketing American bonds became one of 
the most important activities of the merchant bankers, and even if this activity was clearly 
dominated by Baring Brothers and Company, competition was relatively important and 
increasing among eight main houses: Wiggin and Company, Wildes and Company, Wilson 
                                                        
28 This practice was common not only in the United States, but also in the United Kingdom. 
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and Company, W. and J. Brown and Company, Morrison, Cryder and Company, N. M. 
Rothschild and Sons, and Baring Brothers and Company. Success in business depended 
therefore upon the acquisition of reliable credit information about their respective 
correspondents. It was thus crucial to gain knowledge on the credit quality of 
correspondents and enterprises, particularly during the boom years of the early 1830’s. It 
was within this historical context, characterized by a competitive environment and a lack of 
institutionalized and reliable forms of credit reporting, that the idea of the appointment of 
an agent with the sole responsibility of providing accurate and unbiased credit information 
emerged. As one might expect, this system was very high in cost and only the large 
merchant houses could afford it. In 1829, Baring Brothers and Company in the United 
Kingdom innovated with the appointment of an agent whose only task was to provide 
them with accurate reports on their American correspondents. 
 
As shall be discussed, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, the acquisition of 
information on credit worthiness was a very problematic issue, as one of the most valuable 
sources of information we know today – payment histories – were not available in the case 
of individuals. Also, in the first half of the nineteenth century credit information sharing 
devices were reduced to mutual protection societies, where only members had access to 
information on obligors that did not pay their debts on a regular basis. Financial statements 
were also very hard to obtain, and, when available, these were unreliable in content because 
they were rarely audited and there existed no formal accounting principles to respect. 
Moreover, given the highly competitive environment where the large merchant bankers 
evolved, making a direct request to individuals for information on their own current credit 
standing or financial information, was notably problematic because potential or existent 
obligors could well be offended and go to a direct competitor of the merchant house in 
question who could provide credit without the need of additional financial information.  
 
Hidy (1939) provides one of the most useful sources with regard to the practical 
aspects of the acquisition of credit information by the large merchant houses in the first 
half of the nineteenth century. As he explains, unable to obtain information in the form of 
hard data, obligees were compelled to use qualitative information as their primary input to 
assess creditworthiness, and the most easily obtainable proxy was businessmen’s character. 
In the specific case of Baring Brothers and Company, systematic knowledge of the status 
of correspondents was judged in accordance with the following principles: “… a 
correspondent to be reliable must be an accurate judge of the currents of business, must be 
intensely interested in and devoted to his business operations, must have a capital adequate 
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to his transactions, must be prudent, and above all must be thoroughly honest. Although a 
large capital was an attractive attribute of a correspondent, the personal integrity of the 
leading partner or director of the firm was of greater importance. Prudence and integrity 
were, indeed, the main indices of reliability and trustworthiness.29” This description is of 
considerable importance at the time when Baring Brothers and Company signed a contract 
with Thomas Wren Ward, a retired merchant of Boston (in order to control their business 
through personal information with American correspondents), because it provides us with 
the specific aspects that were taken into consideration when evaluating business 
opportunities in the United Sates.  
 
Ward’s collaboration with Baring Brothers and Company lasted from 1829 to 1853, 
period in which he rated “several thousands” of businessmen of all ranks and types, and 
performed the assessments of existing and potential correspondents regardless of their 
interest in applying for credit with the London house. Being fully aware of the difficulties 
described above for acquiring information, Wren Ward gathered knowledge (through 
private conversations with former correspondents and former business partners) of 
potential clients, and then translated this knowledge into a personal judgement of the 
individual applicant. Most importantly, his work led to one of the first types of credit rating 
systems in the modern sense of this concept, as it can be considered the predecessor of the 
one used by the credit rating agencies today. According to Hidy, the evaluations provided 
by Wren Ward to Baring Brothers and Company included: “the location of the firm, its 
capital, its particular preoccupation (dry goods importing, iron importing, import and 
export commission business, cotton exporting, and so on), its character –whether 
trustworthy and honourable or unreliable, the amount of credit that it was safe to give to it, 
the conditions under which the credit should be given, and any special items that might 
have a bearing upon the business activities of the house.30” Ward then created a system 
consisting of a list of companies to which he assigned a number individually expressing the 
standing of their respective credit conditions, and in 1834, January 1836, and January 1837 
he sent to the London house copies of a list of past, active, and potential clients. Thus 
creating a credit rating system based on a grouping of companies according to their level of 
risk, Ward’s description recalls the ones used by today’s credit rating agencies, and can be 
found in Hidy’s (1939) cited work:  
 
                                                        
29 Hidy (1939), p.82. 
30 Hidy (1939), p. 85 
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“No. 1 Contains the Foreign Houses without regard to character or standing but 
alphabetically arranged; No.2 may be considered as Houses not only entirely safe 
for what they may do, but likely to continue so under any possible circumstances. 
They possess of course different degrees of wealth, but are placed together in this 
list on account of wealth, character and habits of business taken together; No. 3 Is 
composed also of those whom I consider as quite safe and many wealthy, and many 
also of your best correspondents and almost all of the right sort of people, but who 
from the extent or nature of their business or from circumstances not necessary to 
enter into, may not be considered as ranking with those whom I suppose are to 
continue always beyond question; No. 4 Consists of a class many of whom I should 
consider safe and some even comparatively rich, but who from the smallness of 
their transactions, or from their having no abiding place and being abroad as 
Supercargoes would not seem to belong to a class to be trusted much, or at all 
unless through me, and it also contain many whom from their extension or want of 
capital might render it unsafe to trust, but contains few or none whose morals so far 
as we know is exceptionable; No. 5 No trust. This column consists of those who 
either have no capital or are not of that character to render it desirable to trust 
them at all; No. 6 Houses having various connections. Some of whom are safe and even 
wealthy, but dong with others renders it less important to cultivate and more 
important to look after; No. 7 Houses having other connections. Are those contained in 
our numbers, but doing business wholly with others; No. 8 Don’t Know. This class 
contains many whom I have never known and with whom you do not appear to 
have had any active account or been exposed in any way, and of many others of 
whom my imperfect knowledge might rather mislead than be useful. They are 
therefore left to take their chance supposing you will not trust except where you 
may have certain knowledge of your own; No. 9 Failed; No. 10 Dissolved, and some 
failed; No. 11 Dead.” (Hidy, 1939, p. 87-88)  
 
If we take the ex post, realised rate of default by category as the base parameter in 
order to assess the performance of a rating system, we can easily conclude that the system 
pioneered by Baring Brothers and Company was highly effective. The rate of default for 
each number assigned is as follows: Ward noted that for all firms grouped in 1835, only six 
per cent of the firms included in group No. 2 had defaulted in 1843, the percentage of 
defaulted firms until that same year for category No. 3 was nine; and for group No. 4, 
sixteen per cent of firms defaulted. Moreover, these categories show the importance 
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accorded to wealth in general terms, but also to morals and character of the men in charge 
of the companies assessed.  
 
In the United States, very similarly to Baring Brothers and Company, another 
international house, the House of Brown, developed their own credit reports using a 
system comparable to Barings’ in form and efficacy. In effect, thanks in part to the 
accuracy of these reports, even as late as 1857, when the Panic seriously damaged the 
businesses and profitability of the merchant houses, the Browns were able to cope with it 
and suffered very few losses (Perkins, 1973). Similar to the merchant bankers operating in 
the United Kingdom, American firms faced the same kind of problems with regard to the 
acquisition of credit information; payment histories were not available and financial 
information was not reliable in content because of the lack of general accounting standards. 
Additionally, in the nineteenth-century United States, there was not a central authority 
requiring firms to present consolidated annual statements mostly because each state 
possessed their own legislature, and only in a few of them was such legislature successfully 
imposed.  
 
Credit information was therefore obtained through agents or reporters (as in the 
case of the London houses), hired to travel through some parts of the country, where 
creditors might have potential business partners, in order to gather knowledge on rough 
financial information (such as the business principal assets and liabilities 31), but giving 
primary importance to the character of businessmen. However, in the case of the United 
States, the ways through which credit information was acquired were somewhat less formal 
that in the United Kingdom in the first half of the nineteenth century (at least until the 
emergence of the American credit reporting agencies in 1841 with the opening of the 
Mercantile Agency in New York); the principal sources were direct interviews with 
potential or existing customers when possible, the business and financial press, county and 
state tax and property records, and, in many cases, even through local gossip. 
 
An example of a report from the 1850’s is reproduced here in order to provide a 
clear portrait of the information gathered on a particular business:  
 
Jones, Smith, & Brown 
Alfred Jones, John Smith, Wm. Brown, Gen’l Dealers. 
                                                        
31 Financial information as understood in modern times, such as measures of cash-flows, profits, costs, etc., was not 
available.  
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“J” is about 50 years old, and a merchant at this place for 20 years, during which 
time he has been doing a good business, and has made money, never failed, is of 
good character, and a shrewd business man, Is now estimated worth about $25,000, 
of which $5,000 is in unencumbered real estate. He does a legitimate business, and 
never ventures into rash speculations. “S” and “B” are each about 35 years old, and 
smart business men. “S” had been in business and failed, settled honorably, acted as 
clerk, for “J” for two or three years, and was admitted a partner some two years 
since, paying in $5,000 in cash, principally a gift from his father, who is well off. 
“B” has been a clerk in the house about four years, and a good and popular one, is 
just admitted a partner, but does not add any capital. They continue to do a good 
business, are in good credit, and worthy of it32. 
 
2.5. The Emergence of the First General Profit-seeking Organisations for the 
Provision of Credit Information in the United States: Credit Reporting 
Agencies and the Systematic Assessment of Risk based on Personal and 
Business Characteristics. 
 
As previously discussed, mutual societies for the protection of trade were 
organisations originated in the United Kingdom that exchanged credit information only 
between their members and were characterised by their non-profit seeking nature. In the 
United States, this kind of information sharing device could not be established most likely 
because of the vast geographical differences existing between the two countries. 
Nevertheless, the size of the American territory, combined with the rapid increase in the 
mobility of resources that characterized the United Sates from the 1830s required an 
information sharing system other than the informal exchange of letters of recommendation 
that had prevailed in an economy in which trade took place in very limited geographic 
areas. As trade was performed between distant suppliers and customers, the system of 
acquiring credit information through personal knowledge no longer sufficed; therefore, the 
necessity for “information on suppliers and customers of whom a businessperson had no 
knowledge increased” 33 . In effect, a rapidly growing population along with the rapid 
increase in the construction of canals and railroads and the considerable expansion of the 
volume of trade, especially in the antebellum years, made the need for knowledge about 
distant and unknown customers, a primary concern for merchants.  
                                                        
32 Elijah W. Morgan, correspondence with American Collecting Agency. Morgan Family Papers, ca. 1830-1900, Box 1, 
Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor. In Olegario (2001), p. 17. 
33 Sylla (2001), p. 7. 
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International banking houses, such as the House of Brown, hired agents in order to 
obtain credit information on existing and potential customers, but as discussed earlier, the 
costs derived from this method were considerable, and only the largest investment and 
merchant houses could afford it. In order to satisfy this somewhat more sophisticated 
credit information need of small and medium firms (with insufficient means to pay a 
private agent) realising trade credit, a new form of organisation appeared for the first time 
in the United States in 1841: the credit reporting agency. Since its inception, American 
credit reporting agencies, unlike British mutual societies for the protection of trade, were 
profit-seeking organisations that provided credit information to every credit grantor that 
requested it in exchange of a constant amount of money. Credit reporting agencies adopted 
a centralised structure with branches in various parts of the country providing the central 
office with credit reports from businesses operating in their respective area and, at the 
same time, supplying local credit grantors with information requested on customers from 
the region. This structure reflected the specific needs of the United States stemming from 
its vast geographical area and the high mobility of its resources in the nineteenth century.  
 
It is evident that, since the years preceding the American Civil War, the old 
informal system of acquiring credit information through personal ties was not only 
imperfect but also inadequate to the rapidly evolving business needs; as reported by James 
Madison in a 1974 article “The inadequacy of existing methods of gaining credit 
information was demonstrated during the economic crisis of the 1830s and the early 1840s, 
when many merchants discovered that their earlier trust in some of their customers had 
been ill-founded. At the same time, rapid changes in the financial condition of individual 
businessmen made clear the need for more up-to-date information.34” There is an extensive 
literature on the history of the first American credit reporting agency, the Mercantile 
Agency, started in 1841 by Lewis Tappan, a New York dry goods and silk merchant; 
however, the difference with the present study is that the latter inserts the development of 
the methods for gaining credit information, by this and other credit reporting agencies, 
within a historical context that aims primarily to explain the evolution of information 
sharing devices in the nineteenth century in the United States and the United Kingdom.  
 
Although the Mercantile Agency was the first centralised, profit-seeking agency to 
innovate in the field of providing credit information to businesses in the United States, the 
Bradstreet Agency, founded in 1849, can also be considered as one of the initiators of the 
                                                        
34 Madison (1974), p. 166. 
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credit reporting movement in the nineteenth-century America. Both evolved in the same 
developing business environment and both (competing agencies) tried to cover the 
deficiencies in the existing information reporting methods used at the time. But financial 
problems after 1865 prevented the Bradstreet Agency from developing as fast as the 
Mercantile Agency until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when it became a serious 
challenger to Dun’s leadership35. Moreover, it is worth noting that Tappan’s solution to the 
problem of acquiring reliable credit information can be interpreted as a reaction to the 
Panic of 1837, a crisis generated by a cascade of defaulted debt, and to the emerging new 
business conditions in the United States in the antebellum years; indeed, the initiator of the 
Mercantile industry was one of the many businessman affected by the unreliability of extant 
traditional methods for gaining credit information: as a wholesaler and a partner in a dry 
goods house in New York, he experienced first-hand the difficulty to obtain reliable 
information on his customers.  
 
Given that Lewis Tappan already possessed credit information on many of his own 
customers, and that he knew the value of this information for many a business at the time, 
the solution he proposed consisted on the creation of an agency operating on a national 
scale and able to collect information on all sorts of potential recipients of credit in order to 
sell it to wholesalers and all sorts of grantors of credit interested in this kind of 
information. The method used to obtain credit information recalls the one used in the early 
nineteenth century by the large London houses; merchants, bank cashiers, newspaper 
editors, postmasters and, especially lawyers were hired as correspondents (agents) on a local 
basis in order to take advantage of their constant access to credit-relevant information 
about businessmen living in their towns and villages across the country. They submitted 
reports to the central office, located in New York, in the case of the Mercantile Agency 
once a year. These reports contained basically the occupation of the subject, a 
parsimonious estimate of his assets, as well as a status of his business. Moreover, similarly 
to Wren Ward’s reports for Baring Brothers and Company, the character of the subjects 
was a very relevant question in the analysis of creditworthiness in many of the reports 
addressed to the agencies. As a contemporary account explains:  
 
“Hence the main object with the agency is, to furnish the home standing of the 
merchant obtained from intelligent and reliable sources, there. . . . There, and only 
there, can [w]e learn whether he owns property, and is a man of good character—
                                                        
35 The Mercantile Agency adopted different names; as Madison (1974) reports, it was known as Lewis Tappan & Co. 
(1841-1849), Tappan & Douglas (1854-1859), and R. G. Dun & Co. (1859-1933). See also Dun and Bradstreet (1966). 
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whether he does a legitimate or a speculative business—and whether he is 
competent, steady, and attentive, or otherwise.36” 
 
Adding to the information on the character of the businessman, his assets and the 
state of his business, additional information on marital status, family background, age, 
former residence, and business experience was usually included by the correspondents in 
their reports. In order to give an example of a typical report, we reproduce one written in 
1846 on a Cincinnati dry goods merchant:  
 
“A self-made man, age ab[ou]t 50, marr[ie]d, mem[ber] of Ch[urch] & in bus[iness] 
n[ea]r 20 y[ea]rs, owns R[eal] E[state] w[orth] $20m unincumb[ere]d, tho[ugh]t to be 
a g[oo]d bus[iness]man, maintain his standing, in g[oo]d cr[edit], & consid[ere]d 
g[oo]d.37”  
 
What was the aim of these reports? As Josh Lauer accurately reports: “At a 
fundamental level, these reports served just two purposes, both of which were predictive: 
estimating the individual's chance of success in business, and gauging the likelihood of 
securing repayment, particularly in the event of failure. Toward this end, the key 
information was encapsulated in what would later be formalized as the "three C's" of credit 
reporting: character, capacity, and capital.38” 
 
In fact, there was not uncommon for correspondents to send reports to the central 
offices that contained only the individual’s general reputation within the town or village in 
which he lived. The problem with this kind of information was that, as the reporters were 
not directly paid for their services by the agencies, in the beginning, there was the 
perception that the reports could be inaccurate and somewhat biased by informal practices 
such as rumours and even gossip circulating among people of doubtful motivations39. As 
can be observed from the example, even very general past payment behaviour 
commentaries of the individual in question were absent in the reports and the information 
provided is more anecdotal in nature than systematically obtained. This problem in gaining 
accurate credit information by the early agencies was the result of their hiring part-time 
agents that were not directly paid; in effect, the agents were compensated within a scheme 
                                                        
36 "The Mercantile Agency," Hunt's Merchant's Magazine, 24 January 1851, 47–48. In Lauer (2008), p. 309. 
37 Dun Credit Ledgers, Ohio, Vol.78, p. 59, Dun & Bradstreet Collection (Baker Library, Graduate School of Business 
Administration, Harvard University). In Madison (1974), p. 167. 
38 Lauer (2008), p. 309. 
39 See Atherton (1946). In fact firms such as Baring Brothers and Company in London and Brown Brothers continued to 
rely on their own credit ratings. Additionally, some firms in the east of the United States preferred to continue to rely on 
their members or employees for estimates of the financial status of customers. 
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consisting of the mutual provision of services with the credit reporting agencies. In the case 
of lawyers, the agencies used to direct their subscribers’ debt collection business in 
exchange for information on the credit subjects. As to the newspaper editors, their 
compensation amounted to the agencies’ contribution in obtaining subscriptions and 
advertisements for the local newspaper. Other types of compensation discussed by Rowena 
Olegario include “recommending their correspondents as agents for insurance and 
steamship companies” and forwarding “requests from firms looking for representatives to 
sell their stock to the public”, in the case of lawyers and bankers respectively 40 . This 
compensation schemes were dependent upon the accuracy and timeliness of the reports 
provided by the agents, and undoubtedly contributed to the development of the early 
agencies, nonetheless, these could hardly verify ex ante the precision of the information 
contained in such documents.  
 
There were in fact numerous critiques to the insufficient coverage across the 
country as well as the incompleteness of the credit information that added to the early 
mistrust from the general business population (Wyatt-Brown, 1966). Therefore, the 
elevated cost in reputational capital for the agencies in cases where the veracity of the 
reports was proven deficient, made them undertake gradual improvements in their 
methods for gaining credit information. First of all, they introduced full-time, paid 
reporters from the years preceding and during the Civil War, and, as discussed by Madison, 
by the 1870s, the majority of agents operating in major cities were already full-time 
employees. At the same time, this direct contact with the employees allowed the agencies 
(in particular R. G. Dun & Co.) to have an enhanced control over the methods used to 
collect information and the necessary training for the reporters. Full-time paid reporters in 
larger cities were divided according to their areas of specialty; each reporter was in charge 
of a particular field of trade in order to optimize the quality of the reports through their 
abilities to assess the creditworthiness of those subjects and firms involved. Moreover, hard 
financial data evenly supplanted pure personal opinions on the character of businessmen: 
from the 1970s reporters not only asked specific questions about the business, but also 
required company balance sheets or financial statements through pre-printed forms 
prepared by the agencies. Reporters were trained to rely less on anecdotal forms of 
acquiring credit information and more on hard financial data from a variety of sources 
including personal interviews with businessmen. Finally, where inconsistencies were 
identified in the reports of the remaining part-time agents, still present in small towns and 
                                                        
40 Olegario (2001),p. 15. See also Olegario (2000). 
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villages, full-time reporters were in charge of corroborating the information, which 
enhanced the quality of the documents as well as the reputation of the agency. 
 
With regard to the dissemination of credit information, credit reporting agencies 
also gradually adopted new approaches in order to enhance quality. Initially, a subscriber 
requesting information on a potential customer used to call at the agency’s offices in order 
to have the credit report read aloud by a clerk, but later, the agencies opened branches in 
different cities in order to decentralise the dissemination of information and divide it by 
geographical areas. Additionally, in 1857, the Bradstreet agency innovated with the 
publication of a Reference Book containing all the credit information on individual 
businesses; the Mercantile Agency followed only two years later. In this way, subscribers 
could use this book whenever they needed it without having to recur constantly to direct 
communication with the agencies’ offices. However, the problem with the reference books 
was that they were published on an annual basis, and therefore, in the course of the year, 
changes in the standing of the credit conditions of potential customers resulted in outdated 
information. Branches of the agencies were thus used in order to solve this problem: 
reporters submitted updated credit information to their respective local offices and these 
branches were in charge to copy and transmit the information to the central office. 
Subscribers were thus able to get updated credit reports for a particular subject just by 
calling to their local branch, which was responsible for a specific trade region and to which 
reporters in the area provided with the solicited information.  
 
This system was not perfect as this network system worked very well only for 
subscribers seeking information about customers located in the same city or town; those 
subscribers established in a city other than the one in which the central office was located, 
and who were seeking information for distant customers, had to make the request and wait 
for the central office to coordinate the transmission of information between the concerned 
areas. The delays resulting from this network structure were indeed the object of criticisms 
from subscribers. It was not until the 1850s, when the telegraph was well established within 
the agencies’ communications that the solution to this problem commenced to emerge. 
Later, the use of the typewriter in the 1870s greatly facilitated the task. Overall, the role in 
the dissemination of credit information by the American reporting agencies was crucial in 
the development of new methods both in the United Sates and the United Kingdom, the 
latter starting the process with mutual societies and the hiring of agents to collect 
information, and the former establishing centralised profit-seeking reporting agencies with 
new methods of dissemination and collection of information. 
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2.6. Credit Information on Corporations and Securities in the Second Half of 
the Nineteenth Century in the United States and the United Kingdom: 
the Assessment of Risk based on Specialized Publications and Statistics. 
 
In modern times it is possible to assess the creditworthiness of individuals as well 
as businesses through scoring models based on an analysis of payment histories as well as 
financial and accounting data. These models are used on a proprietary basis by profit-
seeking providers of credit information such as Callcredit and Experian in the United 
Kingdom; Dun & Bradstreet, or Fair, Isaac and Company in the United States; and 
Equifax, operating in both countries. The informational input, from which an assessment 
on the creditworthiness is derived, is acquired by these agencies through lenders willing to 
share their payment records with them. In this way, business debtors can access the credit 
assessments on any potential business or new customer that allows them to make a lending 
decision based on the likelihood of timely payment. The scoring models are most useful to 
businesses that receive large numbers of applications as they have the potential to identify 
different levels of risk through fine gradations and ultimately make prudent and adequate 
decisions based upon their desired degree of risk. However, scoring models are a relatively 
recent development in credit information analysis; in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, it was very difficult to obtain reliable credit information on individuals as well as 
businesses. Individual payment histories were not available and the accuracy of financial 
information was very doubtful given the lack of regulated practice. Furthermore, many 
times creditors would not ask for these sources of information directly because of the 
possibility that the new customer take offense and go to another house more willing to 
provide credit without requiring this kind of information. Not surprisingly, adverse 
selection was a constant problem, which was compounded by the high degree of 
competition in both the United States and the United Kingdom. 
 
Similarly, investors willing to buy debt from an enterprise in the form of securities 
had to make assessments of its creditworthiness and were therefore confronted with the 
problem of the quality of the available information. In fact, one of the main obstacles to 
the development of public securities markets in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom in the nineteenth century was the information asymmetry between the 
corporations offering debt securities and the investors in possession of the resources to 
buy them. The history of the development of public securities markets is also the history of 
the methods used in order to acquire information on the creditworthiness of corporations 
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and thus overcome the existing information asymmetries. In order to have a better 
understanding of the evolution of credit information in the nineteenth century it is very 
important to present a brief historical context that includes the nature of the trading of 
debt as well as the associated informational issues. The first organized (although informal) 
form of trade in securities markets took place in the trade of government issues, and after 
1720 it became the primary activity of the coffee shops in the City of London41. It was 
during the eighteenth century that securities markets grew considerably in size and 
importance in Europe and the United States. Stock exchanges emerged as increasingly 
organized markets for the trade of securities, which continued to be mostly dominated by 
government issues in both sides of the Atlantic.  
 
In Europe, governments used debt to finance military conflicts and in the United 
States, to finance their war of independence as well as the Civil War. According to Niall 
Ferguson, Britain was the first country in Europe capable of generating enough balance of 
payments surpluses “to allow sustained capital export42” and by 1815 the British Empire’s 
foundations were based on an increasing amount of international lending. At the time, 
sovereigns were already conscious of the fact that they needed to gain and maintain the 
confidence of investors if they wanted their issues to be successful. Therefore, with some 
exceptions, they refrained from cancelling their obligations unilaterally or failing to make 
interest payments when they were due. The creditworthiness of sovereign borrowers was 
thus based more on the “belief” of investors on the trustworthy or safe nature of 
government debt than on the analysis of information collected on the state of the country’s 
finances or other kind of credit assessments. For instance, since 1749, date when the 
British government consolidated its debt into one single issue, known as consols, these 
could be easily bought and sold in the securities market, as investors were more and more 
attracted to them because of the timely payments of principal and interest from the British 
government through time (past payment history). As suggested by Michie (2006) “with the 
British government consistently honouring its debts and interest payments, investors were 
attracted to transferable securities whose value was directly or indirectly dependent on 
government payments.43”  
 
Besides this easily observable measure of the creditworthiness of sovereign 
borrowers, there was also the perception, from the investors’ side, that governments with 
                                                        
41 The informal trade in sovereign debt was formalized as early as 1802 with the establishment of the London Stock 
Exchange. 
42 Ferguson (1998) p. 680. 
43 P. 43. 
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representative forms of government were more likely to honour their obligations than 
absolutist ones. This observation was first brought by Ferguson (1998) and used by Sylla 
(2001) in order to explain how the bond market provided an incentive two centuries ago, 
for governments to become responsible and representative, and concludes that “As more 
countries in Europe and around the world, adopted constitutions and representative forms 
of government during the nineteenth century, the international bond market grew in scale 
and scope. But it was for the most part a market in sovereign debt”. In Ferguson’s words, 
“a constitutional monarchy was seen in London as a better credit-risk than a neo-absolutist 
regime”44. The securities market of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the 
nineteenth century was indeed dominated by government debt and there was little progress 
made in the use of the bond markets by joint-stock companies to obtain funds. First of all, 
the securities market was almost exclusively used in order to fund wars or projects that 
required an initially vast amount of capital, like railways, canals or public utilities. Second, it 
seems that the safety and liquidity that characterised government issues was enough to 
satisfy demand from investors through long-term transferable securities. Third, most of 
joint-stock firms did not require large initial amounts of capital; they could be financed 
through traditional bank loans or even pools of funds stemming from the firm’s associates 
or family members. Fourth, investment in joint-stock companies was perceived as more 
risky due to the unproved nature of the enterprise in question and the lack of information 
regarding the prospects of profit and therefore the creditworthiness of the borrower.  
 
In the United States, before the war of Independence, the majority of securities 
traded were short-term bonds issued by individual states whereas businesses did not yet use 
transferable shares or bonds issues in order to obtain the funds they needed. Those 
Americans with excess of capital looking for remunerative investments used to buy 
securities in London, where securities markets were better organized and therefore safer to 
invest in. Clearly, a domestic securities market started to develop more rapidly in the 1780s 
with the war for independence through increased state borrowing. But even if the volume 
of issued securities by governments and firms increased considerably in this period, the 
organization of the market remained very precarious and most brokers entered the business 
as a part-time activity rather than a full-time profession with the degree of specialization 
achieved in the United Kingdom. One example of this is the fact that even after the war of 
independence, the United States government issued debt in Amsterdam to acquire the 
funds needed to finance war-related costs instead of using domestic markets. 
 
                                                        
44 Ferguson (1998) in Sylla (2001), p. 6. 
Chapter 2: The Evolution of Credit Information Sharing and Risk Assessment in the US and the UK 39 
In the nineteenth century, especially in the second half, both the development and 
use of the concept of limited liability and the very large amounts of capital needed to build 
railroads and canals considerably stimulated the trade of securities of business corporations 
in the United Kingdom and the United States. However, the financing needs of the latter 
were the largest because of the geographic scale. Prior to the middle of the century, railroad 
corporations were relatively small in size and were therefore capable of fulfilling their 
financial needs through banks credit and stock issues. From the 1850s, however, railroad 
corporations rapidly expanded in size covering unsettled and undeveloped territories, 
which required large amounts of capital that could not be provided anymore by traditional 
sources of finance such as bank loans. Additionally, the scale of capital required for 
railroads (for the Western railroads in particular) exceeded by far the wealth of private 
individuals. Only pubic debt issues were judged as capable of fulfilling the vast funding 
needs of the firms operating on a national scale, but as the railroads corporations covered 
now very distant cities and towns, investors very rarely knew, or possessed information on 
the firm allowing them to assess their creditworthiness.  
 
In the case of these new forms of corporation, where the also largest London 
merchant bankers invested considerable amounts (especially in the finance of North 
American trade and the marketing of American bonds since the 1800’s45) accounting and 
financial information was very hard to obtain. As Henry Varnum Poor points out in the 
preface to his History of the Canals and Railroads of North America, even as late as 186046, 
the state of the information on railroad and canal corporations can be generalized to most 
of the corporate sector regardless of the industry: “There is not in this country as in most 
others, a central point at which the more important companies are either domiciled, or at 
which all are required to present annual statements of their affairs, for the reason that they 
derive their existence and powers from the legislatures of the several States. In a few States 
only, is such duty imposed. Where it is, it is often neglected, no penalty being suffered 
thereby. It is not uncommon for leading companies to publish no reports whatever. Some 
make them unwillingly, with no design to convey information upon the subject to which 
they relate. Reports that are full and explicit are accessible only to a small number of parties 
interested. Fewer still have the means of comparing results for consecutive years, without 
which it is impossible to form a correct opinion as to the manner in which a work has been 
conducted, or of its present or prospective value… 47 ” This description of corporate 
                                                        
45 For a discussion on the amounts and sources of foreign capital in the nineteenth century in the United States, see 
Davies and Cull (1994), p. 10-49, and on British foreign investments, Edelstein (1982). 
46 Date when the first edition of the History of the Railroads and Canals of the United States of America appeared.  
47 Poor (1970), preface. 
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reporting says much about its general state until the end of nineteenth-century America and 
provides an explanation of the reasons for the poor quality of information on 
creditworthiness and the search for new and more effective methods of acquiring it in 
order to make informed investments.  
 
In this context, it is worth noting that railroads were the first regulated enterprises, 
but it was not until 1887 that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) promulgated 
formal and uniform accounting standards in the United States. Given that railroad 
corporations were the first to apply accounting standards, it is evident that manufacturing 
corporations took even longer to develop the practice of disclosure of accounting 
information, and that the content of their reports was neither reliable nor complete 
throughout the nineteenth century, which impacted considerably the ways in which 
creditors (investors) acquired credit information. As early as 1869, the New York Stock 
Exchange tried to regulate disclosure of financial information (in order to reduce 
information asymmetries and enhance its reputation for quality) for all the companies 
traded there through the adoption of an official policy requiring annual financial reports. 
Nevertheless, this rule was rarely respected “to the extent that in 1885 the Unlisted 
Department was created for firms providing no information. 48 ” This department 
disappeared in 1910, but it was not until 1926 that almost every company listed in the New 
York Stock Exchange disclosed audited annual financial reports. In the United Kingdom 
the standards of public disclosure required to enterprises were more developed: the 
Companies Act of 1844 required directors of corporations to make up a complete balance 
sheet, which in turn had to be approved by auditors, one of whom (at least) was usually 
elected by the shareholders. And as discussed by Barron Baskin, “the Italians may have 
invented double entry bookkeeping, but it was the British who invented modern financial 
reporting.” Moreover, financial collapses such as the one suffered by the Bank of Glasgow 
in 1878 propelled regulation through compulsory edicts49.  
 
With regard to this very issue, the existing asymmetries in the development of the 
disclosure of financial information in the second half of the nineteenth century between 
the United Sates and the United Kingdom, Davis and Gallman (2001) bring to our 
attention that “the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange recognized that 
savers were concerned about the problem of asymmetric information, and that if the 
Exchange were to flourish, it must provide signals of quality and reputation. They adopted 
                                                        
48 Barron Baskin (1988), p. 228. See also Michie (1987), p. 206-208. 
49 Barron Baskin (1988), p. 228. 
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appropriate signalling policies. In England, such concerns had been largely alleviated 
among a substantial class of saver by the 1870s, although they may still have affected the 
typical investors’ choice of securities. Not only was the number of savers who were willing 
to invest in paper assets increasing and the scope of their portfolios broadening, but the 
British investor had also become more venturesome…50” This difference in the level of 
dissemination of financial information between the two countries provides a partial but 
powerful explanation to the faster development of American reporting methods of gaining 
credit information as well as the emergence of credit rating agencies such as Standard and 
Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch, in the United Sates only.  
 
It is within this context that one can find one of the first and most fundamental 
methods of gaining information on railroad and industrial corporations creditworthiness in 
the late nineteenth-century America: through the specialized business and financial press. 
The United States was characterised by a rapidly growing demand for business and trade 
information at the time; there were therefore many periodicals published in order to satisfy 
this demand. These publications providing business information can be roughly divided 
into four types: the industrial, the commercial, the agricultural, and the scientific journals. 
However, industrial railroad journals received particular attention from the investors’ 
community given the rapid expansion of railroads corporations and their vast capital 
requirements. As discussed, investors needed a reliable source of information on the 
creditworthiness of corporations issuing debt in the form of bonds and its importance was 
compounded by the lack of knowledge of firms given the considerable geographical scale 
of their operations, so these publications proved to be very useful in carrying successfully 
that the task of dissemination. During the 1850s four periodicals provided a good deal of 
information on railroads: Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine, United States Economist, Bankers’ 
Magazine and The American Railroad Journal.  
 
In the beginning these publications included technical engineering information and 
statistics, and only gradually information relevant to businessmen interested in the business 
and commercial aspects of the industry was included. Railroad journalism in Europe, and 
especially in the United Kingdom, had already more sophisticated means of exchanging 
information on the technical side as well as on the business and financial aspect of 
railroads. In the United Kingdom, the engineering societies, the Institution of Civil 
Engineers and the Society of Mechanical Engineers were highly effective channels of 
communication for technical matters regarding the railroad industry, and the Railway 
                                                        
50 P. 154. 
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Magazine, founded in 1843, “concerned itself primarily with defending the railroads from 
the attacks of canal and turnpike operators, property owners and conservative-minded 
persons throughout the Kingdom.51” And the British periodical Railway Times, a successful 
publication founded as early as 1837, provided financial information only, and was widely 
consulted by investors buying railway bonds. Moreover, by the mid-1840s, when railroad 
construction reached its peak, a half dozen railroad journals were being published in the 
United Kingdom. In the United States, “the editor of the American Railroad Journal 52 , 
watching the success of the British financial papers, decided that his paper should follow 
suit… He told his readers that the time had come for the publication of a weekly paper 
concerned with the management and financial affairs of American railroads.53” However, 
the idea revealed itself premature, as the business of investing on railroad debt was yet to 
expand in the subsequent decades.  
 
It was not until 1849, when Henry Varnum Poor became the editor 54  of The 
American Railroad Journal, that the paper gradually started to appeal to the American 
investors’ community and successfully became a widely consulted financial tool that 
included systematic information on the property of railroads, their assets and liabilities, and 
earnings. And as reported by Richard Sylla, “after the American Civil War, Poor and his 
son started a firm to publish Poor’s Manual of the Railroads of the United States, an annual 
volume that first appeared in 1868, ” which reported financial and operating statistics 
covering several years for most of the major American railroads55. By the turn of the 
century, another American businessman, John Moody, who is credit with being the founder 
of the bond rating business, focused also on railroads as well as industrial corporations in 
general and published in 1900 the Manual of Industrial Statistics which provided information 
on stocks and bonds of financial institutions, government bonds, manufacturing, mining, 
utilities, and food companies. This publication did not contain credit ratings yet but had a 
considerable success because of the information asymmetries characterising the market at 
the time. Given the already mature state of railroad companies, the continental scale of the 
industry and the lack of useful information on railroad firms by the end of the nineteenth 
century, John Moody reports in his autobiography, “A high percentage of corporation 
securities had to be bought on faith rather than knowledge… Somebody, sooner or later 
                                                        
51 Chandler (1956), p. 40. 
52 Founded in 1832. 
53 Chandler (1956), p. 40. 
54 Henry Varnum Poor’s editorship of The American Railroad Journal lasted from 1849 to 1962. 
55 Sylla (2001), p. 9. 
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will bring out an industrial statistical manual, and when it comes it will be a gold mine. Why 
not do it myself?56” 
 
2.7. Conclusion.  
 
Information plays a fundamental role, both with regard to the granting of credit 
and its pricing. In modern days, there are various methods to judge on the creditworthiness 
of individuals, businesses, and fixed-income instruments. Credit scoring models are the 
prevailing tools used in order to assess the creditworthiness of the various financial actors. 
Scoring models utilise payment histories, accounting data, financial statements, and even 
non-financial information as their primary inputs to assess the ability of existing and 
potential recipients of credit to make timely payments of contracted financial obligations. 
Credit grantors obtain credit information through information sharing devices, such as 
credit rating agencies or credit reporting agencies, whose main role is to gather relevant 
knowledge and distribute it to subscribers of their services. The output frequently takes the 
form of ordinal scales of creditworthiness or written reports that allow credit grantors to 
make informed business decisions.  
 
However, this kind of credit information, whose collection is now facilitated by the 
willingness of obligors as well of obligees to voluntarily share it, was not easily obtainable 
in the nineteenth century in the United Kingdom and in the United States, where credit 
experimented a very fast expansion due to the exponential growth of trade stemming from 
the Industrial Revolution and later with the development of public corporations issuing 
debt in the form of securities. The methods of gaining information used to assess 
creditworthiness developed according to the historical business context in both countries. 
As payment histories were not available, and financial information was neither reliable nor 
complete, credit grantors innovated in the methods for gaining information susceptible to 
provide them with reliable credit assessments.  
 
The present study divided credit information into three main categories that 
interacted in the nineteenth century and contributed to the evolution of credit information 
in both countries: consumer credit information, trade credit information and information 
on corporations and securities. The nature of this choice of categorisation is not fortuitous, 
as it traces the historical interrelations and therefore their contributions to the development 
                                                        
56 Moody (1933), p. 90. 
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of credit information sharing. Moreover, the study presented a comprehensive analysis, 
through a historical approach, of the different aspects of the evolution of this subject, 
unlike most works focused on descriptive accounts of the history of a credit entity. The 
first form of institutionalised credit sharing was the (non-profit) mutual society for the 
protection of trade in the UK, which shared information only between the members 
concerning the names and the activities of fraudsters in a specific area through periodic 
reunions. Large international merchant banking houses in the United Kingdom innovated 
with a method consisting of the hiring of an agent in charge of collecting information on 
individuals as well as businesses throughout the United Kingdom but also overseas. 
 
As the London banks invested large amounts in American trade, bonds of 
corporations and railroads, and given the lack of data on payment histories and the 
incompleteness and unreliability of financial statements (when available), their agents used 
to gather credit information on potential and existing clients through the collection of 
information mainly on the owner’s assets, and personal aptitudes for the business or 
character. Baring Brothers and Company, under the aegis of its American agent, created one 
of the first credit rating assessments. American bankers later adopted these techniques of 
gaining relevant credit information. However, as can be inferred, hiring private agents was 
very costly and could be afforded only by the largest banking houses. Now the rapid 
expansion of credit in the United States and the United Kingdom, and the fast growth of 
corporate railroads operating on a national scale (especially in the case of the United States, 
were business was carried out with very distant and thus unknown customers), necessitated 
more timely and accurate credit information than the letters of recommendation that were 
used in the first decades of the nineteenth century.  
 
The creation of credit reporting agencies was the solution to the problems of 
asymmetric information as well as to the cost issue; economies of scale stemmed from this 
system that allowed the dissemination of information among every business or person 
subscribed to the service. Moreover, the innovative network structure used to gather and 
provide credit information to subscribers gradually solved the problem of timeliness and 
organisation of large databases. The emergence of this highly effective credit information 
sharing system in the United States can be explained through the geographical differences 
between the two countries but most importantly, it originated in the differences in the 
development of the techniques and regulations regarding financial disclosure. In effect, in 
the United Kingdom both the regulation and the practice of financial disclosure were more 
developed than in the United States in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the vast capital 
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needs of the rapidly flourishing railroad corporations and the national scale of their 
operations, promoted both enhanced financial disclosure though regulations and new 
methods for gaining credit information in the United States. It is not surprising therefore 
that the editors of two of the most important business and financial newspapers in the 
United States are credited with the invention of one of the most influential forms of credit 
information sharing devices in modern times: the credit rating agencies. 
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3. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 
3.1. Sample Selection 
 
The main database for the study is composed of 23,218 observations for a total of 
3,020 non-financial publicly quoted companies, which makes an average of around 7.6 
annual observations per company. The period covered by the observations in the database 
ranges from 1980 to 2011, which yields a total of 32 years taking 1980 into account. 
  
The available accounting data was taken from Datastream and Thomson One 
Banker (Worldscope); the macroeconomic variables were collected from Datastream; and 
the market variables were constructed merging the information available from Datastream, 
the London Share Price Database and Worldscope. Market information was added to the 
companies that were found in the Thomson One Banker database. The latter database was 
chosen because of its wide access to both academics and practitioners in risk management, 
as the present study looks to present results that can be easily replicated by both groups, 
avoiding thus the availability issues of databases and variables provided by private data 
firms (such as credit rating agencies) to very specific academic studies (some of them 
provided on a one-time basis) that could prove difficult to replicate for a professional risk 
manager, for instance. The merging of the accounting and market variables in one database 
resulted in fewer firms having both complete market-based time-series than accounting 
information. Additionally, the present thesis provides evidence of the usefulness of the 
inclusion of industry effects in financial distress/bankruptcy prediction logit models: The 
nine-sector57 industry classification employed for the analysis is based on four-digit United 
Kingdom Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes taken from the Thomson One 
Banker (Worldscope) database.  
 
Due to the existence of extreme values of variables for some observations in most 
databases (that could significantly alter the results of the analysis), the present study uses, 
for the first time in a corporate default prediction model, the hyperbolic tangent 
transformation (tanh transformation) to provide a satisfactory solution to this recurrent 
issue in preference to the frequently used technique of windsorising58 the outliers in a 
                                                        
57 Firms belonging to the ‘Finance, insurance and real estate sector’ were excluded from the analysis. 
58 The setting of all outliers to a specific percentile of the data. For instance, they typical 90% Winsorisation would set all 
the data below the 5th percentile to the value located in the 5th percentile. Similarly, all of the data above the 95th percentile 
would be set equal to the value located in the 95th percentile.  
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dataset. The hyperbolic function tanh(x) has been used and tested in robust signalling 
processing as well as in statistical estimation, and it has been shown to be very useful to 
decrease the effect of extreme values of a specific variable. It has been demonstrated that 
outlying cases can lead to abnormally large residuals and have an atypical impact on the 
fitted maximum likelihood linear predictors resulting from binary logistic regression 
models. Thus, the failure to effectively treat outliers could lead to a critical 
misrepresentation of the validity of the inferences drawn from the models.  The real line 
can be mapped for a range of [-1, 1], and where x possesses a small value, then tanh(x)  x. 
Thus, ‘with appropriate scaling, TANH can be used to provide a linear transformation for 
input values in the neighbourhood of ‘expected’ values while reducing values that are 
outside the expected range.’ (Godfrey, 2009, p. 1).  
 
3.2. Variable Definitions. 
 
From the database, consisting of 130 variables in total, several accounting, 
macroeconomic, and market variables were tested. The final variable selection is reported 
below. The selection method relied on previously reported results, theoretical propositions 
and empirical assessments. The data was subject to a rigorous cleaning and testing process 
and a novel approach for dealing with outlying observations was adopted. Using both 
univariate and multivariate (logit) procedures considerable experimentation was undertaken 
to arrive at the final choice of regressors. The variable selection included four accounting 
ratios: Total Funds from Operations to Total Liabilities, Total Liabilities to Total Assets, 
the No Credit Interval, and Interest Coverage; two macroeconomic variables: the Short-
Term Bill Rate (inflation-adjusted or deflated), and the Retail Price Index (base 100).  Five 
market variables were found to considerably increase the prediction accuracy of the model: 
the firm’s stock price, the company’s yearly abnormal returns, the lagged standard deviation 
of individual security residual returns, the firm’s size relative to the total size of the FTSE 
All-Share market value, and the ratio Market Capitalisation over Total Debt.  
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3.2.1. Accounting Ratios 
Identifier Ratio Definition 
TFOTL Total Funds from Operations 
to Total Liabilities 
Performance measure. This ratio is intended to 
show the extent to which a company is able to 
generate funds from its operations to meet its 
financial obligations. Total Funds from 
Operations represents the sum of net income 
and all non-cash charges or credits; it is the cash 
flow of the firm. Total Liabilities, is composed 
of all short and long-term liabilities acquired by 
the company.  
TLTA Total Liabilities to Total 
Assets 
Leverage measure. The ratio is commonly used 
to measure a firm’s financial leverage by 
calculating the proportion of the company’s 
assets that have been financed using short and 
long-term debt. Total Liabilities is composed of 
all short and long term liabilities acquired by a 
company. Total Assets of industrial firms, is the 
addition of total current assets, long-term 
receivables, investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, other investments, net property 
plant and equipment and other assets. 
NOCREDINT No Credit Interval Liquidity measure. It is an estimate of the length 
of time that a company could finance the 
expenses of its business, at its current level of 
activity, by drawing on its own liquid resources 
and on the assumption that it made no further 
sales. Formula: (Quick assets minus Current 
liabilities) / (Daily operating expenses). Where 
Quick Assets represent the assets that can be 
quickly and easily converted into cash or are 
already in cash form. The formula employed to 
calculate Quick assets is Current Assets minus 
Inventories. Similarly, Daily operating expenses 
are equal to (Sales minus Earnings Before 
Interest and Taxes minus Depreciation) / 365. 
COVERAGE Interest Coverage The ratio measures a firm’s ability to pay interest 
on outstanding debt. The ratio was calculated by 
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dividing Earnings before interest, taxes and 
depreciation (EBITDA) 59  by the variable 
Interest charges or Interest expense on debt that 
represents the service charge for the use of 
capital before the reduction for interest 
capitalized. 
 
3.2.2. Macroeconomic Variables.  
Identifier Variable Definition 
RPI Retail Price Index Inflation measure. An average measure of 
change in the prices of goods and services 
bought for the purpose of consumption by the 
vast majority of the households in the UK. 
SHTBRDEF United Kingdom Short Term 
(3-month) Treasury Bill Rate 
Deflated 
Proxy for interest rates. Treasury Bills are 
defined as ‘bearer Government Securities 
representing a charge on the Consolidated Fund 
of the UK issued in minimum denominations of 
£5,000 at a discount to their face value for any 
period not exceeding one year60. 
 
3.2.3. Market Variables. 
Identifier Variable Definition 
PRICE The firm’s equity price The price per share traded. Last recorded 
transaction price of value for the trading 
instrument. Real-time or delayed based on user's 
entitlements. 
ABNRET The lagged cumulative 
security residual return 
Each firm’s past residual return61 in year t was 
calculated as the cumulative monthly return of 
the twelve months prior to the year where the 
default event was observed, minus the FTSE All 
                                                        
59  EBITDA measures the earnings of a firm before interest expense, income taxes and depreciation. Worldscope 
calculates EBITDA by taking the pre-tax income and adding back interest expense on debt and depreciation, depletion 
and amortization and subtracting interest capitalized. 
60 Definition taken from Datastream, Thomson Financial. 
61  In order to calculate residual/abnormal returns, firms’ individual returns are employed as the main input. The 
investment return can be defined as the total gain or loss on an investment over a given period of time. The return 
incorporates the change in the asset’s values plus any cash distributions (dividends or interest payments). The specific 
Datastream datatype used in the present study is the Total Return Index (RI) which shows ‘a theoretical growth in value 
of a shareholding over a specific period, assuming that dividends are reinvested to purchase additional units of an equity 
or unit trust at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date.’  
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Share Index cumulative monthly return for the 
same period (t-1). 
IDYRISK The lagged standard deviation 
of individual security residual 
returns 
Volatility measure. Each firm’s idiosyncratic 
standard deviation of each firm’s stock returns 
was estimated by regressing (employing a linear 
regression) each stock’s monthly returns in year 
t-1 on the FTSE All Share Index cumulative 
monthly return for the same period which 
corresponds to the year prior to the observation 
of the event of default. The idiosyncratic risk of 
the firm is the standard deviation of the residual 
of this regression. 
SIZE The size of the company The size of the company measured by its market 
capitalisation relative to the total size of the 
FTSE All Share Index (in order to make size 
static). It was calculated as the logarithm of each 
firm’s size relative to the total market value of 
the FTSE All Share Index. 
MCTD Market Capitalisation to Total 
Debt 
Market capitalization (or market cap) is the total 
value of the issued shares of a publicly traded 
company; it is equal to the share price times the 
number of shares outstanding. Total Debt is 
equal to all interest bearing and capitalised lease 
obligations. It is the sum of long and short term 
debt. 
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3.3. Descriptive statistics.  
 
3.3.1. Annual Distribution of Outcomes.  
Table 3-1 displays summary statistics for the time series distribution of the three types 
of outcomes investigated throughout the thesis: Non-financial distress (NFD), Financial 
distress (DIS), and Corporate failure (FAI). The entire sample is composed of 23,218 
observations from 1980 to 2011. The advantage of the sample is that it is composed of the 
maximum amount of companies for which data was available, approximating thus the real 
proportion of outcomes in the United Kingdom.  
 
Table 3-1 Distribution of Outcomes Per Year 
This table reports summary statistics for the distribution of 
observations per year for the entire sample from 1980 to 
2011. NFD stands for Non-financially distressed firms, DIS 
for firms in a state of financial distress, and FAI indicates 
those firms classified as failed companies.  
Year NFD DIS FAI 
1980 54 0 0 
1981 64 0 0 
1982 76 0 0 
1983 84 0 0 
1984 106 0 0 
1985 123 0 0 
1986 138 0 0 
1987 210 0 0 
1988 331 0 0 
1989 410 1 1 
1990 464 6 3 
1991 491 10 12 
1992 488 16 4 
1993 505 8 7 
1994 519 7 4 
1995 524 8 6 
1996 646 6 10 
1997 695 5 12 
1998 641 13 18 
1999 610 11 16 
2000 627 9 26 
2001 980 23 32 
2002 1296 75 18 
2003 1389 71 12 
2004 1539 29 18 
2005 1599 56 25 
2006 1587 76 26 
2007 1491 94 53 
2008 1343 149 34 
2009 1254 117 31 
2010 1199 60 11 
2011 481 19 6 
Total 21964 869 385 
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A firm is classified as DIS when it files for bankruptcy when it meets both of the 
following conditions: i) its earnings before interest and taxes depreciation and amortisation 
(EBITDA) are lower than its financial expenses for two consecutive years, and ii) there is a 
negative growth of its market value for two consecutive periods. A firm is classified as FAI 
when its status in the 2012 LSPD is defined as: suspended, in liquidation or voluntary 
liquidation, when its quotation has been suspended for more than three years, when the 
firm is being held by a receiver (in receivership), in administration or in administrative 
receivership, or when there has been a cancellation or suspension of the firm62. 
 
 
Table 3-2 Summary Statistics of Annual Observations. Financially Distressed,  Not 
Financially Distressed and Failed Firms 
Panel A reports summary statistics for the entire sample. NFD stands for Non-financially distressed 
firms, DIS for firms in a state of financial distress, and FAI indicates those firms classified as failed 
companies.  
Panel A: Classification of annual observations into Non-financially distressed, Financially 
distressed, and Failed companies. 
Response Freq. Per cent Cumulative Freq. Cumulative Per cent 
NFD 21964 94.60 21964 94.60 
DIS 869 3.74 22833 98.34 
FAI 385 1.66 23218 100.00 
 
 
Among the total number of observations (23,218), there are 21,964 firm-years 
classified as non-financially distressed/failed companies, 869 firm-years identified as 
financially distressed, and 385 firms classified as failed. As Table 5-1 shows, the percentage 
of non-financially distressed/failed companies is 94.6, while that of financially distressed 
firm-years and failed companies is equal to 3.74 and 1.66, respectively. 
 
3.3.2. Time series presentations of the macroeconomic measures and the number of corporate 
failure/financial distress observations.  
Figures 3-1 and Figure 3-2 report the time series on an annual basis of the 
macroeconomic measures employed throughout the thesis relative to the number of 
corporate failure/financial distress observations. The first figure displays, on the primary 
vertical axis, the respective number of outcomes relative to the first macroeconomic 
                                                        
62 The LSPD numbers and definitions in the database are: 6) Suspension / cancellation with shares acquired later. 
Meanwhile, may be treated under rule 163/2; 7) Liquidation (usually valueless but there may be liquidation payments; 10) 
Quotation suspended – if suspended for more than three years, this may lead to automatic cancellation; 11) Voluntary 
liquidation, where value remains, and was / is being distributed; 16) Receiver appointed / liquidation. Probably valueless 
but not yet certain; 20) In Administration / Administrative receivership; 21) Cancellation and assumed valueless or 
suspended but assumed valueless. 
Chapter 3: Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 53 
measure included in the models developed in the thesis, which is intended to be a proxy for 
inflation: the Retail Price Index (on the secondary vertical axis). The second figure, on the 
other hand, reflects the number of observations relative to the second macroeconomic 
variable included in the models: the UK 91-day Bill Rate. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Financial Distress/Failure & thre Retail Price Index 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2 Financial Distress Failure & the 3-Month UK Bill Rate 
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4. The Role of Accounting, Market and 
Macroeconomic Variables for the Prediction of 
Corporate Default among Listed Companies 
 
4.1. Introduction. 
 
Credit risk measurement has evolved dramatically over the last 30 years; new 
statistical techniques have been developed and new variables have been tested in response 
to various developments worldwide. The literature concerned with the prediction of default 
of corporations is very extensive. However, the need to build more accurate and timely 
default prediction models has been systematically highlighted in the academic literature and 
emphasised by recent developments that directly affect the practice of credit risk 
management. Inter alia, the main general developments that justify the continuous need for 
research in the field of default prediction are: the marked increase in the riskiness of firms 
from 1997 onwards, as measured by ‘z-score’ analysis, both in the United Kingdom and 
abroad; the growing concerns about a credit crisis contagion effect caused by recent efforts 
to encourage investment by keeping very low levels of interest rates in the global economy 
(especially after the credit crisis of 2007); the application of Basel II, under which banks are 
allowed to use internal measures of credit risk based on ratings in order to set capital 
charges; the explosive growth in the credit derivatives market and off-balance sheet 
instruments with inherent default risk exposure; a decrease in the margins on loans caused 
by more intense competition between banks; and the declining value of real assets 
(collateral) in many markets, including those of developed and sophisticated financial 
economies. 
 
In response to these developments, and their now global effects on very diverse 
financial systems, a large array of solutions have been proposed to alleviate their potentially 
negative effects. The majority and the most useful solutions advanced by academics as well 
as practitioners to this situation are to be found in the field of default/distress prediction 
models. New and more sophisticated credit-scoring models as well as early warning 
systems have been created, more powerful predictors (variables) have been included 
resulting in more accurate forecasts and prognosis, whose usefulness for practitioners has 
been considerably enhanced. It is worth noting that 30 to 40 years ago, many financial 
institutions and bankers still relied in what Altman and Saunders (1998) and Lauer (2008) 
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refer to as the 4 “C’s” of credit in order to make a (subjective) judgement on the granting 
of credit: Character (individuals’ work habits, reputation and personal life); Capital (assets, 
liabilities, and leverage) Capacity (experience in business, history of successes and failures, 
volatility of earnings); and Collateral. 
 
Nowadays, with the development of statistical techniques, more reliable than 
human judgement63, new models concerned with the measuring of credit concentration risk 
have emerged (see Bennett (1984) and Altman and Kao (1992)), which estimate transition 
probabilities through Markovian stable and unstable models), as opposed to estimating the 
credit risk of individual loans to firms. More recently, the use of new methodologies 
focusing on the application of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) to loans and fixed income 
instruments has been translated into research works applying macro econometric models of 
national economies (the U.S., more specifically) in order to generate future possible states 
of the world, thus SIC sector loan payoffs, or loss rates (Chrinko and Guill (1991)). 
Moreover, the estimation of the risk of financial instruments is acquiring an increasingly 
important place in the academic literature; examples of this are: the measurement of 
portfolio risk of fixed income securities and of off-balance sheet instruments64 as well as 
credit risk derivatives (Brewer and Koppenhaver (1992), Jagtiani et al. (1995)), and new 
models that aim to price credit risk. Furthermore, the Basel Capital Accord (Basel II)65, 
initially published in June 2004 (whose main objective is the creation of an international 
standard that can be used by national regulators when establishing capital requirements for 
banks in order to guard against financial and operational risks), has emerged as another 
catalyst for the continuation and development of more accurate and more refined failure 
prediction models for the corporate as well as retail sectors of banks’ lending portfolios. 
 
 This paper contributes to the academic literature in several ways. First, we motivate 
and introduce a new default prediction model for quoted companies in the United 
Kingdom. This model employs a definition of corporate failure based on Christidis and 
Gregory (2010) and uses all available information in the London Share Price Database 
(LSPD) 2012. In order to clearly separate all companies in the database into two 
populations, as required by models with a dichotomous dependent variable such dynamic 
logit models, the present study follows Christidis and Gregory (2010) and defines as failed 
                                                        
63 There is an extensive literature suggesting that a statistical model usually outperform specialists (see Keasey and Watson 
(1987), Keasey and Watson (1991), Dawes and Corrigan (1974), Houghton and Sengupta (1984)).  
64 The development and use of off-balance sheet instruments in the last 30 years is perhaps one of the most dramatic 
developments. For a detailed survey of the evolution, see Saunders (1997). 
65 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004). 
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those firms that are liquidated, in receivership or suspended from quotation. In this way, 
we are providing an objective criterion (indicating why the security ceased to be quoted in 
the SEDOL) that can be objectively dated, and that is therefore valuable for practical 
purposes. A wider, ex ante approach is employed, in order to detect financial distress with a 
high degree of reliability that could be useful to practitioners to avert the high costs 
associated with a bankruptcy filing. Secondly, employing a multi-level empirical procedure 
this study details a corporate default prediction model that, with a carefully selected vector 
of variable chosen based on theory and intuition, exhibit high classification and predictive 
accuracy compares well to previous research works and limits type 1 and 2 errors. Third, 
and perhaps most importantly, the study tests, for the first time in default prediction 
models for public companies in the United Kingdom, the relative contributions (individual 
as well as collective) of three typed of variables: financial ratios, macroeconomic indicators, 
and market variables. 
 
 The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the literature 
that is relevant to our modelling approach. The database and measures of the outcome 
variable and set of explanatory variables are described. The estimation methodology is 
discussed along with analysis, results and conclusions. 
 
4.2. Review of the Literature.  
 
The present study develops a new default prediction model for quoted companies 
in the UK that is based upon the types of death presented in the London Share Price 
Database. As in most of the previous default prediction models for quoted companies in 
the United States that employ a definition of the criterion event that is contingent upon its 
ultimate legal consequence (bankruptcy), the present study uses a technical or legal 
definition of corporate failure that reflects the ‘most extreme forms of financial distress66’: 
liquidation, receivership, suspension and cancellation. Our choice of the criterion event is 
justified by the fact that it constitutes a highly visible legal event that can be objectively 
dated (Keasey and Watson, 1991). There are, however, as noted by Agarwal and Taffler 
(2007), events other than the ones employed in the present study (liquidation, receivership, 
suspension and cancellation), such as capital reconstructions (involving loan write-downs 
and debt equity swaps or equivalent), acquisitions, major closures, and forced disposals of 
large parts of a firm (to repay its bankers) that result in loss to creditors and/or 
                                                        
66 The term in quotes is borrowed from Christidis and Gregory (2010), ‘Some New Models for Financial Distress 
Prediction in the UK.’ Xfi – Centre for Finance and Investment and Discussion Paper no: 10/04, p. 6.  
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shareholders and can therefore be considered as proxies for failure. Evidently, there are 
some drawbacks of the definition of corporate failure used in this study, which will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapter, nevertheless, the present definition of the 
criterion event has a practical use for the estimation of the likelihood of default using 
binary choice models that require that the populations of failing and non-failing firms be 
‘well defined and clearly separated from each other.67’ Moreover, similar to Agarwal and 
Taffler (2007), we have decided to work exclusively with firm insolvencies68 ‘on the basis 
that these are clean measures’ of corporate failure. Finally, most of the previous default 
prediction studies in the United Kingdom take the change in the juridical situation as the 
moment of default (e.g. the Taffler (1983) UK-based z-score model).  
 
Thus, a firm is classified as in default when its LSPD (2012) status is equal to any of 
the following definitions (that indicate the reason why the security ceased to be quoted in 
the SEDOL): 6) Suspension / cancellation with shares acquired later. Meanwhile, may be 
treated under rule 163/2; 7) Liquidation (usually valueless but there may be liquidation 
payments; 10) Quotation suspended – if suspended for more than three years, this may lead 
to automatic cancellation; 11) Voluntary liquidation, where value remains, and was / is 
being distributed; 16) Receiver appointed / liquidation. Probably valueless but not yet 
certain; 20) In Administration / Administrative receivership; 21) Cancellation and assumed 
valueless or suspended but assumed valueless. In addition, the present analysis also tracks 
the specific date when each one of these events occurs. 
 
Previous research has also tested the ability of market variables to predict 
bankruptcy employing methodologies such as the Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton 
(1974) contingent claims or option based approach. Bharath and Shumway (2008), 
Hillegeist et al. (2004), Reisz and Perlich (2007), and Vassalou and Xing (2004) are some of 
the research works that have employed the contingent claims approach to estimate the 
likelihood of corporate failure. Many efforts have been carried out to demonstrate the 
superiority of market-based models over accounting-based models and vice versa. 
However, the results obtained from these models (that entail numerous restrictive 
assumptions 69 ) and the subsequent performance comparisons with accounting-based 
models have been controversial. In a recent paper, Agarwal and Taffler (2008) perform a 
                                                        
67 Balcaen and Ooghe (2004), p. 21. 
68 Administration, receivership, creditors’ voluntary liquidation. 
69 The underlying assumptions of the theoretical Merton-Black-Scholes option-pricing model are, according to Saunders 
and Allen (2002) and Agarwal and Taffler (2008): normality of stock returns, and the existence of a single zero coupon 
loan (it does not distinguish between different types of loans), for instance.  
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comparison of market-based and accounting-based bankruptcy prediction models, and find 
that traditional models based on financial ratios are not inferior to KMV-type, option-
based models for credit risk assessment purposes. They conclude that, ‘in terms of 
predictive accuracy, there is little difference between the market-based and accounting 
models. 70 ’ Hillegeist et al. (2004) provide contrasting results indicating that the Black-
Scholes-Merton option-pricing model provides significantly more information about the 
probability of bankruptcy that do either the Altman’s Z-score or the Ohlson O-score.  
 
To this point, the default prediction literature is characterised by a competing 
approach, where there is a clear division line between market and accounting variables. 
Hillegeist et al. (2004),71 for instance, recommend that researchers use the Black-Scholes-
Merton methodology instead of the traditional accounting-based measures as a proxy for 
the probability of bankruptcy. Nevertheless, despite the relative comparisons in 
performance of the competing approaches, the fact that both yield not too dissimilar 
results suggests that both contain useful information about firms’ likelihood of 
default/financial distress. Furthermore, the individual characteristics of each type of 
variable (market and accounting) offer additional support for the development of a 
comprehensive model that test whether they are able to enhance its performance (therefore 
acting as complements) when they are included in the same equation.  
 
Financial information has been used in the majority of classic models in order to 
predict failure. Balcaen and Ooghe (2004) cite the objectivity and availability as the main 
reasons for the use of financial ratios. More importantly, as failure is not a sudden event 
but rather the conclusion of several years of poor, negative performance, then financial 
accounts should be useful to detect and predict corporate failure (Agarwal and Taffler, 
2008). However, concerns about the reliability of accounting information suggest that it 
might not give a fair and true view of companies undermining thus its usefulness as a 
predictor of failure: creative accounting practices and window dressing might be used 
especially when firms are in a state of financial distress or near failure. This is one of the 
reasons why, even if the double entry system of accounting has diminished the risk of 
manipulation of accounts, it is still recommended that default prediction models include 
other types of variables 72 : ‘if researchers only include financial ratios into their failure 
prediction model, they implicitly assume that all relevant failure or success indicators – 
                                                        
70 P. 1550. 
71 P. 28. 
72 Argenti (1976), Zavgren (1985), Keasey and Watson (1987), and more recently Maltz et al. (2003) offer support for the 
inclusion of non-financial variables to default prediction models. 
Chapter 4: The Role of Accounting, Market and Macroeconomic Variables in Corporate Default Prediction Models 59 
both internal and external- are reflected in the annual accounts.73’ It is clear that financial 
statements do not include all the information that is relevant to the prediction of financial 
distress, and market variables are very likely to complement this deficiency. 
 
Rees (1995) suggests that market prices might be a useful predictor for the 
probability of bankruptcy as they include information on future expected cash flows. For 
Hillegesit et al. (2004) the stock market is an alternative source of information because it 
contains information from other sources in addition to the financial statements. Beaver et 
al. (2005) indicate that a probability of bankruptcy is embedded in market prices, even 
though this probability might not be directly extracted: ‘as the probability of bankruptcy 
increases the non-linear nature of the payoff function for common stock becomes 
increasingly more important because of risky debt and limited liability.’ Clearly the 
inclusion of market-based variables is appealing on several grounds: first, market prices 
reflect the information contained in accounting statements plus other information not in 
the accounting statements (Agarwal and Taffler, 2008), making them a comprehensive mix 
potentially useful for the prediction of corporate default. Second, the inclusion of market-
based variables can considerably increase the timeliness of prediction models, as discussed 
by Keasey and Watson (1991); while financial accounts are available in the United 
Kingdom on a quarterly basis, at best (prior research have used annual data 
conventionally), market prices are available on a daily basis. Third, market prices might be 
more appropriate to predict bankruptcy, as they reflect future expected cash flows 
(accounting statements, in contrast, reflect the past performance of the firm). And fourth, 
market-based variables can provide a direct assessment of volatility, a measure that could 
be a powerful predictor of bankruptcy risk and that is not contained in financial statements. 
According to Beaver et al. (2005) the notion is that the greater the volatility, the higher the 
probability of bankruptcy.  
 
Among the few studies that include a set of market variables to enhance the 
timeliness and power of default prediction models is Campbell et al. (2008), whose analysis 
examines the determinants of failure as well as the pricing of financially distressed stocks 
with a high probability of failure through a logit model that includes accounting and market 
variables. In addition to a set of two accounting variables, several market variables are 
tested: the monthly log excess return on each firm’s equity relative to the S&P 500 index, 
the standard deviation of each firm’s daily stock return over the past three months, the 
relative size of each firm measured as the log ratio of its market capitalisation to that of the 
                                                        
73 Balcaen and Ooghe (2004), p. 35. 
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S&P 500 index, and the firm’s log price per share truncated above at $15. The estimates of 
the study are computed with United States data for public companies.  
 
Similarly, Chava and Jarrow (2004) test in their analysis, in addition to the Altman’s 
(1968) accounting variables, the variables included in Shumway (2001): the accounting 
variables net income to total assets and total liabilities to total assets; and the market 
variables: relative size defined as the natural logarithm of the firm’s equity value in relation 
to the total NYSE/AMEX market equity value, yearly excess returns calculated as the 
firm’s cumulative monthly return minus the value-weighed CRSP NYSE/AMEX monthly 
index return, and the stock’s volatility computed as the standard deviation using the last 
sixty observable daily market prices. In Shumway (2001) the same market variables are 
tested in a bankruptcy prediction model with some minor variations, namely the 
idiosyncratic standard deviation of each firm’s stock returns, whose value is computed by 
regressing each stock’s monthly returns on the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX index return 
for the same period (year). More recently, Christidis and Gregory (2010) follow Campbell 
et al. (2008) and test three market variables in a distress prediction model for UK quoted 
companies that includes also a set of accounting variables. As to the market variables, they 
replace book value of assets with market values and test whether log semi-annual excess 
returns over the FTSE All Share Index and firm stock returns’ standard deviation 
(calculated over a six-month period) can enhance the predictive power of the model. Their 
findings suggest that market values have the ability to increase the accuracy of the distress 
prediction model. 
 
The incorporation of time variant data into credit risk models that captures changes 
in the macroeconomic environment is important in two main respects. First it adds a 
dynamic element to the models that acts to adjust risk scores (likelihood of insolvency) in 
relation to changing macroeconomic conditions. Second such models would have a built-in 
facility to stress test PD estimates across the portfolio. There are few studies that have 
incorporated a macro-dependent hazard into the equations (Nam et al, 2008; Qu, 2008 and 
Mare, 2012). In this paper we control for macro conditions, inflation and interest rate 
changes, over the sample period. 
 
In the next section we discuss the main methodologies used to predict corporate 
default in previous research works. 
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4.3. Default Prediction Methodologies. 
 
In the extensive literature concerned with the prediction of failure, the role of the 
methodologies and statistical techniques cannot be overemphasized. During the last 40 
years, many authors have applied a great variety of statistical techniques in order to 
reconcile the nature of the problem (e.g., probabilities of default; discriminant analysis, to 
compare a firm’s current financial profile with that of previously failed/distressed or non-
failed/non-distressed firms) with the available mathematical tools. The purpose of these 
efforts has been to find a combination capable of yielding the most accurate and reliable 
(stable) predictions regarding the conditions of a firm in a given period of time.  
 
The first works in this area developed univariate and multivariate models and used 
a set of financial ratios. The Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968) papers are considered to be 
the seminal works respectively. The univariate methodology utilizes various key accounting 
ratios of corporations that are perceived as separating defaulted from non-defaulted firms. 
The ratios are computed and then compared to historically derived benchmarks in order to 
differentiate the profiles of the two groups of firms. As can be inferred, the assumption 
underlying the use of sets of accounting ratios is that, there is, if not proportionate74, a clear 
relationship between the two variables whose ratio is calculated.  In this regard, McDonald 
and Morris (1984), through an empirical analysis, provide evidence suggesting that 
traditional ratio analysis is able to capture the relationships between financial variables, 
outperforming Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) alternatives (with respect to residual variance 
and distributional tests) when applied to a homogeneous industry sample. Beaver (1966) 
constructed a symmetric matched sample consisting of 158 firms (79 failed and 79 non-
failed), and analysed 14 financial ratios using a dichotomous classification test in order to 
determine the potential errors of a classification of firms in these two groups based on 
individual financial ratios. He provides evidence suggesting that a number of indicators can 
effectively discriminate between matched samples of the two groups for as long as five 
years prior to failure. The ratios recognized as having the best potential to predict failure 
were profitability, liquidity, and solvency.  
 
However, as the nature of the study clearly suggests, and as Altman (1968) would 
show later, the empirical application of these results for assessing default potential of firms 
is questionable from a theoretical as well as an empirical point of view. In effect, one of the 
                                                        
74 For a discussion on the “proportionality assumption” in the relationship between the 2 variables that conform a ratio, 
see Whittington (1980) and Keasey and Watson (1991). 
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main problems with the univariate methodology is that special importance is placed on 
individual signs as predictors of distress, when in reality, the negative implications of a 
particular ratio could be tempered or even offset by a particular strength measured by the 
analysis of another ratio studied individually.  
 
A potential solution to the inconsistency problem of Beaver’s univariate analysis 
was provided by Altman (1968), who used a multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) 
methodology as primary tool of analysis. The MDA technique is used to classify an 
observation (in this case a firm) into one of various pre-defined groupings, dependent upon 
the observation’s individual characteristics. Altman utilised MDA to classify and make 
predictions of a qualitative dependent variable: failed or non-failed. He analysed a 
symmetric sample of 66 manufacturing firms (33 failed and 33 non-failed) for the period 
1946-1965, and selected 5 ratios (from a list of 22 potentially useful ratios) as the most 
appropriate for predicting corporate bankruptcy: Liquidity, profitability, leverage, solvency 
and activity. The use of the MDA technique has the advantage of taking into account the 
entire range of ratios (as an entire profile of characteristics) common to the firms in 
question, as well as the interactions among them, unlike the univariate analysis, who 
evaluates the ratios one at a time. Another advantage of the MDA methodology in general 
is that it reduces the space dimensionality to G-1 dimensions, where G equals the number 
of pre-defined groups. In the case of the “failed/non-failed” distinction (G=2) it yields the 
simplest form of analysis: one dimension, which considerably simplifies the analysis in 
question.  Furthermore, the resulting Z-score can assign weights to the variables such that 
the “between-groups” variance is maximized relative to the “within group” variance.  
 
Following the seminal paper of Altman (1968) a very large number of studies have 
used MDA to address default/distress prediction problems. Among the most influential we 
can cite the following75: Deakin (1972), Edmister (1972), Blum (1974), Eisenbeis (1977), 
Taffler and Tisshaw (1977), Altman et al. (1977), Micha (1984), Gombola et al. (1987), 
Lussier (1995), Altman et al. (2005). Overall, these research works have yield high levels of 
discriminative accuracy with regard to the classification of firms in one of the two groups 
(failed or non-failed), but it is not certain if this automatically translates into the same levels 
of predictive accuracy, as discussed by Keasey and Watson (1991). In fact, in a strict sense, 
a model based on MDA cannot be considered as a prediction, although, in practice, as 
discussed by Blum (1974), when a firm is classified as pertaining to the failing group 
because it most resembles the failing firms in the next year (when the characteristics of the 
                                                        
75 For a list of papers using MDA methodology, see Altman and Sabato (2007) and Altman et al. (2010).  
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failing sample are measured in year t+1), this result is interpreted as a prediction that the 
firm will fail in year t+1. In Agarwal and Taffler’s (2007) words: “testing models only on 
the basis of how well they classify failed firms is not the same as true ex ante prediction 
tests.” (p. 288).  
 
The MDA methodology has been widely used in the credit risk measurement 
literature, which implies that there are some straightforward advantages in terms of 
availability and modelling, however, since the seminal paper of Ohlson (1980), logit models 
have acquired an important place in academic studies mostly because, theoretically, they 
can provide a solution to some technical issues related to the application of MDA 
techniques to the prediction of corporate failure/distress. First, with the MDA, individual 
estimation of the significance (relative weight) of the model’s variables is not possible. 
MDA yields standardized coefficients that cannot be interpreted like the slopes of a 
regression equation. In other words, the coefficients do not indicate the relative importance 
of the variables. Second, as previously discussed, in essence, the MDA aims to find a linear 
function of accounting variables able to provide the best differentiation between the two 
classification groups (failed and non-failed), which requires an analysis of the entire set of 
characteristics (variables) in order to maximize the between group variance and minimize 
the within group variance among these variables. However, the underlying assumptions are 
that the independent variables included in the model are multivariate normally distributed76 
and that the group dispersion matrices (variance-covariance matrices) are equal across the 
groups77.  
  
A satisfactory solution to these issues was provided by the use of the logit 
methodology, which does not require the relatively restrictive assumptions of the MDA 
methodology. Moreover, as discussed by Altman et al. (2010), from a statistical point of 
view, “logit regression seems to fit well with the characteristics of the default prediction 
problem, where the dependant variable is binary (default/non-default) and where the 
groups are discrete, non-overlapping and identifiable. The logit model yields a score 
between 0 and 1, which conveniently gives the firm’s probability of default. Lastly, the 
estimated coefficients can be interpreted separately as the importance or significance of 
each of the independent variables in the explanation of the estimated probability of 
default.” Logit methodologies (and probit techniques) use cumulative probability 
distributions to yield a conditional probability of an observation belonging to a category, 
                                                        
76 Although Mardia et al. (1979) suggest that multiple discriminant analysis is still appropriate even when multivariate 
normality is not present. 
77 See Barnes (1982), Karels and Prakash (1987), McLeay and Omar (2000). 
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depending upon the individual variables for the observation in question. The logit 
regression measures the importance of the independent variables through weights so as to 
obtain a score for a given observation, and, unlike MDA methodologies, these weights are 
utilized to maximize the joint probability of failure for the known failed firms and the 
probability of failure for the sound ones. Most importantly, this methodology can provide 
the individual significance of the variables included in the model. Not surprisingly, since 
the end of the 1970s (Martin (1977)), and most importantly from the publication of the 
seminal paper of Ohlson (1980), the logit methodology has been widely utilized in the 
default prediction models literature. The logit methodology has been used in studies both 
of small and large corporations. Among the most influential works in the first category 
(small firms) we can cite the following: Keasey and Watson (1987), Peel and Peel (1987), 
Storey et al. (1987). Among the studies concerned with large firms using the logit 
methodology we can cite: Martin (1977), Ohlson (1980), Mensah (1984), Gentry et al. 
(1985), Zavgren (1985), Platt and Platt (1991), Charitou and Trigeorgis (2000), Becchetti 
and Sierra (2003), Altman et al. (2010). 
 
If there exist some important theoretical (statistical) differences between the MDA 
and the logit techniques, in practice, researchers or practitioners concerned solely with the 
“predictive power” of the model have found only minor variations between the two 
methodologies; Hamer (1983) develops and compares the performance of a linear 
discriminant model, a quadratic discriminant model, and a logit model, using four 
alternative variable sets (on firms which failed from 1966-1975) in each of the five years 
before failure. Her findings strongly suggest that the linear discriminant function and the 
logit model yield comparable results and that, overall, the linear and logit models “predict 
at least as well as the quadratic models.” The misclassification rates range from 20% to 
30% in each of the first three years before failure, the predictive accuracy starting to 
decrease after the fourth year. Lo (1986) compares discriminant analysis and logit analysis 
and shows that if the logit methodology is more robust than discriminant analysis for 
purposes of parameter estimation, both procedures yield consistent estimates under certain 
distributional assumptions, and the discriminant analysis estimator is asymptotically 
efficient.  
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4.4. Outcome Definition and Independent Variable Selection. 
 
4.4.1. Outcome Definition 
 
The promised analysis requires a definition of corporate failure, which can be 
viewed as the outcome of a process. A definition based on Christidis & Gregory (2010) is 
utilised. A firm is classified as failed when it is deemed to have formally defaulted on its 
obligations. The definition of the outcome variable was constructed using the information 
available in the 2012 London Share Price Database (LSPD). A firm is defined as in default 
whenever its status is defined as suspended, in liquidation or voluntary liquidation, when its 
quotation has been suspended for more than three years, when the firm is being held by a 
receiver (in receivership), in administration or in administrative receivership, or when there 
has been a cancellation or suspension of the firm. 
 
Thus, a firm is classified as failed when its LSPD (2012) status is equal to any of the 
following definitions (that indicate the reason why the security ceased to be quoted in the 
SEDOL): 6) Suspension / cancellation with shares acquired later. Meanwhile, may be 
treated under rule 163/2; 7) Liquidation (usually valueless but there may be liquidation 
payments; 10) Quotation suspended – if suspended for more than three years, this may lead 
to automatic cancellation; 11) Voluntary liquidation, where value remains, and was / is 
being distributed; 16) Receiver appointed / liquidation. Probably valueless but not yet 
certain; 20) In Administration / Administrative receivership; 21) Cancellation and assumed 
valueless or suspended but assumed valueless. In addition, the present analysis also tracks 
the specific date when each one of these events occurs. 
 
Table 4-1 presents summary statistics for the 381 failed firms that were classified 
according to the definition of corporate failure in this study using the 2012 LSPD database. 
Of a total of 3,022 individual firms, 381 were classified as failed and 2,641 were classified as 
financially healthy, yielding a proportion of 12.6% of corporate failures relative to the 
number of individual firms. On the other hand, it is also important to calculate the 
proportion of ‘events’ relative to the total number of observations in the sample, to ensure 
that there are ‘enough’ corporate failures to compute accurate estimated event probabilities. 
Using the logit regression in small samples (under about 200) can result in biased logit 
coefficients. Moreover, in rare events data, ‘the biases in probabilities can be substantially 
meaningful with sample sizes in the thousands and are in a predictable direction: estimated 
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event probabilities are too small.’78 In the present study, the proportion of ‘events’ to the 
total number of observations is 1.64%, which is higher than most previous research works 
on the prediction of corporate default. 
 
Table 4-1 Summary Statistics of Corporate Failure of UK Firms. 
This table reports summary statistics for the firms in the last stage of financial distress, corporate 
failure. Obs is the total number of observations (firm-years) in the database, N is the number of 
normal (non-failed) firms, F is the number of failed firms according to the definition below, Total is 
the number of firms in the database, and %F is the proportion (in percentage) of failed firms 
relative to the Total number of firms in the database. The definition of corporate failure (that 
follows the approach of Christidis and Gregory (2010)) was constructed using the information 
available in the 2012 London Share Price Database (LSPD). A firm is classified as failed when its 
status in the 2012 LSPD is defined as: suspended, in liquidation or voluntary liquidation, when its 
quotation has been suspended for more than three years, when the firm is being held by a receiver 
(in receivership), in administration or in administrative receivership, or when there has been a 
cancellation or suspension of the firm79.  
Classification of Failed UK Quoted Companies. 
Obs N F80 Total %F 
23,218 2,641 381 3,022 12.6% 
 
In specifying the models there are two main objectives. First, the intention is to 
build more accurate and timely corporate default prediction models, using data that is 
routinely available. The models are designed to obtain more accurate results compared to 
previous works in the academic field and are constructed with a parsimonious approach 
since they are intended to have practical value. Further, Zmijewski (1984) and more 
recently Pindado et al. (2008) have shown that in fact a large set of variables is not required 
for the models to reach their maximum level of accuracy. Pindado et al. (2008), for 
instance, employ a set of only three accounting variables to reach a high level of accuracy in 
their financial distress prediction model. The variables employed in their study are the 
ratios earnings before interest and taxes over total assets, financial expenses to total assets, 
and retained earnings to total assets, which represent profitability, financial expenses, and 
retained earnings, respectively. Zmijewski (1984) uses a set of accounting variables that 
includes proxies for return on assets, financial leverage, and liquidity. Moreover, in a study 
that intends to investigate the empirical relation between risk of bankruptcy and systematic 
                                                        
78 King and Zeng (2000), p. 2 
79 The LSPD numbers and definitions in the database are: 6) Suspension / cancellation with shares acquired later. 
Meanwhile, may be treated under rule 163/2; 7) Liquidation (usually valueless but there may be liquidation payments; 10) 
Quotation suspended – if suspended for more than three years, this may lead to automatic cancellation; 11) Voluntary 
liquidation, where value remains, and was / is being distributed; 16) Receiver appointed / liquidation. Probably valueless 
but not yet certain; 20) In Administration / Administrative receivership; 21) Cancellation and assumed valueless or 
suspended but assumed valueless. 
80 For the purposes of the analysis, firms classified as failed in the database are assigned a value of 1, and zero otherwise 
according to the date of failure. 
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risk through the construction of a single composite score that reflects the ex-ante 
probability of bankruptcy for a company at a given point in time, Dichev (1998) employs a 
measure derived from exiting accounting models such as the 5-variable Altman (1968) Z-
model, and the 7-variable Ohlson (1980) logit model. 
 
The second objective of the analysis is to test the usefulness of other non-
accounting variables, namely macroeconomic and market variables, with regard to their 
contribution to the accuracy and timeliness of corporate default prediction models for 
quoted companies. We investigate whether macroeconomic and market variables enhance 
the discriminating and predicting power of the models. There have been very few studies 
that analyse the performance of these three kinds of variables in a statistical default 
prediction model. It is deemed important to investigate macroeconomic and market 
variables since the former is potentially useful to act as a complement to the accounting 
variables and the latter adjusts estimated scores in relation to changes in the 
macroeconomic environment and provides the facility to impose stress testing scenarios. 
 
Of course, accounting data can only be obtained on an annual basis, so even if the 
discriminating power of some previous and widely used models (such as the Altman (1968) 
model) is quite high, there is always the risk of the relying on out dated information. 
Furthermore, through a detailed analysis of the ‘most extreme form of financial distress,’ 
corporate failure, the present study shows that the firms that were classified as failed81, stop 
providing accounting data one year on average (14 months) before the actual date of 
failure. 
 
From the database, consisting of 130 variables in total, several accounting, 
macroeconomic, and market variables were tested. The final variable selection is discussed 
in detail below. 
  
                                                        
81 The definition of the response variable was constructed using the information available in the 2012 London Share Price 
Database (LSPD). A firm is defined as failed whenever its status is defined as suspended, in liquidation or voluntary 
liquidation, when its quotation has been suspended for more than three years, when the firm is being held by a receiver 
(in receivership), in administration or in administrative receivership, or when there has been a cancellation or suspension 
of the firm.  
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4.4.2. Independent Variable Selection 
4.4.2.1. Accounting Ratios 
 
A range of potential independent variables were selected and tested based on extant 
empirical studies. With regard to the accounting variables, four ratios were selected: Total 
Funds from Operations to Total Liabilities, Total Liabilities to Total Assets, the No Credit 
Interval, and Interest Coverage. The variable, Total Funds from Operations to Total 
Liabilities (TFOTL), funds flow ratio that represents a performance measure, was built 
using the data available in Worldscope. Total Funds from Operations represents the sum 
of net income and all non-cash charges or credits; it is the cash flow of the firm. The 
denominator of the ratio, Total Liabilities, is composed of all short and long-term liabilities 
acquired by the company. This variable has been successfully employed in other studies: 
e.g. Marais (1979) in a Bank of England Study and Ohlson (1980). This ratio is intended to 
show the extent to which a company is able to generate funds from its operations to meet 
its financial obligations. The real line of TFOTL can be mapped onto [-1,1], where a 
positive value indicates a good position of the firm with regard to its financial obligations 
and a negative value suggests that a firm might be in a position where it does not generate 
sufficient funds from its operations to comply with its acquired obligations and might 
default. The higher the value of this financial ratio, the less likely it is for a company to be 
in a distressed financial position. A negative sign for this ratio is expected, confirming the 
above hypothesis that a higher value of this ratio (approaching 1) decreases the probability 
of corporate failure (the estimate’s sign should be negative). 
 
The ratio Total Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA) is a measure of financial leverage. 
The data used to produce this variable was also taken from Worldscope (as was the case of 
most of the accounting ratios in this study). Total Liabilities, as discussed, is composed of 
all short and long term liabilities acquired by a company. The denominator, Total Assets of 
industrial firms, is the addition of total current assets, long-term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and 
other assets. The ratio is commonly used to measure a firm’s financial leverage (and 
therefore financial risk) by calculating the proportion of the company’s assets that have 
been financed using short and long-term debt. Zmijewski (1984) included TLTA 
(represented as FINL) in a three-variable accounting model, where it displayed the 
expected sign and was statistically significant. More recent studies, such as Shumway (2001) 
and Chava and Jarrow (2004) in the United States, and Christidis and Gregory (2010) in the 
United Kingdom, have tested it and confirmed its consistency and contribution to 
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default/bankruptcy prediction models. The real line of TLTA can be mapped onto [-1,1], 
where an increasing large, positive value indicates an increasing leverage of the firm. 
Moreover, the higher the leverage, the higher the financial risk taken by the firm and 
therefore the higher its probability of default. This is because a highly leveraged company 
(a high TLTA ratio) could find itself in a very difficult and perilous position if creditors 
demand the repayment of the contracted debt.  Likewise, a small or negative value of the 
accounting ratio TLTA should indicate that the assets of the firm are financed by equity 
instead of debt. A positive sign of the variable’s estimate is therefore expected in the 
analysis, signifying that a high value of the ratio (a high leverage) should have a positive 
impact in the probability of corporate default. In the present analysis, it is investigated 
whether the ratio TLTA is able to enhance the accuracy of new corporate default 
prediction models for UK quoted companies. 
 
The variable No Credit Interval (NOCREDINT) is intended to measure liquidity 
(Taffler, 1983;  Agarwal and Taffler, 2007).  Graham (2000) defines the No Credit Interval 
variable as ‘an estimate of the length of time that a company could finance the expenses of 
its business, at its current level of activity, by drawing on its own liquid resources and on 
the assumption that it made no further sales.’ 82  The input required to produce this 
accounting variable was taken from Worldscope: Quick assets, Total Current Liabilities, 
Sales, Earnings Before Interest and Taxes, and Depreciation. The NOCREDINT variable 
was calculated with the following formula: (Quick assets minus Current liabilities) / (Daily 
operating expenses). Where Quick Assets represent the assets that can be quickly and easily 
converted into cash or are already in cash form. The formula employed to calculate Quick 
assets is Current Assets minus Inventories. Similarly, Daily operating expenses are equal to 
(Sales minus Earnings Before Interest and Taxes minus Depreciation) / 365. The number 
resulting of this formula is, as expected, the number of days that a company can finance its 
expenses by drawing on its own current resources. However, as previously explained, the 
ratio was transformed using the TANH function in order to treat the problem of outlying 
values of the variable that could have an abnormal impact on the fitted maximum 
likelihood linear predictors as well as on the size of the residuals that resulted from the 
binary logistic regression. After the TANH transformation, the real line of the 
NOCREDINT variable can be mapped onto [-1,1], where an increasing large, positive 
value indicates an increasing capacity of the firm to finance its business expenses with its 
quasi-liquid and liquid resources given its current level of activity. Conversely, a small or 
negative value of this variable suggests a precarious liquidity position of the firm potentially 
                                                        
82 P. 86. 
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leading to a stressed position with regard to its financial obligations. A negative sign of the 
No Credit Interval variable’s estimate is expected, suggesting that a high value of the 
variable should have a negative impact on the firm’s probability of default. 
 
The final accounting ratio is Interest Coverage (COVERAGE) and measures a 
firm’s ability to pay interest on outstanding debt (Altman and Sabato, 2007). The Interest 
Coverage ratio was therefore calculated dividing the variable Earnings before interest, taxes 
and depreciation (EBITDA)83 by the variable Interest charges or Interest expense on debt 
that represents the service charge for the use of capital before the reduction for interest 
capitalized. Typically, a value smaller than 2-2.5 suggests that the firm might be having 
trouble to meet its financial obligations; a value below this threshold should be therefore 
considered as a serious warning sign: the firm is not creating enough cash from its 
operations, as measured by its Earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (EBITDA), 
in order to meet its interest expenses on debt.  A value greater than 2.5 is interpreted as the 
firm being able to generate funds from its operations to meet interest payments. In the 
present study, the COVERAGE ratio was also transformed using the TANH function in 
order to treat the problem of outlying values of the variable that could have an abnormal 
impact on the fitted maximum likelihood linear predictors as well as on the size of the 
residuals that resulted from the binary logistic regression. After the TANH transformation, 
the real line of the COVERAGE variable can be mapped onto [-1,1], where an increasing 
large, positive value indicates an increasing ability of the firm to meet its debt obligations. A 
negative sign of the COVERAGE variable’s estimate is therefore expected, suggesting that 
a high value of the variable should have a negative impact on the firm’s probability of 
failure. 
 
4.4.2.2. Macro-Economic Variables 
 
In addition to the accounting ratios, two macroeconomic variables were selected 
(among a list of eleven macroeconomic indicators) and included in the final model: the 
Retail Price Index (RPI), and the United Kingdom Short Term (3-month) Treasury Bill 
Rate Deflated (or the real short term Treasury bill rate), both are represented on an annual 
scale in the present study. The first macroeconomic variable, the Retail Price Index 
indicator, a measure of inflation, was taken from Datastream (the Office for National 
                                                        
83  EBITDA measures the earnings of a firm before interest expense, income taxes and depreciation. Worldscope 
calculates EBITDA by taking the pre-tax income and adding back interest expense on debt and depreciation, depletion 
and amortization and subtracting interest capitalized. 
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Statistics being the primary source), and it is defined by Thomson Financial as ‘an average 
measure of change in the prices of goods and services bought for the purpose of 
consumption by the vast majority of the households in the UK.’ The Retail Price Index is 
compiled and published monthly. There are just a few default/failure prediction studies 
where this variable has been tested, and its relationship with the probability of default has 
varied. As a measure of inflation, and thus as a ‘hidden risk pressure’ that acts as an 
incentive for those disposing of savings to invest them rather than see their purchasing 
power erode further in the future through inflation, it could be expected that the risk-
taking capacity of investors increases in the same direction, lowering thus a firms’ 
probability of default, as discussed by Qu (2008). However, as acknowledged by the same 
author, the direction of the relationship inflation-probability of default has not been 
unequivocally established due to the ‘complexity of inflation’s effect on the economy.’84 
Mare (2012), on the other hand, develops a failure prediction model for banks and finds 
that the measure of inflation employed is positively related to the probability of default. His 
rationale is that high inflation is rather the consequence of a generally weak 
macroeconomic environment, which in turn increases the number of banking crises. Now, 
as there is a direct relationship between the banking and the industrial sector, whose 
magnitude is dependent upon the choice of capital structure adopted by firms (the 
proportion of debt to equity), the present study’s hypothesis is that a high RPI should 
increase a firm’s probability of failure. A positive sign of the RPI variable’s estimate is 
therefore expected, suggesting that a high value of this variable should have a positive 
impact on the firm’s probability of failure. 
 
The second macroeconomic variable included in the model is the Short Term 
Treasury Bill Rate Deflated (SHTBRDEF), which represents the ‘real’ short-term rate of 3-
month United Kingdom Treasury Bills on an annual basis. Two main sources were used to 
construct this indicator: from the Bank of England website85 the level of the discount rate 
from 1985 to 2011 was obtained; and from Datastream, the inflation rate employed in 
order to deflate the discount rate for the same period. Treasury Bills are defined as ‘bearer 
Government Securities representing a charge on the Consolidated Fund of the UK issued 
in minimum denominations of £5,000 at a discount to their face value for any period not 
exceeding one year86. Treasury Bills are typically considered as the least risky investment 
available. They are much more liquid than gilts (with maturity ranging between 0 and 15 
years) and therefore the yield rate on treasury bills is normally lower than on longer-term 
                                                        
84 P. 194. 
85 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk 
86 Definition taken from Datastream, Thomson Financial. 
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securities. The present study included the annualised level of the 91 days (3-month) 
discount rate in order to test another measure intended to capture the state of the 
macroeconomic environment that could potentially have an effect on the probability of 
failure of industrial companies. This indicator is a proxy for interest rates, which, similar to 
the RPI variable, is very likely to affect industrial firms according to their capital structure. 
Lower interest rates facilitate businesses to borrow in order to invest in new equipment, 
inventories, building, research and development, etc. Furthermore, it is well known that the 
firm’s expected return on investment is higher today when rates are low than when they are 
high, which acts as an incentive for businesses to invest more when they operate in a low 
interest rate environment. Business borrowing is perhaps the most affected by high interest 
rates; firms might be in need to recur to short term loans in order to offset temporary or 
cyclic short-falls in expenses, payroll, etc., thus a high level of interest rate make the cost of 
debt more expensive, as companies will have to pay more interest back to their lenders. It 
is therefore assumed that a high value of the level of SHTBRDEF will increase the 
probability of failure. A positive sign of the SHTBRDEF variable’s estimate is therefore 
expected, suggesting that a high value of this variable should have a positive impact on the 
firm’s probability of failure. 
 
4.4.2.3. Market Variables 
 
The study included five market variables in the models in order to test whether they 
increase the predictive power of an accounting and macroeconomic model. The first one is 
the firm’s equity price (PRICE). Equity prices data was obtained from the Datastream 
database. The implicit underlying assumption used in the present study to justify the 
inclusion of market equity prices in the models is that they reflect a wide mix of public 
information concerning the future cash flows that can be expected from a company’s share 
and, as suggested by Rees (1995), ‘a subset of that information will be relevant to the 
likelihood of liquidation and the cash flow impact.’87 Therefore, it is expected that equity 
prices contain relevant information about the probability of corporate failure even if they 
are not a direct measure of that probability (Beaver et al., 2005). It is also assumed that 
market prices will act as a complement to the financial statement and macroeconomic 
information by enhancing the predictive power of the general model, and not as competing 
or mutually exclusive alternatives that should be used in isolation. The reason is that equity 
prices incorporate financial statement data as well as other information publicly available as 
                                                        
87 P. 310. 
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inputs, potentially making markets a more efficient processor of all available public 
information than accounting data alone (Rees, 2005) and therefore increasing the overall 
accuracy of failure prediction models. It is assumed that the financial position of the firm 
may lead to portfolio realignments that affect and adjust equity prices ahead of the 
corporate default event. Furthermore, Beaver et al. (2005), suggest that ‘as the probability 
of bankruptcy increases, the non-linear nature of the payoff function for common stock 
becomes increasingly more important because of risky debt and limited liability.’ 88 
Nevertheless, it might be also the case that some equity prices incorporate random 
information that is not directly relevant to the financial distress or insolvency process, as 
discussed by Rees (2005), and that this might introduce noise into the analysis and impair 
the predictive accuracy of the model. However, there have been studies where equity prices 
have had a positive effect on the predictive power of the model (Beaver, 1966; Beaver et 
al., 2005; Christidis and Gregory, 2010). Moreover, the superior predictive accuracy of a 
default prediction model is not the only potential benefit drawn from the inclusion of 
equity prices; the timeliness of the models could also be greatly improved (Keasey and 
Watson, 1991). Accordingly, to the extent that market prices reflect investors’ expectations 
of future cash flows or earnings, and that the company’s earnings are affected by its 
financial position, it is expected that there is a close relationship between price 
levels/movements and the probability of corporate default. It is therefore assumed that a 
high value of the level of PRICE will decrease the probability of failure. In other words, a 
negative sign of the PRICE variable’s estimate is therefore expected, suggesting that a high 
value of this variable should have a negative impact on the firm’s probability of failure. 
 
The second market variable included in this study is the lagged cumulative security 
residual return (ABNRET). In order to incorporate this variable in a corporate default 
prediction model, each firm’s past residual return 89  in year t was calculated as the 
cumulative monthly return of the twelve months prior to the year where the default event 
was observed, minus the FTSE All Share Index cumulative monthly return for the same 
period (t-1). Moreover, as with the previous financial statement and macroeconomic 
variables and in order to confirm its predictive ability, the ABNRET variable was 
computed as the cumulative monthly returns two years prior to the observation of the 
corporate default event (t-2). Both of the variables required to construct ABNRET (Firm’s 
                                                        
88 P. 110. 
89  In order to calculate residual/abnormal returns, firms’ individual returns are employed as the main input. The 
investment return can be defined as the total gain or loss on an investment over a given period of time. The return 
incorporates the change in the asset’s values plus any cash distributions (dividends or interest payments). The specific 
Datastream datatype used in the present study is the Total Return Index (RI) which shows ‘a theoretical growth in value 
of a shareholding over a specific period, assuming that dividends are reinvested to purchase additional units of an equity 
or unit trust at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date.’  
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monthly returns and FTSE All Share Index monthly returns) were taken from the 
Datastream database. The ABNRET variable was also transformed using the TANH 
function in order to treat the problem of outlying values of the variable that could have an 
abnormal impact on the fitted maximum likelihood linear predictors as well as on the size 
of the residuals that resulted from the binary logistic regression. After the TANH 
transformation, the real line of the ABNRET variable can be mapped onto [-1,1], where an 
increasing large, positive value suggests a lower probability of financial default. Following 
Shumway (2001), the theoretical underlying assumption used in the present study to justify 
the incorporation of lagged residual returns into the models is that they should be useful to 
predict failure as investors discount the equity of those firms that are in a stressed financial 
position or close to bankruptcy/default. Furthermore, ass discussed by Beaver et al. (2005), 
if the option-like feature of common equity is accurate, where equity can be interpreted as a 
call option on the assets of a company (the face value of the liabilities being the strike 
price), then the value of common equity acts as the ‘equity cushion available to debt-
holders before their principal and interest become jeopardized.’ Therefore, a decline of the 
value of equity (and thus a diminished equity cushion) should entail a higher probability of 
failure. This hypothesis is consistent with the findings of Dichev (1998), who measures 
bankruptcy risk employing the Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) models, and shows that 
there is a negative association between equity returns and the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
Accordingly, it is posited that a high firms’ returns relative to the FTSE All Share Index 
returns will decrease the probability of failure. In other words, a negative sign of the 
ABNRET variable’s estimate is therefore expected, suggesting that a high value of this 
variable should have a negative impact on the firm’s probability of failure. 
 
The third market variable is a measure of the variability of the stock returns of a 
company: the lagged standard deviation of individual security residual returns (IDYRISK). 
The information required estimating individual stock returns, the firm’s monthly returns 
and FTSE All Share Index monthly returns were taken from the Datastream database. 
Each firm’s idiosyncratic standard deviation of each firm’s stock returns was estimated by 
regressing (employing a linear regression) each stock’s monthly returns in year t-1 on the 
FTSE All Share Index cumulative monthly return for the same period which corresponds 
to the year prior to the observation of the event of default. The idiosyncratic risk of the 
firm is the standard deviation of the residual of this regression. The same procedure was 
employed to construct this measure for t-2 or two years prior to the observation of the 
corporate default event. Again, this measure of volatility can provide information relevant 
to the prediction of default that is not contained in the traditional financial ratios (in fact a 
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volatility measure could not be extracted from financial data due to the scarcity of accounts 
which are submitted quarterly at best in the United Kingdom). In fact, as discussed by 
Vassalou and Xing (2004), models based on financial statements take as input only 
information that is historical by nature and do not incorporate the volatility of firm’s assets 
in order to estimate the likelihood of corporate failure. It is therefore important to test a 
measure of volatility because, as shown by models based on the contingency claims 
approach, corporations with similar levels of equity and debt might have different 
probabilities of default if their assets have different levels of volatility (Trujillo Ponce and 
Cardone-Riportella, 2012). As noted by Shumway (2001), it is expected that this variable is 
strongly related to bankruptcy in statistical and logical terms: higher volatility of the cash 
flows of a firm (resulting in more variable stock returns) should entail a higher probability 
of default. In line with Shumway’s (2001) argument, the present study posits that, in logical 
terms, the likelihood of default is explained not only by the level of market variables such 
as abnormal returns (ABNRET), but also by the proportion of their variability that is 
attributed to firm-specific factors.  
 
The volatility of the return on a typical stock can be decomposed into three 
components that sum to the total return volatility of a typical firm: the aggregate market 
return volatility, industry-specific and firm-specific residuals. Nevertheless, the present 
study focuses solely on the idiosyncratic volatility of the firm. The reason is that, as shown 
by Campbell et al. (2001), while market and industry variances have been fairly stable over 
the period of 1962-1997, firm-level variance ‘displays a large and significant positive trend,’ 
more than doubling in the same period, concluding that ‘although the market as a whole 
has not become more volatile, uncertainty on the level of individual firms has increased 
substantially over a 35-year period.’90 It is therefore worth investigating the usefulness of a 
variable reflecting the idiosyncratic volatility of returns as an explanatory variable for the 
prediction of corporate default. Moreover, as discussed by Beaver et al. (2005), other 
parsimonious bankruptcy models that predict ‘stock-outs’ of a liquid asset include a 
measure of the variability of the cash flows as well as their expected values.  The fact that 
the variability of expected asset returns is a fundamental variable in contingent claims 
valuation models such as the Black-Scholes-Merton model is another theoretical rationale 
to test the usefulness of a volatility measure as explanatory variable for the prediction of 
default. After the TANH transformation, the real line of the IDYRISK variable can be 
mapped onto [0, 1], where an increasing large, positive value indicates high volatility of 
returns which in turn have a positive effect on the probability of bankruptcy. In other 
                                                        
90 P. 3. 
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words, a positive sign of the IDYRISK variable is expected, suggesting that a value that is 
near 1 should have a positive impact on the firm’s probability of failure. 
 
The fourth market variable incorporated to the model represents the Size of the 
company measured by its market capitalisation relative to the total size of the FTSE All 
Share Index (in order to make size static). The information required to construct this 
specific variable was taken from the Datastream database where the index Market Value 
(MV) is calculated as the sum of the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary 
shares in issue for each index constituent91. In the present study, the variable SIZE, was 
calculated as the logarithm of each firm’s size relative to the total market value of the FTSE 
All Share Index. The minimum value drawn from this method of calculation was -16.60 
and the maximum value -2.37, with an average equal to -10.05. This range of values results 
from the fact that the logarithmic form of a small number (a firm market value relative to 
that of the FTSE All Share will result in a very small value) yields a negative sign. Firm size 
as measure by the market value can be a potentially powerful predictor of failure if the 
option-like feature of common equity is used again as a theoretical framework; the market 
value of equity of a firm in a stressed financial position is discounted by market participants 
(investors) which entails a reduction in the debt holders ‘equity cushion.’ This decline in the 
level of equity, induced by a negative investors’ judgement of the firm’s financial standing, 
can systematically move towards the ‘strike price’ (or the value of liabilities) until it reaches 
the point where it is insufficient to serve the firm’s debt obligations (and the firm defaults). 
As suggested by Agarwal and Taffler (2008) ‘the probability of bankruptcy is the probability 
that the call option will expire worthless or, in other words, that the value of the assets [as 
measured by the firm’s market value, the size] is less than the face value of the liabilities at 
the end of the holding period.’92 Therefore, it is predicted that a high value of the SIZE 
variable should entail a low probability of failure. Conversely, a relatively small-sized 
company should have a higher probability of default. In other words, a negative sign of the 
SIZE variable’s estimate is therefore expected, suggesting that a high value of this variable 
should have a negative impact on the firm’s probability of failure. 
 
The final market variable that entered the final model is the ratio Market 
Capitalisation to Total Debt (MCTD). The variable Market Capitalisation was taken from 
Datastream whereas the variable Total Debt was taken from Thomson One Banker 
(Worldscope). Total Debt is equal to all interest bearing and capitalised lease obligations. 
                                                        
91 In Thomson Reuters’ 2008 ‘Datastream Global Equity Indices.’ User Guide. Issue 5. P. 20. For companies with more 
than one type of common/ordinary share, market capitalization represents the total market value of the company. 
92 P. 1543. 
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As specified by Thomson Reuters, it is the sum of long and short term debt. This market 
variable was adjusted using the TANH function in order to solve the problem of outlying 
values. The real line of MCTD can be mapped onto (0,1), where a high value indicates that 
there is considerable scope for a decline in value of a firm’s assets (as measured by the 
market value of equity) before its total debt exceeds its assets and it becomes financially 
distressed or insolvent. Conversely, a low value of the variable indicates that the firm’s 
decline in value is very close to reaching the point of insolvency, or the point where its total 
debt exceeds its assets. The higher the value of this financial ratio, the less likely it is for a 
company to be in a distressed financial position. Thus, it is posited that a high value of the 
MCTD variable should entail a low probability of failure. Conversely, a low value company 
should involve a higher probability of failure. In other words, a negative sign of the MCTD 
variable’s estimate is predicted, suggesting that a high value of this variable should have a 
negative impact on the firm’s probability of default. Other than the market value dimension 
(that previous default prediction models in the United Kingdom have failed to 
incorporate), this variable is intended to solve an important problem highlighted in Beaver 
et al. (2005), namely that the variables ABNRET, and specially SIZE, used in this study, are 
not ‘scaled in that [they are] not compared with the magnitude of debt outstanding.’93 The 
case of the variable SIZE should be particularly stressed as it is measured by the company’s 
market capitalisation relative to the total market capitalisation of the FTSE All Share Index 
(transformed employing the logarithmic function). It could be therefore argued that the 
variables MCTD and SIZE, having the same denominator, could be highly correlated 
giving rise to a multicollinearity problem that may affect the stability of the coefficients of 
the independent variables in response to marginal changes in the model and/or data. 
Correlation matrices were computed and presented in Table 4-2 along with other 
diagnostic tests94. 
                                                        
93 P. 111. 
94 Multcollinearity is present when there is linear dependency among two or more independent variables in a multivariate 
model. This problem arises because some of them may be measuring the same concept. Consequently, when a given 
independent variable is a linear or a quasi-linear combination of other independent variables, the affected estimates are 
unstable and the standard errors inflated. Tolerance value and is reciprocal, variance inflation tests are computed as 
    
  and        
   respectively, where   
  is the determination coefficient for regression of the ith regressor on all 
the other regressors. Freud and Little (2000), show how the instability of the coefficient estimates is increased by the 
existence of multicollinearity. It must be mentioned that there is not a formal criterion to establish a VIF value threshold 
above which multicollinearity can be ascertained; it has been argued that a VIF value greater than 10 suggests significant 
collinearity. The VIF values of all the regressors incorporated in the present study’s models, show they are all even below 
5, which indicates that multicollinearity is not present in the models and that the levels of the coefficients obtained are 
therefore reliable. 
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Table 4-2 Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Diagnostics Statistics.  
Panel A of this table reports the correlation matrix of all the variables in included in the model. It includes financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators and 
market variables. P-values represent the probability of observing this correlation coefficient or one more extreme under the null hypothesis (H0) that the correlation 
(Rho) is zero. Panel B reports the values resulting from tests intended to detect the presence of multicollinearity among all the variables incorporated in the model: 
Tolerance Value (TOL) and its reciprocal, Variance Inflation (VIF) are computed as     
  and        
   respectively, where   
  is the determination coefficient 
for regression of the ith regressor on all the other regressors. 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix 
Variable TFOTL TLTA NOCREDINT COVERAGE RPI SHTBRDEF PRICE ABNRET IDYRISK SIZE MCTD 
TFOTL 1.00000  
 
 
 
 
 
       
TLTA 0.17057 
<.0001 
1.00000          
NOCREDINT -0.09720 
<.0001 
-0.44510 
<.0001 
1.00000         
COVERAGE 0.72613 
<.0001 
0.02865 
<.0001 
-0.05983 
<.0001 
1.00000        
RPI -0.19100 
<.0001 
-0.12218 
<.0001 
0.14404 
<.0001 
-0.19691 
<.0001 
1.00000       
SHTBRDEF 0.12491 
<.0001 
0.09343 
<.0001 
-0.10688 
<.0001 
0.11610 
<.0001 
-0.81383 
<.0001 
1.00000      
PRICE 0.37131 
<.0001 
0.05951 
<.0001 
-0.04823 
<.0001 
0.37641 
<.0001 
-0.19656 
<.0001 
0.15184 
<.0001 
1.00000     
ABNRET 0.24136 
<.0001 
-0.04107 
<.0001 
0.03765 
<.0001 
0.27986 
<.0001 
-0.00448 
0.5379 
-0.02817 
0.0001 
0.17361 
<.0001 
1.00000    
IDYRISK -0.39001 
<.0001 
-0.01277 
0.0729 
0.03927 
<.0001 
-0.44025 
<.0001 
0.19503 
<.0001 
-0.07843 
<.0001 
-0.38666 
<.0001 
-0.21194 
<.0001 
1.00000   
SIZE 0.36300 
<.0001 
0.09781 
<.0001 
-0.08105 
<.0001 
0.40685 
<.0001 
-0.23538 
<.0001 
0.10799 
<.0001 
0.58264 
<.0001 
0.22538 
<.0001 
-0.36444 
<.0001 
1.00000  
MCTD 0.08792 
<.0001 
-0.34893 
<.0001 
0.18940 
<.0001 
0.13136 
<.0001 
-0.04910 
<.0001 
-0.00248 
0.7461 
0.20164 
<.0001 
0.19389 
<.0001 
-0.25552 
<.0001 
0.22630 
<.0001 
1.00000 
Panel B: Multicollinearity Diagnostic Statistics 
Test  TFOTL TLTA NOCREDINT COVERAGE RPI SHTBRDEF PRICE ABNRET IDYRISK SIZE MCTD 
TOL 0.48069 0.77587 0.86682 0.44685 0.31244 0.32346 0.61574 0.85806 0.67621 0.5822 0.76426 
VIF 2.08035 1.28887 1.15364 2.23787 3.20065 3.09162 1.62407 1.16542 1.47882 1.71761 1.30846 
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4.5. Methods: Panel Logit Model Specification 
 
The sample is divided into two groups, failed firms and healthy or non-failed firms. 
The outcome is a binary dependent variable. Our approach is to model the outcome within 
a panel logit framework, (Altman et al. 2010 and Altman and Sabato 2007), and follow 
Shumway (2001) and Nan et al. (2008) who show that a panel logit model, that corrects for 
period at risk and allows for time varying covariates95, is equivalent to a hazard model. 
Other influential studies that have used the logit methodology for the development of 
default prediction models are Keasey and Watson (1987), Peel and Peel (1987), Storey et al. 
(1987). Among the studies concerned with large firms using the logit methodology we can 
cite: Martin (1977), Ohlson (1980), Mensah (1984), Gentry et al. (1985), Zavgren (1985, 
1988), Platt and Platt (1991), Charitou and Trigeorgis (2000), Becchetti and Sierra (2003), 
Altman et al. (2010). 
 
The logistic regression model used in this study is based on the following 
mathematical definition. Let                 be a random sample from a conditional logit 
distribution. Next, let              be a collection of   independent variables denoted by 
the vector   . Assuming that each of these variables is at least interval scaled and that the 
conditional probability of the outcome is present is denoted by       |        then the 
logit of the logistic regression model is denoted by:  
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95 Shumway (2010), p. 123. 
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In addition to the estimates computed through this statistical methodology, 
marginal effects for each of the variables are also presented. This calculation, despite its 
usefulness in the interpretation of individual variables on the performance of the model, 
has been overlooked in previous default/distress prediction models. The present study fills 
this gap in the literature by computing marginal effects for all variables in the models. The 
calculations are intended to measure the expected instantaneous change in the response 
variable as a function of a change in a specific predictor variable while keeping all other 
covariates constant. The marginal effect of a predictor is defined by the SAS Institute as 
the partial derivative of the event probability with respect to the predictor of interest96. The 
marginal effects measurement is therefore very useful in order to interpret the effects of 
the regressors on the dependent variable for discrete dependent variable models, in this 
case, a logit binary choice model. Marginal effects are therefore mathematically expressed 
as follows: 
 
For simplicity, consider now the same model but with only one regressor. It is 
called logit because:  
 
  [    |  ]           ) 
 
where    is the explanatory variable and    and    are unknown parametersto be 
estimated, and 
 
     
 
         
 
 
is the distribution function for the logistic (logit) distribution. 
 
If      then   [    |  ]           ) is an increasing function of   :  
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96  Usage Note 22604: Marginal effects estimation for predictors in logistic and probit models. 
http://support.sas.com/kb/22/604.html 
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Thus, the marginal effect of    on   [    |  ] depends on   : 
 
 [    |  ]
   
                 (       )  
 
In practice, there are two frequently used approaches to estimate either average or 
overall marginal effects. According to the SAS Institute, one of them is to calculate the 
marginal effect at the sample means of the data and the other is to estimate marginal effect 
at each observation and then to compute the sample average of individual marginal effects 
to obtain the overall marginal effect97. For large samples, both approaches yield similar 
results, however, for the purposes of this analysis; the average of the individual marginal 
effects is preferred. The present study outputs the marginal effects estimated for each 
observation in the dataset and then computes the sample average of individual marginal 
effects in order to obtain the overall marginal effects. SAS software code was employed to 
get the estimated marginal effects. 
  
                                                        
97 See SAS/ETS Web Examples. Computing Marginal Effects for Discrete Dependent Variable Models. 
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Table 4-3 Summary Statistics for Model 1 
This table presents summary statistics for Model 1, which includes only financial statement 
variables. It covers the Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum Values and the number 
of observations that were used in the logistic regression for the ratios Total Funds from Operation 
to Total Liabilities (TFOTL), Total Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA), the No Credit Interval 
(NOCREDINT), and Interest Coverage (COVERAGE). Panel A contains summary statistics for 
the entire dataset; Panel B for financially healthy firms, and Panel C for failed firms.  
Variable TFOTL TLTA NOCREDINT COVERAGE 
Panel A: Entire Data Set 
Mean 0.069322 0.485737 -0.120307 0.532898 
Std. Dev. 0.337566 0.188089 0.986233 0.818508 
Min -1 -0.432123 -1 -1 
Max 1 1 1 1 
Observations 18,158    
Panel B: Financially Healthy Firms 
Mean 0.073826 0.48373 -0.112936 0.545882 
Std. Dev. 0.335902 0.187087 0.987091 0.810734 
Min -1 -0.432123 -1 -1 
Max 1 1 1 1 
Observations 17,843    
Panel C: Failed Firms 
Mean -0.185767 0.599386 -0.537879 -0.202545 
Std. Dev. 0.33396 0.208933 0.837612 0.916257 
Min -1 0.005761 -1 -1 
Max 0.796339 1 1 1 
Observations 315    
 
Table 4-4 Summary Statistics for Model 2. 
This table presents summary statistics for Model 2, which includes financial statement ratios as well 
as macroeconomic variables. It covers the Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum 
Values and the number of observations that were used in the logistic regression for the ratios Total 
Funds from Operation to Total Liabilities (TFOTL), Total Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA), the 
No Credit Interval (NOCREDINT), Interest Coverage (COVERAGE) the Retail Price Index 
(RPI), and the proxy for interest rates, the 3-month Short Term Bill Rate adjusted for inflation 
(SHTBRDEF). Panel A contains summary statistics for the entire dataset; Panel B for financially 
healthy firms, and Panel C for failed firms. 
Variable TFOTL TLTA NOCREDINT COVERAGE RPI SHTBRDEF 
Panel A: Entire Data Set 
Mean 0.068245 0.485506 -0.116483 0.528139 178.27559 2.061429 
Std. Dev. 0.339132 0.188782 0.986674 0.821606 32.152036 2.412037 
Min -1 -0.432123 -1 -1 94.59 -4.69551 
Max 1 1 1 1 235.18 7.7407 
Observations 17,952      
Panel B: Financially Healthy Firms 
Mean 0.072782 0.483472 -0.108957 0.541189 178.15488 2.060159 
Std. Dev. 0.337499 0.187782 0.987519 0.813904 32.242693 2.419031 
Min -1 -0.432123 -1 -1 94.59 -4.69551 
Max 1 1 1 1 235.18 7.7407 
Observations 17,637      
Panel C: Failed Firms 
Mean -0.185767 0.599386 -0.537879 -0.202545 185.03432 2.132532 
Std. Dev. 0.33396 0.208933 0.837612 0.916257 25.739411 1.983302 
Min -1 0.005761 -1 -1 115.21 -4.69551 
Max 0.796339 1 1 1 235.18 7.1745 
Observations 315      
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Table 4-5 Summary Statistics for Model 3 
This table presents summary statistics for the full model, or Model 3, which includes financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators and market variables. It 
covers the Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum Values and the number of observations that were used in the logistic regression for the ratios Total 
Funds from Operation to Total Liabilities (TFOTL), Total Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA), the No Credit Interval (NOCREDINT), Interest Coverage 
(COVERAGE) the Retail Price Index (RPI), and a proxy for interest rates, the 3-month Short Term Bill Rate adjusted for inflation (SHTBRDEF), the firm’s Equity 
Price (PRICE), the firm’s annual Abnormal Returns (ABNRET ), the firm’s Relative Size (SIZE), and the ratio Market Capital to Total Debt (MCTD). Panel A 
contains summary statistics for the entire dataset; Panel B for financially healthy firms, and Panel C for failed firms. 
Variable TFOTL TLTA NOCREDINT COVERAGE RPI SHTBRDEF PRICE ABNRET IDYRISK SIZE MCTD 
Panel A: Entire Data Set 
Mean 0.089856 0.495185 -0.18222 0.582094 178.41205 2.057968 4.408757 -0.098878 0.122309 -10.083135 0.912645 
Std. Dev. 0.28928 0.171132 0.976069 0.783736 32.300452 2.474547 1.719708 0.401444 0.080925 2.212375 0.18944 
Min -1 -0.162029 -1 -1 97.82 -4.69551 -4.60517 -0.999987 0.012299 -16.602146 0.002877 
Max 1 1 1 1 235.18 7.7407 13.785052 0.997029 0.787179 -2.374161 1 
Observations 14,203           
Panel B: Financially Healthy Firms 
Mean 0.094928 0.492868 -0.173282 0.597459 178.26942 2.057772 4.445545 -0.092124 0.120757 -10.044873 0.91643 
Std. Dev. 0.286516 0.169794 0.977685 0.772992 32.396525 2.483145 1.691239 0.397685 0.079442 2.206104 0.183715 
Min -1 -0.162029 -1 -1 97.82 -4.69551 -3.912023 -0.999987 0.012299 -16.602146 0.002877 
Max 1 1 1 1 235.18 7.7407 13.785052 0.996455 0.751478 -2.374161 1 
Observations 13,929           
Panel C: Failed Firms 
Mean -0.167974 0.612982 -0.636597 -0.198991 185.6627 2.067917 2.538613 -0.442228 0.201189 -12.028228 0.720245 
Std. Dev. 0.311704 0.196133 0.764131 0.919496 26.004402 1.992703 2.084033 0.440864 0.111096 1.566622 0.327313 
Min -1 0.052458 -1 -1 115.21 -4.69551 -4.60517 -0.99966 0.015639 -15.922758 0.00588 
Max 0.49607 1 1 1 235.18 7.1745 10.96388 0.997029 0.787179 -5.641377 1 
Observations 274           
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4.6. Analysis of Results.  
 
Tables 4-6 and 4-7 present results from logistic regressions of the corporate default 
indicator on the predictor variables in t-1 and t-2, respectively. As required by the binary 
logistic regression model, firms classified as failed were given a value of 1 and firms 
identified as financially healthy were given the value 0. This classification was carried out 
using the previously discussed definition of corporate default/insolvency developed 
specifically for this analysis. The present study develops three main ex-ante models to 
estimate corporate default likelihood and test the contribution of macroeconomic 
indicators and market variables to the predictive accuracy of models based on financial 
statement ratios.  
 
Model 1 represents the ‘Accounting only’ model and incorporates the financial 
statement ratios Total Funds from Operations to Total Liabilities (TFOTL), Total 
Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA), the No Credit Interval (NOCREDINT), and Interest 
Coverage (COVERAGE). Model 2 represents the ‘Accounting plus Macroeconomic’ 
model and includes, in addition to the accounting variables, the indicators Retail Price 
Index (RPI), and the Short Term Bill Rate adjusted for inflation (SHTBRDEF). Model 3 is 
the ‘Full model’ incorporating, in addition to the above financial statement ratios and 
macroeconomic indicators, five market variables: each firm’s Equity Price (PRICE) 
transformed using the logarithmic function; the firm’s cumulative monthly abnormal 
returns on an annual basis (ABNRET), generated as the firm’s excess returns minus the 
FTSE All Share return index for the same period of time; the idiosyncratic standard 
deviation of individual security returns (IDYRISK), generated by regressing each stock’s 
monthly returns in year t-1 on the FTSE-All Share index return for the same year: the 
idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the residual of this regression;  the firm’s 
relative size (SIZE) measured by the market capitalisation relative to the total size (market 
capitalisation) of the FTSE All Share index, in logarithmic form. Additionally, Model 4 and 
Model 5 are included in Table 4-6, representing a ‘Market only’ model and a ‘Market plus 
macroeconomic variables’ model, respectively, in order to compare their predictive 
accuracy with that of Model 1 and Model 2. The objective of this additional comparison is 
to test the predictive accuracy of accounting models against the performance of market 
models using logistic regression. Finally, Table 4-7 reports results from logit regressions of 
the default indicator on the predictor variables for the 5 models using the accounts, market 
and macroeconomic data from two years prior to the observation of the corporate default 
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event (t-2) as further tests of the stability of the individual regressors’ coefficients as well as 
the overall predictive ability of the models. 
 
As mentioned above, the present study develops ex-ante models for the estimation 
of corporate default likelihood. In practice, the date of the event of corporate default is not 
known and risk managers are required to employ the data that is available at the time of the 
analysis in order to make an estimate of the likelihood of failure of a company. 
Accordingly, this study estimates the probability of default in the year prior to the 
observation of the event of failure (t-1) as well as two years prior to the event (t-2). In that 
way, the models provide evidence about the predictors that best discriminate between 
failed and healthy companies on the one hand, and on the other, test their predictive 
power. Thus, for the t-1 models, all of the accounting ratios were computed using the 
financial statements of the year prior to the corporate default event. Accordingly, the 
macroeconomic indicators were calculated with information from the year preceding the 
default event: the Retail Price Index (RPI) in base 100 as well as the 3-month Bill rate 
(SHTBRDEF), which was annualised and deflated using the inflation rate in order to 
obtain a measure of the level of ‘real’ interest rates in the economy. As for the market 
variables, equity prices (PRICE) were incorporated to the model as the official closing price 
in t-1, the variable measuring abnormal returns (ABNRET) for year t, when the default 
event was observed, was calculated as the return of the firm in year t-1 minus the FTSE All 
Share Index return in year t-1. Individual firms’ annual returns were generated by 
cumulating monthly returns. The variable reflecting idiosyncratic risk (IDYRISK) or the 
idiosyncratic volatility of each firm’s stock returns was computed as the volatility (standard 
deviation) of residual return from a linear regression of each firm’s monthly returns (one 
year prior to the observation of the corporate default event) on the return on the FTSE 
All-Share Index for the same period (t-1). With regard to the variable that measures the 
relative size of the firm (SIZE), following Shumway (2001), individual firms’ market 
capitalisation was measured at the end of the year before the corporate default event year. 
Finally, as for the ratio Market Capitalisation to Total Debt (MCTD), the latter was also 
measured with information taken from financial statements issued in t-1. The same 
procedure was followed to estimate the models in t-2. 
 
Tables 4-7 and 4-8 report the resulting estimates from logistic regressions of the 
corporate default indicator on the independent variables for periods t-1 and t-2 respectively. 
All of the variables in the ‘Accounting’ model (Model 1) are statistically significant at 5-1% 
in t-1, suggesting that they are efficient predictors of the likelihood of corporate failure. 
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When the model is estimated in t-2, or two years before the corporate failure event was 
observed, the totality of the regressors retain the same level of statistical significance, which 
indicates that, when used in isolation in a default prediction model, the accounting variables 
are also consistent over time. Moreover, the coefficient’s estimates possess the predicted 
sign: the negative sign of the proxy for the performance of a company, TFOTL, indicates 
that the higher the level of funds from operations a company produces (relative to its total 
liabilities) the higher its performance and, therefore, the lower its probability of corporate 
default or bankruptcy. Likewise, the sign of the variable NOCREDINT, a proxy for the 
liquidity of a company, suggests that the higher the level of liquidity of a company, the 
lower its default likelihood. The COVERAGE variable also displays the anticipated 
negative sign, where an increased or substantial ability to pay interest on outstanding debt, 
lowers the firm’s corporate default likelihood. Contrary to the previous accounting ratios, 
the coefficient’s estimate for the variable TLTA displays a positive sign, which indicates 
that a highly leveraged company (a high value of the TLTA variable) will display a higher 
likelihood of corporate failure. This latter result is also consistent with the present study’s 
initial predictions. Interestingly, the TLTA coefficient displays the highest absolute value 
amongst the accounting statement variables, followed by TFOTL and COVERAGE, 
NOCREDINT possessing the smallest absolute value. The same analysis applies for the 
model estimated in t-2, which seems to indicate that the accounting ratios’ coefficient 
estimates are stable over the two periods of time. 
 
Tables 4-6 and 4-7 also present Cox and Snell’s R squared as well as Nagelkerke’s 
max rescaled R squared in order to have a comparison point of the relative increase or 
decrease in performance between the models. As expected, Nagelkerke’s max rescaled R 
squared decreases for Model 1 when it is estimated from t-1 to t-2. However, the decline in 
magnitude is only marginal, which indicates that the models’ regressors are stable over 
time. However, these measures are included only to make comparisons easier, their 
interpretation needing to be treated with caution, as they do not have the same meaning for 
logit models as they have for ordinary least squares regressions. As previously discussed, a 
more appropriate and direct measure of the real performance of a logit model and 
therefore of the predictive accuracy of the model is the Area Under the Receiver Operating 
Characteristics Curve (AUC), and whose output will be discussed shortly. 
 
Model 2, in addition to the accounting ratios, incorporates two macroeconomic 
indicators. Both of them, RPI and SHTBRDEF are statistically significant at 5-1% in the 
model estimated in t-1. In addition, the Nagelkerke’s max rescaled R squared increases 
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from 0.1178 to 0.1298 from Model 1 to the ‘Accounting plus macroeconomic indicators’ 
model (Model 2), implying that the macroeconomic variables contain additional 
information relevant to the prediction of corporate default. However, as discussed, the 
Nagelkerke’s statistic is included for comparison purposes only and not as an appropriate 
measure of the overall predictive accuracy of the model98. Moreover, all of the variables 
included in Model 1 retain their statistical significance as well as the absolute magnitude of 
their coefficient estimates in Model 2 when it is estimated in t-1. However, even if all the 
accounting variables retain their statistical significance when Model 2 is estimated in t-2, 
there is a decline in the significance of the macroeconomic indicators: when Model 2 is 
estimated with information two years prior to the observation of the default event, RPI’s 
significance declines from 5-1% to 10%. SHTBRDEF ceases to be statistically significant 
altogether. These results suggest that accounting ratios are superior in performance to 
macroeconomic indicators when the model is estimated with information two years prior 
to the observation of the default event. The signs of both indicators are also as posited in 
the present study: the positive sign of the RPI’s variable’s estimate indicates that a high 
level of inflation entails an increased likelihood of corporate failure. And the positive sign 
of the SHTBRDEF variable suggests that in a macroeconomic environment characterised 
by a high level of the real rate of interest, all other things being equal, the probability of 
failure for industrial firms increases. However, both macroeconomic regressors’ estimates 
are lower in absolute magnitude than the accounting ratios, RPI displaying the smallest in 
absolute terms, which might suggest a smaller effect of the macroeconomic variables on 
the likelihood of corporate default. 
 
Model 3 in Table 4-6 and 4-7 presents the results from logit regressions of the 
corporate failure indicator on the accounting and macroeconomic predictor variables 
included in Model 2 plus five market variables for the periods t-1 and t-2, respectively: 
firm’s stock prices, lagged abnormal returns, standard deviation of security returns, the 
relative size of the company and the ratio market capitalisation to total debt. All of the 
variables that entered Model 3, with the notable exceptions of COVERAGE and 
IDYRISK, are statistically significant at the 1-5% level when estimated in period t-1. 
COVERAGE and IDYRISK are not statistically significant, but were retained in Model 3 
because they increase the predictive accuracy of the model as measured by the AUC. 
Nevertheless, when the model is estimated in t-2, only two accounting variables, (TFOTL 
                                                        
98 It cannot be interpreted as in linear regression models. In the present case, as the logit methodology is being used to 
estimate the coefficients, it would be erroneous to say that the variables of Model 2 are able to explain a proportion of 
variability in a dataset equal to 12.98%. As discussed, an appropriate and reliable measure of the overall predictive 
accuracy of the model is the area under the receiver operating characteristics curve (AUC), which will be discussed in the 
following lines. 
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and NOCREDINT) and all of the market variables retain their statistical significance at the 
1-5% levels. The only exception is IDYRISK, whose statistical significance marginally 
decreases from 1-5% to 10%. As for the macroeconomic indicators, both RPI and 
SHTBRDEF become insignificant. These results suggest that, when the ‘Full’ model is 
estimated in t-2, market variables are the most consistent set of regressors over time for the 
prediction of corporate default, as only two financial statement variables out of four 
maintain their statistical significance in this period. Interestingly, the variables that entered 
Model 3 with the highest coefficients in absolute terms in t-1 are somewhat different when 
the model is estimated two years prior to default. The variable with the highest magnitude 
in absolute terms in t-1, MCTD, drops to the second place in t-2, to be replaced by 
IDYRISK in the latter period as the variable with the highest coefficient in absolute terms. 
TFOTL drops from the second to the fourth place, from t-1 to t-2, respectively; TLTA 
drops from the third place to the fifth; IDYRISK goes up from the fourth place to the 
first; and ABNRET climbs from the fifth position to the third. In period t-2, the order in 
terms of the absolute magnitude of the coefficients is the following: IDYRISK, MCTD, 
ABNRET, TFOTL and TLTA. It is worth noting that in period t-2 the order of the 
accounting variables relative to the market variables is now inversed, confirming the results 
obtained through the analysis of the statistical significance of the regressors: market 
variables possess superior information relevant to the prediction of default when the model 
is estimated with information two years prior to the event of default. 
 
With regard to the signs of the coefficient estimates, they are all as predicted in the 
present study: a negative sign of the PRICE variable suggests that there is a negative 
relationship between equity price levels and the likelihood of failure for public companies, 
as market equity prices reflect investors’ expectations of future cash flows or earnings, and 
the company’s earnings are in turn affected by its financial position. The sign of the 
ABNRET’s estimate, suggests that, as posited, there is a negative relationship between this 
regressor and the probability of default. Investors do seem to discount the equity of those 
firms that they consider are in a difficult financial position or close to default/bankruptcy, 
and the returns of the company seem to be negatively affected in consequence: individual 
returns of a company outperforming the returns of the FTSE All-Share Index are a sign of 
good financial health and therefore decrease the likelihood of corporate failure. Contrarily, 
company’s returns that fall short to match the FTSE All-Share Index’s returns (negative 
returns) are a consistent predictor of failure over time (this variable is statistically significant 
at the 5-1% level when the model is estimated in both t-1 and t-2).
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Table 4-6 Logit Regression of Default Indicator on Predictor Variables (t-1) 
This table reports results from logit regressions of the default indicator on the predictor variables. The models were computed using the accounts, 
market and macroeconomic data from the year prior to the observation of the corporate default event (t-1). Additionally, results are also presented 
for a ‘Market only’ model and a Market model that incorporates macroeconomic variables (Model 4 and Model 5 respectively) in t-1 for 
comparison purposes. The absolute value of z-statistics is reported in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5%-1%. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
TFOTL -0.9586** 
(4.40) 
-0.9158** 
(4.20) 
-1.0618** 
(3.85) 
  
TLTA 1.7946** 
(6.35) 
1.8134** 
(6.43) 
0.9503** 
(2.74) 
  
NOCREDINT -0.4173** 
(5.46) 
-0.4254** 
(5.56) 
-0.4451** 
(5.01) 
  
COVERAGE -0.6032** 
(6.85) 
-0.5676** 
(6.42) 
-0.1630 
(1.6223) 
  
RPI  
 
0.0210** 
(5.61) 
0.0113** 
(2.83) 
 0.00760** 
(2.05) 
SHTBRDEF  
 
0.2836** 
(5.45) 
0.1768** 
(3.46) 
 0.1521** 
(3.20) 
PRICE   -0.2545** 
(6.83) 
-0.2651** 
(7.58) 
-0.2754** 
(7.74) 
ABNRET   -0.8528** 
(5.25) 
-1.1222** 
(7.35) 
-1.1090** 
(7.26) 
IDYRISK  
 
 0.9671 
(1.46) 
1.7976** 
(3.11) 
1.7046** 
(2.89) 
SIZE   -0.0883** 
(1.97) 
-0.1861** 
(4.65) 
-0.1842** 
(4.52) 
MCTD   
 
-1.1956** 
(4.99) 
-1.4131** 
(7.17) 
-1.3761** 
(6.91) 
Constant -5.0696** 
(29.84) 
-9.4834** 
(11.79) 
-6.4931** 
(6.31) 
-4.4254** 
(7.54) 
-6.0826** 
(6.67) 
Pseudo R2 0.0189 0.0210 0.0392 0.0332 0.0340 
Max-rescaled R2 0.1178 0.1298 0.2261 0.1876 0.1919 
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Table 4-7 Logit Regression of Default Indicator on Predictor Variables (t-2) 
This table reports results from logit regressions of the default indicator on the predictor variables. The models were computed using the accounts, 
market and macroeconomic data from two years prior to the observation of the corporate default event (t-2) in order to confirm their predictive 
ability. Additionally, results are also presented for a ‘Market only’ model and a Market model that incorporates market variables in t-2 for 
comparison purposes. The absolute value of z-statistics is reported in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5%-1%. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
TFOTL -0.8048** 
(3.47) 
-0.7908** 
(3.41) 
-0.8349** 
(2.86) 
  
TLTA 1.3390** 
(4.45) 
1.3432** 
(4.48) 
0.6103 
(1.61) 
  
NOCREDINT -0.2858** 
(3.90) 
-0.2942** 
(4.00) 
-0.1961** 
(2.40) 
  
COVERAGE -0.4322** 
(4.63) 
-0.4075** 
(4.35) 
-0.0127 
(0.12) 
  
RPI  0.00674* 
(1.86) 
-0.00337 
(0.85) 
 -0.00422 
(1.14) 
SHTBRDEF  0.0775 
(1.39) 
-0.0607 
(1.04) 
 -0.0499 
(0.91) 
PRICE   -0.2015** 
(4.84) 
-0.2120** 
(5.38) 
-0.2145** 
(5.40) 
ABNRET   -0.9507** 
(5.44) 
-0.9401** 
(6.04) 
-0.9423** 
(6.03) 
IDYRISK   1.2865* 
(1.76) 
1.9630** 
(3.09) 
2.0769** 
(3.24) 
SIZE   -0.0917** 
(2.05) 
-0.1440** 
(3.56) 
-0.1488** 
(3.63) 
MCTD   -1.1325** 
(4.17) 
-1.1838** 
(5.21) 
-1.1787** 
(5.15) 
Constant -4.6273** 
(26.47) 
-6.0052** 
(7.68) 
-3.1741** 
(3.00) 
-4.0867** 
(6.72) 
-3.2844** 
(3.51) 
Pseudo R2 0.0109 0.0112 0.0244 0.0221 0.0222 
Max-rescaled R2 0.0652 0.0660 0.1388 0.1225 0.1230 
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On the other hand, the sign of IDYRISK seems to confirm the initial prediction of 
this study that the standard deviation of security returns is positively related to the 
probability of default. In other words, the sign of the estimated coefficient confirms that, 
all things being equal, the greater the volatility of security returns, the higher the likelihood 
of default. The sign of MCTD indicates a negative relationship between this variable and 
the probability of corporate default. This study expected this ratio to enhance the 
predictive accuracy of the model and to be consistent over time as it was constructed to 
include, on the one hand, a market approach (through the measure of market capitalisation) 
and, on the other, to solve the problem highlighted in Beaver et al. (2005), namely that the 
variables ABNRET, SIZE and IDYRISK are not scaled in that they are not compared to 
the magnitude of debt outstanding. By including total debt as denominator, it solves the 
problem without giving rise to multicollinearity problems with the variable SIZE. As 
expected, MCTD is a powerful as well as consistent predictor of failure over time (it 
remains statistically significant at the 1-5% level in t-2, and it displays the highest coefficient 
in absolute terms in t-1 and the second in t-2). The sign of the market variable SIZE is also 
as predicted: companies with a high level of SIZE (high market capitalisation relative to the 
FTSE All-Share market capitalisation) are more stable or (and/or well established), 
indicating a good level of the debt holders’ ‘equity cushion,’ far from the ‘strike price’ (or 
the value of liabilities), and therefore judged by investors as capable of serving their debt 
obligations, which lowers the firm’s probability of failure. From Model 3, it can be 
concluded that market variables possess information relevant to the prediction of default 
that complements the information provided by the financial statement indicators. 
Moreover, when Model 3 is estimated in t-2, market variables show a superior performance 
as measured by the temporal consistency suggested by the analysis of their statistical 
significance.  
 
Table 4-8 presents model performance statistics for the five models estimated in 
both t-1 and t-2. The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is a direct and appropriate measure 
of the predictive accuracy of models developed using the logit methodology. DeLong et al. 
(1998) state that argue that ‘when a test is based on an observed variable that lies on a 
continuous grade scale, an assessment of the overall value of the test can be made through 
the use of a receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve.’ 99 Furthermore, Altman et al. 
(2010) state that ‘The ROC curve plots the true positive against the false positive rate as the 
threshold to discriminate between failed and non-failed firms’ changes. The area under the 
ROC curve is a measure of the predictive accuracy of the model, with a value of 1 
                                                        
99 P. 837 
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representing a perfect model.’ Gini rank correlation coefficients 100  and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistics, also presented in Table 4-8, are widely used analysis tools by scoring 
analysts to assess the predictive accuracy of in-sample and hold-out tests (Altman et al., 
2010). The advantage of these tests is that they are easy to interpret and to calculate, as 
both can be derived from the AUC. As Anderson (2007) argues, the Gini rank coefficient 
has been co-opted by credit scoring analysts who employ it as a measure of ‘how well a  
scorecard is able to distinguish between goods and bads’ where ‘the end result is a value 
representing the area under the curve.’ The Gini coefficient is very similar to the AUC, the 
difference being that the former calculates only the area between the curve and the 
diagonal of the Lorenz curve, whereas the latter calculates the full area below the curve101. 
As a reference point, in the context of professional credit scoring analysis, a Gini 
coefficient equal to or above 50% is a very satisfactory level in a retail environment, as 
discussed by Anderson (2007). In the context of the present study, the Gini rank 
coefficient is used in order to complement and check the consistency of the other measures 
presented. 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is performed to measure the maximum vertical 
deviation between two empirical cumulative distribution functions (good and bad) in credit 
score modelling. This measure is, according to Anderson (2007) and Mays (2004), ‘the most 
widely used statistic within the United States for measuring the predictive power of rating 
systems.’ 102 However, Anderson (2007) recommends not using this this statistic (or any 
other measure of the predictive accuracy of a model) in isolation, but rather as a 
complement to others such as the AUC or the Gini rank correlation coefficient, which is 
the approach adopted in the present study. Mays (2004) suggests that the acceptable values 
for this statistic range from 20% to 70%, above which the model is ‘probably too good to 
be true.’ Cox and Snell’s R-squared is a measure based on the log-likelihood of the model, 
the log-likelihood of the original (baseline) model and the sample size, and Nagelkerke’s 
Max-rescaled R-squared is a refinement of the former. In other words, both can be 
considered as measures of the same concept. In general, they can also be interpreted 
similarly (but not identically), to the R-squared in linear regression, as they are measures of 
the significance of the model 103 . The Hosmer-and-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test for 
binary response logistic models is also provided. As discussed by Ragavan (2008), the 
subjects are divided into approximately ten groups of roughly the same size based on the 
                                                        
100 The Gini rank correlation coefficient can be found as the Somer’s D statistic in the SAS software and most statistical 
software packages.  
101 As such, it can be computed as ((2*AUC)-1) following Altman et al. (2010). 
102 Anderson (2007), p. 196 
103 See Cox and Snell (1989) and Nagelkerke (1991). 
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percentiles of the estimated probabilities. The discrepancies between the observed and 
expected number of observations in these groups are summarised by the Pearson chi-
square statistic, which is then compared to a chi-squared distribution with k degrees of 
freedom, where k is the number of groups (11) minus n (2).104 Thus, a small chi-square 
(<15) and a large p-value (>0.05) should suggest that the model is effective to predict the 
behaviour of the data, or that the fitted model is an appropriate one to be employed in 
order to predict the specified binary outcomes in the dataset.  
 
Table 4-8 reports the performance of all the models in the study. From the results 
presented in Section A, which correspond to the models estimated in period t-1, it can be 
concluded that the addition of macroeconomic indicators and specially market variables 
can enhance substantially the performance of corporate default prediction models based on 
financial statement information. Moreover, it is demonstrated that a parsimonious default 
prediction model using information that is widely available to academics as well as 
practitioners, can display a high discriminating and predictive accuracy; in the present 
study, a comprehensive model (Model 3 or the ‘full’ model) that includes a set of three 
types of variables yields an AUC as high as 0.8685 when the model is estimated with 
information available one year prior to the default event. Unsurprisingly, in period t-2, 
when information available two years prior to default is employed, the predictive accuracy 
of the model decreases to 0.8004. These results suggest that the regressors retained in the 
model act as complementary and not as substitutes (or mutually exclusive). It is also 
important to highlight the fact that the high discriminating and predictive power of the full 
model in the present study might be explained by the specific combination of variables, 
which were selected taking into consideration the problems highlighted in previous 
research works with regard to the representation of the main, most likely, and potential 
indicators of corporate failure. A very large number of financial ratios, macroeconomic 
indicators and market variables were tested. Redundant or highly correlated variables (that 
could give rise to multicollinearity problems) were discarded, indicators that have proven 
their contribution to the performance of the models in previous research were included, 
and potentially useful new ones were tested. An example of a new indicator that had not 
yet been tested is the ratio market capitalisation to total debt (MCTD), which proved to 
contain information useful to the prediction of corporate failure. The result was a new 
prediction model with a new set or combination of variables for quoted companies in the 
                                                        
104 P. 10. 
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United Kingdom that proved to be very well positioned relative to previous and well-
known models for the prediction of corporate default105. 
 
The predictive accuracy of Model 1, the ‘accounting only’ model, is enhanced 
(although marginally) when two macroeconomic indicators (RPI and SHTBRDEF) are 
included. As measured by the area under the ROC curve, the performance in t-1 is 
increased from 0.7911 to 0.8032. This suggests that macroeconomic variables contribute 
positively, though marginally, to the performance of a model based on financial statement 
information. As the Gini rank correlation coefficient and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistics are derived from computations based on the level of the AUC, it is not surprising 
that they follow the same pattern as the latter, and fall into the above mentioned highest 
ranges judged as acceptable by credit scoring professionals. Moreover, when market 
variables are incorporated into a comprehensive model that uses accounting ratios and 
macroeconomic indicators as inputs (Model 3), a considerable increase in the predictive 
accuracy of the model can be observed: in period t-1, the AUC is enhanced from 0.8032 to 
0.8685 (from Model 2 to Model 3, respectively); this magnitude of the enhancement 
indicates that market variables contain a substantial amount of information that is not 
available in financial statements but that was taken into consideration by investors and 
market participants and act as a complement to the information provided by accounting 
ratios106. Furthermore, the present study also estimates Model 4 and Model 5 in order to 
directly compare the performance of the ‘accounting only’ model (Model 1) and the 
‘accounting plus macroeconomic variables’ model (Model 2) against the ‘market only’ 
model (Model 4) and the ‘market plus macroeconomic variables’ model (Model 5) 
respectively.  
 
From Panel A in Table 3-9 it can be observed that Model 4 displays an AUC of 
0.8448, which indicates a considerably superior predictive accuracy than Model 1 (AUC = 
0.7911). On the other hand, when macroeconomic indicators are added to both the market 
and accounting models, in Model 5 and Model 2, they display an AUC of 0.8496 and 
0.8032, respectively. It is also important to note that the model with the highest predictive 
                                                        
105 With the advantages of accuracy, simplicity and timeliness. 
106 An example of the information that is not included in financial statements (as by nature they contain only past 
information), might be the information regarding the future prospects of a firm such as an insufficient level of Research 
and Development expenditure, or the negative forecast for a specific industry due to industry-specific micro or 
macroeconomic developments taking place. Information of this kind is typically taken into account by investors and 
market participants in their analysis and is therefore reflected by market variables only such as equity prices or firms’ 
returns.  
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accuracy is Model 3, the ‘full’ model, which yields an AUC of 0.8685; followed by Model 4 
(the market plus macroeconomic indicators model), with an AUC equal to 0.8448; and 
Model 5 (the ‘market only’ model) with an AUC equal to 0.8496. The two accounting 
models follow with a considerable lag: Model 2 AUC is equal to 0.8032 and Model 3 AUC 
is equal to 0.7911. These results clearly indicate that market variables display a superior 
performance relative to accounting variables for the prediction of corporate failure in t-1, 
both in isolation and when macroeconomic indicators are included. 
 
Table 4-8 Model Performance Measures 
This table reports model performance statistics. Panel A shows measures for the five models 
estimated in period t-1, and Panel B displays the same measures for all of the models 
estimated in t-2. Model 1 is the ‘accounting only’ model, Model 2 is the ‘accounting plus 
macroeconomic variables’ model, Model 3 is the ‘full’ model, including market variables in 
addition to the variables in Model 2, Model 4 is the ‘market only’ model, and Model 5 is the 
‘market plus macroeconomic variables’ model. The first measure is a direct measure of the 
predictive accuracy of models estimated using the logit methodology, the Area under the 
Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve (AUC); Gini coefficients, Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistics, Cox and Snell’s R-squared, Nagelkerke’s Max-rescaled R-squared and the models’ 
Chi-squared are also presented. Additionally Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit 
statistics are displayed. 
Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Panel A: Models’ Performance in t-1 
AUC 0.7911 0.8032 0.8685 0.8448 0.8496 
Gini Rank Coefficient 0.5822 0.6064 0.7370 0.6896 0.6992 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.4658 0.4851 0.5896 0.5517 0.5594 
Cox & Snell’s R2  0.0189 0.0210 0.0392 0.0332 0.0340 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.1178 0.1298 0.2261 0.1876 0.1919 
χ2* (4, 6, 11, 5, 7) 346.88 
(P<.0001) 
381.44 
(P<.0001) 
568.37 
(P<.0001) 
520.56 
(P<.0001) 
532.72 
(P<.0001) 
Hosmer & Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test 
χ2 (8) 22.3816 13.9554 13.7600 18.1780 28.9434 
Pr> χ2 <.0043 <.0829 0.0882 0.0199 0.0003 
Panel B: Models’ Performance in t-2 
AUC 0.7140 0.7151 0.8004 0.7870 0.7868 
Gini Rank Coefficient 0.4280 0.4302 0.6008 0.5740 0.5736 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.3424 0.3442 0.4806 0.4592 0.4589 
Cox & Snell’s R2  0.0109 0.0112 0.0244 0.0221 0.0222 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.0652 0.0660 0.1388 0.1225 0.1230 
χ2* (4, 6, 11, 5, 7) 173.8020 
(P<.0001) 
175.3484 
(P<.0001) 
300.7597 
(P<.0001) 
295.1036 
(P<.0001) 
296.3873 
(P<.0001) 
Hosmer & Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test 
χ2 (8) 15.7295 8.3365 14.4307 4.7655 6.6192 
Pr> χ2 0.0464 0.4013 0.0712 0.7823 0.5782 
* the parenthesis following the model’s χ2 represent the degrees of freedom for each 
estimated model: 4 for Model 1, 6 for Model 2, 11 for model 3, 5 for Model 4, and 7 for 
Model 5. 
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Table 4-8 also presents the results of Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit tests. 
According to the results shown in Panel A, Model 3 or the comprehensive model, is the 
most appropriate model to predict the data (to better discriminate and predict the specific 
binary outcomes in the dataset: healthy from failed companies). The test shows that Model 
3 is the model with the smallest chi-squared and the largest p-value, suggesting that it is the 
most adequate. This conclusion finds additional support in the larger AUC of Model 3 
relative to the rest of the models. These results should be, however, treated with caution: 
different results have been obtained in previous research works and its consistency and 
reliability are still subjects of controversy. In t-1, for instance, the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
goodness-of-fit tests show a large chi-square (>15) and a small p-value (<0.05) for Model 4 
and Model 5, the ‘market only’ model and the ‘market plus macroeconomic indicators’ 
model, indicating that, despite a high predictive accuracy, the models might lack other 
independent variables that are capital in order to explain a higher proportion of the 
phenomenon that they are trying to elucidate107. On the other hand, it can be observed that 
the opposite is true for Model 2, which shows a small chi-square (13.9554) and a large p-
value (0.0829), suggesting that this is an adequate model in spite of showing a lower 
predictive accuracy as measured by the AUC than both market models, Model 4 and Model 
5. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the predictive accuracy of the models estimated in t-2 experience a 
decrease, which is consistent with previous default prediction models. However, the same 
patterns can be observed when financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators and 
market variables are combined in a single model. The only exception can be found between 
Model 4 and Model 5; when macroeconomic indicators are added to the ‘market only’ 
model, there is a very small decrease in predictive accuracy (from an AUC of 0.7870 to an 
AUC of 0.7868, respectively), indicating that market variables are (marginally) more reliable 
regressors than macroeconomic indicators when the probability of corporate failure is 
estimated with information available two years prior to the default event (t-2). However, 
because of the inconsequential decrease in performance, it could also be argued that the 
predictive accuracy remains unchanged when macroeconomic indicators are incorporated 
in a market model estimated in t-2. With reference to Model 3, it can be concluded that the 
addition of market variables to Model 2 (estimated in t-2) considerably increases the 
predictive accuracy by an even more impressive magnitude as when it was estimated in 
period t-1: from an AUC of 0.7151 to 0.8004. Furthermore, the Gini rank correlation 
                                                        
107 The same analysis applies for Model 1, which is more consistent with its predictive accuracy: Model 1 shows the lowest 
predictive accuracy and the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit tests show a large chi-square and a small p-value, 
suggesting that the model lack other variables to explain a higher proportion of the phenomenon in question.  
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coefficients as well as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests display patterns consistent with the 
above discussion and confirm the previous results, both the results estimated in t-1 and the 
ones estimated in t-2. Finally, the predictive accuracy of the models presented in this study 
can be located in the high end of the ranges specified by professional credit managers when 
measured through the Gini rank correlation coefficient and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistic. 
 
As stated by Cleves (2002), ‘occasionally, there is a need to compare the predictive 
accuracy of several fitted logit (logistic) or probit models by comparing the areas under the 
corresponding receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves.’ 108 In order to perform the 
comparisons, the present study applies for the first time, in failure prediction models, a 
methodology based on a non-parametric approach that employs the theory developed for 
generalised Man-Whitney U-statistics. The present study follows the methodology 
presented in DeLong et al. (1998) and takes thus into account the correlated nature of the 
data that arises when two or more empirical curves are constructed using tests performed 
on a same set of firms. This issue is paramount  as most of the comparisons of ROC 
curves made in previous studies, not only in the field of finance but also in fields such as 
atmospheric science and medical diagnosis, for which predictions of specific outcomes are 
essential, employ the already available computations in most statistical analysis software 
packages. The problem with this approach is that the models to be compared (derived 
using the same dataset) are estimated on the same number or set of observations. For 
instance, as highlighted by Cleves (2002), when the commands ‘roccontrast’ in SAS or 
‘roccomp’ in STATA are employed to compare the curves after running the logistic 
procedure, the programs use the same number of observations for all models, as they drop 
from the computation any observation109 in which at least one of the covariate values is 
missing (which evidently varies between models). Therefore, difficulties can arise if there 
are missing values included in some models but not in others, as the exclusion of valid 
observations that would have otherwise been used in the normal estimation of the logit 
model, lead to erroneous and inconsistent computations of the area under the receiver 
operating characteristics curve. 
 
                                                        
108 P. 301 
109 Stata’s ‘roccomp’ command also drops from the computation any observation in which at least one of the predicted 
probabilities is missing. See Cleves (2002). 
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The comparison of curves in the present study takes into account the correlated 
nature of the data110, on the one hand, and solves the problem of comparison of two or 
more models using a constant number of observations, on the other. Following DeLong et 
al. (1998) and combining the use of the SAS logistic statistical methodology (PROC 
LOGISTIC) with the ROC macros available from the SAS Institute111, the present study 
reports a very useful visual comparison of the differences in predictive accuracy of the 
‘accounting only’ model, the ‘accounting plus macroeconomic indicators’ model and the 
‘full’ model using a non-parametric approach based on the theory on generalised Man-
Whitney U-statistics. The graphic is constructed plotting the models’ ability to identify true 
positives (sensitivity), on the Y axis, and its ability to detect true negatives (1-specificity). In 
other words, each individual ROC curve is generated (in the field of corporate failure 
prediction models) by plotting the proportion of true failed companies out of the 
companies classified by the model as failed (‘True Positive Rate’) against the proportion of 
false failed companies (healthy companies) out of the firms classified by the model as failed 
(‘False Positive Rate’) at various cutpoints. As to the use and interpretation of the plots’ 
results, ‘if a test could perfectly discriminate, it would have a value above which the entire 
abnormal population would fall and below which all normal values would fall (or vice 
versa). The curve would then pass through the point (0, 1) on the unit grid. The closer a 
ROC curve comes to this ideal point, the better its discriminating ability. A test with no 
discriminating ability will produce a curve that follows the diagonal of the grid.’ 112 
Additionally, the areas under the receiver operating characteristics curve of the three fitted 
models are tested for equality, where an overall p-value below 0.05 is indicative of 
differences between the areas. In other words, an overall p-value <0.05 signifies that the 
null hypothesis of equality of areas under the ROC curve can be rejected, thus confirming 
the reliability of the results.  
 
The nonparametric comparison of the areas under correlated ROC based on the 
theory developed for generalised Man-Whitney U-statistics was performed, initially, on 
three models estimated in t-1: the ‘accounting only’ model, the ‘accounting plus 
macroeconomic indicators’ model, and the ‘full’ model that includes market variables. 
Then, another comparison based on the area under the ROC curve was performed 
between the ‘full’ model and the two market-based model (the ‘market only’ model and the 
                                                        
110 The implicit correlation between the curves when two or more empirical curves are constructed using tests performed 
on a same set of firms. 
111 The use of the SAS PROC LOGISTIC and the macros available from the SAS Institute results in a method capable of 
comparing each model’s receiver operating characteristics area computed using the entire available number of 
observations specific to each individual model and not a constant number of observations for all models, thus avoiding 
the problem highlighted by Cleves (2002). 
112 DeLong et al. (1988), p. 837 
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‘market plus macroeconomic indicators’ model)  with the aim of presenting graphically the 
increase in predictive accuracy of a comprehensive model (including financial statement 
information, macroeconomic indicators and market variables) relative to models based on 
financial information and market variables respectively, on the one hand, and to test 
whether the AUC differs statistically between the models, on the other. Moreover, the 
above procedure for the three models estimated in t-1 was repeated for the same three 
models estimated in t-2. The present study presents thus four figures allowing a 
comparison between models and between estimation periods that facilitates the analysis of 
the differences in predictive accuracy as well as the contribution of the different sets of 
variables (financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators, and market variables) over 
time. Figures 4-1 to 4-4 show a graphic representation of the discussion drawn from Table 
3-9, with regard to the differences in the predictive accuracy of the models through the 
interpretation of their respective AUCs. First, with regard to the macroeconomic 
indicators, it can be confirmed that they contribute positively (though marginally) to the 
performance of the accounting model when it is estimated in both periods t-1 and t-2. The 
same analysis applies when macroeconomic indicators are added to the market model in t-
1; they contribute positively but marginally to its predictive accuracy. However, the results 
are less conclusive when macroeconomic indicators are added to the market model in t-2: 
their inclusion even results in a very small decrease in performance. It can be thus 
concluded that market variables contain more information relevant to the prediction of 
corporate default than macroeconomic indicators when the model is estimated with 
information two years prior to the event of default.  
 
Second, the figures show that when the comprehensive (Model 3 or ‘full’ model) 
model is employed as a benchmark to assess the individual performance of the accounting 
(Figure 3-1 and 3-3) and market (Figure 3-2 and 3-4) models respectively, the ‘full’ model 
performs better than both of them individually. In other words, this clearly suggest that the 
likelihood of default is better captured by models that combine accounting and market 
variables than by individual models using one or the other set of variables in isolation. 
Third, the figures clearly show that the distance between the ROC curves of the market 
models and the comprehensive model are considerably smaller than the distance between 
the ROC curves of the accounting models and the comprehensive model in both t-1 and t-
2. This indicates that the benefit of including market variables to an accounting model is 
greater than the benefit of including accounting variables to a market model: moreover, 
when the models are estimated in t-2 the distance is smallest between the market and 
comprehensive models, suggesting that they perform very similarly when they are estimated 
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using information two years prior to the event of default. In other words, when employed 
in isolation, market variables seem to possess a higher explanatory power than accounting 
variables, as the performance of market variables closely follows the performance of the 
‘full’ model, especially in t-2, where the difference is smallest. Finally, it is interesting to 
note that the four comparisons of the areas under the curve show an overall p-value =< 
0.0001, which indicates that the null hypothesis (H0) of equality of areas under the ROC 
curve can be rejected. In other words, the small p-value resulting from the test strongly 
suggests that the three areas differ statistically and that therefore the analysis is reliable. 
 
 
Figure 4-1 Comparison of Areas under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve of 
Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 estimated in period t-1 
The figure plots the AUC of the ‘accounting only’ model, the ‘accounting plus macroeconomic 
indicators’ model and the ‘full’ model, including market variables; Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 
respectively, estimated in period t-1. The comparison was performed using the non-parametric 
method to compare areas under correlated ROC curves presented in DeLong et al. (1988), where 
Model 1 AUC = 0.7911, Model 2 AUC = 0.8032, and Model 3 AUC = 0.8685. The discriminating 
accuracy of a model’s AUC equal to the diagonal line in the graphic (0.50) would be no different 
than a random guess. Conversely, an AUC equal to 1 would signify that the model is able to 
perfectly discriminate the binary outcomes. Therefore, the closer the real value of an AUC to this 
theoretical value, the better its discriminating ability. The overall p-value =< 0.0001 indicates that 
the null hypothesis of equality of areas under the ROC curve can be rejected. In other words, the 
small p-value of this test strongly suggests that the three areas differ statistically. 
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Figure 4-2 Comparison of Areas under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve of 
Model 3, Model 4, and Model 5 estimated in period t-1 
The figure plots the AUC of the ‘full’ model, the ‘market only’ model and the ‘market plus 
macroeconomic indicators’ model; Model 3, Model 4, and Model 5 respectively, estimated in period 
t-1. The comparison was performed using the non-parametric method to compare areas under 
correlated ROC curves presented in DeLong et al. (1988), where Model 3 AUC = 0.8685, Model 4 
AUC = 0.8448, and Model 5 AUC = 0.8496. The discriminating accuracy of a model’s AUC equal 
to the diagonal line in the graphic (0.50) would be no different than a random guess. Conversely, an 
AUC equal to 1 would signify that the model is able to perfectly discriminate the binary outcomes. 
Therefore, the closer the real value of an AUC to this theoretical value, the better its discriminating 
ability. The overall p-value =< 0.0001 indicates that the null hypothesis of equality of areas under 
the ROC curve can be rejected. In other words, the small p-value of this test strongly suggests that 
the three areas differ statistically. 
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Figure 4-3 Comparison of Areas under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve of 
Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 estimated in period t-2 
The figure plots the AUC of the ‘accounting only’ model, the ‘accounting plus macroeconomic 
indicators’ model and the ‘full’ model, including market variables; Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 
respectively, estimated in period t-2. The comparison was performed using the non-parametric 
method to compare areas under correlated ROC curves presented in DeLong et al. (1988), where 
Model 1 AUC = 0.7140, Model 2 AUC = 0.7151, and Model 3 AUC = 0.8004. The discriminating 
accuracy of a model’s AUC equal to the diagonal line in the graphic (0.50) would be no different 
than a random guess. Conversely, an AUC equal to 1 would signify that the model is able to 
perfectly discriminate the binary outcomes. Therefore, the closer the real value of an AUC to this 
theoretical value, the better its discriminating ability. The overall p-value =< 0.0001 indicates that 
the null hypothesis of equality of areas under the ROC curve can be rejected. In other words, the 
small p-value of this test strongly suggests that the three areas differ statistically. 
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Figure 4-4 Comparison of Areas under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve of 
Model 3, Model 4, and Model 5 estimated in period t-2 
The figure plots the AUC of the ‘full’ model, the ‘market only’ model and the ‘market plus 
macroeconomic indicators’ model; Model 3, Model 4, and Model 5 respectively, estimated in period 
t-2. The comparison was performed using the non-parametric method to compare areas under 
correlated ROC curves presented in DeLong et al. (1988), where Model 3 AUC = 0.8004, Model 4 
AUC = 0.7870, and Model 5 AUC = 0.7868. The discriminating accuracy of a model’s AUC equal 
to the diagonal line in the graphic (0.50) would be no different than a random guess. Conversely, an 
AUC equal to 1 would signify that the model is able to perfectly discriminate the binary outcomes. 
Therefore, the closer the real value of an AUC to this theoretical value, the better its discriminating 
ability. The overall p-value =< 0.0001 indicates that the null hypothesis of equality of areas under 
the ROC curve can be rejected. In other words, the small p-value of this test strongly suggests that 
the three areas differ statistically. 
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4.6.1. Marginal Effects and Changes in Predicted Probabilities.  
 
The parameters estimated from binary response models, unlike those estimated by 
linear models, cannot be directly interpreted because they do not provide useful 
information that fully describes the relationship between the independent variables and the 
outcome (Long and Freese, 2003). Previous financial distress and corporate failure 
prediction models constructed using binary response methodologies invariably focus on 
the overall discriminating and/or predictive accuracy of the models and very rarely do they 
provide an interpretation of the relationship between the predictor variables and the binary 
outcome. Such studies report solely the estimates obtained from binary response models 
and provide an interpretation of the direction of the relationship based on the sign of the 
estimate. Nevertheless, the basic output (the coefficient estimates) obtained by performing 
binary response models cannot explain the effects of the individual variables on the 
model’s outcomes because of their non-linear nature. Marginal effects and changes in 
predicted probabilities are appropriate tools to treat this issue. 
 
This section presents results of the computation of marginal effects of individual 
regressors as well as graphic representations of predicted probabilities of failed companies. 
This section intends to fill an important gap in the default/financial distress prediction 
literature, where the measurement of expected instantaneous changes in the response 
variable (corporate default in the present study) as a function of a change in a specific 
predictor variables while keeping all the other covariates constant, has been overlooked. As 
previously discussed, marginal effects measurements (defines as the computation of the 
partial derivative of the event probability with respect to the predictor of interest) are very 
useful to the interpretation of the individual effects of the regressors on the dependent 
variable in discrete dependent variable models, or binary response models (logit regression 
in the present study). With regard to their calculation, the present’s study’s methodology 
consists of outputting the marginal effects estimated at each observation in the dataset and 
then computing the sample average of individual marginal effects in order to obtain the 
overall marginal effects. SAS statistical software code was employed to generate the 
estimated marginal effects. Figures of changes in predicted probabilities were generated by 
plotting the vector reflecting the variations in the predicted probability of default (the 
predicted probability that the failure indicator, Corporate_Default = 1) when the change in 
an individual regressor ranges from its approximate minimum to its maximum observed 
value, keeping all the other covariates constant at their means113. 
                                                        
113 The SAS statistical package was also employed for this calculation.  
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Table 4-9 Marginal Effects 
This table reports the marginal effects (in percentages) for the ‘accounting only’ model, the 
‘accounting plus macroeconomic indicators’ model, the ‘full’ model including also market variables, 
or Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 respectively. Additionally, marginal effects are generated for a 
‘market only’ model and a ‘market plus macroeconomic variables,’ Model 4 and Model 5, for 
comparison purposes. n represents the number of observations. Marginal effects are intended to 
measure the expected instantaneous changes in the response variable (the corporate default 
indicator) as a function of a change in a specific predictor variable while keeping all the other 
covariates constant. The methodology used in the present study to generate the marginal effects 
consists of outputting the individual marginal effects estimated at each observation in the dataset 
and then calculating their sample average in order to obtain the overall marginal effect. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 
TFOTL -1.592 -1.438 -1.529 -1.431 -1.842 -1.537     
TLTA 2.980 2.392 3.028 2.431 1.648 1.123     
NOCREDINT -0.693 -0.511 -0.710 -0.532 -0.772 -0.361     
COVERAGE -1.002 -0.772 -0.948 -0.737 -0.283 -0.023     
RPI   0.035 0.012 0.020 -0.006   0.014 -0.008 
SHTBRDEF   0.474 0.140 0.307 -0.112   0.276 -0.096 
PRICE     -0.441 -0.371 -0.483 -0.408 -0.500 -0.413 
ABNRET     -1.479 -1.750 -2.046 -1.810 -2.012 -1.813 
IDYRISK     1.678 2.368 3.278 3.779 3.093 3.996 
SIZE     -0.153 -0.169 -0.339 -0.277 -0.334 -0.286 
MCTD     -2.074 -2.085 -2.577 -2.279 -2.497 -2.268 
n 18,276 15,909 18,070 15,703 14,255 12,249 15,468 13,263 15,468 13,263 
 
The marginal effects presented in Table 4-9 reflect a measure of the impact of the 
regressors on the response variable. Marginal effects were computed for all five models 
with information one and two years prior to the event of default, for comparison purposes. 
The predictor variable with the largest absolute impact in Model 1 and Model 2 (the 
accounting-based models) is TLTA, followed by TFOTL, COVERAGE and CREDINT, 
in decreasing order of magnitude. The same analysis holds when the models are estimated 
in both t-1 and t-2, invariably. The macroeconomic variables RPI and SHTBRDEF yield 
the smallest impact on the expected instantaneous changes in the response variable while 
keeping all other covariates constant. A clear pattern is also observed for the market based 
models (Model 4 and Model 5); the regressor with the largest impact in absolute terms is 
IDYRISK, followed by MCTD, ABNRET and PRICE, in decreasing order of magnitude 
in both t-1 and t-2. Similar to the accounting-based models, the macroeconomic variables 
display the smallest individual impact on the expected instantaneous changes in the 
response variables corporate default while keeping all other covariates constant. Finally, 
from the overall marginal effects for the comprehensive model (Model 3), it can be 
observed that the regressor with the largest absolute impact is MCTD in t-1 and IDYRISK 
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in t-2, both market variables. The analysis of the relative effects of individual regressors 
included in the ‘full’ model reflects an important finding: when the model is estimated with 
information one year prior to the event of corporate default both market and accounting 
variable seem to have very similar individual effects on the response variable, however, 
when Model 3 is estimated with information two years prior to the event of default, market 
variables seem to have the largest absolute impact, suggesting that market variables 
perform better than accounting variables in t-2. In t-1, the decreasing order of magnitude 
(in absolute terms) of the regressors of Model 3 is as follows: MCTD, TFOTL, IDYRISK, 
TLTA, and ABNRET; whereas in t-2 the order is IDYRISK, MCTD, ABNRET, TFOTL, 
and TLTA. It can be therefore concluded that market variables do contain additional 
information (performing even better that accounting variables in t-2) that is relevant to the 
prediction of corporate failure and that they perform best when they are used as 
complements to financial ratios. 
 
Presenting and analysing marginal effects for all the models in the study filled a gap 
in the default prediction literature that lacked a measure of the individual instantaneous 
contribution of a change of a specific variable on the response variable (the specific 
definition of corporate failure used in the present analysis), while keeping all other 
regressors constant. Additionally, the present study goes further by presenting the vector of 
predicted probabilities for all the individual variables’ specific minimum and maximum 
ranges where they have the most impact in the likelihood of corporate default, while 
keeping all the other covariates constant at their respective means. Thus, figures 3-4, 3-5, 
and 3-6 show the changes in predicted probabilities for accounting, macroeconomic and 
market variables, respectively, when the Corporate Default indicator is equal to 1. The 
importance of these figures is that they clearly show the magnitude as well as the 
directionality of each regressor reflected by the slope and inclination of the vectors, plotted 
at various levels of the independent variables. 
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Figure 4-5 Changes in Predicted Probabilities – Financial Statement Ratios 
The figure plots the vectors reflecting changes in predicted probabilities (for Corporate Default 
= 1) at different levels of the accounting independent variables Total Funds from Operations to 
Total Liabilities (TFOTL), Total Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA), the No Credit Interval 
(NOCREDINT), and Interest Coverage (COVERAGE), keeping all the other covariates 
constant at their mean values (TFOTL = 0.09, TLTA = 0.495, NOCREDINT = -0.18, 
COVERAGE = 0.582, RPI = 178.4, SHTBRDEF = 2.058, PRICE = 4.409, ABNRET = -0.1, 
IDYRISK = 0.122, SIZE = -10.1, MCTD = 0.913). The computation was made taking into 
account all the variables included in the ‘Full’ model or Model 3 (financial statement ratios, 
macroeconomic indicators and market variables). Predicted probabilities are estimated employing 
an approximate value of the minimum and maximum ranges of the independent variables. In this 
way, the predicted probabilities for all levels of a variable can be observed. This figure reports the 
predicted probabilities for the ‘Full’ model estimated in period t-1, the vectors estimated using 
the full model in t-2 have very similar shapes, so they were not reported in the present study. 
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Figure 4-6 Changes in Predicted Probabilities – Market Variables 
The figure plots the vectors reflecting changes in predicted probabilities (for Corporate Default 
= 1) at different levels of the market independent variables Share Price (PRICE), Abnormal 
Returns (ABNRET), the relative Size of the company (SIZE), and the ratio Market 
Capitalisation to Total Debt (MCTD), keeping all the other covariates constant at their mean 
values  (TFOTL = 0.09, TLTA = 0.495, NOCREDINT = -0.18, COVERAGE = 0.582, RPI = 
178.4, SHTBRDEF = 2.058, PRICE = 4.409, ABNRET = -0.1, IDYRISK = 0.122, SIZE = -
10.1, MCTD = 0.913). The computation was made taking into account all the variables 
included in the ‘Full’ model or Model 3 (financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators 
and market variables). Predicted probabilities are estimated employing an approximate value of 
the minimum and maximum ranges of the independent variables. In this way, the predicted 
probabilities for all levels of a variable can be observed. This figure reports the predicted 
probabilities for the ‘Full’ model estimated in period t-1, the vectors estimated using the full 
model in t-2 have very similar shapes, so they were not reported in the present study. 
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Figure 4-7 Changes in Predicted Probabilities – Macroeconomic Indicators 
The figure plots the vectors reflecting changes in predicted probabilities (for Corporate Default 
= 1) at different levels of the macroeconomic  independent variables Retail Price Index (RPI), 
and the proxy for interest rates, the Deflated Short Term Bill Rate (SHTBRDEF), keeping all the 
other covariates constant at their mean values  (TFOTL = 0.09, TLTA = 0.495, NOCREDINT 
= -0.18, COVERAGE = 0.582, RPI = 178.4, SHTBRDEF = 2.058, PRICE = 4.409, ABNRET 
= -0.1, IDYRISK = 0.122, SIZE = -10.1, MCTD = 0.913). The computation was made taking 
into account all the variables included in the ‘Full’ model or Model 3 (financial statement ratios, 
macroeconomic indicators and market variables). Predicted probabilities are estimated employing 
an approximate value of the minimum and maximum ranges of the independent variables. In this 
way, the predicted probabilities for all levels of a variable can be observed. This figure reports the 
predicted probabilities for the ‘Full’ model estimated in period t-1, the vectors estimated using 
the full model in t-2 have very similar shapes, so they were not reported in the present study. 
 
Figure 4-5 shows the behaviour of the predicted probabilities of corporate default 
at different values of each of the financial statement ratios. From the figure we can observe 
that the TFOTL variable displays the steepest slope relative to the other ratios, indicating 
that a given change in the level of this variable 114 will have the largest impact on the 
predicted probability of corporate failure, when all other variables are kept constant at their 
means. The slope of the TFOTL vector also shows that there is a negative relationship 
between the predicted probability and the level of the variable: there is a considerable 
decrease of the predicted probabilities of corporate default as the TFOTL variable 
approaches its maximum value (1) after being transformed using the TANH function. The 
second variable in importance is TLTA: unlike TFOTL, there is a positive relationship 
between this ratio and the probability of corporate default. This analysis is consistent with 
the prediction of the present study, as TLTA is a measure of financial leverage: the higher 
the level of the variable, the greater the probability of failure. However, the impact is not as 
important as it is in the case of TFOTL as it can be observed that TLTA’s slope is less 
steep than the firm’s performance measure one. In other words, a change in its value 
produces a smaller effect than the one observed when there is a change in the magnitude of 
TFOTL, as shown by the slope of the vector. Changes in the magnitude of NOCREDINT, 
on the other hand, are negatively related to the probability of corporate default, an can be 
                                                        
114 Reflecting a measure of the firm’s performance. 
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considered as having the third most important impact among financial statement ratios, 
followed by COVERAGE, whose slope is almost flat, indicating a very small negative 
impact. 
 
As posited, the market-based variables PRICE, ABNRET, SIZE, and MCTD 
display a negative relationship between variations in individual levels and predicted 
probabilities of corporate default. Also as expected, only the proxy for the firm’s volatility 
of returns is positively related to the likelihood of default. The covariate with the largest 
impact is PRICE, as its vector displays the steepest slope, meaning that a change in the 
level of this variable (relative to the other covariates) will produce the highest change in the 
probability of failure. It is followed by MCTD, ABNRET, SIZE, and IDYRISK. 
Interestingly, the vectors’ slopes of the macroeconomic indicators RPI and SHTBRDEF 
are steeper than the financial statement ratios TLTA, NOCREDINT, and COVERAGE, 
which could lead us to conclude that the have a larger impact on the predicted probability 
of corporate failure than the estimates of marginal effects would suggest. Nevertheless, this 
is hardly the case, as the ranges used to plot the slopes of the macroeconomic indicators 
are larger in absolute terms than those of the three financial statement ratios, which might 
explain the observed phenomenon. 
 
4.6.2. Classification Accuracy Tables. 
 
Classification tables have been used in previous works as additional tools to 
measure the predictive accuracy of the default/bankruptcy prediction models. Departing 
from this, the present study employs a more appropriate methodology that helps alleviate 
estimation bias. In order to classify a set of binary data, previous research works employ 
the same observations used to fit the model to estimate the classification error, resulting in 
biased error-count estimates. In other words, the widely-used 2x2 frequency tables’ 
estimates, where correctly classified observations are displayed on the main diagonal of the 
table, are derived using all observations needed to fit the model. Intuitively therefore, any 
results are subjected to estimation bias since each observation has an effect on the model 
used to classify itself. One approach to reduce this bias, is ‘to remove the binary 
observation to be classified from the data, reestimate the parameters of the model, and 
then classify the observation based on the new parameter estimates115 .’ However, this 
method proves computational expensive for very large datasets. Therefore the present 
                                                        
115 SAS Institute 
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study employs a logistic regression specification that provides a less computationally 
demanding one step approximation to the preceding parameter estimates116. The leave-one 
out jack knife approach is thus to employed to correct for over-sampling issues and to help 
alleviate potential biases common to analysis of classification tables that do not use a 
holdout sample. 
 
In order to construct a bias-adjusted classification table, predicted corporate default 
event probabilities are estimated for each observation. If the predicted event probability 
equals or exceeds a given cutpoint value (whose real line is mapped onto [0,1]), then the 
observation is predicted to be in default, otherwise, it is predicted to be a non-event or a 
healthy firm. The probability levels chosen range from 0.010 to 0.060 in order to get high 
levels of Sensitivity and Specificity, combined as well as individually. The advantage of this 
methodology to construct classification tables is that it provides a useful tool to re-calibrate 
a default prediction model with different probability cutpoints depending on the costs 
assigned to the Type I and Type II errors.  
 
The present study measures the accuracy of the classification through its Sensitivity 
(the ability of the model to predict a corporate default event correctly) and Specificity (the 
ability of the model to predict a non-default event correctly). In Table 4-10, the ‘Correct’ 
column shows the number of observations that were correctly predicted as failed and non-
failed, respectively. The ‘Incorrect ‘column presents the number of non-failed observations 
that were incorrectly predicted as failed, and the number of failed observations that were 
incorrectly predicted as non-failed, respectively. The ‘Percentages’ column exhibits the rate 
of correct classifications, the proportion of corporate default responses that were predicted 
to be default events (Sensitivity, or the ability of the model to predict failure correctly), and 
the rate of non-default responses that were predicted to be non-default events (Specificity 
or the ability of the model to predict non-default events correctly), respectively.  
 
Biased-adjusted classification tables were calculated for Model 2 (the ‘Accounting 
plus macroeconomic indicators’ model) and Model 3 (the ‘Full’ model) in order to assess 
the change in the classification accuracy when market variables are added to a model based 
on financial statement ratios (Panel A and Panel B in Table 4-10, respectively). 
Furthermore, Table 4-10 also exhibits a classification table for Model 3 estimated in period 
t-2 (Panel C) in order to test whether the ‘Full’ model continues to be useful in predicting 
                                                        
116 http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/statug/63033/HTML/default/viewer.htm#statug_logistic_sect037.ht
m 
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corporate default two years prior to the default event, thus confirming its predictive 
accuracy. In order to assess the classification accuracy, the probability level 0.020 was 
chosen as benchmark. The reason for this choice is that, first, this level is equal to the rate 
of failed to healthy companies for which complete data made the computation of predicted 
probabilities possible; and second, at this specific level, we obtain the smallest differences 
of Sensitivity and Specificity; at levels different than the 0.020 cutpoint, the trade-off (the 
gap between Sensitivity and Specificity) between the two measures is higher. It is concluded 
that, at a probability level of 0.020, there is a visible increase in classification performance 
from Model 2 to Model 3, which suggests that market variables provide information 
relevant to the prediction of corporate default that is not included in financial statement 
ratios or macroeconomic indicators. The increase in predictive accuracy when market 
variables are added to the ‘Accounting plus macroeconomic indicators’ model is equal to 
2.4 percentage points as measured by the proportion of overall correct classifications in 
column 6 of table 3-10, at the 0.020 probability level (in bold) as cutpoint value: from 77.5 
to 79.9 per cent of correct classifications in Model 2 and Model 3, respectively. This 
improvement in classification accuracy indicates that the three types of variables act as 
complementary, confirming the previous results obtained from the analysis of areas under 
the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve. 
 
Unsurprisingly, when Model 3 is estimated in period t-2, the rate of correct 
classifications decreases from 79.9 to 75.6, or 4.3 percentage points relative to the same 
model estimated in period t-1, at the same 0.020 probability cutpoint. This suggests that the 
‘Full’ model maintains a very decent level of accuracy to predict corporate failure two years 
prior to the event.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, the present classification accuracy table possesses the 
advantage of allowing a risk manager to calculate higher percentages of Sensitivity and 
Specificity individually. This is particularly useful as Type I and Type II errors are not 
equally weighed by practitioners. A false positive error is not as expensive as a false 
negative: the cost of a firm predicted as failed when it is in fact healthy, is less than the cost 
of a firm predicted as healthy when it is in fact failed. Therefore, if this is the case, a risk 
manager would be more interested in increasing the rate of correctly classified failed firms 
(Sensitivity), choosing a lower probability level as cutpoint.117  
  
                                                        
117 In this case the predicted probability used as cut point would have to be lower than the 0.020 level. 
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Table 4-10 Bias-Adjusted Classification Table 
This table reports a biased-adjusted classification table for predicted default frequencies at 
different probability levels as cut-off values for Model 2 estimated in period t-1, and Model 3 
estimated in period t-1 and t-2, in panels A, B and C respectively. The ‘Correct’ column shows 
the number of observations that were correctly predicted as failed and non-failed, respectively. 
The ‘Incorrect’ column presents the number of non-failed observations that were incorrectly 
predicted as failed, and the number of failed observations that were incorrectly predicted as non-
failed, respectively. The ‘Percentages’ column exhibits the rate of correct classifications, the 
proportion of default responses that were predicted to be corporate default events (Sensitivity, or 
the ability of the model to predict failure correctly), and the rate of non-failure responses that 
were predicted to be non-failure events (Specificity, or the ability of the model to predict non-
failure correctly), respectively. 
Probability 
Level 
Correct Incorrect Percentages 
Failed 
Non-
Failed 
Failed 
Non-
Failed 
Correct Sensitivity Specificity 
Panel A:  Model 2 (t-1) 
0.010 281 9273 8364 34 53.2 89.2 52.6 
0.020 212 13701 3936 103 77.5 67.3 77.7 
0.030 164 15391 2246 151 86.6 52.1 87.3 
0.040 133 16006 1631 182 89.9 42.2 90.8 
0.050 112 16387 1250 203 91.9 35.6 92.9 
0.060 83 16706 931 232 93.5 26.3 94.7 
Panel B: Model 3 (t-1) 
0.010 246 9061 4868 28 65.5 89.8 65.1 
0.020 217 11128 2801 57 79.9 79.2 79.9 
0.030 189 11994 1935 85 85.8 69 86.1 
0.040 172 12452 1477 102 88.9 62.8 89.4 
0.050 148 12770 1159 126 91 54 91.7 
0.060 135 12976 953 139 92.3 49.3 93.2 
Panel C: Model 3 (t-2) 
0.010 210 6140 5816 29 52.1 87.9 51.4 
0.020 171 9052 2904 68 75.6 71.5 75.7 
0.030 132 10121 1835 107 84.1 55.2 84.7 
0.040 106 10648 1308 133 88.2 44.4 89.1 
0.050 86 10988 968 153 90.8 36 91.9 
0.060 76 11232 724 163 92.7 31.8 93.9 
 
This would be achieved, however, only at the cost of reducing the ability of the 
model to predict non-default events correctly (Specificity). The present study presented the 
rates of Specificity and Sensitivity at different probability levels as cutpoints to show the 
practical use of this approach to measure the accuracy of a corporate default prediction 
model and its advantages in relation to the widely employed 2x2 frequency tables that 
implicitly assign equal weights to type I and Type II errors. 
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4.6.3. Model Validation. 
 
In order to validate the performance of the model, the main database was 
subdivided in two sub-periods: 2001-2006. The first one corresponds to the period after 
the collapse of the information technology bubble, which took place during 2000-2001, and 
the second one is the period following the global financial crisis of 2007-2011. Model 3 was 
applied to the two sub-periods in order to test whether the predictive accuracy holds when 
the model is estimated one year prior to the event of corporate default. As shown in Table 
4-11, the predictive accuracy experiences only a very small decline when the model is tested 
using the two sub-period data: from an AUC of 0.8685 for the period 1980-2011 to 0.8636 
for the period 2001-2006 and 0.8661 for the period 2007-2011. The decrease is less than 
one percentage point in both cases. Furthermore, the differences between sub-periods are 
also very small (also less than one percentage point) suggesting that the model is very 
consistent over time. As expected, there is a visible decline in the predictive accuracy when 
the model is estimated with information two years prior to the event of default. But despite 
the expected decrease in performance of the model in t-2, the model retains a high 
predictive accuracy overall. 
 
Table 4-11 Model Validation – Areas Under the ROC Curve 
This table reports the model validation results for Model 3 estimated in period t-1 and t-2. The main 
dataset was divided in two sub-periods. The first one, 2001-2006, corresponds to the periods after 
the collapse of the information technology bubble, and the second one, 2007-2011, is the period 
that follows the global financial crisis that started in 2007. The predictive accuracy or the overall 
performance of the model is measured by the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics 
curve. 
 1980-2011 2001-2006 2007-2011 
Model 3 in t-1 0.8685 0.8636 0.8661 
Model 3 in t-2 0.8004 0.7795 0.8208 
 
4.7. Conclusions. 
 
In précis, the present study develops a new model tasked for the prediction of 
corporate default for quoted companies in the United Kingdom based on the Christidis 
and Gregory (2010) definition of corporate failure. Information used for the model comes 
courtesy of widely available data provided by the London Share Price Database (LSPD). 
Following the approach employed in Christidis and Gregory (2010), the focus of the 
present study is on firm insolvency and, as such, a firm was classified as failed when it was 
deemed to have formally defaulted on its obligations. This study’s definition of corporate 
failure is based upon the types of death available in the LSPD and represents thus the last 
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stage of financial distress: default, which can be viewed as the outcome of a process. 
Furthermore, in order to provide a ‘clean’ measure of the outcome (or the dependent 
variable), we classify a firm as failed if its status is one of the following: in liquidation, 
suspension, receivership, or cancellation. The advantage of this choice is that it was built 
with information specific to the United Kingdom’s legal environment and that it 
constitutes a highly visible event that can be objectively dated, satisfying thus the 
requirements of binary choice models that the populations of failing and non-failing firms 
be well defined and clearly separated from each other.  
 
The overarching contribution of the present study to the default prediction 
literature is the use of a more exact and appropriate definition of corporate failure. Second, 
a large dataset was built merging different types of information from data sources widely 
available to the academic as well as to the industry fields. Consequently this study relies not 
only on independent variables used in previous research works, but also uses a multi-level 
empirical procedure which tests and selects explanatory variables based on the individual 
contribution of coefficients to the model’s explanatory power. In addition, this study 
employs for the first time in default prediction models, the hyperbolic tangent function to 
transform the variables included in the models in order to generate a linear transformation 
for input values located near expected values while reducing those that are outside the 
expected range. The advantage is that this method provides a formal solution to the 
recurrent problem of the presence of outliers that could have an abnormal impact on the 
fitted maximum likelihood linear predictors, as well as on the size of residuals from the 
resultant binary panel logistic regression.  
Separately, this study presents a rationale for the use of each of the retained 
variables in the fitted models. The result is a corporate failure prediction model that yields 
high classification and predictive accuracy relative to previous research works. Third, using 
this definition of failure, the panel logit methodology is employed in order to provide a 
comparison of the classification accuracy and predictive power, through the analysis of 
individual as well as overall contributions, of three types of variables: financial statement 
ratios, macroeconomic indicators and market-based variables.  
 
To our knowledge, this is the first time that such an analysis is carried out in the 
default prediction literature for listed companies in the United Kingdom. Prior research has 
tested the ability of market variables to predict bankruptcy employing methodologies such 
as the Black and Scholes Contingent claims or option-based approach. However, the 
results obtained from these models (that entail numerous restrictive assumptions) have 
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been controversial. Many studies have focused on demonstrating the superiority of market-
based models over accounting-based models and vice-versa, and the relevance of 
macroeconomic variables to the prediction of corporate default has rarely been tested. To 
this point, the default prediction literature is characterised by a competing approach where 
there is a clear division line between market and accounting variables. The present study 
adopts a different approach where the use of the three types of variables is not mutually 
exclusive. It is tested whether the market variables (dependent, in some measure, upon the 
same financial information) and macroeconomic indicators add information that is not 
contained in financial statements and therefore act as complement in default prediction 
models. The results presented in this study clearly indicate that this is the case: the 
comprehensive model (Model 3) yields the best performance in both t-1 and t-2. With 
regard to the inclusion of market variables to an accounting-based model (that also 
included macroeconomic indicators), the considerable increase of the area under the 
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve, from 0.8032 to 0.8685 in a model 
estimated in t-1 and from 0.7151 to 0.8004 in a model estimated in t-2, indicates that market 
variables contain a substantial amount of information relevant to the estimation of the 
likelihood of corporate default that is not included in financial statement ratios.  
 
A comparison of areas under correlated ROC curves (AUC) performed using a 
non-parametric method based on the theory on generalised Man-Whitney U-statistics, and 
the estimation of biased-adjusted classification tables confirmed these results. Furthermore, 
an analysis of these figures reveals that the distance between the ROC curves of the market 
models and the comprehensive model are considerably smaller than the distance between 
the ROC curves of the accounting models and the comprehensive model in both t-1 and t-
2. This indicates that the benefit of including market variables to an accounting model is 
greater than the benefit of including accounting variables to a market model: moreover, 
when the models are estimated in t-2 the distance is smallest between the market and 
comprehensive models, suggesting that they perform very similarly when they are estimated 
using information two years prior to the event of default. In other words, when employed 
in isolation, market variables seem to possess a higher explanatory power than accounting 
variables, as the performance of market variables closely follows the performance of the 
‘full’ model, especially in t-2, where the difference is smallest. An analysis of the estimates 
resulting from the logit regression of the Corporate Failure indicator on the predictor 
variables provides additional evidence that is consistent with this finding: when the 
comprehensive model is estimated in t-2, only two accounting variables, (TFOTL and 
NOCREDINT) and all of the market variables retain their statistical significance at the 1-
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5% levels. The only exception, among market variables, is IDYRISK, whose statistical 
significance marginally decreases from 1-5% to 10%. These results suggest that, when the 
‘Full’ model is estimated in t-2, market variables are the most consistent set of regressors 
over time for the prediction of corporate default, as only two financial statement variables 
out of four maintain their statistical significance in this period. Also in line with these 
findings, Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit tests for binary response logistic models 
suggest that the ‘full’ model fitted with market and macroeconomic variables is an adequate 
model. On the other hand, results are less conclusive with regard to macroeconomic 
indicators, which contribute only marginally to the overall classification accuracy of the 
model. Fourth, the estimation of marginal effects fills an important gap in the default 
prediction literature by presenting expected instantaneous changes in the response variables 
as a function of a change in a specific predictor variable while keeping all the other 
covariates constant. Marginal effects, combined with figures reflecting changes in predicted 
probabilities, proved to be very useful tools to enhance our understanding of individual 
effects of the variables included in the models. 
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5. Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Prediction 
among Listed Companies using Accounting, 
Market and Macroeconomic Variables 
 
5.1. Introduction. 
 
The financial crisis of 2008 highlighted the shortcomings of risk management 
practices within the lending environment and risk assessment at the micro level (PD 
estimation). Lenders and other investors in the corporate sector along with regulators 
require timely information on the default risk probability of corporates within lending and 
derivative portfolios. For banks, developing effective 'Internal Rating Systems' (IRB) for 
corporate risk management requires building probability of default (PD) models geared to 
the specific characteristics of corporate sub-populations (e.g. SME's, private companies, 
listed companies, sector specific models), tuned to changes in the macro environment, and, 
of course, tailored to the availability and timeliness of data. The use of credit risk models 
has been well documented since Altman (1968). There is now an extensive literature on the 
modeling of corporate financial distress and bankruptcy but often, it reports work that is 
either based on using publically available historical accounting data (Altman, 1968) or relies 
on securities market information (Merton, 1974) to predict insolvencies.  
 
Recent papers argue for a combined approach, Trujillo-Ponce and Cardone-
Riportella (2012) test both accounting and market data (Credit Default Swaps, CDS) and 
suggest that “accounting and market data complement one another and thus a comprehensive model that 
includes both types of variables appears to be the best option.” (p. 2). The outcome definition, 
bankruptcy, is taken from formal (legal) insolvency notices, debt servicing (Perraudin, 
1997) and bond (Geske, 1977) or loan defaults, default swaps118 (Ericcson et al, 2009) or 
stock market suspensions.  These modeling approaches have been applied extensively to 
listed companies using statistical procedures such as MDA, logistic regression or hazard 
models. Recent work has extended the definition of bankruptcy to include wider measures 
of ‘financial distress’ based on financial statements. Further, attempts have been made to 
incorporate some dynamics by the inclusion of data reflecting changes in the 
macroeconomic environment, non- financial data and other time variant predictors. The 
                                                        
118 The issuance of (rated) bonds and the related CDS market is relatively small amongst UK listed companies and 
therefore not considered in this study 
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present study contributes to the academic literature by, first, presenting distress prediction 
model for quoted companies in the United Kingdom that employ a ‘finance-based’ 
definition of distress, to detect early stages of financial distress, alongside the more formal 
approach using event data provided by the London Share Price Database. Timely 
prediction of financial distress could, in practice, help creditors mitigate some of the costs 
associated with bankruptcy fillings. Secondly, employing a multi-level empirical procedure, 
this paper outlines a financial distress prediction model that, with a rather small number of 
variables, boasts considerably higher classification and prediction accuracy relative to 
previous research. Third, and perhaps most importantly, this study contributes to the 
extant literature by providing the first prediction model for public companies in the United 
Kingdom, that tests the relative contributions (individual as well as collective) of three 
typed of variables: financial ratios, macroeconomic indicators, and market variables.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the literature 
that is relevant to our modelling approach. We describe our database and measures of the 
outcome variable and set of explanatory variable. The estimation methodology is discussed 
along with analysis, results and conclusions. 
 
5.2. Review of the Literature. 
 
Most of prior default prediction models for quoted companies employ a definition 
of the criterion event that is contingent upon its ultimate legal consequence: either 
bankruptcy in the United States and creditors’ compulsory and/or voluntary liquidation in 
the United Kingdom. These are highly visible legal events that can be objectively and 
accurately dated for use as an outcome variable. The likelihood of bankruptcy can be 
modelled using binary choice models that require that the populations of failing and non-
failing firms be ‘well defined and clearly separated from each other119. However, this legal 
definition of default is not without issues. For instance insolvency can be a lengthy legal 
process and the ‘legal’ date of failure may not represent the ‘economic’ or the ‘real’ event of 
failure. Analysis of UK companies demonstrates a considerable time gap (up to three years 
or 1.17 years in average) between the period that a firm enters a state of financial distress 
(that caused the firm to default) and the date of legal default/bankruptcy. This evidence is 
consistent with the finding by Theodossiou (1993) that firms in the United States stop 
providing accounts approximately two years before the bankruptcy filing. The implication 
                                                        
119 Balcaen and Ooghe (2004), p. 21. 
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is that a firm in this situation is already in serious financial distress at some point two years 
before the legal bankruptcy event. Moreover, it is possible that a firm in a state of financial 
distress does not change the legal status that a bankruptcy filing would entail (Balcaen and 
Ooghe, 2004). Moreover, changes in insolvency legislation, (e.g. the Enterprise Act 2004 in 
the UK or Chapter 11 in the US) which have attempted to create a ‘rescue culture’, have 
changed the nature and timing of the legal bankruptcy process. Wruck (1990) states that 
there are several stages that a firm can go through before it is defined as dead: financial 
distress, insolvency, filing of bankruptcy, administrative receivership (in order to avoid 
filing for bankruptcy), for instance. Moreover decline can be managed by the sale of assets 
(pre packs) and eventual dissolution rather than formal bankruptcy. 
 
The present study introduces for the first time, for quoted companies in the United 
Kingdom, a definition based on ‘financial distress’. This development has been highlighted 
as important in the academic literature (Pindado et al., 2008; Barnes, 1990; and Barnes, 
1987) and is justified by the fact that the failure of a firm to meet its financial obligations 
does not inevitably lead to a filing of bankruptcy. The study recognises that financial 
distress can be costly for creditors and that they would wish to take timely actions to 
minimise/avert these costs. It is therefore essential that a reliable financial distress 
prediction model be developed that uses not only the event of bankruptcy as the primary 
outcome, but includes the time when a company fails to meet its financial obligations. 
Wruck (1990) defines financial distress as the situation where the cash flow of a firm is not 
enough to cover its current financial obligations120. Asquith et al. (1994) analyse the options 
that junk bond issuers face in order to prevent bankruptcy and define financial distress in a 
similar way. Their definition of financial distress is based on interest coverage ratios. In 
practical terms, a firm is classified as financially distressed if its earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) are less than its reported financial expenses 
(interest expense on debt) for two consecutive year beginning in the year following its junk 
bond issue, or, if in any other year, EBITDA is less than 80 per cent of its interest expense. 
Similarly, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) define financial distress as the first year that a firm’s 
EBITDA is less than financial expenses. However, the authors classify firms in this 
category (in addition to the first condition) whenever a firm attempts to restructure its 
debt, or defaults. The fulfilment of any of these conditions classifies a firm as financially 
distressed. Whitaker (1999), analyses the early stages of financial distress and points out 
that its effects are not limited to those firms that are unable to meet contractual debt 
obligations as they come due, but also to those firms whose likelihood of default increases. 
                                                        
120 Such as debts to suppliers and employees, principal or interest payments in arrears, among others.  
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He states that, in fact, the effects of financial distress can be detected before the firm 
defaults, as a proportion of the loss in firm value occurs before default or bankruptcy. 
Whitaker (1999) defines financial distress as the first year in which a firm’s cash flow121 is 
less than current maturities of long-term debt. Moreover, market value is used in order to 
confirm financial distress i.e. whether the distressed firms in the sample had either a 
negative rate of growth in market value or a negative rate of growth in industry-adjusted 
market value.  
 
Previous research has tested the utility of market variables in predicting bankruptcy 
by employing methodologies such as the Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) 
contingent claims or option based approach. Bharath and Shumway (2008), Hillegeist et al. 
(2004), Reisz and Perlich (2007), and Vassalou and Xing (2004) have employed the 
contingent claims approach to estimate the likelihood of corporate failure. More recently 
data on Credit Default Swaps (prices and spreads) have been used to proxy credit risk 
(Alexander and Kaeck, 2008). Many empirical papers have attempted to demonstrate the 
superiority of market-based models over accounting-based models and vice versa. 
However, the results obtained from these models (that entail numerous restrictive 
assumptions 122 ) and the subsequent performance comparisons with accounting-based 
models have been controversial. In a recent paper, Agarwal and Taffler (2008) perform a 
comparison of market-based and accounting-based bankruptcy prediction models, and find 
that traditional models based on financial ratios are not inferior to KMV-type, option-
based models for credit risk assessment purposes. They conclude that, ‘in terms of 
predictive accuracy, there is little difference between the market-based and accounting 
models.123’ Hillegeist et al. (2004) provide contrasting results indicating that the Black-
Scholes-Merton option-pricing model provides significantly more information about the 
probability of bankruptcy that do either the Altman’s Z-score or the Ohlson O-score.  As 
surmised earlier the default prediction literature can be characterised by a competing 
approach, where there is a clear division between market and accounting variables. 
Hillegeist et al. (2004),124 for instance, recommends that researchers use the Black-Scholes-
Merton methodology instead of the traditional accounting-based measures as a proxy for 
the probability of bankruptcy. 
 
                                                        
121 Defined as net income plus non-cash charges. 
122 The underlying assumptions of the theoretical Merton-Black-Scholes option-pricing model are, according to Saunders 
and Allen (2002) and Agarwal and Taffler (2008): normality of stock returns.  
123 P. 1550. 
124 P. 28. 
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More recent work suggests that both approaches yield similar results implying that 
both contain useful information about firms’ likelihood of default/financial distress. 
Furthermore, the individual characteristics (e.g. timeliness) of each type of variable (market 
and accounting) give promise to the development of a model that is superior in 
performance than ones that rely on either accounting or market variables. Balcaen and 
Ooghe, (2004)125 argue that ‘if researchers only include financial ratios into their failure prediction 
model, they implicitly assume that all relevant failure or success indicators – both internal and external- are 
reflected in the annual accounts.126’ It is clear that financial statements do not include all the 
information that is relevant to the prediction of financial distress, and market variables are 
very likely to complement this deficiency. 
 
Rees (1995) suggests that market prices might be a useful predictor for the 
probability of bankruptcy as they include information on future expected cash flows. For 
Hillegesit et al. (2004) the stock market is an alternative source of information because it 
contains information from other sources in addition to the financial statements. Beaver et 
al. (2005) indicate that a probability of bankruptcy is embedded in market prices, even 
though this probability might not be directly extracted: ‘as the probability of bankruptcy 
increases the non-linear nature of the payoff function for common stock becomes 
increasingly more important because of risky debt and limited liability.’ Clearly the 
inclusion of market-based variables is appealing on several grounds: first, market prices 
reflect the information contained in accounting statements plus other information not in 
the accounting statements (Agarwal and Taffler, 2008), making them a comprehensive mix 
potentially useful for the prediction of corporate default. Second, the inclusion of market-
based variables can considerably increase the timeliness of prediction models; while 
financial accounts are available in the United Kingdom on a quarterly basis, at best (prior 
research have used annual data conventionally), market prices are available on a daily basis. 
Third, market prices might be more appropriate to predict bankruptcy, as they reflect 
future expected cash flows (accounting statements, in contrast, reflect the past performance 
of the firm). And fourth, market-based variables can provide a direct assessment of 
volatility, a measure that could be a powerful predictor of bankruptcy risk and that is not 
contained in financial statements. According to Beaver et al. (2005) the notion is that the 
greater the volatility, the higher the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
 
                                                        
125 Argenti (1976), Zavgren (1985), Keasey and Watson (1987), and more recently Maltz et al. (2003) offer support for the 
inclusion of non-financial variables to default prediction models. 
126 Balcaen and Ooghe (2004), p. 35. 
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Among the few studies that include a set of market variables to enhance the 
timeliness and power of distress prediction models is Campbell et al. (2008), whose analysis 
examines the determinants of failure as well as the pricing of financially distressed stocks 
with a high probability of failure through a logit model that includes accounting and market 
variables. In addition to a set of two accounting variables, several market variables are 
tested: the monthly log excess return on each firm’s equity relative to the S&P 500 index, 
the standard deviation of each firm’s daily stock return over the past three months, the 
relative size of each firm measured as the log ratio of its market capitalisation to that of the 
S&P 500 index, and the firm’s log price per share truncated above at $15. The estimates of 
the study are computed with United States data for public companies. 
 
Similarly, Chava and Jarrow (2004) test in their analysis, in addition to the Altman’s 
(1968) accounting variables, the variables included in Shumway (2001): the accounting 
variables net income to total assets and total liabilities to total assets; and the market 
variables: relative size defined as the natural logarithm of the firm’s equity value in relation 
to the total NYSE/AMEX market equity value, yearly excess returns calculated as the 
firm’s cumulative monthly return minus the value-weighed CRSP NYSE/AMEX monthly 
index return, and the stock’s volatility computed as the standard deviation using the last 
sixty observable daily market prices. In Shumway (2001) the same market variables are 
tested in a bankruptcy prediction model with some minor variations, namely the 
idiosyncratic standard deviation of each firm’s stock returns, whose value is computed by 
regressing each stock’s monthly returns on the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX index return 
for the same period (year). More recently, Christidis and Gregory (2010) follow Campbell 
et al. (2008) and test three market variables in a distress prediction model for UK quoted 
companies that includes also a set of accounting variables. As to the market variables, they 
replace book value of assets with market values and test whether log semi-annual excess 
returns over the FTSE All Share Index and firm stock returns’ standard deviation 
(calculated over a six-month period) can enhance the predictive power of the model. Their 
findings suggest that market values have the ability to increase the accuracy of the distress 
prediction model. 
 
The incorporation of time variant data into credit risk models that captures changes 
in the macro-economic environment. The macroeconomic environment is important in 
two main respects. First it adds a dynamic element to the models that acts to adjust risk 
scores (likelihood of insolvency) in relation to changing macro-economic conditions. 
Second such models would have a built-in facility to stress test PD estimates across the 
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portfolio. There are few studies that have incorporated a macro-dependent hazard into the 
equations (Nam et al, 2008; Qu, 2008 and Mare, 2012). In this paper we control for macro 
conditions, inflation and interest rate changes, over the sample period. 
In the next section we describe the database used in the study, the construction of 
our outcome variable and the selection of independent variables. 
 
5.3. Outcome Definition and Independent Variable Selection. 
 
5.3.1. Outcome Definition 
 
The promised analysis requires a definition of financial distress, which can be 
viewed as the outcome of a process. In line with earlier discussions and recent papers we 
focus on the ability of a firm to repay its financial obligations (Asquith et al., 1994). We 
develop an ex-ante model for estimating financial distress likelihood following Pindado et al. 
(2008) which employs two main conditions that need to be met in order to detect and 
predict financial distress in a given firm/year (observation): a firm is classified as financially 
distressed127, i) whenever its earnings before interest and taxes depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) 
are lower than its financial expenses for two consecutive years; ii) whenever the firm suffers from a negative 
growth in market value for two consecutive years. With regard to the first condition, if EBITDA is 
lower than the interest expense on the company’s debt then it can be concluded that the 
operational profitability of the firm is not sufficient to cover its financial obligations; on the 
other hand, with reference to the second condition, Pindado et al. (2008) state that the 
market as well as stakeholders are likely to judge negatively a firm that suffers from the 
operational deficit (described in the first condition) until an improvement in the financial 
condition is perceived again. Thus, the fall in market value for two consecutive years is 
interpreted as an indication that a firm is in effect in financial distress. As in Pindado et al. 
(2008), the study is thus introducing a dynamic approach, a novel development in existing 
financial distress definitions. The variables Earnings before interest and taxes depreciation 
and amortization (EBITDA) and Interest expense on debt were obtained from Thomson 
One Banker. In order to compute the changes in market value for the companies in the 
                                                        
127  In a general logit model a firm is considered as financially distressed in the year that immediately follows the 
occurrence of both events by assigning a value of 1, and zero otherwise. 
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database, the present study used the information available in both Thomson One Banker 
and Datastream128. 
 
However, this study recognises the need to include an indicator of default in 
addition to the previous ‘finance-based’ definition of distress in order to complete the 
concept of financial distress and therefore enhance the scope and the 
discriminating/predictive power of the model for practical purposes. A definition based on 
Christidis & Gregory (2010) is utilised. Thus, a firm is classified as being in financial 
distress not only when it meets the previous two conditions, but when it is deemed to have 
formally defaulted on its obligations. The definition of the outcome variable was 
constructed using the information available in the 2012 London Share Price Database 
(LSPD). A firm is defined as in default / financial distress whenever its status is defined as 
suspended, in liquidation or voluntary liquidation, when its quotation has been suspended 
for more than three years, when the firm is being held by a receiver (in receivership), in 
administration or in administrative receivership, or when there has been a cancellation or 
suspension of the firm. 
 
Thus, a firm is classified as financially distressed when its LSPD (2012) status is 
equal to any of the following definitions (that indicate the reason why the security ceased to 
be quoted in the SEDOL): 6) Suspension / cancellation with shares acquired later. 
Meanwhile, may be treated under rule 163/2; 7) Liquidation (usually valueless but there 
may be liquidation payments; 10) Quotation suspended – if suspended for more than three 
years, this may lead to automatic cancellation; 11) Voluntary liquidation, where value 
remains, and was / is being distributed; 16) Receiver appointed / liquidation. Probably 
valueless but not yet certain; 20) In Administration / Administrative receivership; 21) 
Cancellation and assumed valueless or suspended but assumed valueless. In addition, the 
present analysis also tracks the specific date when each one of these events occurs. 
 
For simplicity, in the remainder of this study, the binary dependent variable 
including both of the above definitions of corporate failure and financial distress will be 
referred to as ‘Financial Distress Indicator’. Accordingly, all firms classified as failed or 
financially distressed, will be referred to as ‘financially distressed’ or in ‘financial distress.’ 
Among the total number of observations, there are 1,254 firm-years classified as financially 
distressed; yielding a proportion of 5% of annual observations in financial distress (Table 5-
                                                        
128 Both databases were used as some missing information on specific companies in one database could be completed by 
the data of the other. A merging of the databases was therefore required in order to obtain larger time series and thus a 
more accurate model.  
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1). The available accounting data was taken from Datastream and Thomson One Banker 
(Worldscope); the macroeconomic variables were collected from Datastream; and the 
market variables were constructed merging the information available from Datastream, the 
London Share Price Database and Worldscope.  Market information was added to the 
companies that were found in the Thomson One Banker database. The merging of the 
accounting and market variables in one database resulted in fewer firms having both 
complete market-based time-series than accounting information. 
 
Table 5-1 Summary Statistics of the Annual Observations. Financially and Not 
Financially Distressed Firms 
Panel A reports summary statistics for the entire sample used in the construction of the financial 
distress prediction model. NFD and FD are Financially and Not Financially Distressed Firms. 
%FD is the proportion (in percentage) of annual observations that meet the financial distress 
criteria of the study. The criteria used to classify firms into financially and not financially distressed 
firms are as follows. A firm is classified as FD when it files for bankruptcy (definition constructed 
using the London Share Price Database, see details below), or whenever it meets both of the 
following conditions: i) its earnings before interest and taxes depreciation and amortisation 
(EBITDA) are lower than its financial expenses for two consecutive years, and ii) there is a negative 
growth of its market value for two consecutive periods. 
Panel A: Classification of annual observations into financially and not financially distressed 
firms. 
NFD FD Total %FD 
21,964 1,254 23,218 5.0% 
 
Table 5-2 presents summary statistics for the 379 failed firms that were classified 
according to the definition of corporate failure in this study using the 2012 LSPD database. 
Among the 381 failed companies, 379 were used for the calculation of summary 
statistics129. Section B in Table 4-2 shows that, among the companies that form the sample 
of failed firms; there is a lag that ranges from 0 to 36 months before the date of failure. In 
other words, firms in financial difficulty, that eventually fail, cease providing accounts 1.17 
years in average before the date of failure. The minimum lag of months is zero (meaning 
that the company that fails keeps providing accounts until the date of failure) and the 
maximum observed lag is 36; one firm in the sample ceased providing official accounts 3 
years before failure130. 
  
                                                        
129 Two companies were removed as they presented a lag in the number of months that was much higher than that 
observed for the Maximum in the present sample of failed firms. As such, both firms were considered as extreme 
observations (outliers) that can have an abnormally high influence on the results, and were therefore not employed in the 
calculation of the summary statistics presented in Table 2. 
130 A likely explanation for this considerable lag is that the firm might already be facing serious financial stress at the time 
it ceases to provide accounting information and is therefore attempting to defer the accounts in order to prevent its 
financial state from deteriorating any further or from a suspension of the trading of its stock on the main exchange where 
it is quoted, which can be very costly. 
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Table 5-2 Summary Statistics of Corporate Failure of UK Firms 
Panel A reports summary statistics for the firms in the last stage of financial distress, corporate 
failure. Obs is the total number of observations (firm-years) in the database, N is the number of 
normal (non-failed) firms, F is the number of failed firms according to the definition below, Total is 
the number of firms in the database, and %F is the proportion (in percentage) of failed firms 
relative to the Total number of firms in the database. The definition of corporate failure (that 
follows the approach of Christidis and Gregory (2010)) was constructed using the information 
available in the 2012 London Share Price Database (LSPD). A firm is classified as failed when its 
status in the 2012 LSPD is defined as: suspended, in liquidation or voluntary liquidation, when its 
quotation has been suspended for more than three years, when the firm is being held by a receiver 
(in receivership), in administration or in administrative receivership, or when there has been a 
cancellation or suspension of the firm131. Panel B reports the lag of months between the date of 
failure of the company and the last available account. N is the number of failed companies that 
were classified as failed according to the above 2012 LSPD definition, Min is the minimum number 
of months observed among the failed companies, and Max is the maximum observed number of 
months. The table also shows the Mean (14.21 Months or 1.17 years approximately) and the 
standard deviation (STD). 
Panel A: Classification of Failed UK Quoted Companies. 
Obs N F132 Total %F 
23,218 2,641 379 3,020 12.6% 
Panel B: Failed Companies: Lag of Months between the Date of Failure and the Last Available Account. 
N Min Max Mean STD 
379 0 36  14.21 4.82 
 
In specifying the models there are two main objectives. First, the intention is to 
build more accurate and timely financial distress prediction models, using data that is 
routinely available. The models are designed to obtain more accurate results compared to 
previous works in the academic field and are constructed with a parsimonious approach 
since they are intended to have practical value. Further, Zmijewski (1984) and more 
recently Pindado et al. (2008) have shown that in fact a large set of variables is not required 
for the models to reach their maximum level of accuracy. Pindado et al. (2008), for 
instance, employ a set of only three accounting variables to reach a high level of accuracy in 
their financial distress prediction model. The variables employed in their study are the 
ratios earnings before interest and taxes over total assets, financial expenses to total assets, 
and retained earnings to total assets, which represent profitability, financial expenses, and 
retained earnings, respectively. Zmijewski (1984) uses a set of accounting variables that 
includes proxies for return on assets, financial leverage, and liquidity. Moreover, in a study 
that intends to investigate the empirical relation between risk of bankruptcy and systematic 
risk through the construction of a single composite score that reflects the ex-ante 
                                                        
131 The LSPD numbers and definitions in the database are: 6) Suspension / cancellation with shares acquired later. 
Meanwhile, may be treated under rule 163/2; 7) Liquidation (usually valueless but there may be liquidation payments; 10) 
Quotation suspended – if suspended for more than three years, this may lead to automatic cancellation; 11) Voluntary 
liquidation, where value remains, and was / is being distributed; 16) Receiver appointed / liquidation. Probably valueless 
but not yet certain; 20) In Administration / Administrative receivership; 21) Cancellation and assumed valueless or 
suspended but assumed valueless. 
132 For the purposes of the analysis, firms classified as failed in the database are assigned a value of 1, and zero otherwise 
according to the date of failure. Accordingly, the failed firms are included among the 1,254 financially distressed 
indicators in the database. 
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probability of bankruptcy for a company at a given point in time, Dichev (1998) employs a 
measure derived from exiting accounting models such as the 5-variable Altman (1968) Z-
model, and the 7-variable Ohlson (1980) logit model. 
 
The second objective of the analysis is to test the usefulness of other non-
accounting variables, namely macroeconomic and market variables, with regard to their 
contribution to the accuracy and timeliness of financial distress prediction models for 
quoted companies. We investigate whether macroeconomic and market variables enhance 
the discriminating and predicting power of the models. There have been very few studies 
that analyse the performance of these three kinds of variables in a statistical financial 
distress prediction model. It is deemed important to investigate macroeconomic and 
market variables since the former is potentially useful to act as a complement to the 
accounting variables and the latter adjusts estimated scores in relation to changes in the 
macro-economic environment and provides the facility to impose stress testing scenarios. 
 
Of course, accounting data can only be obtained on an annual basis, so even if the 
discriminating power of some previous and widely used models (such as the Altman (1968) 
model) is quite high, there is always the risk of the relying on out dated information. 
Furthermore, through a detailed analysis of the ‘most extreme form of financial distress133, 
corporate failure, the present study shows that the firms that were classified as failed134, 
stop providing accounting data one year on average (14 months) before the actual date of 
failure. 
5.3.2. Independent Variable Selection 
 
From the database, consisting of 130 variables in total, several accounting, 
macroeconomic, and market variables were tested. The selection method relied on 
previously reported results, theoretical propositions and empirical assessments. The data 
was subject to a rigorous cleaning and testing process and a novel approach for dealing 
with outlying observations was adopted. Using both univariate and multivariate (logit) 
procedures considerable experimentation was undertaken to arrive at the final choice of 
regressors. The variable selection included four accounting ratios: Total Funds from 
Operations to Total Liabilities, Total Liabilities to Total Assets, the No Credit Interval, and 
                                                        
133 The term in quotes is borrowed from Christidis and Gregory (2010),  p. 6.  
134 The definition of the response variable was constructed using the information available in the 2012 London Share 
Price Database (LSPD). A firm is defined as failed whenever its status is defined as suspended, in liquidation or voluntary 
liquidation, when its quotation has been suspended for more than three years, when the firm is being held by a receiver 
(in receivership), in administration or in administrative receivership, or when there has been a cancellation or suspension 
of the firm.  
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Interest Coverage; two macroeconomic variables: the Short-Term Bill Rate (inflation-
adjusted or deflated), and the Retail Price Index (base 100).  Four market variables were 
found to considerably increase the prediction accuracy of the model: the firm’s stock price, 
the company’s yearly abnormal returns, the firm’s size relative to the total size of the FTSE 
All-Share market value, and the ratio Market Capitalisation over Total Debt. These were 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter. 
 
In the previous chapter, where a corporate default prediction model was developed 
based on a UK-specific legal definition of failure, another market variable (in addition to 
the four market variables presented in the above lines) was tested and included in the final 
‘market’ and ‘full’ models: IDYRISK or the lagged standard deviation of individual security 
residual returns. This variable was constructed to reflect the variability of the stock returns 
of a company135. The rationale for the inclusion of this variable in the models is that a 
measure of volatility might provide information relevant to the prediction of default that is 
not contained in the traditional financial ratios (in fact, a volatility measure could not be 
extracted from financial data due to the scarcity of accounts, which are submitted quarterly 
at best in the United Kingdom). As noted by Shumway (2001) it is expected that this 
variable is related to bankruptcy in statistical and logical terms: higher volatility of the cash 
flows of a firm (resulting in more variable stock returns) should entail a higher probability 
of default. In line with Shumway’s (2001) argument, the present study posited that, in 
logical terms, the likelihood of default is explained not only by the level of market variables 
such as abnormal returns (ABNRET), but also by the proportion of their variability that is 
attributed to firm-specific factors136. This hypothesis was confirmed through the analysis of 
the performance of a comprehensive corporate default prediction model including 
accounting ratios, macroeconomic indicators and market variables: the inclusion of 
IDYRISK enhanced the accuracy of the model (as measured by the area under the Receiver 
Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve) and was found to be positively related to the 
likelihood of corporate failure, even if the results regarding its statistical significance were 
not as conclusive (they vary according to the estimation periods t-1 and t-2). However, 
unlike the previous study that focused on corporate default, IDYRISK does not enhance 
the overall prediction accuracy of the comprehensive financial distress prediction model 
                                                        
135 As indicated in the previous chapter, each firm’s idiosyncratic standard deviation of each firm’s stock returns was 
estimated by regressing (using a linear regression) individual stock’s monthly returns in year t-1 on the FTSE All Share 
Index cumulative monthly return for the same period which corresponds to the year prior to the observation of the event 
of corporate default. The idiosyncratic risk of the firm is the standard deviation of the residual of this regression. The 
same procedure was employed to construct this measure to estimate the models with information two years prior to the 
observation of the corporate default event. 
136  The previous chapter includes a detailed account that justifies the inclusion of this variable in a corporate 
default/financial distress prediction model. 
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(Model 3) nor is it statistically significant. Unreported results show that in the present 
study, when the model is estimated in t-1, the inclusion of the proxy for equity returns’ 
variability IDYRISK, leaves the overall prediction accuracy of the model unchanged at the 
0.9190 level, as measured by the area under the ROC curve. Furthermore, the variable is 
not statistically significant (its inclusion does not alter the statistical significance of the 
remaining variables either). On the other hand, when the model is estimated with 
information two years prior to the observation of the corporate failure event (in t-2), the 
inclusion of IDYRISK results in a (marginal) decrease of the overall prediction accuracy of 
the model, from a ROC curve level of 0.8918 (without IDYRISK) to 0.8913 (when 
IDYRISK is included). However, when the comprehensive model is estimated in period t-
2, the inclusion of this variable (which does not reach the minimum levels of statistical 
significance either) alters the statistical significance of at least one accounting ratio: 
NOCREDINT. This financial statement variable passes from being statistically significant 
at the 5-10% level (without IDYRISK) to being non-statistically significant (when 
IDYRISK is included).  
 
From these results it can be concluded that, at best, the inclusion of the proxy for a 
firm’s equity returns variability in a comprehensive model keeps the overall accuracy of the 
model unchanged and, at worst, marginally hinders the model’s predictive accuracy and 
makes the variables’ logit estimates unstable. Therefore, in order to maintain the estimates’ 
stability of the comprehensive model, it was decided to discard this variable from the logit 
estimation for the prediction of financial distress. Finally, the above analysis suggests that 
the market variables (other than the one measuring stock returns’ variability) incorporated 
to the ‘full’ model already include most of the information that is relevant for the 
prediction of corporate default, making the information potentially contained in IDYRISK 
superfluous or redundant. More generally, the evidence indicates that the usefulness of 
independent variables is, to a certain degree, dependent upon the methodology employed 
to construct the definition of the binary outcome in prediction models. 
 
Finally, in order to discard any multicollinearity problems among the variables 
included in all the models, correlation matrices and direct multicollinearity diagnostic tests 
were computed and presented in Table 5-3. 
 
 
 
C
h
ap
ter 4: F
in
an
cial D
istress an
d
 B
an
kru
p
tcy P
red
ictio
n
 u
sin
g A
cco
u
n
tin
g, M
ark
et an
d
 M
acro
eco
n
o
m
ic V
ariab
les 
1
3
1
 
Table 5-3 Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Diagnostics Statistics 
Panel A of this reports the correlation matrix of all the variables in included in the model. It includes financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators and market 
variables. P-values represent the probability of observing this correlation coefficient or one more extreme under the null hypothesis (H0) that the correlation (Rho) is 
zero. Panel B reports the values resulting from tests intended to detect the presence of multicollinearity among all the variables incorporated in the model: Tolerance 
Value (TOL) and its reciprocal, Variance Inflation (VIF) are computed as     
  and        
   respectively, where   
  is the determination coefficient for 
regression of the ith regressor on all the other regressors. 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix 
Variable TFOTL TLTA NOCREDINT COVERAGE RPI SHTBRDEF PRICE ABNRET SIZE MCTD 
TFOTL 1.00000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
TLTA 0.17057 
<.0001 
1.00000         
NOCREDINT -0.09720 
<.0001 
-0.44510 
<.0001 
1.00000        
COVERAGE 0.72613 
<.0001 
0.02865 
<.0001 
-0.05983 
<.0001 
1.00000       
RPI -0.19100 
<.0001 
-0.12218 
<.0001 
0.14404 
<.0001 
-0.19691 
<.0001 
1.00000      
SHTBRDEF 0.12491 
<.0001 
0.09343 
<.0001 
-0.10688 
<.0001 
0.11610 
<.0001 
-0.81383 
<.0001 
1.00000     
PRICE 0.37131 
<.0001 
0.05951 
<.0001 
-0.04823 
<.0001 
0.37641 
<.0001 
-0.19656 
<.0001 
0.15184 
<.0001 
1.00000    
ABNRET 0.25785 
<.0001 
-0.06960 
<.0001 
0.03254 
<.0001 
0.29870 
<.0001 
-0.04405 
<.0001 
-0.05138 
<.0001 
0.28852 
<.0001 
1.00000   
SIZE 0.36300 
<.0001 
0.09781 
<.0001 
-0.08105 
<.0001 
0.40685 
<.0001 
-0.23538 
<.0001 
0.10799 
<.0001 
0.58264 
<.0001 
0.29448 
<.0001 
1.00000  
MCTD 0.08792 
<.0001 
-0.34893 
<.0001 
0.18940 
<.0001 
0.13136 
<.0001 
-0.04910 
<.0001 
-0.00248 
0.7461 
0.20164 
<.0001 
0.23896 
<.0001 
0.22630 
<.0001 
1.00000 
Panel B: Multicollinearity Diagnostic Statistics 
Test  TFOTL TLTA NOCREDINT COVERAGE RPI SHTBRDEF PRICE ABNRET SIZE MCTD 
TOL 0.49947 0.77183 0.87329 0.47709 0.31558 0.32067 0.60705 0.81705 0.58202 0.77601 
VIF 2.00214 1.29562 1.14509 2.09603 3.16874 3.11847 1.6473 1.22391 1.71817 1.28865 
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5.4. Methods: Panel Logit Model Specification 
 
The sample is divided into two groups, financially distressed firms (either financially 
distressed or insolvent in law) and normal or non-financially distressed firms. The outcome 
is a binary dependent variable. Our approach is to model the outcome within a panel logit 
framework (Altman et al. 2010; Altman and Sabato 2007), and follow Shumway (2001) and 
Nam et al. (2008) who show that a panel logit model, that corrects for period at risk and 
allows for time varying covariates 137 , is equivalent to a hazard model. The detailed 
mathematical development of the model employed in the present study can be found in the 
previous chapter.  
 
In addition to the estimates computed through this statistical methodology, 
marginal effects for each of the variables are presented. The marginal effect of a predictor 
is defined as the partial derivative of the event probability with respect to the predictor of 
interest138.  The marginal effects measurement is therefore very useful in order to interpret 
the effects of the regressors on the dependent variable for discrete dependent variable 
models, in this case, a logit binary choice model. The study reports the average marginal 
effects of each explanatory variable in the reported models. 
 
The details regarding the formal mathematical development of the panel logit 
methodology and the formal derivation of marginal effects can be found in Section 5 of the 
previous chapter. 
  
                                                        
137 Shumway (2010), p. 123. 
138  Usage Note 22604 : Marginal effects estimation for predictors in logistic and probit models. 
http://support.sas.com/kb/22/604.html 
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Table 5-4 Summary Statistics for Model 1 
This table presents summary statistics for Model 1, which includes only financial statement 
variables. It covers the Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum Values and the number 
of observations that were used in the logistic regression for the ratios Total Funds from Operation 
to Total Liabilities (TFOTL), Total Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA), the No Credit Interval 
(NOCREDINT), and Interest Coverage (COVERAGE). Panel A contains summary statistics for 
the entire dataset; Panel B for financially healthy firms, and Panel C for the firms in financial 
distress. 
Variable TFOTL TLTA NOCREDINT COVERAGE 
Panel A: Entire Data Set 
Mean 0.068572 0.486146 -0.121824 0.530676 
Std. Dev. 0.338255 0.188591 0.986025 0.819871 
Min -1 -0.432123 -1 -1 
Max 1 1 1 1 
Observations 18,276    
Panel B: Non-Financially Distressed Firms 
Mean 0.089208 0.482734 -0.113742 0.593286 
Std. Dev. 0.323753 0.183374 0.986886 0.77798 
Min -1 -0.432123 -1 -1 
Max 1 1 1 1 
Observations 17,349    
Panel C: Financially Distressed Firms 
Mean -0.317646 0.550002 -0.273086 -0.641079 
Std. Dev. 0.370257 0.260108 0.95777 0.69207 
Min -1 -0.302382 -1 -1 
Max 0.99792 1 1 1 
Observations 927    
 
  
Chapter 4: Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Prediction using Accounting, Market and Macroeconomic Variables 134 
Table 5-5 Summary Statistics for Model 2 
This table presents summary statistics for Model 2, which includes financial statement ratios as well 
as macroeconomic variables. It covers the Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum 
Values and the number of observations that were used in the logistic regression for the ratios Total 
Funds from Operation to Total Liabilities (TFOTL), Total Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA), the 
No Credit Interval (NOCREDINT), Interest Coverage (COVERAGE) the Retail Price Index 
(RPI), and the proxy for interest rates, the 3-month Short Term Bill Rate adjusted for inflation 
(SHTBRDEF). Panel A contains summary statistics for the entire dataset; Panel B for financially 
healthy firms, and Panel C for the firms in financial distress. 
Variable TFOTL TLTA NOCREDINT COVERAGE RPI SHTBRDEF 
Panel A: Entire Data Set 
Mean 0.067493 0.485921 -0.118042 0.525922 178.39851 2.048426 
Std. Dev. 0.339813 0.189284 0.986466 0.822947 32.220261 2.427929 
Min -1 -0.432123 -1 -1 94.59 -4.69551 
Max 1 1 1 1 235.18 7.7407 
Observations 18,070      
Panel B: Non-Financially Distressed Firms 
Mean 0.088319 0.482455 -0.109658 0.589027 177.75165 2.068698 
Std. Dev. 0.325357 0.184057 0.987328 0.781256 32.427066 2.442916 
Min -1 -0.432123 -1 -1 94.59 -4.69551 
Max 1 1 1 1 235.18 7.7407 
Observations 17,143      
Panel C: Financially Distressed Firms 
Mean -0.317646 0.550002 -0.273086 -0.641079 190.36081 1.673542 
Std. Dev. 0.370257 0.260108 0.95777 0.69207 25.31356 2.097986 
Min -1 -0.302382 -1 -1 115.21 -4.69551 
Max 0.99792 1 1 1 235.18 7.1745 
Observations 927      
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Table 5-6 Summary Statistics for Model 3 
This table presents summary statistics for the full model, or Model 3, which includes financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators and market variables. It 
covers the Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum Values and the number of observations that were used in the logistic regression for the ratios Total 
Funds from Operation to Total Liabilities (TFOTL), Total Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA), the No Credit Interval (NOCREDINT), Interest Coverage 
(COVERAGE) the Retail Price Index (RPI), and a proxy for interest rates, the 3-month Short Term Bill Rate adjusted for inflation (SHTBRDEF), the firm’s Equity 
Price (PRICE), the firm’s annual Abnormal Returns (ABNRET ), the firm’s Relative Size (SIZE), and the ratio Market Capital to Total Debt (MCTD). Panel A 
contains summary statistics for the entire dataset; Panel B for financially healthy firms, and Panel C for the firms in financial distress. 
Variable TFOTL TLTA NOCREDINT COVERAGE RPI SHTBRDEF PRICE ABNRET SIZE MCTD 
Panel A: Entire Data Set 
Mean 0.097363 0.497767 -0.19551 0.599672 178.08903 2.046149 4.427373 -0.108952 -10.046418 0.91036 
Std. Dev. 0.27721 0.169538 0.973386 0.770045 32.874323 2.532696 1.702743 0.386299 2.22842 0.192053 
Min -1 -0.102771 -1 -1 94.59 -4.69551 -3.912023 -0.999988 -16.602146 0.002877 
Max 1 1 1 1 235.18 7.7407 14.151983 0.999996 -2.374161 1 
Observations 13,529          
Panel B: Non-Financially Distressed Firms 
Mean 0.118203 0.492827 -0.184269 0.669078 177.4168 2.066005 4.526808 -0.086315 -9.913979 0.919151 
Std. Dev. 0.258451 0.163083 0.975489 0.713444 33.102993 2.553595 1.630117 0.374557 2.189381 0.17828 
Min -1 -0.102771 -1 -1 94.59 -4.69551 -3.912023 -0.999829 -16.480853 0.006411 
Max 1 1 1 1 235.18 7.7407 14.151983 0.999996 -2.374161 1 
Observations 12,801          
Panel C: Financially Distressed Firms 
Mean -0.269089 0.584634 -0.393164 -0.620747 189.90931 1.696996 2.678938 -0.506989 -12.375197 0.755794 
Std. Dev. 0.334293 0.242075 0.91392 0.70417 25.859392 2.10305 1.982343 0.372911 1.506558 0.318516 
Min -1 0.028495 -1 -1 115.21 -4.69551 -3.912023 -0.999988 -16.602146 0.002877 
Max 0.724547 1 1 1 235.18 7.1745 10.96388 0.949759 -5.641377 1 
Observations 728          
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5.5. Analysis of Results.  
 
Table 5-7 presents results from logistic regressions of the financial distress indicator 
on the predictor variables. As required by the binary logistic regression model, firms 
classified as financially distressed were given a value of 1 and firms identified as financially 
healthy were given the value 0. This classification was carried out using the previously 
discussed financially-based definition of distress developed specifically for this analysis. The 
present study develops three main ex-ante models for estimating financial distress likelihood 
and to test the contribution of macroeconomic indicators and market variables to the 
predictive accuracy of models based on financial statement ratios. Model 1 represents the 
‘Accounting only’ model and incorporates the financial statement ratios Total Funds from 
Operations to Total Liabilities (TFOTL), Total Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA), the No 
Credit Interval (NOCREDINT), and Interest Coverage (COVERAGE). Model 2 
represents the ‘Accounting plus Macroeconomic’ model and includes, in addition to the 
accounting variables, the indicators Retail Price Index (RPI), and the Short Term Bill Rate 
adjusted for inflation (SHTBRDEF). Model 3 is the ‘Full model’ incorporating, in addition 
to the above financial statement ratios and macroeconomic indicators, four market 
variables: each firm’s Equity Price (PRICE) transformed using the logarithmic function; the 
firm’s cumulative monthly abnormal returns on an annual basis (ABNRET), generated as 
the firm’s excess returns minus the FTSE All Share return index for the same period of 
time; the firm’s relative size (SIZE) measured by the market capitalisation relative to the 
total size (market capitalisation) of the FTSE All Share index, in logarithmic form. 
Additionally, Model 4 and Model 5 are included in Table 5-7, representing a ‘Market only’ 
model and a ‘Market plus macroeconomic variables’ model, respectively, in order to 
compare their predictive accuracy with that of Model 1 and Model 2. The objective of this 
additional comparison is to test the predictive accuracy of accounting models against the 
performance of market models using logistic regression.  
 
As mentioned above, the present study develops ex-ante models for the estimation 
of financial distress likelihood. In practice, the date of the event of financial distress is not 
known and risk managers are required to employ the data that is available at the time of the 
analysis in order to make an estimate of the likelihood of failure or financial distress of a 
company. Accordingly, this study estimates the probability of failure in the year prior to the 
observation of corporate financial distress (t-1) as well as two years prior to the financial 
distress event (t-2). In that way, the models provide evidence about the predictors that best 
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discriminate between financially distressed and healthy companies on the one hand, and on 
the other, test their predictive power. Thus, for the t-1 models, all of the accounting ratios 
were computed using the financial statements of the year prior to the financial distress 
event. Accordingly, the macroeconomic indicators were calculated with information from 
the year preceding the distress event: the Retail Price Index (RPI) in base 100 as well as the 
3-month Bill rate (SHTBRDEF), which was annualised and deflated using the inflation rate 
in order to obtain a measure of the level of ‘real’ interest rates in the economy. As for the 
market variables, equity prices (PRICE) were incorporated to the model as the official 
closing price in t-1, the variable measuring abnormal returns (ABNRET) for year t, when 
the distress event was observed, was calculated as the return of the firm in year t-1 minus 
the FTSE All Share Index return in year t-1. Individual firms’ annual returns were 
generated by cumulating monthly returns. With regard to the variable that measures the 
relative size of the firm (SIZE), following Shumway (2001), individual firms’ market 
capitalisation was measured at the end of the year before the financial distress event year. 
Finally, as for the ratio Market Capitalisation to Total Debt (MCTD), the latter was also 
measured with information taken from financial statements issued in t-1. 
 
Table 5-7 reports the resulting estimates from logistic regressions of the financial 
distress indicator on the independent variables. All of the variables in the ‘accounting’ 
model (Model 1) are statistically significant at 5-1% in t-1 year, which suggest that they are 
efficient predictors of the probability of financial distress. In t-2, or two years before the 
financial distress event was observed, all of the regressors retain their statistical significance 
except the accounting ratio Total Liabilities to Total Assets, which becomes statistically 
insignificant. This is the case not only for the ‘accounting’ model, but also for the 
‘accounting plus macroeconomic’ model and the ‘full’ model139. The fact that all of the 
variables in Model 1 except one retain the same level of significance in both t-1 and t-2 
before the distress event suggest that the financial statement ratios that were retained in the 
model possess a high discriminating and predicting power. Furthermore, the coefficient’s 
estimates possess the predicted sign: a negative sing of the ratio TFOTL, which represents 
a measure of the performance of a company, suggests that the higher the level of funds 
from operations a company produces (relative to their liabilities) the higher its performance 
and therefore the lower its probability of entering financial distress. Similarly, the sign of 
                                                        
139 In the remainder of the present study the term ‘Model 1’ will be used to make reference to the ‘Accounting’ only 
model, ‘Model 2’ to the model that includes macroeconomic indicators in addition to financial statement ratios, and the 
term ‘Model 3’ will be representing the ‘full model,’ or the model that includes financial statement ratios, macroeconomic 
indicators and market variables. In addition ‘Model 4’ and ‘Model 5’ will be used to make reference to a ‘Market only’ 
model and a ‘Market plus macroeconomic indicators,’ respectively. 
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the variable NOCREDIT suggests that the higher the liquidity of a company140, the lower 
its financial distress likelihood. The COVERAGE variable also displays the anticipated 
negative sign, where an increased or substantial ability to pay interest on outstanding debt, 
lowers the firm’s financial distress likelihood. The coefficient’s estimate for the variable 
TLTA displays a positive sign which indicates, opposite to the previous accounting ratios, 
that a highly leveraged company (a high value of the TLTA variable) will display a higher 
likelihood of financial distress. This last result is also consistent with the present study’s 
initial predictions. Interestingly, the COVERAGE coefficient estimate possesses the 
highest absolute value among the financial statement ratios, followed by TLTA and 
TFOTL, NOCREDITINT having the smallest value. The same applies for the model 
estimated in t-2, which suggests that the accounting ratios’ coefficient estimates are stable 
over the two periods of time.  
 
Table 5-7 also presents Cox and Snell’s R squared as well as Nagelkerke’s max 
rescaled R squared in order to have a comparison point of the relative increase or decrease 
in performance between the models. As expected, the Nagelkerke’s max rescaled R squared 
decreases for Model 1 when it is estimated from t-1 to t-2. However, the magnitude of the 
decline is only marginal, which suggests that the models’ regressors are stable over time. 
Nevertheless, these measures are only included to make comparisons easier and their 
interpretation needs to be treated with caution, as they do not have the same meaning for 
logit regressions as they have for ordinary least squares regressions. As previously 
discussed, a more appropriate and direct measure of the real performance of a logit model 
is the area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve141 (AUC), whose output will 
be discussed in the following lines. 
 
In addition to the accounting ratios, Model 2 incorporates two macroeconomic 
indicators. Both of them, RPI and SHTBRDEF are statistically significant at 5-1% in the 
model estimated in t-1, and retain the same statistical significance in t-2, which as in the 
case of three of four of the financial statement ratios, indicate that the stability of the 
variables over two periods. Furthermore, all of the variables initially included in Model 1 
retain their statistical significance and the relative magnitude of their coefficient estimates 
in Model 2. The signs of both indicators are also as predicted in the present study: the 
positive sign of the RPI variable’s estimate indicates that a higher level entails an increased 
                                                        
140 Or, in the specific case of the No Credit Interval variable, the period that a company could finance its own business 
expenses, at its current level of activity, by drawing on its own liquid resources and on the assumption that it made no 
further sales   
141 In the remainder of the present study, the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve will be referred to 
as ‘AUC.’ 
Chapter 4: Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Prediction using Accounting, Market and Macroeconomic Variables 139 
likelihood of financial distress. And the positive sign of the SHTBRDEF indicator suggests 
that in a macroeconomic environment characterised by a high level of the real rate of 
interest, all other thing beings equal, the probability of financial distress for industrial firms 
increases. However, both macroeconomic regressors’ estimates are lower in magnitude 
than the accounting ratios, RPI having the smallest estimate in absolute terms, which might 
suggest a smaller effect of the macroeconomic variables on the likelihood of firms’ 
financial distress. With regard to the macroeconomic variables’ contribution to the 
predictive accuracy of accounting the model, as directly measured by the AUC, it can be 
concluded that they contribute positively, although rather marginally, when the model is 
estimated in t-1: The AUC shows an increase from 0.87 to 0.88. However, when the model 
is estimated in t-2, the contribution of the macroeconomic indicators is less conclusive: a 
very small decrease is even observed from an AUC of 0.8523 to 0.8514, suggesting that in 
t-2, financial statement ratios alone are more powerful to predict financial distress than 
mixed with macroeconomic indicators. 
 
Model 3 in Table 5-7 presents the results from logit regressions of the financial 
distress indicator on the accounting and macroeconomic predictor variables included in 
Model 2 plus 4 market variables: firms’ stock prices, past abnormal returns, the relative size 
of the company and the ratio market capitalisation to total debt. All of the market variables 
that entered Model 3 are statistically significant at 5-1% when estimated in period t-1. With 
the notable exception of the SIZE, all of the variables retain the same levels of significance 
when estimated in t-2, suggesting that PRICE, ABNRET, and MCTD are powerful and 
consistent predictors over time of the likelihood of financial distress. SIZE was kept in the 
models as, in spite of its lack of statistical significance in t-2, it contributed positively to the 
predictive accuracy of the model as measured by the AUC. The only exception is 
NOCREDINT, which experienced a marginal decrease, from being statistically significant 
at 5-1% to 10% in the models estimated with data generated two years prior to the 
observation of the financial distress event. It should be also noted that the accounting ratio 
TLTA displays the same behaviour as in the previous analysis of Model 1 and Model 2; 
when Model 3 is estimated in period t-1 the ratio is significant at 5-1%, however, when it is 
estimated in period t-2, it ceases to be statistically significant, which suggests that TLTA, 
despite having a positive contribution to the predictive accuracy of the model, is not 
consistent over time. As for the signs of the coefficient estimates, they all are as predicted 
in this study: a negative sign of the PRICE variable indicates that there is a negative 
relationship between stock price levels and the likelihood of financial distress of public 
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companies, as market prices reflect investors’ expectations of future cash flows or earnings, 
and the company’s earnings are affected by its financial position. 
 
The sign of the ABNRET’s estimate, suggest that, as posited, there is a negative 
relationship between this regressor and the probability of financial distress. Investors do 
seem to discount the equity of those firms that are in a stressed financial position or close 
to default/bankruptcy, and the returns of the company seem to be affected in 
consequence: individual returns of a company outperforming the returns of the FTSE All 
Share Index are a sign of good financial health and thus decrease the likelihood of financial 
distress. Contrarily, company’s returns that fall short to match the FTSE All Share Index’s 
returns (negative returns) are a consistent predictor of financial distress over time (both in 
t-1 and t-2). The sign of MCTD suggests a negative relationship between this variable and 
the probability of financial distress. The study expected this ratio to enhance the predictive 
accuracy of the model and to be consistent over time as it was constructed to include, on 
the one hand, a market approach (through the measure of market capitalisation) and, on 
the other, to solve the problem highlighted in Beaver (2005), namely that the variables 
ABNRET and SIZE are not scaled in that they are not compared to the magnitude of debt 
outstanding. By including total debt as denominator, it solves this problem without giving 
rise to multicollinearity problems with the variable SIZE. As expected, MCTD is a 
powerful as well as consistent predictor of financial distress over time. The sign of the 
market variable SIZE is also as predicted: companies with a high level of SIZE (high 
market capitalisation relative to the FTSE All Share market capitalisation) are more stable 
(and/or well established), indicating a good level of the debt holders’ ‘equity cushion,’ far 
from the ‘strike price’ (or the value of liabilities), and therefore judged by investors as 
capable of serving their debt obligations lowering thus the likelihood of financial distress. 
As to the magnitude of the coefficients’ estimates, ABNRET possess the highest absolute 
value in Model 3, estimated in t-1 as well as t-2, followed by MCTD in t-1 but not in t-2, 
where it displays a lower absolute magnitude, followed by SIZE and PRICE. It is therefore 
concluded that the market variables are also consistent predictors of the likelihood of 
financial distress over time. 
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Table 5-7 Logit Regression of Financial Distress Indicator on Predictor Variables 
This table reports results from logit regressions of the financial distress indicator on the predictor variables. The models were computed for two periods: using the 
accounts, market and macroeconomic data from the year prior to the observation of the financial distress event (t-1), and the accounts, market and macroeconomic 
data from two years prior to the observation of the financial distress event (t-2) in order to confirm their predictive ability in addition to their discriminating power. 
Additionally, results are also presented for a ‘Market’ model that incorporates market variables in t-1 for comparison purposes. The absolute value of z-statistics is 
reported in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5%-1%. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-1 
TFOTL 
 
-0.8105 ** 
(6.74) 
-0.7327** 
(6.18) 
-0.7711** 
(6.30) 
-0.7357** 
(6.19) 
-1.0784** 
(6.51) 
-1.0001** 
(6.26) 
  
TLTA 1.2825** 
(7.61) 
0.2048 
(1.18) 
1.3438** 
(7.96) 
0.2593 
(1.49) 
0.6102** 
(2.66) 
0.00600 
(0.03) 
  
NOCREDINT -0.2130** 
(4.80) 
-0.1670** 
(3.79) 
-0.2245** 
(5.07) 
-0.1685** 
(3.81) 
-0.1513** 
(2.83) 
-0.0938* 
(1.82) 
  
COVERAGE -1.3362** 
(22.99) 
-1.2792** 
(22.36) 
-1.2851** 
(22.00) 
-1.2481** 
(21.56) 
-0.9738** 
(14.24) 
-0.9678** 
(14.21) 
  
RPI  
 
 0.0201** 
(8.45) 
0.0145** 
(5.85) 
0.0119** 
(4.27) 
0.00728** 
(2.60) 
 0.0113** 
(4.57) 
SHTBRDEF  
 
 0.1901** 
(6.51) 
0.2111** 
(5.63) 
0.1262** 
(3.84) 
0.1028** 
(2.45) 
 0.1010** 
(3.48) 
PRICE     -0.1043** 
(4.00) 
-0.0711** 
(2.79) 
-0.1716** 
(6.92) 
-0.1629** 
(6.49) 
ABNRET     -1.1429** 
(9.55) 
-1.6046** 
(13.59) 
-1.7637** 
(15.42) 
-1.7378** 
(15.15) 
SIZE     -0.2356** 
(7.23) 
-0.0440 
(1.47) 
-0.4398** 
(15.49) 
-0.4140** 
(14.43) 
MCTD    
 
 -1.2944** 
(7.53) 
-0.6249** 
(3.16) 
-0.9757** 
(6.97) 
-1.0043** 
(7.13) 
Constant -7.8570** 
(37.63) 
-2.9831** 
(30.63) 
-7.8570** 
(15.60) 
-6.1015** 
(11.40) 
-7.2547** 
(10.52) 
-4.4563** 
(6.08) 
-6.9068** 
(16.55) 
-8.8751** 
(14.17) 
Pseudo R2 0.0926 0.0929 0.0965 0.0953 0.1420 0.1260 0.1017 0.1032 
Max-rescaled R2 0.2802 0.2626 0.2901 0.2674 0.4148 0.3527 0.2967 0.2984 
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Table 5-8 presents model performance statistics for the five models estimated in 
both t-1 and t-2. The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is a direct and appropriate measure 
of the predictive accuracy of models developed using the logit methodology. DeLong et al. 
(1988) state that ‘when a test is based on an observed variable that lies on a continuous or 
graded scale, an assessment of the overall value of the test can be made through the use of 
a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve.’142 Furthermore, Altman et al. (2010) argue 
that ‘The ROC curve plots the true positive against the false positive rate as the threshold 
to discriminate between failed and non-failed firms’ changes. The area under the ROC 
curve is a measure of the predictive accuracy of the model, with a value of 1 representing a 
perfect model.’ Gini rank correlation coefficients143 and Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, 
also presented in Table 5-8, are widely used analysis tools by scoring analysts to assess the 
predictive accuracy of in-sample and hold-out tests (Altman et al., 2010). The advantage of 
these tests is that they are easy to interpret and to calculate, as both can be derived from 
the AUC. As Anderson (2007) argues, the Gini rank coefficient has been co-opted by credit 
scoring analysts, who employ it as a measure of ‘how well a scorecard is able to distinguish 
between goods and bads’ where ‘the end result is a value representing the area under the 
curve.’ The Gini coefficient is very similar to the AUC; the difference is that the former 
calculates only the area between the curve and the diagonal of the Lorenz curve, unlike the 
latter, which calculates the full area below the curve144. As a reference point, in the context 
of professional credit scoring analysis, a Gini coefficient equal to or above 50% is a very 
satisfactory level in a retail environment, as discussed by Anderson (2007). In the context 
of the present study, the Gini rank coefficient is used in order to complement and check 
the consistency of the other measures presented. 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is performed to measure the maximum vertical 
deviation between two empirical cumulative distribution functions (good and bad) in credit 
score modelling. This measure is, according to Anderson (2007) and Mays (2004), ‘the most 
widely used statistic within the United States for measuring the predictive power of rating 
systems.’145 However, Anderson (2007) recommends not using this statistic (or any other 
measure of the predictive accuracy of a model) in isolation, but rather as a complement to 
others such as the AUC or the Gini rank coefficient, which is the approach adopted in the 
present study. Mays (2004) suggests that the acceptable values for this statistic range from 
                                                        
142 P. 837 
143 The Gini rank correlation coefficient can be found as the Somer’s D statistic in the SAS software and most statistical 
software packages.  
144 As such, it can be computed as ((2*AUC)-1) following Altman et al. (2010). 
145 Anderson (2007), p. 196 
Chapter 4: Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Prediction using Accounting, Market and Macroeconomic Variables 143 
20% to 70%, above which the model is ‘probably too good to be true.’ Cox and Snell’s R-
squared is a measure based on the log-likelihood of the model, the log-likelihood of the 
original (baseline) model and the sample size, and Nagelkerke’s Max-rescaled R-squared is a 
refinement of the former. In other words, both can be considered as measures of the same 
concept. In general, they can also be interpreted very similarly (but not identically), to the 
R-squared in linear regression, as they are measures of the significance of the model146. The 
Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test for binary response logistic models is also 
provided. As discussed by Ragavan (2008), the subjects are divided into approximately ten 
groups of roughly the same size based on the percentiles of the estimated probabilities. The 
discrepancies between the observed and expected number of observations in these groups 
are summarised by the Pearson chi-square statistic, which is then compared to a chi-
squared distribution with k degrees of freedom, were k is the number of groups (10) minus 
n (2).147 Thus, a small chi-square (<15) and a large p-value (>0.05) should suggest that the 
model is effective to predict the behaviour of the data, or that the fitted model is an 
appropriate one to be employed in order to predict the specified binary outcomes in the 
dataset. 
 
  Table 5-8 shows the performance of all of the models in the study. From the 
results presented in Section A, which correspond to the models estimated in period t-1, it 
can be concluded that even if Model 1, the ‘accounting only’ model possesses an already 
high discriminating accuracy as measured by the AUC, the addition of macroeconomic 
indicators and market variables can contribute positively and substantially to the 
performance of the financial distress prediction models. Furthermore, it is demonstrated 
that a distress prediction model, does not require the inclusion of a large number of 
regressors (as in some previous academic studies) to display a high discriminating and 
predictive accuracy; in the present study, a set of only 10 regressors yielded an impressive 
AUC of 0.92 in period t-1 (which decreased only marginally to 0.89 in period t-2), 
suggesting that the independent variables retained in the model act as complementary and 
not as substitutes (or mutually exclusive). It is also important to highlight the fact that the 
high discriminating and predictive accuracy of the full model in the present study might be 
explained by the specific combination of independent variables, which were selected taking 
into consideration the problems highlighted in previous research works with regard to the 
representation of the main, most likely, and potential indicators of financial distress. A very 
large number of financial ratios, macroeconomic indicators and market variables were 
                                                        
146 See Cox and Snell (1989) and Nagelkerke (1991). 
147 P. 10. 
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tested. Redundant variables were discarded, indicators that have proven their contribution 
to the performance of the models in previous research were included, and potentially useful 
new ones were tested. An example of a new indicator that had not yet been tested is the 
ratio market capitalisation to total debt (MCTD), which proved to contain information 
useful to the prediction of financial distress. The result was a new distress prediction model 
with a new set or combination of variables for quoted companies in the United Kingdom 
that proved to be very well positioned relative to previous and well-known models for the 
prediction of company’s default/distress148. 
 
 From Model 1 to Model 2 in period t-1, an increase in the performance of the 
models measured by the AUC was observed (from 0.872 to 0.876), which indicates that 
macroeconomic variables contribute only marginally, though positively, to the predictive 
accuracy of a model based on financial statement ratios. As the Gini rank coefficient and 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic are both derived from computations based on the level 
of the AUC, they follow the same pattern as the latter, and fall into the (previously 
discussed) highest ranges that are considered by credit scoring professionals as acceptable. 
On the other hand, a considerable increase in the AUC is observed when market variables 
are added in Model 3 (from an AUC equal to 0.88 to an AUC equal to 0.92); the magnitude 
of the enhancement suggest that market variables contain a substantial amount of 
information that is not available in financial statements but that was taken into 
consideration by the markets and act as a complement to the information provided by 
accounting ratios149. Furthermore, the present study also estimates Model 4 and Model 5 in 
order to directly compare the performance of the ‘accounting only’ model (Model 1) and 
the ‘accounting plus macroeconomic variables’ model (Model 2) against the ‘market only’ 
model (Model 4) and the ‘market plus macroeconomic variables’ model (Model 5) 
respectively. It can be observed that accounting and market models in isolation yield almost 
the same predictive accuracy, with an AUC of 0.8718 and 0.8712 for the accounting and 
market only models respectively, and an AUC of 0.8763 and 0.8727 when macroeconomic 
variables are added to the models. In both cases, the inclusion of macroeconomic variables 
enhances, although marginally, the predictive accuracy. The accounting models have a 
                                                        
148 With the advantages of accuracy, simplicity and timeliness. 
149 An example of the information that is not included in financial statements (as by nature they contain only past 
information), might be the information regarding the future prospects of a firm such as an insufficient level of Research 
and Development expenditure, or the negative forecast for a specific industry due to industry-specific micro or 
macroeconomic developments taking place. Information of this kind is typically taken into account by investors and 
market participants in their analysis and is therefore reflected by market variables only such as equity prices or firms’ 
returns.  
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marginally better performance when estimated in period t-1 using binary logistic regression 
as the main statistical methodology. It is therefore of paramount importance to highlight 
the prominent increase in predictive accuracy (from an AUC equal to 0.88 to 0.92) resulting 
from the combination of two models that yield an almost equal (both significantly minor to 
the ‘full’ model) predictive accuracy when they are estimated in isolation.  
 
Table 5-8 also presents the results of Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit tests. 
Despite the different results obtained in previous research works, and the controversy 
surrounding its consistency, the present study reports the results of the goodness-of-fit test 
as it points to an interesting observation worth taking into consideration: when Model 1 
and Model 2 (the ‘accounting only’ model and the ‘accounting plus macroeconomic 
variables’ model respectively) are estimated, the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit 
test show a large chi-square and a p-value < .0001, both of which indicate that the model, 
although displaying a high predictive accuracy, might lack other independent variables that 
are crucial in order to explain a higher proportion of the phenomenon that a model is 
trying to elucidate. On the other hand, it can be observed that the opposite is true when 
market variables are incorporated to the ‘accounting and macroeconomic variables model’ 
in Model 3: the results for the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test show a small 
chi-square (<15) and a large p-value (>0.05) that suggests that Model 3 is and adequate 
model. In other words, these values imply that the model fitted with macroeconomic 
variables is more appropriate to predict the data (to better discriminate and predict the 
specified binary outcomes in the dataset: healthy from financially distressed companies). 
This argument finds additional support in the significantly larger AUC (from 0.88 to 0.92) 
when market variables are present.  
 
In order to test if the same results hold true for models based on market variables, 
the same test was applied to Model 4 and Model 5 (the ‘market only’ model and the ‘market 
plus macroeconomic variables’ respectively). Consistent with the previous analysis of 
results, Model 4 displays a chi-square with a value below 15 and a p-value well above the 
0.05 threshold, suggesting that market variables are appropriate regressors to measure the 
likelihood of financial distress. Interestingly, when macroeconomic indicators are added to 
the ‘market only’ model, both Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit statistics display 
better values than for the accounting models (Model 1 and Model 2). Furthermore, the 
same results apply for the models estimated in t-2, making the above interpretation more 
consistent. 
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Table 5-8 Model Performance Measures 
This table reports model performance statistics. Panel A shows measures for the five models 
estimated in period t-1, and Panel B displays the same measures for all of the models 
estimated in t-2. Model 1 is the ‘accounting only’ model, Model 2 is the ‘accounting plus 
macroeconomic variables’ model, Model 3 is the ‘full’ model, including market variables in 
addition to the variables in Model 2, Model 4 is the ‘market only’ model, and Model 5 is the 
‘market plus macroeconomic variables’ model. The first measure is a direct measure of the 
predictive accuracy of models estimated using the logit methodology, the Area under the 
Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve (AUC); Gini coefficients, Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistics, Cox and Snell R-squared, Nagelkerke’s Max-rescaled R-squared and the models’ 
Chi-squared are also presented. Additionally Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit 
statistics are displayed. 
Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Panel A: Models’ Performance in t-1 
AUC 0.8718 0.8763 0.9190 0.8712 0.8727 
Gini Rank Coefficient 0.7436 0.7526 0.8380 0.7424 0.7454 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.5949 0.6021 0.6704 0.5939 0.5963 
Cox & Snell’s R2  0.0926 0.0965 0.1420 0.1017 0.1032 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.2802 0.2901 0.4148 0.2967 0.2984 
χ2* (4, 6, 10, 4, 6) 1776.13 
(P<.0001) 
1834.72 
(P<.0001) 
2072.44 
(P<.0001) 
1587.72 
(P<.0001) 
1588.23 
(P<.0001) 
Hosmer & Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test 
χ2 (8) 86.5081 55.8609 10.2224 12.5565 18.5788 
Pr> χ2 <.0001 <.0001 0.2498 0.1280 0.0173 
Panel B: Models’ Performance in t-2 
AUC 0.8523 0.8514 0.8918 0.8355 0.8358 
Gini Rank Coefficient 0.7046 0.7028 0.7836 0.6710 0.6716 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.5637 0.5622 0.6269 0.5368 0.5373 
Cox & Snell’s R2  0.0929 0.0953 0.1260 0.0822 0.0831 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.2626 0.2674 0.3527 0.2302 0.2301 
χ2* (4, 6, 10, 4, 6) 1550.94 
(P<.0001) 
1573.33 
(P<.0001) 
1657.38 
(P<.0001) 
1167.70 
(P<.0001) 
1158.12 
(P<.0001) 
Hosmer & Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test 
χ2 (8) 97.7438 45.3124 13.7421 10.7357 18.1839 
Pr> χ2 <.0001 <.0001 0.0887 0.2171 0.0199 
* the parenthesis following the model’s χ2 represent the degrees of freedom for each estimated 
model: 4 for Model 1, 6 for Model 2, 10 for model 3, 4 for Model 4, and 6 for Model 5. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the predictive accuracy of the models estimated in t-2 experience a 
decrease, which is consistent with previous default prediction models. However, the same 
patterns can be observed when financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators and 
market variables are combined in a single model. The only exception that can be observed 
is between Model 1 and Model 2; when macroeconomic variables are added to the 
‘accounting only’ model, there is a marginal decrease in predictive accuracy (from and AUC 
of 0.852 to an AUC of 0.851), suggesting that financial statement ratios are (marginally) 
more reliable regressors than macroeconomic indicators when the likelihood of financial 
distress is estimated in t-2. Nevertheless, because of the inconsequential (very small) 
decrease in performance, it could also be argued that the predictive accuracy remains 
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unchanged when macroeconomic indicators are included in an accounting model estimated 
in t-2. As to Model 3, it can be concluded that the addition of market variables to Model 2 
(estimated in t-2) considerably increases the predictive accuracy by the same magnitude as 
when it was estimated in period t-1: from an AUC of 0.851 to 0.892. Model 5 also shows an 
increase in predictive accuracy relative to Model 4: from an AUC of 0.835 to 0.836, 
suggesting that, although marginally, macroeconomic variables contribute positively to the 
performance of the model. However, as in the case of Model 1 and Model 2, the 
contribution is so small that the performance could also be considered as unchanged. 
Again, this analysis confirms the consistency of the behaviour of macroeconomic 
indicators when added either to the t-2 ‘accounting only’ model or to the ‘market only’ 
model. The additional Gini rank coefficients as well as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
display patterns consistent with the above discussion and confirm the previous results, 
both the models estimated in t-1 and the ones estimated in t-2. Moreover, the predictive 
accuracy of the models presented in this study can be located in the high end of the ranges 
specified by professional credit managers when measured through the Gini coefficient and 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. 
 
As stated by Cleves (2002), ‘occasionally, there is a need to compare the predictive 
accuracy of several fitted logit (logistic) or probit models by comparing the areas under the 
corresponding receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves.’150 In order to perform the 
comparisons, the present study applies for the first time, in financial distress prediction 
models, a methodology based on a non-parametric approach that employs the theory 
developed for generalised Man-Whitney U-statistics. The present study follows the 
methodology presented in DeLong et al. (1998) and takes thus into account the correlated 
nature of the data that arises when two or more empirical curves are constructed using tests 
performed on a same set of firms. This issue is paramount as most of the comparisons of 
ROC curves made in previous studies, not only in the field of finance but also in fields 
such as atmospheric science and medical diagnosis, for which predictions of specific 
outcomes are essential, employ the already available computations in most statistical 
analysis software packages. The problem with this approach is that the models to be 
compared (derived using the same dataset) are estimated on the same number or set of 
observations. For instance, as highlighted by Cleves (2002), when the commands 
‘roccontrast’ in SAS or ‘roccomp’ in STATA are employed to compare the curves after 
running the logistic procedure, the programs use the same number of observations for all 
                                                        
150 P. 301 
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models, as they drop from the computation any observation151 in which at least one of the 
covariate values is missing (which varies between models). Therefore, difficulties can arise 
if there are missing values included in some models but not in others, as the exclusion of 
valid observations that would have otherwise been used in the normal estimation of the 
logit model, lead to inconsistent and erroneous computations of the area under the receiver 
operating characteristics curve. 
 
The comparison of curves in the present study takes into account the correlated 
nature of the data152, on the one hand, and solves the problem of comparison of two or 
more models using a constant number of observations, on the other. Following Delong et 
al. (1988) and combining the use of the SAS logistic statistical methodology (PROC 
LOGISTIC) with the ROC macros available from the SAS Institute153, the present paper 
reports a useful visual comparison of the differences in predictive accuracy of the 
‘accounting only’ model, the ‘accounting plus macroeconomic indicators’ model and the 
‘full’ model using a non-parametric approach based on the theory on generalised Man-
Whitney U-statistics. The graphic is constructed plotting the models’ ability to identify true 
positives (sensitivity), on the Y axis, and its ability to detect true negatives (1 - specificity). 
In other words, each individual ROC curve is generated (in the field of financial distress 
prediction models) by plotting the proportion of true distressed companies out of the 
companies classified by the model as distressed (‘True Positive Rate’) against the 
proportion of false distressed companies (healthy companies) out of the companies 
classified by the model as distressed (‘False Positive Rate’) at various cutpoints. As to the 
use and interpretation of the plots’ results, ‘if a test could perfectly discriminate, it would 
have a value above which the entire abnormal population would fall and below which all 
normal values would fall (or vice versa). The curve would then pass through the point (0, 1) 
on the unit grid. The closer a ROC curve comes to this ideal point, the better its 
discriminating ability. A test with no discriminating ability will produce a curve that follows 
the diagonal of the grid.’ 154  Additionally, the areas under the receiver operating 
characteristic curve of the three fitted models are tested for equality, where an overall p-
value below 0.05 is indicative of differences between the areas. In other words, an overall p-
                                                        
151 Stata’s ‘roccomp’ command also drops from the computation any observation in which at least one of the predicted 
probabilities is missing. See Cleves (2002). 
152 The implicit correlation between the curves when two or more empirical curves are constructed using tests performed 
on a same set of firms. 
153 The use of the SAS PROC LOGISTIC and the macros available from the SAS Institute results in a method capable of 
comparing each model’s receiver operating characteristics area computed using the entire available number of 
observations specific to each individual model and not a constant number of observations for all models, thus avoiding 
the problem highlighted by Cleves (2002). 
154 DeLong et al. (1988), p. 837 
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value <0.05 signifies that the null hypothesis of equality of areas under the ROC curve can 
be rejected, thus confirming the reliability of the results. 
 
The nonparametric comparison of the areas under correlated ROC based on the 
theory developed for generalised Man-Whitney U-statistics was performed, initially, on 3 
models estimated in period t-1: the ‘accounting’ model, the ‘accounting plus 
macroeconomic variables’ model, and the ‘full’ model that includes market variables. Then, 
two out of the three models with the best predictive accuracy, based on the area under the 
ROC curve, were selected for another comparative test with the aim of presenting 
graphically the increase in predictive accuracy when market variables are added to Model 2, 
on the one hand, and to test whether the AUC differs statistically between the two models, 
on the other. Furthermore, the above procedure for the three models estimated in t-1 was 
repeated for the same three models estimated in t-2. The present study presents thus four 
figures that allow a comparison between models and between estimation periods that 
facilitates the analysis of the differences in predictive accuracy as well as the contribution of 
the different sets of variables (financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators, and 
market variables) over time.  
 
Figures 5-1 to 5-4 show a graphic representation of the discussion drawn from 
Table 5-7, regarding the differences in the predictive accuracy of the models through the 
interpretation of their respective AUCs: it can be thus confirmed that the contribution of 
macroeconomic indicators to the performance of the accounting model is positive, though 
marginal, when the model is estimated in t-1, however, results are less conclusive when the 
model is estimated in t-2: there is even a very small decrease in performance entailed by the 
inclusion of macroeconomic indicators. It can be therefore concluded that financial 
statement ratios are more powerful to predict financial distress in period t-2. On the other 
hand, the inclusion of market variables results in a substantial increase in the predictive 
accuracy of ‘accounting plus macroeconomic indicators’ models, showing consistency 
when they are estimated in both periods t-1 and t-2.  Finally, it is worth noting that the four 
comparisons of areas under the curve show an overall p-value =< 0.0001 which indicates 
that the null hypothesis (H0) of equality of areas under the ROC curve can be rejected. In 
other words, the small p-value resulting from the test strongly suggests that the three areas 
differ statistically and that the analysis is reliable. 
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Figure 5-1 Comparison of Areas under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve of 
Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 estimated in period t-1 
The figure plots the AUC of the ‘accounting only’ model, the ‘accounting plus macroeconomic 
indicators’ model and the ‘full’ model, including market variables; Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 
respectively, estimated in period t-1. The comparison was performed using the non-parametric 
method to compare areas under correlated ROC curves presented in DeLong et al. (1988), where 
Model 1 AUC = 0.87, Model 2 AUC = 0.88, and Model 3 AUC = 0.92. The discriminating 
accuracy of a model’s AUC equal to the diagonal line in the graphic (0.50) would be no different 
than a random guess. Conversely, an AUC equal to 1 would signify that the model is able to 
perfectly discriminate the binary outcomes. Therefore, the closer the real value of an AUC to this 
theoretical value, the better its discriminating ability. The overall p-value =< 0.0001 indicates that 
the null hypothesis of equality of areas under the ROC curve can be rejected. In other words, the 
small p-value of this test strongly suggests that the three areas differ statistically. 
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Figure 5-2 Comparison of Areas under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve of 
Model 2, and Model 3 estimated in period t-1 
The figure plots the AUC of the two models with the best discriminating ability: Model 2 and 
Model 3 estimated in period t-1, the ‘accounting plus macroeconomic indicators’ model and the ‘full 
model,’ including market variables, respectively. The comparison was performed using the non-
parametric method to compare areas under correlated ROC curves presented in DeLong et al. 
(1988), where Model 2 AUC = 0.88, and Model 3 AUC = 0.92. The discriminating accuracy of a 
model’s AUC equal to the diagonal line in the graphic (0.50) would be no different than a random 
guess. Conversely, an AUC equal to 1 would signify that the model is able to perfectly discriminate 
the binary outcomes. Therefore, the closer the real value of an AUC to this theoretical value, the 
better its discriminating ability. Similar to the above comparison of the three models, the overall p-
value =< 0.0001 indicates that the null hypothesis of equality of areas under the ROC curve for 
Model 2 and Model 3 can be rejected. In other words, the small p-value of this test strongly 
suggests that the three areas differ statistically.  
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Figure 5-3 Comparison of Areas under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve of 
Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 estimated in period t-2 
The figure plots the AUC of the ‘accounting only’ model, the ‘accounting plus macroeconomic 
indicators’ model and the ‘full model,’ including market variables; Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 
respectively, estimated in period t-2. The comparison was performed using the non-parametric 
method to compare areas under correlated ROC curves presented in DeLong et al. (1988), where 
Model 1 AUC = 0.85, Model 2 AUC = 0.85, and Model 3 AUC = 0.89. The predictive accuracy of 
a model’s AUC equal to the diagonal line in the graphic (0.50) would be no different than a random 
guess. Conversely, an AUC equal to 1 would signify that the model is able to perfectly predict the 
binary outcomes. Therefore, the closer the real value of an AUC to this theoretical value, the better 
its predicting ability. The overall p-value =<0.0001 indicates that the null hypothesis of equality of 
areas under the ROC curve can be rejected. In other words, the small p-value of this test strongly 
suggests that the three areas differ statistically. 
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Figure 5-4 Comparison of Areas under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve of 
Model 2, and Model 3 estimated in period t-2 
The figure plots the AUC of the two models with the best predictive ability: Model 2 and Model 3 
estimated in period t-2, the ‘accounting plus macroeconomic indicators’ model and the ‘full model,’ 
including market variables, respectively. The comparison was performed using the non-parametric 
method to compare areas under correlated ROC curves presented in DeLong et al. (1988), where 
Model 2 AUC = 0.85, and Model 3 AUC = 0.89. The predictive accuracy of a model’s AUC equal 
to the diagonal line in the graphic (0.50) would be no different than a random guess. Conversely, an 
AUC equal to 1 would signify that the model is able to perfectly predict the binary outcomes. 
Therefore, the closer the real value of an AUC to this theoretical value, the better its predictive 
ability. Similar to the above comparison of the three models, the overall p-value =< 0.0001 
indicates that the null hypothesis of equality of areas under the ROC curve for Model 2 and Model 
3 can be rejected. In other words, the small p-value of this test strongly suggests that the three areas 
differ statistically. 
 
5.5.1. Marginal Effects and Changes in Predicted Probabilities. 
 
 The parameters estimated from binary response models, unlike those estimated by 
linear models, cannot be directly interpreted because they do not provide useful 
information that fully describes the relationship between the independent variable and the 
outcome (Long and Freese, 2003). Previous bankruptcy, default, and financial distress 
prediction models constructed using binary response methodologies- invariably focus only 
on the overall discriminating or predictive accuracy of the models presented and very rarely 
do they provide an interpretation of the relationship between the predictor variables and 
the binary outcome. Such studies report solely the estimates obtained from binary response 
models and provide an interpretation of the direction of the relationship based on the sign 
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of the estimate. Nevertheless, the basic output (the coefficient estimates) obtained by 
performing binary response models cannot explain the effects of individual variables on the 
model’s outcomes because of their nonlinear nature. Marginal effects and predicted 
probabilities are appropriate analytic tools to treat this issue 
 
This section presents results of the computation of marginal effects of individual 
regressors as well as graphic representations of predicted probabilities of financial 
distressed companies. This section intends to fill an important gap in the default/financial 
distress prediction models literature, where the measurement of expected instantaneous 
changes in the response variable (financial distress indicator in the present study) as 
function of a change in a specific predictor variable while keeping all the other covariates 
constant, has been overlooked. As previously discussed, marginal effect measurements 
(defined as the computation of the partial derivative of the event probability with respect to 
the predictor if interest) are very useful to the interpretation of the individual effects of the 
regressors on the dependent variable in discrete dependent variable models, or binary 
response models (logit regression in the present study). With regard to their calculation, the 
present study’s methodology consists of outputting the marginal effects estimated at each 
observation in the dataset and then computing the sample average of individual marginal 
effects in order to obtain the overall marginal effects. SAS statistical software code was 
employed to generate the estimated marginal effects. Predicted probabilities were generated 
by plotting the vector reflecting the variations in the predicted probability of financial 
distress (the predicted probability that the financial distress indicator, Financial_Distress = 
1) when the change in an individual regressor ranges from its approximate minimum to its 
maximum observed value, keeping all the other covariates constant at their means155. 
 
The marginal effects presented in Table 5-9 reflect a measure of the impact of the 
regressors on the response variable. The predictor variables with the largest impact, in 
absolute terms, in Model 2 are invariably the financial ratios TLTA, COVERAGE, and 
TFOTL, in order of importance, with the NOCREDINT variable and macroeconomic 
indicators having the smallest impact on the expected instantaneous changes in the 
response variable while keeping all of the other covariates constant. This is also true when 
Model 2 was estimated in t-2. 
  
                                                        
155 The SAS statistical package was also employed for this calculation.  
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Table 5-9 Marginal Effects 
This table reports the marginal effects (in percentages) for the ‘accounting only’ model, the 
‘accounting plus macroeconomic indicators’ model, the ‘full’ model including also market 
variables, or Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 respectively. Additionally, marginal effects are 
generated for a ‘market only’ model and a ‘market plus macroeconomic variables,’ Model 4 and 
Model 5, for comparison purposes. n represents the number of observations. Marginal effects 
are intended to measure the expected instantaneous changes in the response variable (the 
financial distress indicator) as a function of a change in a specific predictor variable while 
keeping all the other covariates constant. The methodology used in the present study to 
generate the marginal effects consists of outputting the individual marginal effects estimated at 
each observation in the dataset and then calculating their sample average in order to obtain the 
overall marginal effect. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-1 
TFOTL -3.375 -3.427 -3.211 -3.464 -4.059 -4.267   
TLTA 5.340 0.958 5.595 1.221 2.297 0.026   
NOCREDINT -0.887 -0.781 -0.935 -0.794 -0.569 -0.400   
COVERAGE -5.564 -5.983 -5.351 -5.878 -3.665 -4.129   
RPI   0.084 0.068 0.045 0.031  0.048 
SHTBRDEF   0.792 0.994 0.475 0.439  0.431 
PRICE     -0.393 -0.303 -0.724 -0.696 
ABNRET     -4.301 -6.846 -7.446 -7.424 
SIZE     -0.887 -0.188 -1.857 -1.769 
MCTD     -4.872 -2.666 -4.119 -4.291 
n 18,276 15,909 18,070 15,703 13,529 12,305 14,807 14,578 
 
Interestingly, when market variables are added to the models based on financial 
ratios, ABNRET and MCTD are among the 4 largest marginal effects in absolute terms in 
Model 3; MCTD and ABNRET having the largest marginal effects in Model 3 in period t-1 
and t-2, respectively. 
 
 The present study also estimates the marginal effects for the ‘Market only’ model 
and the ‘Market plus macroeconomic indicators’ model, Model 4 and Model 5, in order to 
assess the changes in the response variable following a change in the specific market 
variables while keeping all the other covariates constant. These estimations confirm the 
previous results: in both market models, the variables ABNRET, MCTD, SIZE and 
PRICE have the largest marginal effects, followed by the macroeconomic indicators 
SHTBRDEF and RPI, in order of importance and in absolute terms. It can be therefore 
concluded that market variables do contain additional information very important to the 
prediction of financial distress. Moreover, market variables act as complements to financial 
ratios. 
 
 Presenting and analysing marginal effects for all the models in the study has filled a 
gap in the financial distress prediction literature that lacked a measure of the individual 
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instantaneous contribution of a change of a specific variable on the response variable (the 
Financial Distress indicator built for the present analysis), while keeping all the other 
regressors constant. Additionally, the present study goes further and presents the vector of 
predicted probabilities for all the individual variables’ specific minimum and maximum 
ranges where they have the most impact in the probability of financial distress, while 
keeping all the other covariates constant at their respective means. Thus, Figures 5-4, 5-5, 
and 5-6 show the changes in predicted probabilities for accounting, macroeconomic and 
market variables, respectively, when the Financial Distress indicator is equal to 1. The 
importance of these figures is that they clearly show the magnitude as well as the 
directionality of each regressor reflected by the slope and inclination of the curves, plotted 
at various levels of the independent variables. 
 
Figure 5-5, shows the behaviour of the predicted probabilities for financial distress 
at different values of each of the financial statement ratios. It can be observed that the 
COVERAGE variable displays the steepest slope relative to the other ratios, indicating that 
a given change in the level of this variable156 will have the largest impact on the predicted 
probability of financial distress, when all the other variables are kept constant at their 
means. The slope of the COVERAGE vector also shows that there is a negative 
relationship between the predicted probability and the level of the variable: there is an 
important decrease of the predicted probabilities of financial distress as the COVERAGE 
variable approaches its maximum estimation value (1). A very similar pattern can be 
observed for the TFOTL ratio reflecting the liquidity of a company: the slope also 
negatively relates the predicted probability of financial distress to the magnitude of the 
variable, although a change in its value produces a slightly smaller impact than the one 
observed when there is a change in the magnitude of COVERAGE, as shown by the slope 
of the vector. Changes in the magnitude of TLTA, on the other hand, are positively related 
to the predicted probability of financial distress, and can be considered as having the third 
most important impact among financial statement ratios, followed by NOCREDINT, 
whose slope is almost flat, indicating a very small negative impact. 
  
                                                        
156 Reflecting the firm’s ability to pay interest on outstanding debt. 
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Figure 5-5 Changes in Predicted Probabilities – Financial Statement Ratios 
The figure plots the vectors reflecting changes in predicted probabilities (for Financial Distress 
= 1) at different levels of the accounting independent variables Total Funds from Operations 
to Total Liabilities (TFOTL), Total Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA), the No Credit Interval 
(NOCREDINT), and Interest Coverage (COVERAGE), keeping all the other covariates 
constant at their mean values (TFOTL = 0.097, TLTA = 0.498, NOCREDINT = -0.2, 
COVERAGE = 0.6, RPI = 178.1, SHTBRDEF = 2.046, PRICE = 4.427, ABNRET = -0.11, 
SIZE = -10, MCTD = 0.91). The computation was made taking into account all the variables 
included in the ‘Full’ model or Model 3 (financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators 
and market variables). Predicted probabilities are estimated employing an approximate value of 
the minimum and maximum ranges of the independent variables. In this way, the predicted 
probabilities for all levels of a variable can be observed. This figure reports the predicted 
probabilities for the ‘Full’ model estimated in period t-1, the vectors estimated using the full 
model  in t-2 have very similar shapes, so they were not reported in the present study. 
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Figure 5-6 Changes in Predicted Probabilities – Market Variables 
The figure plots the vectors reflecting changes in predicted probabilities (for Financial Distress 
= 1) at different levels of the market independent variables Share Price (PRICE), Abnormal 
Returns (ABNRET), the relative Size of the company (SIZE), and the ratio Market 
Capitalisation to Total Debt (MCTD), keeping all the other covariates constant at their mean 
values  (TFOTL = 0.097, TLTA = 0.498, NOCREDINT = -0.2, COVERAGE = 0.6, RPI = 
178.1, SHTBRDEF = 2.046, PRICE = 4.427, ABNRET = -0.11, SIZE = -10, MCTD = 0.91). 
The computation was made taking into account all the variables included in the ‘Full’ model or 
Model 3 (financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators and market variables). Predicted 
probabilities are estimated employing an approximate value of the minimum and maximum 
ranges of the independent variables. In this way, the predicted probabilities for all levels of a 
variable can be observed. This figure reports the predicted probabilities for the ‘Full’ model 
estimated in period t-1, the vectors estimated using the full model  in t-2 have very similar 
shapes, so they were not reported in the present study. 
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Figure 5-7 Changes in Predicted Probabilities – Macroeconomic Indicators 
The figure plots the vectors reflecting changes in predicted probabilities (for Financial Distress 
= 1) at different levels of the macroeconomic  independent variables Retail Price Index (RPI), 
and the proxy for interest rates, the Deflated Short Term Bill Rate (SHTBRDEF), keeping all 
the other covariates constant at their mean values  (TFOTL = 0.097, TLTA = 0.498, 
NOCREDINT = -0.2, COVERAGE = 0.6, RPI = 178.1, SHTBRDEF = 2.046, PRICE = 
4.427, ABNRET = -0.11, SIZE = -10, MCTD = 0.91). The computation was made taking into 
account all the variables included in the ‘Full’ model or Model 3 (financial statement ratios, 
macroeconomic indicators and market variables). Predicted probabilities are estimated 
employing an approximate value of the minimum and maximum ranges of the independent 
variables. In this way, the predicted probabilities for all levels of a variable can be observed. 
This figure reports the predicted probabilities for the ‘Full’ model estimated in period t-1, the 
vectors estimated using the full model  in t-2 have very similar shapes, so they were not 
reported in the present study. 
 
 As expected, all of the market variables show a negative relationship between 
variations in individual levels and predicted probabilities of financial distress. The covariate 
with the largest impact on the latter is SIZE, as the vector displays the steepest slope. It is 
followed by ABNRET, MCTD and PRICE, which is consistent with the output obtained 
from the calculation of marginal effects. Finally, variations in the magnitude of economic 
indicators are positively related to changes in the predicted probabilities of financial distress 
when all the other covariates are kept constant at their means. Interestingly, the vectors’ 
slopes of the macroeconomic indicators RPI and SHTBRDEF are steeper than the 
financial statement ratios TLTA and COVERAGE, which could lead us to conclude that 
they have a larger impact on the predicted probability of financial distress than the 
estimates of marginal effects would suggest. However, this is hardly the case, as the ranges 
used to plot the slopes of the macroeconomic indicators are larger in absolute terms than 
those of the two financial statement ratios, which might explain the observed 
phenomenon. 
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5.5.2. Classification Accuracy Tables. 
 
Classification accuracy tables have been used in previous works as an additional 
tool to measure the predictive accuracy of the default/bankruptcy prediction models. The 
present study, however, employs a different and more appropriate methodology to estimate 
proportions of correct and incorrect classifications of financially and non-financially 
distressed firms. In order to classify a set of binary data, previous research works employ 
the same observations used to fit the model to estimate the classification error, resulting in 
biased error-count estimates. In other words, the widely-used 2x2 frequency tables’ 
estimates, where correctly classified observations are displayed on the main diagonal of the 
table, are derived using all observations to fit the model. Therefore, the results are biased, 
as each observation has an effect on the model used to classify itself. One way of reducing 
said bias is ‘to remove the binary observation to be classified from the data, reestimate the 
parameters of the model, and then classify the observation based on the new parameter 
estimates157.’ Unfortunately this method is computationally demanding when using large 
datasets. For this reason, the present study employs logistic regression that, although is less 
computationally intensive still delivers high predictive accuracy and minimises type I and II 
error rates. Specifically, a one step approximation is applied to the preceding parameter 
estimates158. The leave-one out jack knife approach to correct for over-sampling employed 
in the present study helps eliminate potential biases common to analysis of classification 
tables that fail to use holdout samples. 
 
 
In order to construct a bias-adjusted classification table, predicted financial distress 
event probabilities are estimated for each observation. If the predicted event probability 
exceeds or equals a given cutpoint value (whose real line is mapped onto [0,1]), then the 
observation is predicted to be in financial distress, otherwise, it is predicted to be a non-
event or non-financially distressed. The probability levels chosen range from 0.020 to 0.120 
in order to get high levels of Sensitivity and Specificity, combined as well as individually. 
The advantage of this methodology to construct classification tables is that it provides a 
useful tool to re-calibrate a distress prediction model with different probability cutpoints 
depending on the costs assigned to the Type I and II errors. 
 
                                                        
157 SAS Institute 
158 http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/statug/63033/HTML/default/viewer.htm#statug_logistic_sect037.ht
m 
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The present study measures the accuracy of the classification through its Sensitivity 
(the ability of the model to predict a financial distress event correctly) and Specificity (the 
ability of the model to predict a non-financial distress event correctly). In Table 5-10, the 
‘Correct’ column shows the number of observations that were correctly predicted as 
financially distressed and non-financially distressed, respectively. The ‘Incorrect’ column 
presents the number of non-financially distressed observations that were incorrectly 
predicted as financially distressed, and the number of financially distressed observations 
that were incorrectly predicted as non-financially distressed, respectively. The ‘Percentages’ 
column exhibits the rate of correct classifications, the proportion of financial distress 
responses that were predicted to be financial distress events (Sensitivity, or the ability of the 
model to predict financial distress correctly), and the rate of non-financial distress 
responses that were predicted to be non-financial distress events (Specificity, or the ability 
of the model to predict non-financial distress correctly), respectively. 
 
 Biased-adjusted classification tables were calculated for Model 2 (the ‘Accounting 
plus macroeconomic indicators’ model) and Model 3 (the ‘Full’ model) in order to assess 
the increase in the classification accuracy when market variables are added to a model 
based on financial statement ratios (Section A and section B in Table 5-10, respectively). 
Furthermore, Table 5-10 also exhibits a classification table for Model 3 estimated in period 
t-2 in order to test whether the ‘Full’ model continues to be useful in predicting financial 
distress two years prior to the distress event, thus confirming its predictive accuracy. It can 
be concluded that the methodology employed was effective to confirm these two points: 
there is a considerable increase in classification performance from Model 2 to Model 3, 
meaning that market variables provide useful information not included in financial 
statement ratios or macroeconomic indicators. Furthermore, the improvement suggests 
that the three types of variables act as complementary, confirming the previous results 
obtained from the analysis of Areas under the Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve. 
The 0.060 probability level was chosen as an appropriate benchmark to perform a 
comparison between models for the following reasons: First, this level is equal to the rate 
of failed to healthy companies for which complete data made the computation of predicted 
probabilities possible. Second, this level produces the smallest gap between sensitivity and 
specificity percentages. Sections A, B, and C show that a probability level of 0.060 used as 
cutpoint, yields the combined highest predictive accuracy between Sensitivity and 
Specificity for the three models. The increase in predictive accuracy when market variables 
are added to the ‘Accounting and macroeconomic indicators’ model is equal to 5 
percentage points as measured by the proportion of correct classifications in column 6 of 
Chapter 4: Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Prediction using Accounting, Market and Macroeconomic Variables 162 
Table 4-10, at the 0.060 probability level as cutpoint value; from 80 to 85 per cent correct 
classifications in Model 2 and Model 3, respectively. 
 
Table 5-10 Bias-Adjusted Classification Table 
This table reports a biased-adjusted classification table for predicted distress frequencies at 
different probability levels as cut-off values for Model 2 estimated in period t-1, and Model 3 
estimated in period t-1 and t-2, in panels A, B and C respectively. The ‘Correct’ column shows the 
number of observations that were correctly predicted as financially distressed and non-financially 
distressed, respectively. The ‘Incorrect’ column presents the number of non-financially distressed 
observations that were incorrectly predicted as financially distressed, and the number of 
financially distressed observations that were incorrectly predicted as non-financially distressed, 
respectively. The ‘Percentages’ column exhibits the rate of correct classifications, the proportion 
of financial distress responses that were predicted to be financial distress events (Sensitivity, or 
the ability of the model to predict financial distress correctly), and the rate of non-financial 
distress responses that were predicted to be non-financial distress events (Specificity, or the 
ability of the model to predict non-financial distress correctly), respectively. 
Probability 
Level 
Correct Incorrect Percentages 
Distressed 
Non-
Distressed 
Distressed 
Non-
Distressed 
Correct Sensitivity Specificity 
Panel A: Model 2 (t-1) 
0.020 841 12282 4861 86 72.6 90.7 71.6 
0.040 785 13602 3541 142 79.6 84.7 79.3 
0.060 762 13764 3379 165 80.4 82.2 80.3 
0.080 738 13983 3160 189 81.5 79.6 81.6 
0.100 701 14275 2868 226 82.9 75.6 83.3 
0.120 646 14643 2500 281 84.6 69.7 85.4 
Panel B: Model 3 (t-1) 
0.020 685 9455 3346 43 75.0 94.1 73.9 
0.040 651 10419 2382 77 81.8 89.4 81.4 
0.060 631 10845 1956 97 84.8 86.7 84.7 
0.080 608 11136 1665 120 86.8 83.5 87.0 
0.100 584 11342 1459 144 88.2 80.2 88.6 
0.120 563 11499 1302 165 89.2 77.3 89.8 
Panel C: Model 3 (t-2) 
0.020 654 7793 3800 58 68.6 91.9 67.2 
0.040 611 9305 2288 101 80.6 85.8 80.3 
0.060 576 9757 1836 136 84.0 80.9 84.2 
0.080 556 10013 1580 156 85.9 78.1 86.4 
0.100 532 10205 1388 180 87.3 74.7 88.0 
0.120 508 10356 1237 204 88.3 71.3 89.3 
 
 Furthermore, when Model 3 is estimated in period t-2, the rate of correct 
classifications decreases by only one percentage point relative to the same model estimated 
in period t-1, at the same 0.060 probability cutpoint: the correct classifications percentage is 
85 in t-1, decreasing only marginally to 84 in t-2. This indicates that the ‘Full’ model is also 
very useful to predict financial distress two years prior to the event. 
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The present classification table also possesses the advantage of allowing a risk 
manager to calculate higher percentages of Sensitivity and Specificity individually. This is 
particularly useful as Type I and II errors are not equally weighted by practitioners. A false 
positive error is not as expensive as a false negative: the cost of a firm predicted as 
financially distressed when it is in fact healthy, is less than the cost of a firm predicted as 
financially healthy when it is in fact financially distressed. Therefore, if this is the case, a 
risk manager would be more interested in increasing the rate of correctly classified 
financially distressed firms (Sensitivity), choosing a lower probability level as cutpoint.159 
This would be achieved, however, only at the cost of reducing the ability of the model to 
predict non-financial distress events correctly (Specificity). The present study presented the 
rates of Specificity and Sensitivity at different probability levels as cutpoints to show the 
practical use of this approach to measure the accuracy of a distress prediction model and its 
advantages in relation to the widely employed 2x2 frequency tables that implicitly give 
equal weights to Type I and Type II errors.  
 
5.5.3. Model Validation.  
 
 In order undertake validation tests for model performance, the main database was 
divided in two sub-periods: 2001-2006 and 2007-2011. The first one corresponds to the 
period after the collapse of the information technology bubble, which took place during 
2000-2001, and the second one is the period following the global financial crisis of 2007 to 
2011. The ‘Full’ model was applied to the two sub-periods in order to test whether its 
predictive accuracy remain acceptable as measured by the Area under the ROC Curve. 
Additionally, Model 3 was tested in period t-1 and t-2, in order to confirm whether the 
predictive accuracy holds when the model is estimated one year prior to the event of 
financial distress. As shown in Table 5-11, the predictive accuracy decreases only marginally 
when the model is tested with the two sub-period data. Interestingly, the model performs 
better in the 2007-2011 period than in the 2001-2006 period, which might be explained by 
the smaller number of observations of the former, and thus the lower amount of financial 
distress event to predict. The same analysis applies when the model is estimated in t-2. 
Nevertheless, the model retains a very high predictive accuracy overall. 
  
                                                        
159 In this case the predicted probability used as cut point would have to be lower than the 0.060 level. 
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Table 5-11 Model Validation – Areas Under the ROC Curve 
This table reports the model validation results for Model 3 estimated in period t-1 and t-2. The main 
dataset was divided in two sub-periods. The first one, 2001-2006, corresponds to the periods after 
the collapse of the information technology bubble, and the second one, 2007-2011, is the period 
that follows the global financial crisis that started in 2007. The predictive accuracy or the overall 
performance of the model is measured by the Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristics 
Curve. 
 1980-2011 2001-2006 2007-2011 
Model 3 in t 0.9190 0.9029 0.9123 
Model 3 in t-1 0.8918 0.8807 0.8935 
 
5.5.4. Performance Comparison Benchmarks.  
 
 The present study also tests the robustness of the models through a comparison 
between the three main Models presented (Model 1, 2, and 3), the classic Altman’s (1968) 
model estimated employing logistic regression, the widely-used Altman’s (1968) Z-Score, 
and the comprehensive model estimated using artificial neural networks (multilayer 
perceptron). Three techniques for the prediction of financial distress are therefore 
employed to test the performance of our model. Table 5-12 presents a comparison of the 
performance of the ‘accounting only’ model, the ‘accounting plus macroeconomic 
indicators’ model, the ‘full’ model, Altman’s (1968) model estimated using logistic 
regression, and the ‘full’ model estimated using artificial neural networks, as measured by 
the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve (AUC), Gini rank coefficients, 
and Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics.  
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Table 5-12 Logistic Regression and Neural Networks Performance Comparison 
Results 
This table reports model performance statistics. Panel A shows measures for the models estimated 
in period t-1, and Panel B displays the same measures for the models estimated in t-2. Models 1, 2, 3 
and Altman’s model were estimated using the panel logit methodology. In addition, Model 3 was 
estimated using the neural networks methodology (multilayer perceptron). Model 1 is the 
‘accounting only’ model, Model 2 is the ‘accounting plus macroeconomic variables’ model, Model 3 
is the ‘full’ model, including market variables in addition to the variables in Model 2. The Altman 
Model includes the following accounting ratios: Working Capital to Total Assets, Retained Earnings 
to Total Assets, Earnings Before Interest and Taxes to Total Assets, Market Value of Equity to 
Book Value of Total Debt, and Sales to Total Assets. The first measure is a direct measure of the 
predictive accuracy of models estimated using the logit methodology; the area under the Receiver 
Operating Characteristics curve (AUC); Gini coefficients and Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic are 
also presented. 
Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Altman Multilayer 
Perceptron 
Panel A: Models’ Performance in t-1 
AUC 0.8718 0.8763 0.9190 0.8517 0.9250 
Gini Rank Coefficient 0.7436 0.7526 0.8380 0.7034 0.8500 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.5949 0.6021 0.6704 0.5627 0.6800 
Panel B: Models’ Performance in t-2 
AUC 0.8523 0.8514 0.8918 0.8229 0.9120 
Gini Rank Coefficient 0.7046 0.7028 0.7836 0.6458 0.8240 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.5637 0.5622 0.6269 0.5166 0.6592 
 
Table 5-12 shows that when the Altman model is estimated employing the panel 
logit methodology, it displays a predictive accuracy similar (marginally inferior) to the 
‘accounting only’ model (Model 1) and the ‘accounting plus macroeconomic indicators’ 
model (Model 2), as measured by the area under the ROC curve. This is as expected, as 
Model 1, Model 2 and the Altman model are accounting-based models, which makes the 
comparison appropriate. Model 2, which includes macroeconomic indicators, yields the 
best performance among the accounting-based models (AUC = 0.8763), followed by 
Model 1 (AUC = 0.8718), and Altman’s (1968) model (0.8517) in t-1. This same pattern is 
reproduced when the models are estimated in t-2, the only difference being, as previously 
discussed, that Model 1 performance is marginally higher than Model 2, indicating that the 
information contained in accounting variables is more relevant to the prediction of 
failure/financial distress than the information obtained from macroeconomic variables 
when the model is estimated with data two years prior to the event of failure/financial 
distress. 
 
Following the comparative approach between statistical methods and intelligent 
techniques in Olson et al. (2012), Tseng and Hu (2010), Cho et al. (2009), and Kumar and 
Ravi (2007), the present study also estimates Model 3 (the ‘Full’ model) using artificial 
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neural networks160 in order to perform an additional test of the performance of our model. 
Moreover, logistic regression is a prevalent statistical methodology employed as benchmark 
for comparison purposes by these authors. The present study employs the Multilayer 
Perceptron161, which is the most common architecture in artificial neural networks (Alfaro 
et al., 2008162). In this regard, Table 5-12 shows that the comprehensive Model 3 estimated 
using artificial neural networks (multilayer perceptron) yields the highest overall 
performance among all models with an AUC equal to 0.9250, followed by Model 3 
estimated using logistic regression with an AUC equal to 0.9190. The marginally superior 
performance of artificial neural networks is consistent with previous research; neural 
networks comprise highly complex sets of node connections and weights that can be 
obtained from software (Olson et al., 2012), and overcome the restrictions entailed by 
traditional statistical methodologies (logistic regression included) such as the assumption of 
linearity, normality, independence among predictor variables, for instance (Yang et al., 
2011). However, Table 5-12 shows that the difference in performance is marginal; 
moreover, logistic regression has the advantage of providing a form that can be understood 
and transported quite easily, unlike neural networks, which lack ‘transparency (seeing what 
the model is doing, or comprehensibility) and transportability (being able to easily deploy 
the model into a decision support system for new cases)’ (Olson et al., 2012163). 
 
Table 5-13 presents a biased-adjusted classification table for predicted distress 
frequencies at different probability levels as cut-off values when the models are estimated 
in period t-1. Models 2, 3, and Altman’s model are estimated using the panel logit 
methodology (Panel A, B, and C respectively). In addition, Model 3 was estimated using the 
neural networks methodology (multilayer perceptron) in Panel D. When the 0.060 level is 
used as a benchmark to compare the predictive accuracy of Model 2 and Model 3 relative 
to the Altman model, it can be observed that Model 2 possesses a marginally higher 
predictive accuracy than Altman’s (1968) model: the overall rate of correct predictions for 
the Altman model is 77.8%, following closely the predictive accuracy of Model 2, which is 
equal to 80.4%. On the other hand, the ‘Full’ model displays a rate of correct predictions 
equal to 86.7%, which is significantly superior to both accounting-based models.  
 
Finally, when Model 3 is estimated using artificial neural networks (multilayer 
perceptron), it can be observed that it yields a very similar classification accuracy to Model 
                                                        
160 For details regarding the fitting of the artificial neural network model in the present study, see the Appendix. 
161 The Multilayer Perceptron is a feedforward network that consists of an input layer, an output layer, and a number of 
hidden layers.  
162 P. 116. 
163 P. 464. 
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3 in t-1; with regard to the overall accuracy, Model 3 (logistic regression) shows a marginally 
higher performance of only 10 basis points (0.10%) approximately at the three probability 
levels presented. Table 5-13 also shows that, as to the performance in correctly predicting 
financially distressed firms, the neural networks methodology is marginally superior (by less 
than 1 percentage point) to the logistic regression methodology. The opposite is true as to 
the rate of correct classifications of healthy firms: the logistic methodology is marginally 
superior to the neural networks technique. Overall, it can be concluded that the 
performances of the logistic regression model and the neural networks model are almost 
identical, as the differences in predictive accuracy are very small, with the neural networks 
model outperforming the logit model for the prediction of failed/distressed firms, although 
by a very small margin (less than 1 percentage point approximately), which is consistent 
with the results obtained through the analysis of their respective areas under the ROC 
curves in Table 5-12.  
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Table 5-13 Bias-Adjusted Classification Table. Logistic Regression and Artificial 
Neural Networks Comparison 
This table reports a biased-adjusted classification table for predicted distress frequencies at 
different probability levels as cut-off values when the models are estimated in period t-1. Models 2, 
3, and Altman’s model are estimated using the panel logit methodology (Panels A, B, and C 
respectively). In addition, Model 3 was estimated using the neural networks methodology 
(multilayer perceptron) in panel D. The ‘Correct’ column shows the number of observations that 
were correctly predicted as financially distressed and non-financially distressed, respectively. The 
‘Incorrect’ column presents the number of non-financially distressed observations that were 
incorrectly predicted as financially distressed, and the number of financially distressed 
observations that were incorrectly predicted as non-financially distressed, respectively. The 
‘Percentages’ column exhibits the rate of correct classifications, the proportion of financial distress 
responses that were predicted to be financial distress events (Sensitivity, or the ability of the model 
to predict financial distress correctly), and the rate of non-financial distress responses that were 
predicted to be non-financial distress events (Specificity, or the ability of the model to predict 
non-financial distress correctly), respectively. 
Probability 
Level 
Correct Incorrect Percentages 
Distressed 
Non-
Distressed 
Distressed 
Non-
Distressed 
Correct Sensitivity Specificity 
Panel A: Model 2 (t-1) 
0.040 785 13602 3541 142 79.6 84.7 79.3 
0.060 762 13764 3379 165 80.4 82.2 80.3 
0.080 738 13983 3160 189 81.5 79.6 81.6 
Panel B: Model 3 (t-1) 
0.040 651 10419 2382 77 81.8 89.4 81.4 
0.060 631 10845 1956 97 84.8 86.7 84.7 
0.080 608 11136 1665 120 86.8 83.5 87.0 
Panel C: Altman Model (t-1) 
0.040 1046 12584 5887 170 69.2 86.0 68.1 
0.060 944 14365 4106 272 77.8 77.6 77.8 
0.080 854 15359 3112 362 82.4 70.2 83.2 
Panel D: Multilayer Perceptron (t-1) 
0.040 659 10390 2411 69 81.7 90.5 81.2 
0.060 640 10818 1983 88 84.7 87.9 84.5 
0.080 620 11098 1703 108 86.6 85.2 86.7 
 
Table 5-14 shows Altman’s Z-Score classification table to discriminate between 
healthy and financially distressed companies employing the widely-used cutoff values: a 
company is classified as ‘financially healthy’ if its Z-Score is greater than 2.99 and as 
‘financially distressed’ if its Z-Score is less than 1.81; additionally, following Altman (2000), 
a company is classified as ‘financially distressed’ if its Z-Score is less than 2.67 (in 
parenthesis). From Table 5-14, it can be concluded that this method shows an impressive 
classification accuracy with regard to financially distressed firms. However, the Z-Score 
performance is less impressive to correctly classify safe or financially healthy companies, 
identifying a high proportion of healthy firms as distressed. Even if an error of the first 
kind or Type I error (false positive) is not as costly as an error of the second kind (false 
negative), the present analysis shows that our model for UK listed companies has some 
advantages over the Z-Score model. First, when comparing the predictive accuracy, it can 
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be observed that, taking the 0.060 predicted probability level as cut-off, the ‘full’ model 
displays a superior performance for the classification of distressed firms: it correctly 
classified 87% of distressed companies while the Z-Score model correctly classified 81%. 
Second, using the same 0.060 predicted probability level as cut-off, the ‘full’ model displays 
an almost equal predictive accuracy with regard to financially healthy companies (sensitivity 
is equal to 85%), which makes the model reliable for the prediction of both distressed and 
financially healthy companies. Third, in technical terms, it is very straightforward to modify 
the predicted probability level employed as cut-off in order to minimise Type I or Type II 
errors (through a trade-off) depending on the researcher’s/risk manager’s objectives. 
 
Table 5-14 Classification Table using Altman’s Z-Score 
This table shows the classification accuracy results for Altman’s Z-score 
model. In order to estimate the rate of correct predictions, three different 
cut-offs were employed: a company was classified as financially healthy if its 
Z-Score was greater than 2.99, and it was classified as failed/financially 
distressed if its Z-Score was less than 1.81. The numbers in parenthesis 
represent the firms classified as failed/financially distressed when using a 
cut-off of 2.67, following Altman (2000). 
  Predicted   
Observed Healthy Distressed Total % Correct 
Healthy 9178 8278 17456 52.58% 
Distressed 234 899 (997) 1133 79.35% (80.99%) 
Overall Per cent       54.21% 
Average Per cent       65.96% 
 
5.6. Conclusions. 
 
This study offers a comparison of the classification accuracy and predictive power 
of three types of variables (financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators and 
market variables) in a logit model for quoted companies in the United Kingdom based on a 
financial definition of firm distress. It contributes to the default prediction literature by, 
first, using a finance-based definition of distress complemented with a technical approach 
built using information provided by the London Share Price Database. The advantage is 
that the definition of financial distress presented in this study is not contingent upon its 
ultimate legal consequence: bankruptcy, as in most of the previous prediction literature. A 
wider, ex ante approach is employed, in order to detect early stages of financial distress with 
a high degree of reliability that could be useful to practitioners to avert the high costs 
associated with a bankruptcy filing. Second, a large dataset was built merging different 
types of information from data sources widely used in the academic as well as in the 
industry fields. Therefore, this study relies not only on independent variables used in 
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previous research works; it applied a multi-level empirical procedure to test and select the 
variables with the highest contribution to the overall accuracy of the model. Furthermore, 
the study presents justifications for the use of each of the retained variables in the final 
models. The result is a model for the prediction of financial distress in the United 
Kingdom for quoted companies that, with a small number of variables, displays a very high 
classification and prediction accuracy relative to previous research works. Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, the study tests, for the first time in financial distress prediction 
models for quoted companies in the UK, the relative contributions (individual and as 
groups) of the three types of variables to the predictive accuracy of the model: financial, 
macroeconomic and market variables. Prior research has tested the ability of market 
variables to predict bankruptcy employing methodologies such as the Black and Scholes 
contingent claims or option-based approach. However, the results obtained from these 
models (that entail numerous restrictive assumptions) have been controversial. Many 
efforts have been carried out to demonstrate the superiority of market-based models over 
accounting-based models and vice versa. To this point, the default prediction literature is 
characterised by a competing approach, where there is a clear division line between market 
and accounting variables.  
 
The present study adopts a different approach where the use of these types of 
variables is not mutually exclusive. It is tested whether the market variables (dependent, in 
some measure, upon the same financial information) add information that is not contained 
in financial statements and therefore act as complement in default prediction models. The 
results presented in this study clearly indicate that this is the case. The considerable increase 
of the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve (among several other 
formal measures), from 0.88 to 0.92 in a model estimated in t-1 and from 0.85 to 0.89 in a 
model estimated in t-2, that followed the incorporation of market variables in an 
accounting model indicates that they contain information that is not included in financial 
statement ratios. A comparison of areas under correlated ROC curves performed using a 
non-parametric method, and the estimation of biased-adjusted classification tables 
confirmed these results. In addition, when a full model was estimated in t-2 to test the real 
predictive accuracy of the model, three out of four market variables retained their statistical 
significance, the same proportion as the financial ratios, which indicates that the variables 
included in the model are consistent. Interestingly, Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit 
tests for binary response logistic models suggest that the ‘full model’ fitted with market 
variables is an adequate model, unlike the ‘accounting only’ or ‘accounting plus 
macroeconomic variables’ model. On the other hand, results are less conclusive for 
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macroeconomic variables, which contribute only marginally to the overall classification 
accuracy of the model. Finally, the estimation of marginal effects fills an important gap in 
the default prediction literature by presenting expected instantaneous changes in the 
response variable as a function of a change in a specific predictor variable while keeping all 
the other covariates constant, which is very useful to the interpretation of the individual 
effects. 
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5.7. Appendix. 
 
5.7.1. Computation of Model 3 using the Neural Networks Methodology (Multilayer 
Perceptron). 
Network information. 
Input Layer Covariates: 1. TFOTL, 2. TLTA, 3. NOCREDINT, 4. COVERAGE, 5. RPI, 
6. SHTBRDEF, 7. PRICE, 8. ABNRET, 9. SIZE , 10. MCTD 
Hidden layers.  
Number of Hidden Layers: 1 
Number of Units in Hidden Layer 1 (Excluding the bias unit): 4 
Activation Function: Hyperbolic Tangent 
Output Layer. 
Dependent Variable: Financial Distress Indicator 
Number of Units: 2 
Activation Function: Softmax 
Error Function: Cross-entropy 
Casing Processing Summary. 
Training: 70.2% 
Holdout: 29.8% 
 
 
 
Figure 5-8 Model 3. Multilayer Perceptron – Areas under the ROC Curve 
Area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve when:  
Financial Distress Indicator (1) = 0.925 
Financial Distress Indicator (0) = 0.925 
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Figure 5-9 Model 3. Multilayer Perceptron Diagram 
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5.7.2. Estimation of Model 3 with Industry controls. 
 
Table 5-15 Industry Code Construction 
This table shows the SIC codes corresponding to the Industry classification used in the 
present study to control for firm sector. Four-digit SIC codes for each firm were 
employed for the partitioning into ten major industrial sectors. The corresponding names 
of the industrial groupings are presented in the last column of the table. Firm belonging to 
the ‘Finance, Insurance and Real Estate Sector’ were excluded from the analysis. 
Following Chava and Jarrow (2004), SIC codes were chosen for this study because they 
are the most widely available industry classifications for the present sample period. 
Industry Code SIC Code Industry name 
1 <1000 Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
2 1000 to less than 1500 Mineral Industries 
3 1500 to less than 1800 Construction Industries 
4 2000 to less than 4000 Manufacturing 
5 4000 to less than 5000 Transportation, Communication and  Utilities 
6 5000 to less than 5200 Wholesale Trade 
7 5200 to less than 6000 Retail Trade 
8 6000 to less than 6800 Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 
9 7000 to less than 8900 Service Industries 
10 9100 to less than 10000 Public Administration 
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Table 5-16 Logit Regression of Financial Distress Indicator on Predictor Variables – Models with Industry Dummies 
This table reports results from logit regressions of the financial distress indicator on the predictor variables. The models were computed for two periods: using the 
accounts, market and macroeconomic data from the year prior to the observation of the financial distress event (t-1), and the accounts, market and macroeconomic 
data from two years prior to the observation of the financial distress event (t-2) in order to confirm their predictive ability in addition to their discriminating power. 
Additionally, results are also presented for a ‘Market’ model that incorporates market variables in t-1 for comparison purposes. The absolute value of z-statistics is 
reported in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5%-1%. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-1 
TFOTL 
 
-0.8081** 
(6.67) 
-0.7355** 
(6.14) 
-0.7684** 
(6.31) 
-0.7326** 
(6.09) 
-1.1047** 
(6.62) 
-1.0056** 
(6.24) 
  
TLTA 1.1752** 
(6.70) 
-0.0109 
(0.06) 
1.2222** 
(6.95) 
0.0347 
(0.19) 
0.6149** 
(2.58) 
-0.1022 
(0.42) 
  
NOCREDINT -0.2183** 
(4.87) 
-0.1766** 
(3.94) 
-0.2313** 
(5.16) 
-0.1795** 
(4.00) 
-0.1440** 
(2.65) 
-0.0968* 
(1.85) 
  
COVERAGE -1.3580** 
(23.20) 
-1.3124** 
(22.68) 
-1.3093** 
(22.31) 
-1.2797** 
(21.95) 
-0.9805** 
(14.25) 
-0.9885** 
(14.44) 
  
RPI  
 
 0.0211** 
(8.78) 
0.0158** 
(6.30) 
0.0123** 
(4.38) 
0.0079** 
(2.78) 
 0.0109** 
(4.37) 
SHTBRDEF  
 
 0.1889** 
(6.44) 
0.2141** 
(5.68) 
0.1258** 
(3.81) 
0.1025** 
(2.43) 
 0.0991** 
(3.42) 
PRICE     -0.1022** 
(3.87) 
-0.0740** 
(2.88) 
-0.1650** 
(6.60) 
-0.1588** 
(6.28) 
ABNRET     -1.1505** 
(9.53) 
-1.6262** 
(13.60) 
-1.7593** 
(15.33) 
-1.7364** 
(15.06) 
SIZE     -0.2469** 
(7.44) 
-0.0476 
(1.55) 
-0.4484** 
(15.56) 
-0.4242** 
(14.55) 
MCTD    
 
 -1.2621** 
(7.26) 
-0.6109** 
(3.05) 
-0.9678** 
(6.87) 
-0.9878** 
(6.98) 
Constant -3.9969** 
(3.48) 
-2.8718** 
(2.44) 
-8.9642** 
(6.96) 
-6.4594** 
(4.89) 
-7.2825** 
(4.54) 
-3.7900** 
(2.40) 
-19.8216 
(0.03) 
-20.4127 
(0.05) 
Industry Dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.0934 0.0951 0.0977 0.0978 0.1428 0.1277 0.1027 0.1041 
Max-rescaled R2 0.2826 0.2687 0.2936 0.2743 0.4169 0.3573 0.2996 0.3009 
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Table 5-17 Model Performance Measures – Models with Industry Dummies 
This table reports model performance statistics. Section A shows measures for the five 
models estimated in period t-1 and Section B displays the same measures for all of the models 
estimated in t-2. Model 1 is the ‘accounting only’ model, Model 2 is the ‘accounting plus 
macroeconomic variables’ model, Model 3 is the ‘full’ model, including market variables in 
addition to the variables in Model 2, Model 4 is the ‘market only’ model, and Model 5 is the 
‘market plus macroeconomic variables’ model. The first measure is a direct measure of the 
predictive accuracy of models estimated using the logit methodology, the area under the 
Receiver Operating Characteristics curve (AUC); Gini coefficients, Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistics, Cox and Snell R-squared, Nagelkerke’s Max-rescaled R-squared and the models’ 
Chi-squared are also presented. Additionally Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit 
statistics are displayed. 
Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Panel A: Models’ Performance in t-1 
AUC 0.8719 0.8775 0.9194 0.8723 0.8735 
Gini Rank Coefficient 0.7438 0.7550 0.8388 0.7446 0.7470 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.5950 0.6040 0.6710 0.5957 0.5976 
Cox & Snell’s R2  0.0934 0.0977 0.1428 0.1027 0.1041 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.2826 0.2936 0.4169 0.2996 0.3009 
χ2* (4, 6, 10, 4, 6) 1792.53 
(P<.0001) 
1857.77 
(P<.0001) 
2084.05 
(P<.0001) 
1604.07 
(P<.0001) 
1602.42 
(P<.0001) 
Hosmer & Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test 
χ2 (8) 76.6702 56.0823 11.0757 16.7956 14.9459 
Pr> χ2 <.0001 <.0001 0.1974 0.0323 0.0602 
Panel B: Models’ Performance in t-2 
AUC 0.8548 0.8553 0.8922 0.8371 0.8368 
Gini Rank Coefficient 0.7096 0.7106 0.7844 0.6742 0.6736 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.5677 0.5685 0.6275 0.5394 0.5389 
Cox & Snell’s R2  0.0951 0.0978 0.1277 0.0834 0.0843 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.2687 0.2743 0.3573 0.2336 0.2333 
χ2* (4, 6, 10, 4, 6) 1589.11 
(P<.0001) 
1616.09 
(P<.0001) 
1680.4646 
(P<.0001) 
1186.2039 
(P<.0001) 
1175.0079 
(P<.0001) 
Hosmer & Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test 
χ2 (8) 77.4006 36.4974 10.3433 14.7841 11.3724 
Pr> χ2 <.0001 <.0001 0.2418 0.0635 0.1815 
* the parenthesis following the model’s χ2 represent the degrees of freedom for each estimated 
model: 4 for Model 1, 6 for Model 2, 10 for model 3, 4 for Model 4, and 6 for Model 5. 
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6. Polytomous Response Financial Distress 
Models for Listed Companies using 
Accounting, Market and Macroeconomic 
Variables 
 
6.1. Introduction. 
 
Models for the prediction of financial distress/bankruptcy have been the object of 
considerable interest for academic as well as practitioners over the last four decades, which 
has been reflected by the number of research works in this field. In particular, the financial 
crisis of 2007-08 brought attention to the shortcomings of risk management practices 
within the lending environment and risk assessment at the micro level (PD estimation). 
Lenders and other investors require timely information on the default risk probability of 
corporates within lending and derivative portfolios. For banks, developing effective 
'Internal Rating Systems' (IRB) for corporate risk management requires building probability 
of default (PD) models geared to the specific characteristics of corporate sub-populations 
(e.g. SME's, private companies, listed companies, sector specific models), tuned to changes 
in the macro environment, and, of course, tailored to the availability and timeliness of data. 
Given the importance of accurate forecasts and assessments of the likelihood of financial 
distress/bankruptcy to academics, practitioners, and regulators, conceptually richer, and 
more accurate prediction models have been developed. Furthermore, as discussed by Jones 
and Hensher (2004), financial distress prediction models are now widely used for a range of 
purposes that include: “monitoring of the solvency of financial and other institutions by 
regulators, assessments of loan security, going-concern evaluations by auditors, the 
measurement of portfolio risk, and the pricing of defaultable bonds, credit derivatives, and 
other securities exposed to credit risk.”164 
 
Several previous research works offer models that focus on the prediction accuracy 
of bankrupt/financially distressed companies versus financially sound firms. Therefore, a 
vast majority of the models advanced incorporate a binary outcome as the independent 
variable. In practice, the predictive accuracy of the models has been significantly enhanced, 
allowing risk managers to identify financial distress at an early stage and to take the 
necessary actions to avoid the costs associated with failure. The relative advantages of 
                                                        
164 Jones and Hensher (2004), p. 1011. 
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binary logit models have been widely discussed since Efron’s (1975) seminal theoretical 
paper. More recently, Jones (1987) provided a discussion on their application in the field of 
bankruptcy prediction, and Maddala (1991) reviewed the role of logit, probit, and 
discriminant analysis in accounting research. Altman et al. (2010) state that, from a 
statistical point of view, “logit regression seems to fit well with the characteristics of the 
default prediction problem, where the dependant variable is binary (default/non-default) 
and where the groups are discrete, non-overlapping and identifiable. The logit model yields 
a score between 0 and 1, which conveniently gives the firm’s probability of default. Lastly, 
the estimated coefficients can be interpreted separately as the importance or significance of 
each of the independent variables in the explanation of the estimated probability of 
default.” 
 
The novelty of the present study lies on the fact that it considers corporate default 
as a dynamic process by including three possible states/outcomes in a generalised or 
polytomous logit regression model: a state that encloses on-going firms assumed to be in a 
financially sound position, a state reflecting firm Financial distress (based on a finance 
definition of corporate distress), and a state that represents Corporate failure (based on a 
technical definition built using information provided by the London Share Price Database). 
Next, and perhaps most importantly, this study argues that the applications to finance of 
the multinomial logit methodology have not been explored enough, and that the literature 
on financial distress and corporate failure could significantly benefit not only from the 
analysis of its output in the form of prediction accuracy results (of three possible 
outcomes), but also from the new insights that can be obtained through appropriate 
transformations of the multinomial function coefficients in order to provide a direct 
interpretation of the effects of individual covariates on the likelihood of a firm moving into 
one of the three possible states. Leclere (1999) argues that a potential reason for the 
underutilisation of these types of models “is that the interpretation of the model 
coefficients in a bivariate probit or logistic regression already differs substantially from 
OLS regression. When the models move from a dichotomous to an n-chotomous 
dependent variable, the interpretation becomes more complex. Compounding this 
difficulty, the typical coverage in an econometric text fails to provide readers with a 
systematic approach to the interpretation of model coefficients.” To fill this gap in the 
financial distress literature, marginal effects, derived from the output of the polytomous 
response model, are estimated and interpreted in detail in the present study. Moreover, 
graphic representations of the changes produced in the vectors of predicted probabilities 
by a change in the level of a specific covariate (while keeping all other variables constant at 
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their means) are presented to further analyse the individual effects of all types of variables 
in the models, providing thus additional insights on their patterns of behaviour as well as 
additional support to the interpretation of the marginal effects. 
 
 Therefore, the first objective of this chapter is to compare the multinomial function 
coefficients with the estimated marginal effects in order to observe the existing differences 
and to highlight the relevance of the latter to the interpretation of individual covariates in a 
polytomous response logit model. The second objective is to test whether the inclusion of 
accounting and market variables in a single multinomial logit model is able to outperform 
models based exclusively on either market or accounting information. It is investigated 
whether the combination of accounting and market variables enhance the goodness-of-fit 
of the models by estimating an ‘Accounting only model,’ a ‘Market only’ model  and a 
‘Comprehensive’ model that includes both accounting and macroeconomic data. Finally, 
the third objective is to provide and test a methodology to evaluate the predictive accuracy 
of the model using a database that is representative of the whole population of quoted 
companies in the United Kingdom. 
 
 The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the literature 
that is relevant to our modelling approach. The database and measures of the outcome 
variable and set of explanatory variables are described. The estimation methodology is 
discussed along with analysis, results and conclusions. 
 
6.2. Review of the Literature. 
 
There have been a number of studies that make use of polytomous response 
models in areas outside the field of failure prediction: Boskin (1974), using human capital 
theory as analysis framework, empirically tests hypothesis about the variables influencing 
occupational choice. Lawrence and Arshadi (1995) analyse problem loan resolution choices 
using a multinomial logit model in the field of banking. Leclere (1999) develops and 
explains several approaches to interpreting coefficients in polytomous response models and 
applies them to accounting models. In the field of econometrics, McFadden and Train 
(2000) provide evidence suggesting that mixed multinomial logit models provide a 
computationally practical method for economic discrete choice that stems from utility 
maximisation. On the other hand, in the field of finance, Ward (1994) develops an ordinal 
four-state polytomous logit model to test the predictive ability of Beaver’s naïve operating 
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cash flow measure. More recently, Jones and Hensher (2004), tests the incremental ability 
of a three state mixed logit model to predict firm financial distress. 
 
The above works vouch for the interest in examining the behaviour of individuals 
and firms through polytomous response models in several research fields (including 
finance), nevertheless, there is a very small number of research works that employ 
multinomial regression logit as the main methodology to construct financial distress models 
despite the fact that they could provide new insights and thus a better understanding of the 
financial distress/corporate failure dynamics. All of them focus exclusively on the 
predictive accuracy of their models relative to other research works. Occasionally, 
multinomial coefficient estimates are presented to infer the nature of the relationship of 
individual variables with respect to the probability of falling into a certain outcome. In 
other words, through the signs of the multinomial function coefficients, previous research 
works try to ascertain whether this relationship is positive or negative. To the best of my 
knowledge, there are no studies to date that deal with the issue of the magnitudes of 
individual effects on the (predicted) probabilities of falling into each of the specified 
outcomes.  
 
Lau (1987) is one of the first (and very few) studies that applied the multinomial 
logit methodology to the field of financial distress prediction. She claims that her study 
extends previous binary (failing/non-failing dichotomy) corporate failure prediction models 
by utilising five possible states to “approximate the continuum of corporate financial 
health.”165 The five categories are created as follows: the first state contains financially 
stable firms; state 2 includes firms that have omitted or reduced dividend payments; state 2 
refers to those firms that are in technical default and defaulted on loan payments; state 3 
applies to firms that have filed a petition and are protected under Chapter X or XI of the 
Bankruptcy Act; and state 4 comprises firms in bankruptcy and liquidation. The original 
sample consisted of 350, 20, 15, 10, and 5 firms for each of the states, respectively. The 
model was tested in years 1, 2, and 3, and the multinomial function coefficients obtained 
were interpreted according to their respective signs. The model yielded a high predictive 
accuracy even though the coefficients’ signs showed a number of inconsistencies. The most 
likely reason is that marginal effects (which do not necessarily yield the same signs as the 
coefficients166) are a more reliable measure to interpret the effects of individual covariates 
in a multinomial logit model.  
                                                        
165 P. 127. 
166 Greene (2012). 
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More recently, Johnsen and Melicher (1994) develop a multinomial logit model for 
the prediction of corporate bankruptcy and financial distress. To the dichotomy 
bankrupt/non-bankrupt, they add a financially weak category in order to build a 3-state 
model and test the value added by multinomial logit regression methodologies. The sample 
used to estimate the model is composed of 157 bankrupt firms, 300 non-bankrupt firms, 
and 300 financially weak firms. Their study reports multinomial function coefficients and, 
through classification accuracy tests, finds that the multinomial model significantly reduces 
misclassification errors.  
 
The previous studies that employ the multinomial logit methodology applied to the 
financial distress prediction field have some drawbacks that need to be addressed. First, 
Balcaen and Ooghe (2006), referring to the classic statistical failure prediction models, 
argue that if a financial distress/bankruptcy prediction model is developed for practical 
purposes and for use in a predictive context, the samples used in the estimation of the 
model should be representative for the whole population of companies. Moreover, Balcaen 
and Ooghe (2004) state that ‘the firms in the estimation sample and new, future samples of 
cases, for which a failure prediction [model] is to be made, are assumed to come from the 
same distribution. Nevertheless, in the great majority of the classic statistical failure 
prediction models, the estimation of the models is based on non-random samples, whose 
compositions are different from the population’s composition.’167 As a matter of fact, the 
previous research works on financial distress/corporate bankruptcy prediction models that 
employ the polytomous response logit methodology use non-random samples whose 
compositions are highly dissimilar to the population’s composition.  
 
By contrast, the present study employs a sample for the estimation of the model 
that intends to reflect the distribution of the United Kingdom public company whole 
population. The reason for this choice is that it has been documented that if the estimation 
sample is not random, the function estimates as well as the predicted outcome probabilities 
are biased, which leads to an alteration of the overall classification accuracy (Manski and 
Lerman, 1977; Zmijewski, 1984). Now, the problem with non-random samples is that they 
can give rise to biases usually stemming from over-sampling the failing companies 
(Zmijewski, 1984; and Platt and Platt, 2002), from matching the number of financially 
sound and failed firms (Ohlson, 1980; Scott 1981; Platt and Platt, 2002), or from employing 
a ‘complete data’ sample selection criterion (Taffler, 1982; and Declerc et al., 1991), 
                                                        
167 P. 26. 
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resulting in a misleading classification accuracy that cannot be generalised (Piesse and 
Wood, 1992).  
 
Second, previous multinomial financial distress prediction models employ juridical 
definitions of default that are not exempt of shortcomings. For example, corporate 
bankruptcy can be a lengthy legal process and the legal date of failure may not represent 
the ‘economic’ or the ‘real’ event of failure. The previous chapter finds evidence indicating 
that there is a considerable time gap (up to three years or 1.17 years in average) between the 
period that a firm enters a state of financial distress (that caused the firm to default) and the 
date of legal default/bankruptcy. In line with these findings, Theodossiou (1993) reports 
that firms in the United States stop providing accounts approximately two years before the 
bankruptcy filing. Moreover, it is also possible that a firm in a state of financial distress 
does not change the legal status that a bankruptcy filing would entail (Balcaen and Ooghe, 
2004). Referring to the classic binary default prediction models, Ooghe et al. (1995) and 
Charitou et al. (2004) argue that the legal definition of failure is commonly employed 
because, on the one hand, it provides an objective criterion to divide the sample into two 
distinct populations, and on the other, it allows the moment of failure to be objectively 
dated. In order to create a well-defined classification method that yields three financial 
states clearly separated from each other, the present chapter follows Barnes (1987), Barnes 
(1990) and Pindado et al. (2008) and presents a novel finance-based definition of firm 
distress that is dependent upon the level of a firm’s EBITDA relative to its financial 
expenses and the changes in the market value of a firm over time. Additionally, the present 
study follows Christidis and Gregory (2010) and offers a proxy for corporate failure whose 
observation date reflects the economic or real event of failure: a technical definition of 
corporate failure based on the London Share Price Database is employed.  
 
Finally, all of the variables included in prior polytomous response financial 
distress/bankruptcy prediction models include only accounting measures as independent 
variables. However, there is reason to believe that these models could benefit from the 
relevant information contained in market variables, as suggested by previous research 
works that have tested the utility of market variables in predicting bankruptcy by employing 
methodologies such as the Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) contingent claims 
or option based approach. Bharath and Shumway (2008), Hillegeist et al. (2004), Reisz and 
Perlich (2007), and Vassalou and Xing (2004) have employed the contingent claims 
approach to estimate the likelihood of corporate failure. More recently data on Credit 
Default Swaps (prices and spreads) have been used to proxy credit risk (Alexander and 
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Kaeck, 2008)168. However, the results obtained from these models (that entail numerous 
restrictive assumptions) have been controversial. Many efforts have been carried out to 
demonstrate the superiority of market-based models over accounting-based models and 
vice versa. To this point, the default prediction literature is characterised by a competing 
approach, where there is a clear division line between market and accounting variables. The 
present study adopts a different approach where the use of these types of variables is not 
mutually exclusive. It is tested whether the market variables (dependent, in some measure, 
upon the same financial information) add information that is not contained in financial 
statements and therefore act as complement in default prediction models. 
 
6.3. Outcome Definition. 
 
The criteria used to identify failed firms and to classify firm-years into non-
financially distressed, financially distressed and failed firms in order to create an appropriate 
three-state panel for a polytomous-response logit analysis are as follows. A firm-year 
observation is classified as pertaining to the financially distressed state (DIS) whenever it 
meets both of the following conditions: i) its earnings before interest and taxes 
depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) are lower than its financial expenses for two 
consecutive years, and ii) there is a negative growth of its market value for two consecutive 
periods. With regard to the most extreme outcome, corporate failure (FAI), a firm was 
classified in this category when its status in the 2012 London Share Price Database (LSPD) 
is one of the following 169 : suspended, in liquidation or voluntary liquidation, when its 
quotation has been suspended for more than three years, when the firm is being held by a 
receiver (in receivership), in administration or in administrative receivership, or when there 
has been a cancellation or suspension of the firm 170 . Finally, firm-year observations 
classified as non-financially distressed/failed (NFD) are those that did not display signs of 
financial distress according to the DIS state and that had not been classified as pertaining 
to the FAI state. Thus, firm-year observations that entered the NFD state are those that do 
not belong to either of the remaining two categories according to the established 
classification criteria. 
                                                        
168 See the previous chapter for a detailed literature review on market based and accounting based financial distress 
prediction models. 
169 This definition is based on the definition of corporate failure in Christidis and Gregory (2010). 
170 The LSPD numbers and definitions in the database are: 6) Suspension / cancellation with shares acquired later. 
Meanwhile, may be treated under rule 163/2; 7) Liquidation (usually valueless but there may be liquidation payments; 10) 
Quotation suspended – if suspended for more than three years, this may lead to automatic cancellation; 11) Voluntary 
liquidation, where value remains, and was / is being distributed; 16) Receiver appointed / liquidation. Probably valueless 
but not yet certain; 20) In Administration / Administrative receivership; 21) Cancellation and assumed valueless or 
suspended but assumed valueless. 
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6.3.1. Outcome Definition 
 
The promised analysis requires a specific definition for each of the three potential 
outcomes: Non-financial distress’/failure (NFD), Financial distress (DIS), and Corporate 
failure (FAI), which can be appropriately regarded as the outcome of a process. The 
present study develops ex-ante models for the prediction of financial distress and failure, so 
it is crucial to employ compelling criteria that is capable of distinctly differentiating the 
potential outcomes (especially in the case of financial distress and failure), as required by 
the polytomous response logit methodology. The main reason is that one of the main 
objectives of the present study is not only to provide a timely and accurate financial distress 
prediction model (with practical value and macro dependent dynamics that have relevance 
for stress testing), as in the previous chapter, but also to investigate the behaviour of the 
probabilities of falling into one of the three mutually exclusive states given different levels 
of the independent variables included in the models (accounting, market and 
macroeconomic indicators). Therefore, the states of financial distress and corporate failure, 
unlike in the previous chapter, are created as two distinct outcomes for analysis. First, in 
regard to the definition of financial distress (DIS), the ability of a firm to repay its financial 
obligations (Asquith et al., 1994) plays a special role in the present study and is in line with 
earlier discussions and recent papers. The present study’s definition of financial distress 
follows Pindado et al. (2008) and employs two main conditions that need to be fulfilled in 
order for a firm-year observation to be classified as such: thus, a firm is classified as 
financially distressed 171  whenever i) its earnings before interest and taxes depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) are lower than its financial expenses for two consecutive years and; ii) the firms 
suffers from a negative growth in market value for two consecutive years.  
 
With regard to the first condition, the reasoning is as follows: if EBITDA is lower 
than the interest expense on the company’s debt then it can be concluded that the 
operational profitability of the firm is not sufficient to cover its financial obligations; on the 
other hand, with reference to the second condition, Pindado et al. (2008) state that the 
market as well as stakeholders are likely to judge negatively a firm that suffers from the 
operational deficit (described in the first condition) until an improvement in the financial 
condition is perceived again. Thus, the fall in market value for two consecutive years is 
interpreted as an indication that a firm is in effect in financial distress. As in Pindado et al. 
(2008), the study is thus introducing a dynamic approach, a novel development in existing 
                                                        
171  In a general logit model a firm is considered as financially distressed in the year that immediately follows the 
occurrence of both events. 
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financial distress definitions. The variables Earnings before interest and taxes depreciation 
and amortization (EBITDA) and Interest expense on debt were obtained from Thomson 
One Banker. In order to compute the changes in market value for the companies in the 
database, the present study used the information available in both Thomson One Banker 
and Datastream172. 
 
Secondly, the present study’s definition of corporate failure employs the 
information available in the 2012 London Share Price Database (LSPD) and is based on 
Christidis & Gregory (2010). A firm is classified as failed whenever its status is defined as 
suspended, in liquidation or voluntary liquidation, when its quotation has been suspended 
for more than three years, when the firm is being held by a receiver (in receivership), in 
administration or in administrative receivership, or when there has been a cancellation or 
suspension of the firm. Thus, a firm is classified as financially distressed when its LSPD 
(2012) status is equal to any of the following formal definitions (that indicate the reason 
why the security ceased to be quoted in the SEDOL): 6) Suspension / cancellation with 
shares acquired later. Meanwhile, may be treated under rule 163/2; 7) Liquidation (usually 
valueless but there may be liquidation payments; 10) Quotation suspended – if suspended 
for more than three years, this may lead to automatic cancellation; 11) Voluntary 
liquidation, where value remains, and was / is being distributed; 16) Receiver appointed / 
liquidation. Probably valueless but not yet certain; 20) In Administration / Administrative 
receivership; 21) Cancellation and assumed valueless or suspended but assumed valueless. 
In addition, the present analysis also tracks the specific date when each one of these events 
occurs. Finally, the state of non-financial distress is defined as those firms that did not 
enter either the financial distress state or the corporate failure category. 
 
Among the total number of observations, there are 21,964 firm-years classified as 
non-financially distressed/failed companies, 869 firm-years identified as financially 
distressed, and 385 firms classified as failed. As Table 6-1 shows, the percentage of non-
financially distressed/failed companies is 94.6, while that of financially distressed firm-years 
and failed companies is equal to 3.74 and 1.66, respectively. Finally, for simplicity and as 
required by the software to estimate generalized or polytomous response logit models, 
individual identifiers were assigned to each of the three potential outcomes of the 
Response variable. Accordingly, the state of Non-financial distress is denoted by the 
                                                        
172 Both databases were used as some missing information on specific companies in one database could be completed by 
the data of the other. A merging of the databases was therefore required in order to obtain larger time series and thus a 
more accurate model.  
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identifier Response = 1, the state of Financial distress by the identifier Response = 2, and 
the state of Corporate failure by the identifier Response = 3. 
 
 
Table 6-1 Summary Statistics of the Annual Observations. Financially and Not 
Financially Distressed Firms 
Panel A reports summary statistics for the entire sample. NFD stands for Non-financially distressed 
firms, DIS for firms in a state of financial distress, and FAI indicates those firms classified as failed 
companies. Firms. A firm is classified as DIS when it files for bankruptcy when it meets both of the 
following conditions: i) its earnings before interest and taxes depreciation and amortisation 
(EBITDA) are lower than its financial expenses for two consecutive years, and ii) there is a negative 
growth of its market value for two consecutive periods. A firm is classified as FAI when its status in 
the 2012 LSPD is defined as: suspended, in liquidation or voluntary liquidation, when its quotation 
has been suspended for more than three years, when the firm is being held by a receiver (in 
receivership), in administration or in administrative receivership, or when there has been a 
cancellation or suspension of the firm173. 
Panel A: Classification of annual observations into Non-financially distressed, Financially 
distressed, and Failed companies. 
Response Freq. Per cent Cumulative Freq. Cumulative Per cent 
NFD 21964 94.60 21964 94.60 
DIS 869 3.74 22833 98.34 
FAI 385 1.66 23218 100.00 
 
The previous chapter’s main objective was to build more accurate and timely 
financial distress prediction models, using data that is routinely available. To achieve this 
objective, financial distressed prediction models were built employing a binary logistic 
regression for the analysis of the panel of data described above. The resulting logit model 
classification accuracy were then compared to the widely used Altman’s z-score model and 
to the output obtained through the estimation of a multilayer perceptron model based on 
the artificial neural networks methodology. The results were as follows: the new binary 
logistic model’s classification accuracy clearly outperformed the z-score’s and displayed 
greater flexibility, transportability and transparency relative to the multiplayer perceptron’s 
one. Moreover, the categorical model developed in the previous chapter displayed the 
advantages of providing crucial information related to the usefulness of the different types 
of variables as well as their individual contributions to the prediction accuracy of financially 
sound against financially distressed companies. The models were designed specifically to 
obtain more timely and accurate results compared to previous works in the academic field 
                                                        
173 The LSPD numbers and definitions in the database are: 6) Suspension / cancellation with shares acquired later. 
Meanwhile, may be treated under rule 163/2; 7) Liquidation (usually valueless but there may be liquidation payments; 10) 
Quotation suspended – if suspended for more than three years, this may lead to automatic cancellation; 11) Voluntary 
liquidation, where value remains, and was / is being distributed; 16) Receiver appointed / liquidation. Probably valueless 
but not yet certain; 20) In Administration / Administrative receivership; 21) Cancellation and assumed valueless or 
suspended but assumed valueless. 
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and were constructed using a parsimonious approach since they were intended to have 
practical value.174  
 
The present chapter, additionally, investigates the effect of the different types of 
variables (individually and as groups) on the outcome probabilities of falling into one of the 
mutually exclusive three-state Response variable. This is therefore the first study that 
investigates the effects of the independent variables on the changes in predicted 
probabilities from one state to another conditionally on a base outcome. This is also of 
crucial importance for academics as well as practitioners, as it provides new insights on 
practical and theoretical issues such as: what is the effect of a negative change of magnitude 
z of the accounting ratio x (while keeping the levels of all other independent variables 
constant) on the probability that a corporation will be in a state of failure in the future given 
that it is now in a state of financial distress (or conditionally upon being already facing a 
perilous financial situation175)?; or even, what is the magnitude of the effect of variable x on 
this probability relative to variable y? Through the answers to this questions, practitioners 
could focus on the firm areas which deserve particular attention in order to prevent it from 
advancing to a more serious state of financial distress, with failure being the most extreme 
and costly outcome.  
 
Previous research works have invariably focused on the accuracy to predict 
different outcomes employing multinomial logit methodologies that include almost 
exclusively financial statement ratios, and do not provide any insights relevant to the above 
central questions. The reason is that these research studies present only the coefficient 
estimates obtained through the fitting of generalized logit models (with a variable number 
of potential outcomes). Now, as it is shown in more detail in the next section of the 
present study, coefficients estimates of multinomial logit models, despite their relative 
usefulness and unlike linear regression models, do not possess an obvious and direct 
interpretation. The present study’s aim is to fill this gap and thus contribute to the literature 
on polytomous response financial distress/corporate failure models by employing the 
appropriate transformations in order to directly interpret the models’ results and thus 
provide straightforward and clear answers to the questions raised. To this effect, marginal 
effects derived from the output of the polytomous response model are estimated and 
shown in the present study. Furthermore, vectors of predicted probabilities are plotted to 
                                                        
174 Zmijewski (1984) and more recently Pindado et al. (2008) have shown that in fact a large set of variables is not 
required for the models to reach their maximum level of accuracy. Pindado et al. (2008), for instance, employ a set of only 
three accounting variables to reach a high level of accuracy in their financial distress prediction model. 
175 Defined by two conditions: a lower level of EBITDA relative to financial obligations, and a fall in market value (both 
for two consecutive years), which could put the normal operations of the firm at serious risk.  
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confirm the effects of all types of variables in the models and to provide additional support 
to the interpretation of the marginal effects. 
 
The second objective of the analysis is to test the usefulness of non-accounting 
variables, namely macroeconomic and market variables, with regard to their contribution to 
the accuracy and timeliness of financial distress/corporate failure prediction models for 
quoted companies. It is investigated whether the combination of accounting and market 
variables enhance the goodness-of-fit of the models by estimating an ‘Accounting only 
model,’ a ‘Market only’ model  and a ‘Comprehensive’ model that includes both accounting 
and macroeconomic data (with information one and two years prior to the observation of 
the relevant event). There have been very few studies that analyse the performance of these 
types of variables in a statistical dynamic prediction model that includes controls for 
changes in the macroeconomic environment (thus adjusting estimated scores in relation to 
changes in the macroeconomic environment and providing the facility to impose stress 
tests scenarios). It is deemed important to investigate the potential usefulness of market 
variables in a generalized or polytomous response logit model since they are likely to act as 
a complement to the information content provided by the accounting variables, as 
suggested by the findings of the previous chapter. On the other hand, given the real costs 
associated with financial distress and corporate failure, market data is included in order to 
highlight the timeliness and therefore the practical value of the models. 
 
It is also important to draw attention to the fact that data based on financial ratios 
can only be obtained on an annual basis, so even if the discriminating power of some 
previous and widely used accounting models (such as Altman’s z-score model) is quite 
high, there is always the risk of relying on out dated information. Furthermore, through a 
detailed analysis of the most extreme form of financial distress, corporate failure, the 
present study shows that the firms that were classified as failed 176 , stop providing 
accounting data one year on average (14 months) before the actual date of failure. 
Therefore, because of the continuous availability of market data, it is expected that market 
variables play an important role in the timeliness of the output obtained from the models 
by providing early warnings about financial stress (therefore allowing corporate managers 
to take preventive actions to avoid failure as well as corrective actions to tackle financial 
distress at early stages in order to avoid the costs associated with these events). 
 
                                                        
176 See previous chapter.  
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Furthermore, this study provides a novel and flexible approach to measuring the 
classification accuracy of a three-state financial distress logit model using an unbalanced 
panel that is intended to approximate the real proportions of financially distressed/failed 
quoted companies in the United Kingdom. It is very important to highlight the fact that, 
almost invariably, the few previous research studies based on the multinomial logit 
methodology for the construction of financial distress prediction models, employed almost 
symmetric (or balanced) panels of data consisting of either an approximately equal number 
of observations for each category, or an extremely small number of total observations. 
Now, the number of observations as well as the proportions of the different outcomes 
relative to the total size of the database and to the proportions among outcomes results in 
alterations to individual observations’ predicted probabilities (Zmijewski, 1984). The final 
model in this study is tested using the entire database with the original proportions of 
outcomes, and a novel and flexible approach for the construction of biased-adjusted 
classification tables based on the previous chapter is presented. 
 
Finally, in order to take into account potential correlation problems among 
variables included in all the models that could cause multicollinearity issues (resulting in 
imprecise coefficient estimates and artificially large standard errors), correlation matrices 
and direct multicollinearity diagnostic tests177 were computed and presented in Table 6-2.
                                                        
177 Multcollinearity is present when there is linear dependency among two or more independent variables in a multivariate 
model. This problem arises because some of them may be measuring the same concept. Consequently, when a given 
independent variable is a linear or a quasi-linear combination of other independent variables, the affected estimates are 
unstable and the standard errors inflated. Tolerance value and is reciprocal, variance inflation tests are computed as 
    
  and        
   respectively, where   
  is the determination coefficient for regression of the ith regressor on all 
the other regressors. Freud and Little (2000), show how the instability of the coefficient estimates is increased by the 
existence of multicollinearity. It must be mentioned that there is not a formal criterion to establish a VIF value threshold 
above which multicollinearity can be ascertained; it has been argued that a VIF value greater than 10 suggests significant 
collinearity. The VIF values of all the regressors incorporated in the present study’s models, show they are all even below 
5, which indicates that multicollinearity is not present in the models and that the levels of the coefficients obtained are 
therefore reliable. 
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Table 6-2 Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Diagnostics Statistics 
Panel A of this table reports the correlation matrix of all the variables in included in the model. It includes financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators and 
market variables. P-values represent the probability of observing this correlation coefficient or one more extreme under the null hypothesis (H0) that the correlation 
(Rho) is zero. Panel B reports the values resulting from tests intended to detect the presence of multicollinearity among all the variables incorporated in the model: 
Tolerance Value (TOL) and its reciprocal, Variance Inflation (VIF) are computed as     
  and        
   respectively, where   
  is the determination coefficient 
for regression of the ith regressor on all the other regressors. 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix 
Variable TFOTL TLTA NOCREDINT COVERAGE RPI SHTBRDEF PRICE ABNRET SIZE MCTD 
TFOTL 1.00000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
TLTA 0.17057 
<.0001 
1.00000         
NOCREDINT -0.09720 
<.0001 
-0.44510 
<.0001 
1.00000        
COVERAGE 0.72613 
<.0001 
0.02865 
<.0001 
-0.05983 
<.0001 
1.00000       
RPI -0.19100 
<.0001 
-0.12218 
<.0001 
0.14404 
<.0001 
-0.19691 
<.0001 
1.00000      
SHTBRDEF 0.12491 
<.0001 
0.09343 
<.0001 
-0.10688 
<.0001 
0.11610 
<.0001 
-0.81383 
<.0001 
1.00000     
PRICE 0.37131 
<.0001 
0.05951 
<.0001 
-0.04823 
<.0001 
0.37641 
<.0001 
-0.19656 
<.0001 
0.15184 
<.0001 
1.00000    
ABNRET 0.25785 
<.0001 
-0.06960 
<.0001 
0.03254 
<.0001 
0.29870 
<.0001 
-0.04405 
<.0001 
-0.05138 
<.0001 
0.28852 
<.0001 
1.00000   
SIZE 0.36300 
<.0001 
0.09781 
<.0001 
-0.08105 
<.0001 
0.40685 
<.0001 
-0.23538 
<.0001 
0.10799 
<.0001 
0.58264 
<.0001 
0.29448 
<.0001 
1.00000  
MCTD 0.08792 
<.0001 
-0.34893 
<.0001 
0.18940 
<.0001 
0.13136 
<.0001 
-0.04910 
<.0001 
-0.00248 
0.7461 
0.20164 
<.0001 
0.23896 
<.0001 
0.22630 
<.0001 
1.00000 
Panel B: Multicollinearity Diagnostic Statistics 
Test  TFOTL TLTA NOCREDINT COVERAGE RPI SHTBRDEF PRICE ABNRET SIZE MCTD 
TOL 0.49947 0.77183 0.87329 0.47709 0.31558 0.32067 0.60705 0.81705 0.58202 0.77601 
VIF 2.00214 1.29562 1.14509 2.09603 3.16874 3.11847 1.6473 1.22391 1.71817 1.28865 
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6.4. Methods: Polytomous Response Logit Model Specifications. 
 
As the sample for analysis is divided into a number of distinct groups that is higher 
than two, the outcome takes the form of a polytomous dependent variable. Therefore, the 
statistical analysis of the panel of data requires a generalisation of a binary logistic 
regression model in order to include more than two outcomes. A multinomial logistic 
methodology is appropriate for the analysis. This type of model can be referred to as a 
multinomial logit model because the probability distribution for the response variable is 
assumed to be a multinomial rather than a binomial distribution. The development of the 
model is as follows. Suppose that there are J categorical outcomes, with the running index j 
= 1, 2,…, J. Next, let pij be the probability that observation i falls into outcome j. The 
model is thus given by  
  
   
   
     
  ,   
  
Where   
  is a column vector of independent variables describing observation i, and    is a 
row vector of coefficients for outcome j. These equations are solved to yield 
         |        
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 where j = 1, 2,…, J 
 
Now, given that the probabilities for all J outcomes must sum to 1, 
    
 
  ∑         
      
 
 
therefore, in the general form of the model, only J parameter vectors are required to 
determine the J+1 probabilities. 
 
Next, in a multinomial logit model, each outcome is compared to a base outcome, 
so assuming that there are J categorical outcomes  and – without loss of generality – the 
base outcome is defined as 1 (still with j=1,2,…,J), then the probability that the response 
for the ith observation is equal to the jth outcome is  
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This methodology was employed in the present study to solve the equations for different 
base outcomes. 
 
The log-likelihood is derived by defining, for each individual (observation),       
if outcome j is occurring for observation i, and 0 otherwise, for the J+1 possible outcomes. 
Thus, for each observation i, one and only one of the    ’s is 1. The log-likelihood is thus a 
generalisation of that for the binomial logit (and probit) model. 
    ∑∑   
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The present study employs the Newton-Raphson maximum likelihood optimisation 
algorithm. 
 
However, the coefficient parameters of a multinomial logit model are difficult to 
interpret. In a linear model, the coefficients can be directly interpreted as marginal effects 
of the predictor variables on the outcome variable. For instance, in a linear model of the 
form 
                   
 
   can be interpreted as the effect of a one unit increase in   on  . Nevertheless,    is just 
the marginal effect of   with respect to   , following 
  
   
    
 
From this equation, it can be observed that the effect of   on   is a derivative. 
Hence, the natural interpretation of a linear regression model’s marginal effects through 
derivatives stems from the linearity of the model: in the present example the marginal 
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effect of    on   is given by   . This is true regardless of the values of    or   under 
consideration or the values of other variables in the model. 
 
This is not the case for polytomous response logit models. Neither the magnitude 
nor the sign of the parameters possess a natural meaning that can be directly interpreted. 
Nevertheless, the relevant estimations can be obtained using appropriate transformations 
of the coefficients. Therefore, in addition to the coefficient estimates computed employing 
the above statistical methodology, marginal effects are presented for each of the variables. 
The marginal effect of a predictor can be defined as the partial derivative of the event 
probability with respect to the predictor of interest. Marginal effects are thus a more 
appropriate measure to interpret the effect of the regressors on the dependent variable for 
discrete dependent variable models such as the multinomial logit model. Marginal effects 
are formally expressed as follows below. 
 
First, for simplicity, let the probability of outcome j in response to a change in a 
specific variable  , specific to outcome j be denoted by  
   
   
 (    )     
 
Next, taking into account that an identical change in the specific variable will occur 
for all outcomes in which the variable appears as an outcome specific variable, it is 
necessary to employ the cross-derivative of the probability of outcome j occurring in 
response to a change in the variable, specific to outcome k  
   
   
         
 
the sum over all outcomes     is thus 
∑
   
   
    
    ∑    
   
 
 
finally, the sum over all outcomes including j is denoted by 
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where  ̅ is the probability weighted average of the outcome specific variable parameters. 
 
Notice that the marginal effect of an independent variable    on the occurrence of 
outcome j incorporates the parameters of k as well as the parameters of all the other 
outcomes: it is shown that the derivative of the probability with respect to a change in a 
variable is equal to the product of the probability times the amount by which the variable’s 
coefficient for that outcome exceeds the probability weighted average variable coefficient 
over all outcomes. Furthermore, it is necessary to highlight that – without loss of generality 
– for any individual    , 
    
    
 need not display the same sign as    . 
 
The present study tests a three-state financial distress/failure model based on a 
polytomous response logit regression model, where the Response possible outcomes are: 
NFD or Non-financially distressed companies, DIS or Financially distressed companies, 
and FAI or Failed firms. As required by the statistical software used to estimate this type of 
generalised logit model, individual identifiers were assigned to each of these three potential 
outcomes of the Response variable: the state of Non-financial distress is denoted by the 
identifier Response = 1, the state of Financial distress by the identifier Response = 2, and 
the state of Corporate failure by the identifier Response = 3. Thus, the analysis of the 
present study is based on a multinomial logit model whose response variable is composed 
of three mutually exclusive potential outcomes. In other words, depending upon its 
individual characteristics (as well as the macroeconomic environment), a firm-year 
observation can fall into one of the following categories: Non-financial distress, Financial 
distress and Corporate failure. As previously stated, the probability distribution of the 
response variable that was employed for this study is assumed to be a multinomial rather 
that a binomial distribution. Moreover, the multinomial function coefficients resulting from 
the three-level response logit model are supposed to reflect the effects of a specific variable 
on the probability of a firm-year observation falling into one of the three outcomes 
conditional upon a base outcome that can be selected among the options depending on the 
objectives of the analysis.  
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In order to empirically test the formal assumptions developed in this section, the 
present study presents, in a first stage, the multinomial function coefficients for the three 
possible non-redundant combinations of outcomes: Non-financial distress versus Financial 
distress, Corporate Failure versus Distress, and Corporate Failure versus Non-financial 
distress. In order to obtain the coefficient estimates, as well as average marginal effects 
(AMEs) for the first two pairs of outcomes, the category Financial distress was selected as 
the base outcome of the multinomial logit regression, as this category can be considered as 
a transition point between two extremes in a process. And in order to obtain the coefficient 
estimates (as well as AMEs) for the third pair of categories, FAI versus DIS, which further 
tests the ability of the variables in the model to discriminate among two potential 
outcomes, a second multinomial logit function was fitted specifying the category NFD as 
the base outcome. It is logically expected that, among these possible combinations, the 
model will produce better performing estimates for the prediction of pairs of outcomes 
that involve extreme or opposite categories. In other words, more reliable coefficient 
estimates (involving higher statistical significance and correct expected signs), should be 
expected for the pairs DIS versus NFD and FAI versus NFD than for the pair DIS versus 
FAI. The reason is that, concerning the latter pair of categories (where the outcomes are 
closer or more similar), DIS can be considered as a stage in a process that involves a 
deterioration of the characteristics of a firm (and a macroeconomic environment) that can 
ultimately lead, if aggravated to a certain point, to a most extreme outcome of the financial 
distress-failure process: FAI. Three sets of coefficient estimates are thus obtained for each 
model for the periods t-1 and t-2. 
 
Next, given that it was shown that care should be taken in interpreting the 
coefficient estimates obtained from this type of model (as the coefficients cannot be 
interpreted as the effect of a one unit change of a given covariate on the dependent 
variable, like those resulting from a linear regression model), this section demonstrated that 
appropriate transformations must be performed in order to obtain a relevant assessment of 
the effects of individual independent variables on the probability of a specific outcome 
occurring. Marginal effects, defined as the partial derivative of the event probability with 
respect to the predictor of interest, are thus presented as a more appropriate measure to 
interpret the effect of the regressors on the dependent variable (for discrete dependent 
variable model) and compared with the coefficient estimates. The methodology used in the 
present study to generate AMEs consists of outputting the individual marginal effects 
estimated at each observation in the dataset and then calculating their sample average in 
order to obtain the overall marginal effect. Additionally, standard errors (obtained 
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employing the Delta-method), significance statistics, and 95 per cent confidence intervals 
are reported. In this manner, a comparison between ex-ante propositions/expectations, 
coefficient estimates, and AMEs is performed in order to provide evidence supporting the 
primary premise that the latter are a more appropriate measure to evaluate and interpret 
polytomous response logistic regression models while providing new insights on the 
individual effects of the independent variables. Further, the study presents biased-adjusted 
classification accuracy tables for all the models. 
 
6.5. Independent Variable Specifications and Ex-ante Hypotheses. 
 
The selection of the variables retained in the final multinomial logit models is based 
on previously reported results, theoretical propositions and empirical evaluations. 
Furthermore, the data was subject to a rigorous cleaning and testing process and a novel 
approach for dealing with outlying observations was tested for the first time in financial 
distress/corporate failure prediction models. Both univariate and multivariate procedures 
were employed and considerable experimentation was undertaken to arrive at the final 
choice of independent variables. A detailed account regarding the sources and the 
construction of the variables can be found in Chapter 3.  This section explains the role of 
each variable in the models and advances their implications for the interpretation of the 
output obtained from the polytomous response logit regression models. 
 
6.5.1. Accounting Ratios. 
 
With regard to the accounting variables, four variables were retained in the final 
models: Total Funds from Operations to Total Liabilities, Total Liabilities to Total Assets, 
the No Credit Interval, and Interest Coverage. The first ratio, Total Funds from 
Operations to Total Liabilities (TFOTL) can be decomposed as follows: Total Funds from 
Operations represents the sum of net income and all non-cash charges or credits (it is the 
cash flow of the firm), whereas the denominator, Total Liabilities, is composed of all short 
and long-term liabilities acquired by the company. This ratio is intended to show the extent 
to which a company is able to generate funds from its operations to meet its financial 
obligations. Therefore, the higher the value of TFOTL, the less likely it should be for a 
company to be in a state of financial distress/failure. The second ratio TLTA is estimated 
as Total Liabilities over Total Assets of industrial firms (the addition of total current assets, 
long-term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net 
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property plant and equipment and other assets). The ratio TLTA is commonly used to 
measure a firm’s financial leverage (and therefore financial risk) by calculating the 
proportion of the company’s assets that have been financed using short and long-term 
debt. The implications of this ratio are as follows: the higher the leverage, the higher the 
financial risk taken by a given firm and therefore the higher its probability of financial 
distress/failure. The third variable, the No-credit interval (NOCREDINT) can be defined 
as ‘an estimate of the length of time that a company could finance the expenses of its 
business, at its current level of activity, by drawing on its own liquid resources and on the 
assumption that it made no further sales.’ 178  This variable was calculated using the 
following formula: (Quick assets minus Current liabilities) / (Daily operating expenses)179. 
The ratio is commonly used to evaluate a firm’s liquidity position through the number of 
days that a company can finance its expenses by drawing on its own current resources. An 
increasing, positive value of NOCREDINT indicates an enhanced capacity of the firm to 
finance its business expenses (with its quasi-liquid and liquid resources given its current 
level of activity), and, therefore, a lower probability of financial distress/failure.  
 
The final accounting ratio, Interest Coverage (COVERAGE), was calculated by 
dividing the variable Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA)180 by the 
variable Interest charges or Interest expense on debt that represents the service charge for 
the use of capital before the reduction for interest capitalized. COVERAGE measures a 
firm’s ability to pay interest on outstanding debt181. An increasing value of this ratio reflects 
an enhanced capacity of a company to make interest payments, which should result in a 
lower probability of firm financial distress/failure. Further, all of the above accounting 
ratios were transformed using the TANH function in order to treat the problem of outlying 
values of the variable that could have an abnormal impact on the fitted maximum 
likelihood linear predictors as well as on the size of the residuals that resulted from the 
binary logistic regression. After the TANH transformation, the real line of the variables can 
be mapped onto [-1, 1]. 
  
                                                        
178 Graham (2000), P. 86. 
179 Where Quick Assets represent the assets that can be quickly and easily converted into cash or are already in cash form, 
Quick assets is Current Assets minus Inventories, and Daily operating expenses is equal to (Sales minus Earnings Before 
Interest and Taxes minus Depreciation) / 365. 
180  EBITDA measures the earnings of a firm before interest expense, income taxes and depreciation. Worldscope 
calculates EBITDA by taking the pre-tax income and adding back interest expense on debt and depreciation, depletion 
and amortization and subtracting interest capitalized. 
181 Chapter 2 provides a detailed interpretation of the possible ranges of this accounting ratio. 
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6.5.2. Market Variables. 
 
Four market variables were retained in the multinomial logit final models of the 
present study in order to assess whether they contain additional information on the 
likelihood of financial distress and corporate failure that can increase the goodness-of-fit 
and performance (discriminating and predicting ability) of accounting only models182. The 
first market variable is the firm’s equity price (PRICE). Market equity prices are employed 
as proxies for investor’s expectations of future cash flows and earnings, therefore, to the 
extent that a firm’s earnings are affected by its financial stance, it is expected that there is a 
negative relationship between price levels/movements and the likelihood of financial 
distress/failure: it is posited that a high or increasing level of PRICE will decrease the 
likelihood of financial distress and corporate failure.  
 
The second market variable included in this study is the lagged cumulative security 
residual return (ABNRET). In order to incorporate this variable in a financial distress 
prediction model, each firm’s past residual return 183  in year t was calculated as the 
cumulative monthly return of the twelve months prior to the year where the financial 
distress event was observed, minus the FTSE All Share Index cumulative monthly return 
for the same period (the same procedure was replicated for both periods t-1 and t-2). In line 
with the findings of previous empirical studies184, it is assumed that a high level of a firm’s 
residual returns relative to those of the FTSE All Share Index will decrease the likelihood 
of falling into the financial distress/failure category. The third market variable incorporated 
to the model represents the Size of the company measured by its market capitalisation 
relative to the total size of the FTSE All Share Index (SIZE). It is intended to measure the 
magnitude of a discount in a firm’s market value of equity induced by a negative investors’ 
assessment of the firm’s financial stance (while taking into account the total size of the 
FTSE All Share Index in order to make size static). A decline in the level of equity can 
systematically move towards the ‘strike price’ (or the value of liabilities) and eventually 
reach a level (below the strike price) where it is insufficient to serve the firm’s financial 
obligations (and the firm defaults). Thus, it is predicted that a high or increasing level of 
                                                        
182 A positive finding would suggest that market variables (which already incorporate information based on financial 
ratios) act as complements to accounting information. In addition, they are potentially very useful to enhance the 
timeliness of models relying exclusively on annual accounts. 
183  In order to calculate residual/abnormal returns, firms’ individual returns are employed as the main input. The 
investment return can be defined as the total gain or loss on an investment over a given period of time. The return 
incorporates the change in the asset’s values plus any cash distributions (dividends or interest payments). The specific 
Datastream datatype used in the present study is the Total Return Index (RI) which shows ‘a theoretical growth in value 
of a shareholding over a specific period, assuming that dividends are reinvested to purchase additional units of an equity 
or unit trust at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date.’  
184 See Dichev (1998), Shumway (2001), and Chapter 2. 
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SIZE should entail a decrease in the likelihood of firm falling into the financial 
distress/failure category. The final market variable that entered the final model is the ratio 
Market Capitalisation to Total Debt (MCTD). The denominator, Total Debt, is equal to all 
interest bearing and capitalised lease obligations (the sum of short and long term debt). A 
high value of this variable suggests that there is considerable scope for a decline in value of 
a firm’s assets (as measured by the market value of equity) before its total debt exceeds its 
assets and it becomes financially distressed or insolvent. It is therefore assumed that a high 
level of this variable should entail a low likelihood of financial distress/failure. 
 
6.5.3. Macroeconomic Indicators. 
 
Two macroeconomic variables were selected (among a list of eleven 
macroeconomic indicators) and retained in all the models in order to incorporate macro 
dependent dynamics: the Retail Price Index (RPI), and the United Kingdom Short Term 
(3-month) Treasury Bill Rate Deflated (or the real short term Treasury bill rate), both are 
represented on an annual scale in the present study. The first macroeconomic variable is 
the Retail Price Indicator (RPI) and was taken from Datastream and the Office for 
National Statistics in a monthly basis and then annualised, as required by the study. This 
variable is used to measure the change in the prices of goods and services bought for the 
purpose of consumption by the vast majority of households in the UK. The ex-ante 
hypothesis in this study regarding this variable is in line with Mare (2012), who suggests 
that high inflation is a consequence of a generally weak macroeconomic environment, 
which increases the number of banking crises. It is therefore expected that a high RPI 
should increase a firm’s probability of financial distress/failure. The second 
macroeconomic variable included in the model is the Short Term Treasury Bill Rate 
Deflated (SHTBRDEF), which represents the ‘real’ short-term rate of 3-month United 
Kingdom Treasury Bills on an annual basis. The present study included the annualised level 
of the 91 days (3-month) discount rate. This indicator is a proxy for interest rates, which, 
similar to the RPI variable, is very likely to affect industrial firms according to their capital 
structure. Now, taking into account that a high level of interest rates increases the cost of 
debt (business borrowing is perhaps the most affected) and decreases firm’s expected 
returns on investment, it is assumed that a macroeconomic environment characterised by a 
high level of interest rates (a high or increasing level of SHTBRDEF) will affect positively 
firms’ likelihood of falling into the financial distress/failure category. 
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6.5.4. Implications for the Comparison of Response categories in the Models. 
 
The variables incorporated in the models can be further classified into those that 
have a negative effect on the likelihood of state NFD occurring (Response = 1) and a 
positive effect on the likelihood of falling into category DIS (Response = 2) and FAI 
(Response = 3), on the one hand, and those having the opposite effects, on the other. 
Consequently, in order to better understand and present the effects of individual variables 
on the possible combinations of outcomes (NFD versus DIS, FAI versus DIS, and FAI 
versus NFD) it is useful to simplify this additional classification of variables into those that 
decrease (negatively affect) the likelihood of falling into the financial distress (DIS) and 
corporate failure (FAI) categories, and those that increase (positively affect) the likelihood 
of falling into the DIS and FAI categories. All types of variables included, the first group is 
composed by: TFOTL, NOCREDINT, COVERAGE, PRICE ABNRET, SIZE, and 
MCTD. And the second group includes the variables:  TLTA, RPI, and SHTBRDEF. 
 
Therefore, the ex-ante assumptions concerning the possible pairs of outcomes are as 
follows: an increasing level of the variables composing the first group (TFOTL, 
NOCREDINT, COVERAGE, PRICE ABNRET, SIZE, and MCTD) reduces the 
likelihood of a firm falling into the financial distress category (Response = 2), as shown in 
Chapter 3. Now, given that financial distress can be considered as a stage of a process that 
could ultimately result in the failure of a company, then the likelihood of falling into the 
third (and most extreme) response level in the present study, Corporate failure (Response 
= 3), should also be negatively affected by a high (approaching 1) or increasing level of 
these independent variables. Accordingly, a low or decreasing level of these covariates 
should increase the likelihood of both financial distress and corporate failure. On the other 
hand, the second group (TLTA, RPI, and SHTBRDEF) should have the opposite effect as 
the first one: A high or increasing level of TLTA should positively affect (increase) the 
probability of a firm falling into the financial distress category as well the corporate failure 
category. 
 
The implications for the multinomial function coefficients and the AMEs of the 
models included in the present study are as follows: With regard to the variables composing 
the first group, a negative sign of the coefficient estimates and AMEs is expected for the 
comparisons Failure (FAI) versus Distress (DIS) and Failure (FAI) versus Non-financial 
distress (NFD), confirming the study’s ex-ante hypothesis that a high or increasing level of 
these set of covariates has a negative impact on (decreases) the likelihood of a firm falling 
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into the corporate failure category versus falling into the financial distress category as well 
as the likelihood of falling into the corporate failure category versus falling into the non-
financial distress category. Accordingly, the sign of the coefficient and AME for the pair 
Non-financial distress (NFD) versus Financial distress (DIS) is expected to be positive, 
suggesting that an increasing level of the covariates included in the first group positively 
affects (increases) the probability of a firm falling into the non-financial distress category 
versus falling into the financial distress category. Conversely, the opposite reasoning can be 
applied to the expectations regarding the directionality of the signs of the coefficients and 
AMEs for all the variables included in the second group: a positive sign is expected for the 
pairs Failure (FAI) versus Distress (DIS) and Failure (FAI) versus Non-financial distress 
(NFD), indicating that a high or increasing level of these set of covariates has a positive 
impact on (increases) the likelihood of a firm falling into the corporate failure category 
versus falling into the financial distress category as well as the likelihood of falling into the 
corporate failure category versus falling into the non-financial distress category. 
Accordingly, the sign of the coefficient and AME for the combination Non-financial 
distress (NFD) versus Financial distress (DIS) is expected to be negative, suggesting that an 
increasing level of the variables comprised in the second group negatively affect (decrease) 
the probability of a firm falling into the non-financial distress category versus falling into 
the financial distress category. 
 
By advancing multinomial function coefficient estimates as well as AMEs for each 
of the variables in incorporated in the models, this study provides new insights not only 
about the directionality of individual effects of the covariates on the likelihood of failing into 
each of the three possible outcomes but also about the magnitude (and therefore 
importance) of the individual effects relative to the other covariates. This is the first study 
on the financial distress/failure literature that tests the theoretical assumptions of the 
polytomous response logit model methodology with regard to the differences between 
coefficients estimates and marginal effects in order to provide new information on three 
essential outcomes for both academics and practitioners: Non-financial distress, Financial 
distress, and Corporate failure. Furthermore, the study also fills a very important gap in the 
financial distress/failure literature by presenting comparisons of predicted probability 
vectors between the financial distress category and the corporate failure state for different 
levels of individual covariates while keeping the other independent variables constant (at 
their means). In this way, new insights are advanced with regard to the specific variables 
that have the largest (and smallest) impact on each of these two negative outcomes. Having 
this type of information is capital given the real costs associated with financial distress and 
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corporate failure. Finally, this is the first study that tests the classification accuracy of a 
model that combines accounting and market variables (while controlling for macro 
dependent dynamics) applied to an unbalanced panel of data, where the proportions of 
non-financial distress, distressed and failed companies have a strong resemblance with the 
real proportions in the quoted companies sector in the United Kingdom. 
 
Table 6-3 Summary Statistics for Model 1 
This table presents summary statistics for Model 1, which includes financial statement and 
macroeconomic variables. It covers the Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum Values 
and the number of observations that were used in the logistic regression for the financial ratios 
Total Funds from Operation to Total Liabilities (TFOTL), Total Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA), 
the No Credit Interval (NOCREDINT), and Interest Coverage (COVERAGE); and the 
macroeconomic variables Retail Price Index (RPI) and the proxy for interest rates, the 3-month 
Short Term Bill Rate adjusted for inflation (SHTBRDEF). Panel A contains summary statistics for 
the entire dataset, Panel B for financially healthy firms, Panel C for financially distressed firms, and 
Panel D for failed firms. 
Variable TFOTL TLTA NOCREDINT COVERAGE RPI SHTBRDEF 
Panel A: Entire data set 
Mean 0.067493 0.485921 -0.118042 0.525922 178.39851 2.048426 
Std. Dev. 0.339813 0.189284 0.986466 0.822947 32.220261 2.427929 
Min -1 -0.432123 -1 -1 94.59 -4.69551 
Max 1 1 1 1 235.18 7.7407 
Observations 18,070 
 
     
Panel B: Non-financially distressed firms  
Mean 0.088319 0.482455 -0.109658 0.589027 177.75165 2.068698 
Std. Dev. 0.325357 0.184057 0.987328 0.781256 32.427066 2.442916 
Min -1 -0.432123 -1 -1 94.59 -4.69551 
Max 1 1 1 1 235.18 7.7407 
Observations 17,143 
 
     
Panel C: Financially distressed firms 
Mean -0.385525 0.524583 -0.136795 -0.866796 193.10239 1.437297 
Std. Dev. 0.369959 0.279639 0.987389 0.379827 24.667725 2.117728 
Min -1 -0.302382 -1 -1 115.21 -4.69551 
Max 0.99792 1 1 0.751412 235.18 7.1745 
Observations 612 
 
     
Panel D: Failed Firms 
Mean -0.185767 0.599386 -0.537879 -0.202545 185.03432 2.132532 
Std. Dev. 0.33396 0.208933 0.837612 0.916257 25.739411 1.983302 
Min -1 0.005761 -1 -1 115.21 -4.69551 
Max 0.796339 1 1 1 235.18 7.1745 
Observations 315      
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Table 6-4 Summary Statistics for Model 2 
This table presents summary statistics for Model 2, which includes market and macroeconomic 
variables. It covers the Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum Values and the number 
of observations that were used in the multinomial logistic regression for the firm’s Equity Price 
(PRICE), the firm’s annual Abnormal Returns (ABNRET), the firm’s Relative Size (SIZE), and the 
ratio Market Capital to Total Debt (MCTD); and the macroeconomic variables Retail Price Index 
(RPI) and the proxy for interest rates, the 3-month Short Term Bill Rate adjusted for inflation 
(SHTBRDEF). Panel A contains summary statistics for the entire dataset, Panel B for financially 
healthy firms, Panel C for financially distressed firms, and Panel D for failed firms. 
Variable PRICE ABNRET SIZE MCTD RPI SHTBRDEF 
Panel A: Entire data set 
Mean 4.392914 -0.111672 -10.10087 0.911268 177.87621 2.075157 
Std. Dev. 1.720131 0.388324 2.238356 0.191682 32.877633 2.52962 
Min -3.912023 -0.999988 -18.762915 0.002019 94.59 -4.69551 
Max 14.151983 0.999996 -2.374161 1 235.18 7.7407 
Observations 14,578 
 
     
Panel B: Non-financially distressed firms 
Mean 4.495108 -0.088945 -9.965482 0.920038 177.18654 2.097117 
Std. Dev. 1.646194 0.376547 2.197184 0.17782 33.115608 2.549583 
Min -3.912023 -0.999829 -18.762915 0.002019 94.59 -4.69551 
Max 14.151983 0.999996 -2.374161 1 235.18 7.7407 
Observations 13,780 
 
     
Panel C: Financially distressed firms 
Mean 2.652963 -0.566576 -12.605192 0.790393 192.29895 1.491971 
Std. Dev. 1.982396 0.318766 1.464687 0.304776 24.90328 2.135678 
Min -3.912023 -0.999988 -16.602146 0.002877 115.21 -4.69551 
Max 10.266393 0.560483 -7.427867 1 235.18 7.1745 
Observations 522 
 
 
 
   
Panel D: Failed Firms 
Mean 2.580608 -0.384036 -12.118752 0.701029 184.95234 2.088227 
Std. Dev. 2.012367 0.450497 1.642173 0.334435 26.553931 2.041848 
Min -3.912023 -0.996655 -16.581148 0.00588 115.21 -4.69551 
Max 10.96388 0.949759 -5.641377 1 235.18 7.1745 
Observations 273      
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Table 6-5 Summary statistics for Model 3 
This table presents summary statistics for the comprehensive model, or Model 3, which includes financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators and market 
variables. It covers the Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum Values and the number of observations that were used in the logistic regression for the 
ratios Total Funds from Operation to Total Liabilities (TFOTL), Total Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA), the No Credit Interval (NOCREDINT), Interest Coverage 
(COVERAGE) the Retail Price Index (RPI), and a proxy for interest rates, the 3-month Short Term Bill Rate adjusted for inflation (SHTBRDEF), the firm’s Equity 
Price (PRICE), the firm’s annual Abnormal Returns (ABNRET ), the firm’s Relative Size (SIZE), and the ratio Market Capital to Total Debt (MCTD). Panel A 
contains summary statistics for the entire dataset, Panel B for financially healthy firms, Panel C for the firms in financial distress, and Panel D for failed firms. 
Variable TFOTL TLTA NOCREDINT COVERAGE RPI SHTBRDEF PRICE ABNRET SIZE MCTD 
Panel A: Entire dataset 
Mean 0.097363 0.497767 -0.19551 0.599672 178.08903 2.046149 4.427373 -0.108952 -10.046418 0.91036 
Std. Dev. 0.27721 0.169538 0.973386 0.770045 32.874323 2.532696 1.702743 0.386299 2.22842 0.192053 
Min -1 -0.102771 -1 -1 94.59 -4.69551 -3.912023 -0.999988 -16.602146 0.002877 
Max 1 1 1 1 235.18 7.7407 14.151983 0.999996 -2.374161 1 
Observations 13,529 
 
         
Panel B: Non-financially distressed firms 
Mean 0.118203 0.492827 -0.184269 0.669078 177.4168 2.066005 4.526808 -0.086315 -9.913979 0.919151 
Std. Dev. 0.258451 0.163083 0.975489 0.713444 33.102993 2.553595 1.630117 0.374557 2.189381 0.17828 
Min -1 -0.102771 -1 -1 94.59 -4.69551 -3.912023 -0.999829 -16.480853 0.006411 
Max 1 1 1 1 235.18 7.7407 14.151983 0.999996 -2.374161 1 
Observations 12,801 
 
         
Panel C: Financially Distressed Firms 
Mean -0.332766 0.561524 -0.252689 -0.849951 192.32595 1.507206 2.708543 -0.563883 -12.555755 0.785255 
Std. Dev. 0.335827 0.262972 0.963513 0.401609 25.028722 2.094824 1.964593 0.322238 1.428658 0.307795 
Min -0.999979 0.028495 -1 -1 115.21 -4.69551 -3.912023 -0.999988 -16.602146 0.002877 
Max 0.724547 1 1 0.751412 235.18 7.1745 10.266393 0.560483 -7.427867 1 
Observations 482 
 
         
Panel D: Failed firms 
Mean -0.144323 0.629916 -0.668404 -0.171655 185.17427 2.068862 2.62093 -0.395512 -12.021421 0.698069 
Std. Dev. 0.29425 0.187108 0.735512 0.921337 26.84074 2.07339 2.019445 0.43582 1.593138 0.331656 
Min -1 0.052458 -1 -1 115.21 -4.69551 -3.912023 -0.996655 -15.922758 0.00588 
Max 0.49607 1 1 1 235.18 7.1745 10.96388 0.949759 -5.641377 1 
Observations 246          
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6.6. Analysis of results. 
 
 The choice of variables to include in each of the models is consistent with the 
objectives of the present study: on the one hand, the aim is to present new insights on the 
effects of the individual variables on the vectors of transition predicted probabilities of a 
firm reaching a particular state conditionally on being in a different one, as well as on the 
marginal effects of the variables on the probability of falling into one of the three 
categories; and, on the other hand, to test whether the combination of accounting and 
market variables in a single model is able to increase its goodness-of-fit and overall 
performance (to correctly discriminate and predict outcomes). Table 6-6 presents tests to 
assess the fitting of the model: it reports likelihood ratio tests in order to evaluate the 
effects of the independent covariates on the Response variable, as well as linear hypothesis 
tests to estimate the overall effects of all pairs of coefficients on the outcome variable for 
three models, all of which include macroeconomic indicators in order to account for the 
models’ macro dependent dynamics: the ‘Accounting’ model (Model 1), the ‘Market’ model 
(Model 2), and the ‘Comprehensive’ model (Model 3) which combines accounting and 
market variables as well as macroeconomic indicators. The tests displayed in Table 5-6 are 
performed for periods t-1 and t-2, using information one and two years prior to the 
observation of the event of interest. 
 
Panel A, B, and C of Table 6-6 show likelihood-ratio test results to confirm the 
significance of the predictors to the model: the    can be interpreted as overall statistics 
that provide relevant information on which independent variables significantly predict the 
outcome category. It tests the null hypothesis that a given individual variable does not 
affect the outcome of the Response variable. This test shows that, in t-1 and for all of the 
models, the hypothesis that all of the coefficients associated with each of the individual 
variables are simultaneously equal to zero can be rejected at the 99 per cent level. As for t-2, 
the tests performed on Model 3 show that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the 
accounting variable TLTA and the market variable SIZE, which is a very small proportion 
of the total number of variables. This is not surprising since the tests were estimated using 
information two years prior to the relevant event. However, given that, overall, all of the 
coefficients significance statistics allows the null hypothesis to be rejected, all of the 
variables were kept in the final models. Panel D, on the other hand, reports linear 
hypothesis results that test the null hypothesis that all 10 pairs of coefficients for financial 
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distress (DIS) and corporate failure (FAI)185 conditionally on nonfinancial distress (NFD) 
are equal. It yields a Wald    equal to 181.2717 with 10 degrees of freedom, producing a p-
value equal to 0.0001. It can be concluded that the coefficients for DIS (versus NFD) and 
FAI (versus NFD) are not the same. Had this test produced a high p-value (e.g., p > 0.05) 
the null hypothesis could not have been rejected, which would have suggested that the 
categories of financial distress and corporate failure can be combined into a single category. 
 
In order to test the assumptions of this study concerning the effects of individual 
variables on the three-state response variable, this study compares the multinomial 
coefficient estimates with the average marginal effects.  Coefficients obtained through the 
multinomial logit methodology are presented in a first stage. Tables 6-7 to 6-9 present 
results from logistic regressions of the Response indicator on the predictor variables. As 
required by the polytomous response logistic regression model, firms classified as non-
financially distressed (NFD) were given a value of 1, firms identified as financially 
distressed (DIS) were given the value 2, and failed firms (FAI) were assigned the value of 3. 
This classification was carried out using the previously discussed definitions developed 
specifically for this analysis. The present study develops three main ex-ante models for 
estimating financial distress likelihood and to test the contribution of market variables to 
the predictive accuracy of models based on financial statement ratios.  
 
Table 6-7 reports results from multinomial logit regressions of the three-level 
Response variable on the predictor variables for Model 1 or the the ‘Accounting’ model, 
which incorporates the financial statement ratios Total Funds from Operations to Total 
Liabilities (TFOTL), Total Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA), the No Credit Interval 
(NOCREDINT), and Interest Coverage (COVERAGE). Table 6-8 reports results from 
multinomial logit regressions of the three-level Response variable on the predictor variables 
for Model 2 or the ‘Market’ model, which includes each firm’s Equity Price (PRICE) 
transformed using the logarithmic function; the firm’s cumulative monthly abnormal 
returns on an annual basis (ABNRET), generated as the firm’s excess returns minus the 
FTSE All Share return index for the same period of time; and the firm’s relative size 
(SIZE) measured by the market capitalisation relative to the total size (market 
capitalisation) of the FTSE All Share index, in logarithmic form. Finally, Table 6-9 reports 
results from polytomous response logit regressions of the 3-level Response variable on the 
predictors for the ‘Comprehensive’ model or Model 3, which combines both types of 
                                                        
185 The test was applied to this particular outcomes as it could be argued that, because of their potential proximity, they 
could be combined into a single category in order to satisfy the polytomous response logit models’ requirement that the 
outcome categories be clearly distinct. 
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variables in a single logit model of financial distress/failure. Furthermore, all the three 
models incorporate two proxies for the macroeconomic environment in order to control 
for macro dependent dynamics: the Retail Price Index (RPI) and the Short Term Bill Rate 
adjusted for inflation (SHTBRDEF). 
 
Table 6-6 Likelihood-ratio and linear hypothesis testing results 
This table reports likelihood-ratio tests to assess the effects of the independent covariates on the 
Response variable for the ‘Accounting plus macroeconomic indicators’ model (Model 1), the 
‘Market plus macroeconomic indicators’ model (Model 2), and the ‘Comprehensive’ model (Model 
3) in Panel A, B and C, respectively. The likelihood ratio tests were estimated with accounting 
market and macroeconomic information one and two years prior to the observation of the event of 
interest (for periods t-1 and t-2). The test is used to confirm the significance of the predictors to the 
model. Additionally, Panel D reports linear hypothesis testing results for the null hypothesis that all 
ten pairs of coefficients are equal. 
Effect DF Chi-Square (Pr>ChiSq) Chi-Square (Pr>ChiSq) 
Panel A: Model 1  t-1 t-2 
TFOTL  2 37.686 (<.0001) 31.828 (<.0001) 
TLTA 2 75.154 (<.0001) 19.422 (<.0001) 
NOCREDINT 2 38.460 (<.0001) 20.040 (<.0001) 
COVERAGE 2 639.078 (<.0001) 652.672 (<.0001) 
RPI 2 80.485 (<.0001) 40.647 (<.0001) 
SHTBRDEF 2 54.266 (<.0001) 42.175 (<.0001) 
 
Panel B: Model 2 
   
PRICE 2 62.548 (<.0001) 35.661 (<.0001) 
ABNRET 2 313.185 (<.0001) 590.850 (<.0001) 
SIZE 2 248.434 (<.0001) 102.040 (<.0001) 
MCTD 2 78.609 (<.0001) 48.367 (<.0001) 
RPI 2 23.085 (<.0001) 21.213 (<.0001) 
SHTBRDEF 2 16.156 (<.0001) 6.738 (0.034) 
 
Panel C: Model 3 
   
TFOTL 2 34.180 (<.0001) 31.695 (<.0001) 
TLTA 2 13.079 (0.001) 2.655 (0.265) 
NOCREDINT 2 23.849 (<.0001) 6.028 (0.049) 
COVERAGE 2 304.970 (<.0001) 356.000 (<.0001) 
RPI 2 20.424 (<.0001) 14.938 (0.001) 
SHTBRDEF 2 18.024 (<.0001) 15.564 (<.0001) 
PRICE 2 35.368 (<.0001) 23.095 (<.0001) 
ABNRET 2 117.757 (<.0001) 224.161 (<.0001) 
SIZE 2 63.715 (<.0001) 4.894 (0.087) 
MCTD 2 59.550 (<.0001) 18.371 (<.0001) 
    
Panel D: Linear Hypothesis Testing Results –  Model 3 
ALL VARIABLES 
TESTED 
 
10 
 
181.2717 (<.0001) 
 
 
As mentioned above, the present study develops ex-ante models for the estimation 
of financial distress/failure likelihood. In practice, the date of the event of financial distress 
is not known and risk managers are required to employ the data that is available at the time 
of the analysis in order to make an estimate of the likelihood of failure or financial distress 
of a company. Accordingly, this study estimates the probability of financial distress/failure 
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in the year prior to the observation of the relevant event (t-1) as well as two years prior to 
the event (t-2). In that way, the models provide evidence about the predictors that best 
discriminate between financially sound, distressed and failed companies on the one hand, 
and on the other, test their predictive power. Thus, for the t-1 models, all of the accounting 
ratios were computed using the financial statements of the year prior to the event. 
Accordingly, the macroeconomic indicators were calculated with information one year 
prior the event: the Retail Price Index (RPI) in base 100 as well as the 3-month Bill rate 
(SHTBRDEF), which was annualised and deflated using the inflation rate in order to 
obtain a measure of the level of ‘real’ interest rates in the economy. As for the market 
variables, equity prices (PRICE) were incorporated to the model as the official closing price 
in t-1, the variable measuring abnormal returns (ABNRET) for year t, when the relevant 
event was observed, was calculated as the return of the firm in year t-1 minus the FTSE All 
Share Index return in year t-1. Individual firms’ annual returns were generated by 
cumulating monthly returns. With regard to the variable that measures the relative size of 
the firm (SIZE), following Shumway (2001), individual firms’ market capitalisation was 
measured at the end of the year before the financial distress/failure event. Finally, as for 
the ratio Market Capitalisation to Total Debt (MCTD), the latter was also measured with 
information taken from financial statements issued in t-1.The same procedure was 
employed to estimate coefficients and average marginal effects for the period t-2. 
 
6.6.1. Multinomial Function Coefficients. 
 
Table 6-7 reports the resulting estimates from multinomial logistic regressions of 
the 3-state Response indicator on the independent variables for the ‘Accounting’ model. It 
can be observed that, as to the comparison of the Corporate failure (FAI) category versus 
the Non-financially distressed (NFD) category, all of the coefficients (accounting variables 
as well as macroeconomic indicators) in t-1 are statistically significant at the 5%-1% level 
and possess the expected signs. This is in line with the study’s ex-ante assumptions, as it 
displays the coefficients resulting from the comparison of the extreme outcomes contained 
in the Response indicator. Therefore, it is unsurprising that all of the covariates have the 
ability to reliably discriminate between corporate failure and financial distress. Similarly, the 
coefficients for the pair Non-financial distress (NFD) versus Financial distress (DIS) 
display the expected signs and, with the exception of NOCREDINT (which is statistically 
significant at the 10% level), are statistically significant at the 5%-1% level, suggesting that 
almost all of them are able to reliable discriminate between the pair of categories. Again, 
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this is in line with the ex-ante assumptions of the study, given that, although not as extreme 
as the previous comparison, this pair includes two contrasting response levels. On the 
other hand, the results obtained from the comparison Corporate failure (FAI) versus 
Financial distress (DIS) are less unequivocal: two covariates - one accounting ratio and one 
macroeconomic indicator - lose their statistical significance. However, even if the number 
covariates that reliably discriminate and predict between these two outcomes is reduced, 
there are still three financial ratios and one macroeconomic indicator that are statistically 
significant. This suggests that even for similar outcomes (there is more proximity or 
similarity between the pair Corporate failure and Financial distress than between any of the 
other pairs of outcomes), the accounting model presented in this study displays a sound 
performance. Further, it is interesting to note that, for both pairs NFD versus DIS and 
FAI versus DIS, COVERAGE exhibits the highest coefficient in magnitude followed by 
TLTA, TFOTL, and NOCREDINT, in order of importance. This rank is not the same for 
the pair that compares the most extreme categories (FAI versus NFD). In this case the 
coefficient with the highest magnitude is TLTA, followed by TFOTL, COVERAGE and 
NOCREDINT, suggesting that the importance of the coefficients depends on the specific 
comparison pair, and that TLTA is more powerful to discriminate between extreme 
outcomes than COVERAGE, which performs better when the outcomes to be compared 
are more similar. However, the fact that the sign of the variable COVERAGE (concerning 
the pair FAI versus DIS) does not display the expected sign must be highlighted: in 
contrast with these results, it was previously posited that an increasing value of this variable 
would have a negative effect on the probability of falling into the Corporate failure 
category versus falling into the Financial distress category. Finally, the coefficients obtained 
when the model was estimating using information two years prior to the event of interest 
show a similar pattern.  
 
Table 6-8 reports the multinomial function coefficient estimates for the ‘Market’ 
model (Model 2). The pattern reflected by the analysis of the pairs of comparisons FAI 
versus NFD and NFD versus DIS is similar to the one observed for the ‘Accounting 
model’: regarding the first pair, all of the market variables are statistically significant at the 
5%-1% level and display the correct signs, suggesting that they are able to reliably 
discriminate between the most extreme potential outcomes of the Response indicator. For 
the next comparison, NFD versus DIS, only the macroeconomic indicator SHTBRDEF 
displays a decrease of statistical significance from the 5%-1% level to the 10% level. 
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Table 6-7 Multinomial Logit Regression of 3-Level Response Variable on Predictor 
Variables - Model 1 - Accounting + Macroeconomic Variables Model 
This table reports results from multinomial logit regressions of the 3-level Response variable on the 
predictor variables for the Accounting plus macroeconomic variables Model 1. The 3-level 
Response variable is composed of the following states: Non-financial distress (NFD or non-failed 
firms), financial distress (DIS or financially distressed companies), and failure (FAI or failed firms). 
Model 1 was computed for two periods: using the accounts and macroeconomic data from the year 
prior to the observation of the relevant event (t-1), and the accounts and macroeconomic data from 
two years prior to the observation of the event (t-2) in order to confirm the stability over time of 
the displayed signs as well as the magnitude of the coefficients. The absolute value of z-statistics is 
reported in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5%-1%. 
Covariates NFD V DIS FAI V DIS FAI V NFD 
 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 
TFOTL  0.6103** 
(4.49) 
0.5862** 
(4.41) 
-0.3945 
(1.60) 
-0.3003 
(1.16) 
-1.0049** 
(4.57) 
-0.8865** 
(3.80) 
TLTA -1.1633** 
(5.89) 
0.0747 
(0.36) 
0.7940* 
(2.42) 
1.3846** 
(3.95) 
1.9573** 
(6.90) 
1.3100** 
(4.36) 
NOCREDINT 0.1177* 
(2.21) 
0.0981 
(1.81) 
-0.3160** 
(3.49) 
-0.2021* 
(2.27) 
-0.4337** 
(5.65) 
-0.3001** 
(4.08) 
COVERAGE 1.9453** 
(19.73) 
2.0394** 
(20.11) 
1.3069** 
(10.06) 
1.5608** 
(11.50) 
-0.6384** 
(7.23) 
-0.4786** 
(5.11) 
RPI -0.0202** 
(6.77) 
-0.0192** 
(5.96) 
0.00241 
(0.52) 
-0.0115* 
(2.44) 
0.0226** 
(6.03) 
0.00772* 
(2.13) 
SHTBRDEF -0.1431** 
(4.22) 
-0.2946** 
(6.02) 
0.1570** 
(2.61) 
-0.1994** 
(2.76) 
0.3001** 
(5.80) 
0.0951 
(1.71) 
Intercept 8.5451** 
(13.59) 
7.9198** 
(11.27) 
-1.2830 
(1.30) 
1.7931 
(1.75) 
-9.8282** 
(12.16) 
-6.1267** 
(7.84) 
 
 The marginal decrease in performance (suggested by the decrease in statistical 
significance of the proxy for interest rates) reflects the fact that the outcomes’ proximity is 
increased. This comparison indicates that that the market model contains useful 
information for the classification of financially healthy versus financially distressed 
companies. In contrast, three variables obtained from the comparison pair FAI versus DIS 
display signs that are at odds with the study’s expectations, namely, ABNRET, SIZE and 
RPI. It was expected that an increase in both the level of residual returns and the size of 
the company would entail a decrease in the likelihood of the firm falling into the failure 
category versus falling into the financial distress category. In the case of RPI it was 
assumed that an increase of inflation would have a positive effect on the likelihood of 
failure given a current strained financial condition. From this analysis, it can be concluded 
that the accounting model is more reliable to discriminate between this pair of categories.  
 
On the other hand, an analysis of the coefficients magnitudes shows that, for the 
pair NFD versus DIS, ABNRET can be ranked in first place followed by MCTD, SIZE 
and PRICE. This order is different for the pair FAI versus NFD: MCTD have the largest 
coefficient in absolute terms followed by ABNRET, PRICE, and SIZE, suggesting that 
residual returns might have an important role in discriminating between extreme outcomes. 
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Unsurprisingly, the statistical significance of some of the variables decreases when the 
model is estimating using information two years prior to the event of relevance. 
 
Table 6-8 Multinomial Logit Regression of 3-Level Response Variable on Predictor 
Variables - Model 2 - Market + Macroeconomic Variables Model 
This table reports results from multinomial logit regressions of the 3-level Response variable on the 
predictor variables for the Market plus macroeconomic variables Model 2. The 3-level Response 
variable is composed of the following states: Non-financial distress (NFD or non-failed firms), 
financial distress (DIS or financially distressed companies), and failure (FAI or failed firms). Model 
2 was computed for two periods: using the market and macroeconomic data from the year prior to 
the observation of the relevant event (t-1), and the market and macroeconomic data from two years 
prior to the observation of the event (t-2) in order to confirm the stability over time of the 
displayed signs as well as the magnitude of the coefficients. The absolute value of z-statistics is 
reported in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5%-1%. 
Covariates NFD V DIS FAI V DIS FAI V NFD 
 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 
PRICE 0.0887** 
(3.05) 
0.0485 
(1.70) 
-0.2132** 
(4.62) 
-0.1859** 
(3.96) 
-0.3019** 
(7.65) 
-0.2344** 
(5.85) 
ABNRET 2.3548** 
(15.92) 
3.0210** 
(20.34) 
1.6494** 
(7.60) 
1.6941** 
(7.81) 
-0.7053** 
(4.16) 
-1.3269** 
(7.97) 
SIZE 0.4941** 
(13.97) 
0.2897** 
(8.95) 
0.2291** 
(4.29) 
0.1052* 
(2.07) 
-0.2650** 
(6.10) 
-0.1845** 
(4.48) 
MCTD 0.4949** 
(2.86) 
-0.8680** 
(3.87) 
-1.3721** 
(5.58) 
-2.1018** 
(6.97) 
-1.8670** 
(9.18) 
-1.2337** 
(5.43) 
RPI -0.0127** 
(4.16) 
-0.0139** 
(4.45) 
-0.00238 
(0.51) 
-0.0152** 
(3.26) 
0.0103** 
(2.68) 
-0.00136 
(0.37) 
SHTBRDEF -0.0733* 
(2.14) 
-0.1181* 
(2.48) 
0.0926 
(1.64) 
-0.1379* 
(1.97) 
0.1659** 
(3.44) 
-0.0198 
(0.37) 
Intercept 11.4310** 
(14.71) 
10.7512** 
(13.14) 
4.8330** 
(4.09) 
6.8700** 
(5.70) 
-6.5980** 
(6.88) 
-3.8812** 
(4.15) 
 
 Table 6-9 reports from polytomous logit regressions of the three-state Response 
indicator on the predictor variables for the ‘Comprehensive’ model. As expected, all of the 
variables coefficients resulting from the comparison FAI versus NFD (or the pair that 
includes the outcomes at the extremes of the financial distress/failure process) have the 
expected signs and display statistical significance at the 5%-1% levels, providing thus 
additional evidence suggesting that all of the variables contain information that is useful to 
discriminate between these opposite states. In other words, unambiguous differences in 
individual characteristics between the Corporate failure and the Non-financial distress 
categories can be found in every single accounting, market and macroeconomic variable 
incorporated in the ‘Comprehensive’ model. An assessment of the coefficient magnitudes 
reveals that, for this comparison pair, the market variable MCTD can be ranked in the first 
position followed by TLTA, TFOTL, ABNRET and NOCREDINT, which might indicate 
the order of importance of individual variables to discriminate between failed and 
financially sound companies. Next, with regard to the comparison NFD versus DIS, 
despite the fact that all of the covariates show the expected signs, only one accounting 
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variable is statistically significant, while three out of four market variables – ABNRET, 
SIZE, and MCTD – and all of the macroeconomic indicators retain their statistical 
significance at the 5%-1% level. Furthermore, an ordering of the variables based upon the 
magnitude of their coefficients reveals that the top five is composed by three market 
variables and two financial ratios: COVERAGE, ABNRET, MCTD, TFOTL, and SIZE, 
in order of importance. Unlike in the previous comparison, these results confirm the 
importance of the effects of market variables on the likelihood of falling into category 
NFD versus falling into category DIS. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the pair that combines the categories FAI and DIS yields only 6 
statistically significant variables: the market variables PRICE, ABNRET, and SIZE (all of 
them at the 5%-1% level), and the accounting ratios COVERAGE, NOCREDINT, and 
TLTA (significant at the 5%-1% and 10% levels, respectively). Interestingly, when the 
model is estimated using information two years prior to the observation of the event of 
relevance, the macroeconomic indicators and the market variable MCTD become 
statistically significant, indicating that there is a difference in the performance (or in the 
amount of useful information that is relevant to the prediction of each outcome) of the 
variables that is dependent upon the period of analysis. Furthermore, the market variables 
ABNRET and SIZE and the accounting variable COVERAGE display signs at odds with 
this study’s ex-ante assumptions: a negative relationship would have been expected instead 
for the three covariates suggesting that the higher the level of each individual variable, the 
lower the likelihood of falling into the FAI category versus falling into the DIS category. 
An analysis of the magnitude of the coefficients based on their absolute values reveals that 
the top five is composed by the accounting variable COVERAGE (although with the 
wrong sign) occupying the first place, followed by TLTA, ABNRET (also displaying the 
wrong sign), TFOTL and MCTD. Now, if the variables displaying the wrong signs were 
discarded then TLTA, TFOTL, and MCTD would be followed by NOCREDINT and 
PRICE. 
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Table 6-9 Multinomial Logit Regression of 3-Level Response Variable on Predictor 
Variables - Model 3 - Comprehensive Model 
This table reports results from multinomial logit regressions of the 3-level Response variable on the 
predictor variables for the comprehensive Model 3. The 3-level Response variable is composed of 
the following states: Non-financial distress (NFD or non-failed firms), financial distress (DIS or 
financially distressed companies), and failure (FAI or failed firms). Model 3 was computed for two 
periods: using the accounting, market and macroeconomic data from the year prior to the 
observation of the relevant event (t-1), and the accounting, market, and macroeconomic data from 
two years prior to the observation of the event (t-2) in order to confirm the stability over time of 
the displayed signs as well as the magnitude of the coefficients. The absolute value of z-statistics is 
reported in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5%-1%. 
Covariates NFD V DIS FAI V DIS FAI V NFD 
 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 
TFOTL 0.8406** 
(4.51) 
0.8364** 
(4.61) 
-0.4411 
(1.33) 
-0.2416 
(0.74) 
-1.2817** 
(4.29) 
-1.0780** 
(3.67) 
TLTA -0.2855 
(1.07) 
0.0960 
(0.35) 
1.0362* 
(2.46) 
0.6839 
(1.55) 
1.3217** 
(3.58) 
0.5879 
(1.54) 
NOCREDINT 0.0207 
(0.33) 
0.0456 
(0.72) 
-0.4177** 
(3.82) 
-0.1480 
(1.49) 
-0.4384** 
(4.59) 
-0.1936* 
(2.36) 
COVERAGE 1.6100** 
(14.45) 
1.8016** 
(15.86) 
1.2631** 
(8.67) 
1.6784** 
(11.00) 
-0.3469** 
(3.42) 
-0.1232 
(1.15) 
RPI -0.0125** 
(3.57) 
-0.0141** 
(3.75) 
0.000306 
(0.06) 
-0.0153** 
(2.94) 
0.0128** 
(3.12) 
-0.00126 
(0.32) 
SHTBRDEF -0.1017** 
(2.58) 
-0.2107** 
(3.73) 
0.0805 
(1.31) 
-0.2383** 
(3.07) 
0.1821** 
(3.50) 
-0.0276 
(0.48) 
PRICE 0.0356 
(1.19) 
0.0167 
(0.57) 
-0.2069** 
(4.42) 
-0.1840** 
(3.80) 
-0.2425** 
(5.87) 
-0.2007** 
(4.76) 
ABNRET 1.5031** 
(9.96) 
1.8065** 
(12.26) 
0.9834** 
(4.44) 
0.5839* 
(2.58) 
-0.5197** 
(2.91) 
-1.2226** 
(6.71) 
SIZE 0.3111** 
(7.45) 
-0.00848 
(0.22) 
0.1823** 
(3.08) 
-0.1044 
(1.83) 
-0.1289** 
(2.77) 
-0.0959* 
(2.15) 
MCTD 1.1416** 
(5.36) 
0.1002 
(0.38) 
-0.4365 
(1.50) 
-1.0814** 
(3.06) 
-1.5780** 
(6.58) 
-1.1816** 
(4.41) 
Intercept 
 
9.3569** 
(10.47) 
6.9788** 
(7.24) 
2.5189 
(1.93) 
3.5683** 
(2.61) 
-6.8379** 
(6.42) 
-3.4106** 
(3.24) 
 
The above analysis of the multinomial function coefficient was useful in order to be 
aware of the potentially useful predictors of the three levels of the response variables given 
a base outcome. It also provides hints regarding the overall performance of the model by 
displaying the number of variables that are statistically significant for each pair of variables. 
The above analysis is, nevertheless, most useful as a benchmark to make comparisons 
relative to what this study posited to be the most appropriate tool to interpret the 
individual effects of the independent variables on the different levels of the Response 
indicator for Polytomous response logit models: marginal effects. 
 
Before moving on to the analysis of the average marginal effects, and in order to 
formally assess the goodness-of-fit of individual models, the present study employs a set of 
measures shown in Table 6-10. 
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6.6.2. Model Fit Statistics. 
 
Table 6-10 reports model fit statistics. In order to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of 
each model in the study, a set of complementary measures is employed. The first of these 
measures, Cox and Snell’s R-squared is based on the log-likelihood of the model, the log-
likelihood of the original (baseline) model, and the sample size. Nagelkerke’s Max-rescaled 
R-squared is a refinement of the former. The higher the value, the better the model’s 
goodness-of-fit. Both can thus be considered as measuring the same concept. In general, 
they can be interpreted similarly (but not identically), to the R-squared in linear regression, 
given that they reflect the significance of the model186. Next, this is the first study on 
financial distress/failure models that employs measures based on the Akaike’s information 
criterion and the Schwartz’s Bayesian criterion in order to compare fit statistics between 
models187. These criteria are useful in cases where the main objective is to compare models 
(with different sets of independent variables) for the same data. The methodology used is 
the following: First, for both criteria (Akaike and Schwartz information criteria), statistics 
are estimated for an intercept only model and for a model that incorporates the relevant 
independent variables. Next, given that a lower value of the ‘intercept plus predictors’ 
statistic relative to the ‘intercept only’ statistic indicates a better fit of a given model188, the 
difference is calculated and presented in the tables. Therefore, the higher this difference 
(shown in Table 5-10) the greater the improvement of the goodness-of-fit resulting from 
the inclusion of the specific model’s independent variables. χ2 Chi-square statistics, on the 
other hand, result of the likelihood ratio test and tests the joint effect (significance) of the 
independent variables included in the model. Thus, small p-values (e.g., p<0.05) reject the 
null hypothesis that all slope parameters are equal to zero (      ). Finally, Deviance 
and Pearson statistics are also reported. For both tests, large p-values suggest that there is 
insufficient evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis that the model fits. 
  
                                                        
186 See Cox and Snell (1989) and Nagelkerke (1991). 
187 In fact, the Akaike information criterion and the Schwartz’s information criterion provide two distinct ways of 
adjusting the -2 Log L statistic for the number of terms in the model and the number of observations used. 
188 In other words, a lower value of the ‘intercept plus predictors’ statistic relative to the ‘intercept only’ statistic suggests 
that the model with predictors  is better than the ‘intercept only’ model.  
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Table 6-10 Comparative Model Fit Statistics 
This table reports model performance statistics. Panel A shows measures for the three models 
estimated in period t-1 and Panel B displays the same measures for all of the models estimated in t-
2. Model 1 is the ‘accounting plus macroeconomic variables’ model, Model 2 is the ‘market plus 
macroeconomic variables’ model, Model 3 is the ‘comprehensive’ model, including accounting, 
market and macroeconomic variables. The first two measures are Cox and Snell’s R-squared and 
Nagelkerke’s Max-rescaled R-squared, which provide a gauge to compare the substantive 
significance of the 3 models; in addition Akaike information criterion and Schwartz’s bayesian 
criterion statistics, the models’ Chi-squared, and the deviance and Pearson statistics are also 
presented. 
Measure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Panel A: models’ fit statistics in t-1 
Cox & Snell’s R2 0.1071 0.1100 0.1555 
Nagelkerke’s Max-rescaled R2 0.2854 0.2819 0.4028 
Akaike Information Criterion 2023.246 1675.399 2247.175 
Schwartz’s Bayesian Criterion 1929.622 1584.352 2096.923 
χ2 Chi-square (12, 12, 20) 2047.246 (p<.0001)  1699.399 (p<.0001) 2287.175 (p<0.0001) 
Deviance 6453.086 (p<1.0000) 5514.040 (p<1.0000) 4315.100 (p<1.0000) 
Pearson 
 
26842.865 (p<1.0000) 22898.823 (p<1.0000) 19082.679 (p<1.0000) 
Panel B: models’ fit statistics in t-2 
Cox & Snell’s R2 0.1122 0.0914 0.1458 
Nagelkerke’s Max-rescaled R2 0.2796 0.2241 0.3617 
Akaike Information Criterion 1845.295 1254.999 1899.099 
Schwartz’s Bayesian Criterion 1753.355 1165.015 1750.744 
χ2 Chi-square (12, 12, 20) 1869.294 (p<.0001)  1278.999 (p<.0001) 1939.099 (p<.0001) 
Deviance 6189.397 (p<1.0000) 5713.619 (p<1.0000) 4409.522 (p<1.0000) 
Pearson 24879.178 (p<1.0000) 22705.242 (p<1.0000) 17163.792 (p<1.0000) 
 
An analysis of the measures shown in Table 6-10 indicates that, overall, the 
‘Comprehensive model’ or Model 3, that includes the three types of variables (accounting, 
market, and macroeconomic), yields the best goodness-of-fit statistics: Model 3 displays the 
highest Cox and Snell’s R-squared and Nagelkerke’s Max-rescaled R-squared statistics, as 
well as the highest differences between the ‘intercept plus predictors’ statistic and the 
‘intercept only’ statistic in both the Akaike information and the Schwartz Bayesian criteria, 
which indicates that Model 3 contains the set of independent variables that produces the 
largest improvement of goodness-of-fit statistics. Furthermore, the χ2 statistic has a small p-
value (p<0.0001), indicating that there is enough evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis 
that all slope parameters are equal to zero. In other words, it unambiguously suggests that 
the overall effect of the independent variables included in the model is different from zero. 
Moreover, with regard to the Deviance and Pearson statistics, the tests’ large p-values (e.g., 
p<1.0000) suggest that there is insufficient evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis that 
the model fits the data well. This analysis applies when Model 3 is estimated in both 
periods t-1 and t-2, although a marginal decrease in the levels of the statistics can be 
perceived, which is not unexpected, given that, in t-2, the models are estimated using 
information two years prior to the event of interest. A similar analysis of Models 1 and 2 
(the Accounting and Market models, respectively) shows that there is sufficient evidence to 
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conclude that they both have positive goodness-of-fit statistics. The differences in model 
fit statistics are only marginal, with Model 1 showing slightly higher levels for the first four 
measures (Cox and Snell’s R-squared is an exception, as Model 2 displays a marginally 
higher value) when the model is estimated using information one as wells as two years prior 
to the observation of the event of relevance. Nevertheless, Model 1 shows lower 
magnitudes for the Deviance and Pearson statistics in both t-1 and t-2, even though their 
respective p-values provide clear evidence suggesting that both models fit the data. In 
summary, through the comparison of the Accounting and the Market model’s statistics it 
can be concluded that both models fit the data well; however, the evidence is insufficient to 
positively ascertain the superiority of one over the other. 
 
6.6.3. Marginal Effects and Changes in Predicted Probabilities. 
 
As previously discussed, the multinomial function coefficient estimates produced 
by polytomous response logit regression models (as well as binary response logit models), 
unlike those generated by linear regression models, cannot be directly interpreted because 
they do not contain useful information that fully describes the relationship between 
individual independent variables and the outcome (Long and Freese, 2003). Previous 
financial distress/failure prediction models built up using polytomous and binary response 
models have invariably focused on the overall discriminating and/or predictive accuracy 
and only very rarely do they advance insights regarding the individual effects of the 
variables on the probability of falling into each of the possible categories. This has been the 
case for research works employing binary as well as polytomous response logit models. 
Moreover, previous research works provide interpretations of the direction of the 
relationship based on the sign of the estimate. However, the coefficient estimates obtained 
by performing binary response models cannot explain the individual effects of variables on 
the model’s outcomes because of their nonlinear nature. Marginal effects and predicted 
probabilities are appropriate analytic tools to treat this issue.  
 
This section presents results of the computation of marginal effects of individual 
regressors as well as graphic representations of predicted probabilities of financial 
distressed companies. As previously discussed, marginal effect measurements (defined as 
the computation of the partial derivative of the event probability with respect to the 
predictor if interest) are very useful to the interpretation of the individual effects of the 
regressors on the dependent variable in discrete dependent variable models, or categorical 
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response models (polytomous response logit regression in the present study). On the other 
hand, predicted probabilities were generated by plotting the vector reflecting the variations 
in the predicted probabilities of falling in to the financial distress and corporate failure 
categories (the predicted probability that the financial distress indicator, Response = 2 and 
Response = 3, respectively) when the change in an individual regressor ranges from its 
approximate minimum to its maximum observed value, keeping all the other covariates 
constant at their means. 
 
Table 6-11 presents marginal effects (on a percentage basis) of the variables 
included in Model 1 and 2. Significance statistics, and standard errors obtained employing 
the Delta method are also presented. The analysis of marginal effects for the ‘Accounting 
model’ (Model 1) reveals that there is a strong similarity with regard to the previously 
reported coefficient estimates: the individual average marginal effects (AME) relative to the 
probability of falling into the FAI category (Response = 3) display same ranking (as the 
coefficients for the pair Corporate failure versus Non-financial distress) based on their 
absolute levels or magnitude. The same analysis can be applied to the marginal effects 
corresponding to the probability of falling into the NFD category (Response = 1) relative 
to the coefficients obtained for the pair NFD versus DIS. With respect to the marginal 
effects for the probability of falling into the DIS category (Response = 2) - a part from a 
change of ranking of the variables NOCREDINT and SHTBRDEF from the 4th and 5th 
places to the 5th and 4th places, respectively – there is one crucial difference to highlight: the 
AME for the variable COVERAGE displays the expected negative sign, in contrast with 
the sign displayed by the respective coefficient estimate (for the pair FAI versus DIS). 
Next, a similar conclusion can be obtained for the analysis of Model 2: The ranking of the 
variables based on the magnitude of the AMEs is very similar for the probability that 
Response = 1 (relative to the pair NFS versus DIS) and Response = 2 (relative to the pair 
FAI versus DIS). As to the probability that Response = 3, it can be observed that PRICE 
occupies the 1st place in the ranking followed by MCTD, ABNRET, and SIZE. But most 
importantly, the signs for ABNRET, SIZE, and RPI, possess the correct expected signs 
(negative, negative, and positive), unlike the signs of the corresponding coefficient 
estimates (for the pair FAI versus DIS). 
  
Chapter 5: Polytomous Response Financial Distress Models using Accounting, Market and Macroeconomic Variables 218 
Table 6-11 Marginal Effects – Model 1 and Model 2 
This table reports the marginal effects (in percentages) for the ‘accounting plus macroeconomic 
indicators’ model, or Model 1 and for the ‘market plus macroeconomic indicators’ model, or Model 
2, in panel A and B respectively. Marginal effects are intended to measure the expected 
instantaneous changes in the response variable as a function of a change in a specific predictor 
variable while keeping all the other covariates constant. Columns 2 and 3 display the individual 
marginal effects of each accounting variable and macroeconomic indicator on the probability that 
the response variable is equal to non-financial distress (j=1) one and two years prior to the 
observation of the event (t-1 and t-2, respectively). Columns 4 and 5 present the individual marginal 
effects of each variable on the probability that the outcome variable is equal to financial distress 
(j=2) one and two years prior to the observation of the event (t-1 and t-2, respectively). Lastly, 
columns 7 and 7 display the individual marginal effects on the probability that the response 
indicator is equal to failure (j=3) one and two years prior to the observation of the event (t-1 and t-
2, respectively). The methodology used in the present study to generate the marginal effects 
consists of outputting the individual marginal effects estimated at each observation in the dataset 
and then calculating their sample average in order to obtain the overall marginal effect. Standard 
errors, obtained employing the Delta-method, are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 
10%, ** denotes significant at 5%-1%. 
Panel A: Model 1 – Accounting plus macroeconomic indicators model 
 Pr (j = 1) Pr (j = 2) Pr (j = 3) 
 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 
TFOTL  3.1273** 
(0.0051) 
3.2490** 
(0.0058) 
-1.5739** 
(0.0039) 
-1.7531** 
(0.0043) 
-1.5534** 
(0.0037) 
-1.4958** 
(0.0042) 
TLTA -6.0229** 
(0.0071) 
-1.9115* 
(0.0084) 
2.9924** 
(0.0056) 
-0.4472 
(0.0066) 
3.0304** 
(0.0049) 
2.3584** 
(0.0055) 
NOCREDINT 0.9568** 
(0.0019) 
0.7917** 
(0.0021) 
-0.2600 
(0.0015) 
-0.2694 
(0.0017) 
-0.6968** 
(0.0013) 
-0.5222** 
(0.0013) 
COVERAGE 6.1852** 
(0.0033) 
7.0448** 
(0.0038) 
-5.4805** 
(0.0032) 
-6.5086** 
(0.0036) 
-0.7051** 
(0.0014) 
-0.5364** 
(0.0016) 
RPI -0.0877** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0716** 
(0.0001) 
0.0540** 
(0.0001) 
0.0609** 
(0.0001) 
0.0338** 
(0.0001) 
0.0108 
(0.0001) 
SHTBRDEF -0.8283** 
(0.0012) 
-1.0601** 
(0.0018) 
0.3573** 
(0.0010) 
0.9361** 
(0.0016) 
0.4709** 
(0.0009) 
0.1241 
(0.0010) 
 
Panel B: Model 2 – Market plus macroeconomic indicators model 
 Pr (j = 1) Pr (j = 2) Pr (j = 3) 
 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 
PRICE  0.7002** 
(0.0011) 
0.5552** 
(0.0012) 
-0.1961* 
(0.0009) 
-0.1175 
(0.0009) 
-0.5040** 
(0.0007) 
-0.4378** 
(0.0008) 
ABNRET 7.5441** 
(0.0051) 
11.7408** 
(0.0059) 
-6.8496** 
(0.0047) 
-9.7677** 
(0.0055) 
-0.6948* 
(0.0028) 
-1.9731** 
(0.0031) 
SIZE 1.7596** 
(0.0012) 
1.2244** 
(0.0013) 
-1.4109** 
(0.0011) 
-0.9261** 
(0.0011) 
-0.3488** 
(0.0008) 
-0.2983** 
(0.0008) 
MCTD 4.1821** 
(0.0061) 
-0.5926 
(0.0085) 
-1.0534* 
(0.0050) 
3.103** 
(0.0074) 
-3.1285** 
(0.0038) 
-2.5112** 
(0.0044) 
RPI -0.0504** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0411** 
(0.0001) 
0.0354** 
(0.0000) 
0.0562** 
(0.0001) 
0.0150* 
(0.0001) 
-0.0052 
(0.0001) 
SHTBRDEF -0.4523** 
(0.0012) 
-0.3355 
(0.0018) 
0.1809 
(0.0010) 
0.3950* 
(0.0016) 
0.2715** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0594 
(0.0010) 
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Table 6-12 Marginal Effects – Model 3 
This table reports the marginal effects (in percentages) for the ‘comprehensive’ model, or Model 3 
that includes three types of variables: accounting, market and macroeconomic. Marginal effects are 
intended to measure the expected instantaneous changes in the response variable as a function of a 
change in a specific predictor variable while keeping all the other covariates constant. Columns 2 
and 3 display the individual marginal effects of each accounting variable and macroeconomic 
indicator on the probability that the response variable is equal to non-financial distress (j=1) one 
and two years prior to the observation of the event (t-1 and t-2 respectively). Columns 4 and 5 
present the individual marginal effects of each variable on the probability that the outcome variable 
is equal to financial distress (j=2) one and two years prior to the observation of the event (t-1 and t-
2 respectively). Lastly, columns 6 and 7 display the individual marginal effects on the probability 
that the response indicator is equal to failure (j=3) one and two years prior to the observation of the 
event (t-1 and t-2 respectively). The methodology used in the present study to generate the marginal 
effects consists of outputting the individual marginal effects estimated at each observation in the 
dataset and then calculating their sample average in order to obtain the overall marginal effect. 
Standard errors obtained employing the Delta-method are reported in parenthesis. * denotes 
significant at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5%-1%. 
 Pr (j = 1) Pr (j = 2) Pr (j = 3) 
 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 
TFOTL 3.7638** 
(0.0064)  
3.9531** 
(0.0071) 
-1.8691** 
(0.0048) 
-2.1635** 
(0.0051) 
-1.8945** 
(0.0050) 
-1.7895** 
(0.0054) 
TLTA -2.5054** 
(0.0087) 
-0.6939 
(0.0101) 
0.3925 
(0.0070) 
-0.3997 
(0.0078) 
2.1127** 
(0.0061) 
1.0934 
(0.0069) 
NOCREDINT 0.6558** 
(0.0021) 
0.4331* 
(0.0022) 
0.0652 
(0.0017) 
-0.0894 
(0.0018) 
-0.7209** 
(0.0016) 
-0.3437* 
(0.0015) 
COVERAGE 4.2914** 
(0.0031) 
4.9695** 
(0.0037) 
-4.1569** 
(0.0031) 
-5.1283** 
(0.0035) 
-0.1347 
(0.0016) 
0.1585 
(0.0019) 
RPI -0.0472** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0352** 
(0.0001) 
0.0294** 
(0.0000) 
0.0405** 
(0.0001) 
0.0178** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0053 
(0.0000) 
SHTBRDEF -0.4928** 
(0.0012) 
-0.5136** 
(0.0018) 
0.2187** 
(0.0010) 
0.6188** 
(0.0016) 
0.2741** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0952 
(0.0011) 
PRICE 0.4198** 
(0.0010) 
0.3679** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0276 
(0.0008) 
-0.0051 
(0.0008) 
-0.3922** 
(0.0007) 
-0.3627** 
(0.0008) 
ABNRET 4.2773** 
(0.0044) 
6.7551** 
(0.0049) 
-3.8271** 
(0.0039) 
-4.9082** 
(0.0040) 
-0.4503 
(0.0029) 
-1.8470** 
(0.0034) 
SIZE 0.9149** 
(0.0012) 
0.1322 
(0.0013) 
-0.7864** 
(0.0011) 
0.0447 
(0.0011) 
-0.1285 
(0.0008) 
-0.1768* 
(0.0008) 
MCTD 4.887** 
(0.0065) 
2.1706* 
(0.0086) 
-2.5830** 
(0.0055) 
-0.0352 
(0.0074) 
-2.3035** 
(0.0041) 
-2.1352** 
(0.0050) 
 
Table 6-12 presents marginal effects (on a percentage basis) of the variables 
included in Model 3, the comprehensive model. From the analysis of the average marginal 
effects it can be observed that the ranking, based on their absolute magnitude, is somewhat 
different relative to the previously reported ranking based on the multinomial function 
coefficient estimates. The individual average marginal effects (AME) relative to the 
probability of falling into the NFD category (Response = 1) are highest for the market 
variable MCTD, which is followed by COVERAGE, ABNRET, TFOTL, TLTA and 
SIZE. There is an equal number of market and accounting variables in the first six places 
of the ranking, with two macroeconomic variables entering the top three. Moreover, it is 
very important to highlight the fact that all variables display the expected signs and are 
statistically significant at the 5%-1% level. Next, an analysis of the average marginal effects 
corresponding to the probability of falling into the DIS category (or Response = 2), yields 
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the following ranking (also based on the absolute magnitudes of the AMEs): the 
accounting variable COVERAGE possesses the highest value of the AME, followed by the 
market variables ABNRET and MCTD. TFOTL, SIZE and TLTA occupy the next places. 
Again, two market variables entered the top three, suggesting that ABNRET and MCTD 
contain a high degree of information useful to estimate the probability of a firm falling into 
the NFD as well as DIS categories. But above all, the procedure employed to estimate 
AMEs yields the correct or expected signs for all variables, with NOCREDINT being the 
only exception (however, the AME is not statistically significant, which provides the 
estimation procedure with a high degree of reliability). Moreover, seven out of ten 
covariates in the model are statistically significant at the 5%-1% level.  Finally, with regard 
to the probability of a firm falling into the FAI category (Response = 3), the analysis of the 
absolute magnitudes of the AMEs yields the following ranking: MCTD occupies the first 
place followed by TLTA, TFOTL, NOCREDINT, ABNRET and PRICE. In this category 
there are three accounting variables in the top four, which suggests that financial ratios 
contain a high degree of useful information to predict FAI (corporate failure). 
Furthermore, six out of ten of the comprehensive model’s covariates are statistically 
significant at the 5%-1% level, and one at the 10% level, which indicates a high degree of 
reliability of the AMEs estimates. Most importantly, all of the AMEs for the FAI category 
display the correct or expected signs.  
 
On the other hand, all categories comprised, the resulting AMEs obtained using 
information two years prior to the event of interest, confirm the results of obtained when 
the models are estimated in t-1: regardless of the expected decrease of the number of 
covariates that are statistically significant, AMEs estimated for the period t-2 display similar 
behaviour patterns to those estimated for t-1. Likewise, all of the individual AMEs that are 
statistically significant, show the expected signs, and the entirety of those few (six, all 
categories comprised) AMEs that display an incorrect or unexpected sign, are not 
statistically significant at any level. This observation provides further evidence that 
confirms the directionality as well as the magnitude of the effects of the estimated AMEs, 
which further corroborates the validity of the marginal effects estimation method and the 
usefulness of the AMEs reported in the present study. 
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Figure 6-1 Marginal effects on the Probabilities of Non-Financial Distress, Financial 
Distress and Corporate Failure in t-1 
The figure plots the average marginal effects (AME) for each variable in the comprehensive model, 
or Model 3, on the probability that the Response variable is equal to Non-financial distress 
(Response = 1), Financial distress (Response = 2), and Corporate failure (Response = 3), 
respectively, one year prior to the observation of the relevant event (t-1). The vertical lines divide 
the figures into Accounting (Acc), Macroeconomic (Mac) and Market (Mkt) variables, where Acc1 
= TFOTL, Acc2 = TLTA, Acc3 = NOCREDINT, Acc4 = COVERAGE, Mac1 = RPI, Mac2 
SHTBRDEF, Mkt1 = PRICE, Mkt2 = ABNRET, Mkt3 SIZE and Mkt4 = MCTD. The horizontal 
line divides the figures into positive and negative AMEs on the respective response indicator. In 
addition, the coloured area indicates 95 per cent confidence limits (Cls) for each level of the AME. 
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Figure 6-1 shows a graphical representation of the average marginal effects for each 
covariate included in the comprehensive model (Model 3) on the probability that the 
Response variable is equal to NFD (Response = 1), DIS (Response = 2), and FAI 
(Response = 3),  respectively, in period (t-1)189. Each plot contains vertical lines dividing the 
figures into Accounting (Acc), Macroeconomic (Mac) and Market (Mkt) variables, where 
Acc1 = TFOTL, Acc2 = TLTA, Acc3 = NOCREDINT, Acc4 = COVERAGE, Mac1 = 
RPI, Mac2 = SHTBRDEF, Mkt1 = PRICE, Mkt2 = ABNRET, Mkt3 = SIZE and Mkt4 = 
MCTD. Additionally, the horizontal line divides the figures into positive and negative 
AMEs on the respective response indicator. The purpose of Figure 6-1 is to facilitate the 
analysis of the directionality and magnitude (by category) of the AMEs in Model 3 by 
presenting a graphic representation of the effects of individual AMEs. In this way it is 
possible to make a direct comparison between the effects of the individual variables 
incorporated in Model 3 on the three outcome categories. Furthermore, the Figure 5-1 
provides 95% confidence limits (Cl) for each level of the AME.  
 
Overall, the estimation and analysis of all covariates’ AMEs incorporated in the 
three models provided a solution to an essential gap in the financial distress/bankruptcy 
models literature: the lack of a measure of the individual instantaneous effect of a change 
of a specific covariate on the polytomous (3-state) response variable (NFD, DIS, FAI), 
while keeping all the other regressors constant. Now, given the high costs associated with financial 
distress (DIS) and corporate failure (FAI), and the cost-minimisation behaviour of 
practitioners such as banks and investment companies, the present study presents a 
comparison of the vectors of predicted probabilities that reflect the impact of a change of 
individual specific variables on the probability of falling in the DIS and FAI categories, 
while keeping all the other covariates constant at their respective means. The advantage of 
such vector representations is that they inform practitioners as well as academics on the 
predicted probability of falling into one of the two categories for a level of the specific 
covariate that ranges from its minimum to its maximum possible values. In other words, 
the figures clearly show the magnitude as well as the directionality of the effect of each 
regressor reflected by the slope and inclination of the curves, plotted at all the possible 
levels of the specific independent variable. 
  
                                                        
189 The graph displaying the AMEs for Model 3 estimated using information two years prior to the event of interest are 
not included in the present study, as they are show very similar patterns, as previously discussed. 
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Figure 6-2 Changes in Predicted Probabilities – Financial Statement Ratios 
The figure plots the vectors reflecting changes in predicted probabilities for Financial distress 
(Response = 2) and Corporate Failure (Response = 3) resulting from individual changes in the 
levels of the financial statement ratios Total Funds from Operations to Total Liabilities 
(TFOTL), Total Liabilities to Total Assets (TLTA), the No Credit Interval (NOCREDINT), and 
Interest Coverage (COVERAGE), while keeping all the other covariates constant at their mean 
values (TFOTL = 0.097, TLTA = 0.498, NOCREDINT = -0.2, COVERAGE = 0.6, RPI = 
178.1, SHTBRDEF = 2.046, PRICE = 4.427, ABNRET = -0.11, SIZE = -10, MCTD = 0.91). 
The computation was made taking into account all the variables included in the ‘Comprehensive’ 
model or Model 3 (financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators and market variables). 
Predicted probabilities are estimated employing an approximate value of the minimum and 
maximum ranges of the independent variables. In this way, the predicted probabilities for all 
levels of a variable can be observed. This figure reports the predicted probabilities for the ‘Full’ 
model estimated in period t-1, the vectors estimated using the full model  in t-2 have very similar 
shapes, so they were not reported in the present study. 
 
Figure 6-2 vectors reflect the behaviour of the predicted probabilities for financial 
distress at different values of each of the financial statement ratios. This figure corroborates 
the directionality and the magnitude of the effects of the financial ratios: The analysis 
shows that, concerning the DIS category (Response = 2), a positive change in the level of 
TFOTL, NOCREDINT, and COVERAGE results in a decreased predicted probability of 
falling into the financial distress category. Likewise, a positive change in the level of the 
proxy for leverage, TLTA, yields a positive variation (increase) in the probability of 
financial distress, as previously suggested by the estimation of average marginal effects. 
Furthermore, the accounting variable COVERAGE produces the steepest slope relative to 
the other financial ratios, indicating that a given change in the level of this variable should 
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have the largest impact on the predicted probability of falling in the financial distress 
category. Similarly, with regard to the FAI category (Response = 3), the analysis confirms 
that a positive change in the magnitude of TFOTL should have the largest (negative) effect 
on the probability of falling in to the corporate failure category, as this accounting variable 
generated the steepest slope relative to the other financial ratios (especially in the range -1.0 
to 0.0). Moreover, as expected, the directionality of the vectors related to the Corporate 
failure category follow the same directionality patterns as those related to the Financial 
distress category. The visible differences in magnitude, reflected by the steepness of the 
slopes, suggest that the same individual accounting covariates in the model have different 
effects on the likelihood of Financial distress and Corporate failure, which is consistent 
with the assumptions of the present study. 
 
The analysis of Figure 6-3 indicates that all of the market variables show a negative 
relationship between the variations in individual covariate levels and the estimated 
predicted probabilities of the Financial distress (Response = 2) and Corporate Failure 
(Response = 3). The only difference lies in the magnitudes of the changes of the predicted 
probabilities that correspond to the changes in the covariate levels. Thus, it can be 
observed that, concerning the DIS category, the variable SIZE produces the vector with 
the steepest slope, suggesting that a positive change in the level of this market indicator 
should have the highest negative impact in the probability of falling into the Financial 
distress category, followed by ABNRET, MCTD, and PRICE. As to the vectors 
corresponding to the Corporate failure category, Figure 6-3 shows that the covariate 
PRICE generates the vector with the steepest slope, which seems to indicate that an 
increase (decrease) in its level should produce the highest decrease (increase) in the 
likelihood of a firm falling in to the Corporate failure category (particularly in the range -5.0 
to 5.0). The market indicators MCTD, SIZE, and ABNRET are next in the list (based 
upon their respective impact on the likelihood of Corporate failure). 
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Figure 6-3 Changes in Predicted Probabilities – Market Variables 
The figure plots the vectors reflecting changes in predicted probabilities for Financial distress 
(Response = 2) and Corporate Failure (Response = 3) resulting from individual changes in the 
levels of the market independent variables Share Price (PRICE), Abnormal Returns 
(ABNRET), the relative Size of the company (SIZE), and the ratio Market Capitalisation to 
Total Debt (MCTD), while keeping all the other covariates constant at their mean values 
(TFOTL = 0.097, TLTA = 0.498, NOCREDINT = -0.2, COVERAGE = 0.6, RPI = 178.1, 
SHTBRDEF = 2.046, PRICE = 4.427, ABNRET = -0.11, SIZE = -10, MCTD = 0.91). The 
computation was made taking into account all the variables included in the ‘Comprehensive’ 
model or Model 3 (financial statement ratios, macroeconomic indicators and market variables). 
Predicted probabilities are estimated employing an approximate value of the minimum and 
maximum ranges of the independent variables. In this way, the predicted probabilities for all 
levels of a variable can be observed. This figure reports the predicted probabilities for the ‘Full’ 
model estimated in period t-1, the vectors estimated using the full model  in t-2 have very 
similar shapes, so they were not reported in the present study. 
 
 
Finally, Figure 6-4 presents the changes in predicted probabilities produced by the 
individual changes in magnitude of the two macroeconomic indicators incorporated in the 
models: RPI and SHTBRDEF. In line with the present study’s ex ante assumptions, a 
positive change in the level both indicators should result in a positive variation in the 
predicted probability of a firm’s likelihood of falling into the Financial distress and the 
Corporate failure categories. Overall, the changes in predicted probabilities are very useful 
as they confirm the validity of the results obtained through the estimation of marginal 
effects. However, it is important to highlight the fact that, the differences in ranking (based 
on the magnitude of the impact of individual variables on the likelihood of falling into one 
of the three possible categories) between marginal effects and changes in predicted 
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probabilities stem from the specific characteristics and definitions of each. The 
identification of these subtle differences, far from being a disadvantage, can be instead 
employed by the academic/practitioner as an additional source of information to enhance 
their analysis. 
 
 
Figure 6-4 Changes in Predicted Probabilities – Macroeconomic indicators 
The figure plots the vectors reflecting changes in predicted probabilities for Financial distress 
(Response = 2) and Corporate Failure (Response = 3) resulting from individual changes in the 
levels of the macroeconomic  independent variables Retail Price Index (RPI), and the proxy for 
interest rates, the Deflated Short Term Bill Rate (SHTBRDEF), while keeping all the other 
covariates constant at their mean values (TFOTL = 0.097, TLTA = 0.498, NOCREDINT = -
0.2, COVERAGE = 0.6, RPI = 178.1, SHTBRDEF = 2.046, PRICE = 4.427, ABNRET = -
0.11, SIZE = -10, MCTD = 0.91). The computation was made taking into account all the 
variables included in the ‘Comprehensive’ model or Model 3 (financial statement ratios, 
macroeconomic indicators and market variables). Predicted probabilities are estimated 
employing an approximate value of the minimum and maximum ranges of the independent 
variables. In this way, the predicted probabilities for all levels of a variable can be observed. 
This figure reports the predicted probabilities for the ‘Full’ model estimated in period t-1, the 
vectors estimated using the full model  in t-2 have very similar shapes, so they were not 
reported in the present study. 
 
6.6.4. Classification Accuracy Tables. 
 
 In order to evaluate the classification accuracy of the three polytomous response 
(three-state) logit models developed in the present study, a generalisation of the already 
tested biased-adjusted classification accuracy tables for the binary logistic models 
(introduced in the second and third chapters) is employed. This method has the advantage 
of testing the accuracy of the models to differentiate (and predict) among all the possible 
non-redundant comparison pairs of response outcomes. But most importantly, this 
methodology was selected to perform prediction accuracy tests as it has the advantage of 
being able to incorporate distinct cut-off points that allow the academic/practitioner to 
calibrate the model taking into account the costs associated with each outcome (financial 
distress, bankruptcy) in order to obtain better results for a desired outcome. Furthermore, 
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this technique allows the inclusion of very close approximations of the actual proportions 
of an outcome relative to the one it is being tested against, which is very important as they 
can be used as cut-off points in an unbalanced panel (such as the one used in the present 
study, that approximates the actual proportions observed in the United Kingdom) 
providing thus the researcher with realistic and reliable results as well as a high degree of 
accuracy.  
 
The latter point should be highlighted because, as discussed by Ooghe and Joos 
(1990), if a financial distress/bankruptcy prediction model is developed for practical 
purposes and for use in a predictive context, the samples of financially sound, financially 
distressed, and failed companies used for the estimation of the model should be 
representative for the whole population of companies. Moreover, Balcaen and Ooghe 
(2004) state that ‘the firms in the estimation sample and new, future samples of cases, for 
which a failure prediction [model] is to be made, are assumed to come from the same 
distribution. Nevertheless, in the great majority of the classic statistical failure prediction 
models, the estimation of the models is based on non-random samples, whose 
compositions are different from the population’s composition.’190 As a matter of fact, a 
great majority of the previous research works on financial distress/corporate bankruptcy 
prediction models that employ the polytomous response logit methodology use non-
random samples whose compositions are highly dissimilar to the population’s composition. 
The methodology used in the present study incorporates an approximation of the 
proportions (as cut-off points) observed in the population of UK quoted companies in 
order to obtain a balanced (and the highest) classification accuracy for each pair of 
outcomes. In other words, specific weights based on the relative costs of financial distress 
and corporate failure are not assigned. 
 
Classification accuracy tables have been used in previous works as an additional 
tool to measure the predictive accuracy of the default/bankruptcy prediction models. The 
present study, however, employs a different and more appropriate methodology to estimate 
proportions of correct and incorrect classifications of financially and non-financially 
distressed firms. In order to classify a set of binary data, previous research works employ 
the same observations used to fit the model to estimate the classification error, resulting in 
biased error-count estimates. In other words, the widely-used 2x2 frequency tables’ 
estimates, where correctly classified observations are displayed on the main diagonal of the 
table, are derived using all observations to fit the model. Therefore, the results are biased, 
                                                        
190 P. 26. 
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as each observation has an effect on the model used to classify itself. One way of reducing 
said bias is ‘to remove the binary observation to be classified from the data, reestimate the 
parameters of the model, and then classify the observation based on the new parameter 
estimates191.’ Unfortunately this method is computationally demanding when using large 
datasets. For this reason, the present study employs logistic regression that, although is less 
computationally intensive still delivers high predictive accuracy and minimises type I and II 
error rates. Specifically, a one step approximation is applied to the preceding parameter 
estimates192. The leave-one out jack knife approach to correct for over-sampling employed 
in the present study helps eliminate potential biases common to analysis of classification 
tables that fail to use holdout samples. 
 
 In order to construct the biased-adjusted classification tables, predicted 
probabilities from three possible non-redundant combinations of outcomes through binary 
logit regressions are estimated. Thus, equation 1 computes the predicted probabilities for 
the pair of outcomes Non-financial distress and Financial distress, equation 2 estimates the 
probabilities for the pair Non-financial distress and Corporate failure, and equation 3 
computes the probabilities for the pair Financial distress and Corporate failure. This 
procedure is performed in period t-1 and in period t-2, using information one and two years 
prior to the observation of the event of relevance. In this way, the predictive ability of the 
models can be assessed. Next, from a range of probability levels, those that closely 
approximate the real proportions of the pairs of events and that, at the same time, 
minimise the difference between sensitivity and specificity, are selected for comparison. In 
this manner, the study provides a consistent point of comparison. Finally, the numbers of 
correct and incorrect classifications for each of the above equations are incorporated into a 
single table that reports the overall classification accuracy (in percentages) of the models 
built up using a panel of data that, unlike previous multinomial logit financial 
distress/corporate failure prediction models, is representative of the population of UK 
quoted companies. However, the flexibility of this methodology reflected by its ability to 
re-calibrate the results of the models through different choices of probability levels that, 
unlike the present study, take into account the costs associated with financial distress and 
corporate failure, must be emphasized, as it provides the present model with real practical 
value. 
 
                                                        
191 SAS Institute 
192 http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/statug/63033/HTML/default/viewer.htm#statug_logistic_sect037.ht
m 
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 Table 6-13 reports classification accuracy tables for predicted frequencies in 
percentages for Model 1 (the ‘Accounting plus macroeconomic indicators model’), Model 2 
(the ‘Market plus macroeconomic indicators model’), and Model 3 (the ‘Comprehensive 
model’) using information one year prior to the observation of the event of interest. The 
analysis of Table 6-13 unambiguously indicates that the combination of accounting and 
market variables yields the highest classification accuracy among the three polytomous 
response logit models built in this study. Model 3 results in overall classification accuracy of 
85 %, while Model 1 and Model 2 produce very similar accuracy results: 80% and 79% 
respectively, which suggest that the performance of accounting and market variables is not 
highly dissimilar: the accounting model is only marginally superior to the market model by 
approximately one percentage point. 
 
Table 6-13 Bias-Adjusted Classification Accuracy Table in t-1 
This table reports a biased-adjusted classification table for predicted frequencies in 
percentage for the ‘Accounting plus macroeconomic indicators’ model (Model 1), 
the ‘Market plus macroeconomic indicators’ model (Model 2), and the 
‘Comprehensive model’ (Model 3, that includes the three types of variables) in 
Panel A, B and C, respectively. The results were obtained using information one 
year prior to the observation of the event of interest (period t-1). The first column 
compares the observed responses with the first row of predicted outcomes. Thus, 
the diagonal line (replicated in the last column ‘Correct’) shows the three individual 
models’ correct predictions for non-financially distressed/failed (NFD), financially 
distressed (DIS) and failed (FAI) companies. In addition, this table presents overall 
classification accuracy percentages by model in order to compare their relative 
performances. 
 
Predicted 
Observed NFD DIS FAI Total Correct 
Panel A: Model 1 
NFD 80.83 8.15 11.02 100.00 80.83 
DIS 8.42 75.25 16.34 100.00 75.25 
FAI 15.56 17.62 66.83 100.00 66.83 
 Overall Classification Accuracy 80.40 
 
Panel B: Model 2 
NFD 79.25 9.65 11.11 100.00 79.25 
DIS 8.48 73.81 17.71 100.00 73.81 
FAI 12.64 18.13 69.23 100.00 69.23 
 Overall Classification Accuracy 78.86 
 
Panel C: Model 3 
NFD 85.45 5.46 9.09 100.00 85.45 
DIS 5.39 80.29 14.32 100.00 80.29 
FAI 10.98 14.02 75.00 100.00 75.00 
 Overall Classification Accuracy 85.08 
 
 The classification accuracy results obtained using information two years prior to the 
observation of the event of relevance confirm the superiority of the predictive accuracy of 
Chapter 5: Polytomous Response Financial Distress Models using Accounting, Market and Macroeconomic Variables 230 
the ‘Comprehensive’ model relative to Model 1 and Model 2 by revealing a very similar 
pattern to the models estimated in period t-1: Model 1 displays the highest overall 
classification accuracy (82%), followed by Model 1 (79%), and Model 2 (75%), which 
suggests that accounting models might perform better than market models in period t-2. 
What is more, even though the percentages decreased in period t-2, as expected, the models 
still show high classification accuracies, which confirm the robustness of the models. 
Unsurprisingly, the monotonic decrease in classification accuracy observed by response 
category can be explained by the monotonic decrease in the respective observations for 
each outcome, which affect accordingly the predicted probability estimations. Nevertheless, 
it must be emphasized that even the individual accuracies remain quite high. 
 
Table 6-14 Bias-Adjusted Classification Accuracy Table in t-2 
This table reports a biased-adjusted classification table for predicted frequencies in 
percentage for the ‘Accounting plus macroeconomic indicators’ model (Model 1), 
the ‘Market plus macroeconomic indicators’ model (Model 2), and the 
‘Comprehensive model’ (Model 3, that includes the three types of variables) in 
Panel A, B and C, respectively. The results were obtained using information two 
years prior to the observation of the event of interest (period t-2). The first column 
compares the observed responses with the first row of predicted outcomes. Thus, 
the diagonal line (replicated in the last column ‘Correct’) shows the three individual 
models’ correct predictions for non-financially distressed/failed (NFD), financially 
distressed (DIS) and failed (FAI) companies. In addition, this table presents overall 
classification accuracy percentages by model in order to compare their relative 
performances. 
 
Predicted 
Observed NFD DIS FAI Total Correct 
Panel A: Model 1 
NFD 79.39 7.90 12.71 100.00 79.39 
DIS 7.74 78.18 14.09 100.00 78.18 
FAI 20.45 13.75 65.81 100.00 65.81 
 Overall Classification Accuracy 79.09 
 
Panel B: Model 2 
NFD 75.74 10.15 14.11 100.00 75.74 
DIS 11.39 70.46 18.15 100.00 70.46 
FAI 13.75 17.47 68.77 100.00 68.77 
 Overall Classification Accuracy 75.40 
 
Panel C: Model 3 
NFD 82.26 6.04 11.71 100.00 82.26 
DIS 5.92 82.35 11.73 100.00 82.35 
FAI 14.64 11.72 73.64 100.00 73.64 
 Overall Classification Accuracy 82.09 
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6.7. Conclusions. 
 
 This study presents new financial/distress corporate failure models for quoted 
companies in the United Kingdom using a polytomous response (three-state) logit 
methodology. It provides a number of contributions to the literature: first, in creates a 
three-state response variable that comprises a finance-based definition of the Financial 
distress category, a technical definition of the Corporate failure category (built using 
information provided by the London Share Price Database), and a category that encloses 
on-going firms assumed to be in a financially sound position. Further, the study, in line 
with the previous chapter, employs a multilevel empirical procedure to test and select the 
variables with the highest contribution to the overall performance of the models. Second, 
unlike previous research works, the present study builds up a large dataset by merging 
different types of information from data sources widely used in the academic as well as in 
the industry fields in order to estimate generalised logit models based on a sample whose 
distribution is representative of the whole population of quoted companies in the United 
Kingdom. Third, the study tests whether the inclusion of accounting and market variables 
in a single multinomial logit model is able to outperform models based exclusively on either 
market or accounting information. The reported results unambiguously indicate that this is 
the case: model performance statistics, tested for the first time in a financial 
distress/corporate failure model, invariably show a considerable increase in the goodness-
of-fit of the ‘Comprehensive model’ relative to the ‘Accounting only’ model and the 
‘Market only’ model. Additionally, novel biased-adjusted classification accuracy tables 
provide evidence corroborating these results: in period t-1, the ‘Comprehensive model’ 
yields an 85% overall classification accuracy, whereas the ‘Accounting’ and ‘Market’ models 
yield an overall classification accuracy of 80% and 79%, respectively. As expected, the 
accuracy of the models decreased when the models were estimated using data two years 
prior to the observation of the event of relevance; nevertheless, similar patters confirming 
the ascendancy of a comprehensive model can be observed. Furthermore, the classification 
accuracy of the models in t-2 remains quite high: for the ‘Comprehensive’ model it is equal 
to 82%, 79% for the ‘Accounting’ model and 75% for the ‘Market’ model.  
 
Through the estimation of marginal effects and changes in predicted probabilities, 
the study compared (for the first time in financial distress prediction models for quoted 
companies in the United Kingdom) the relative individual as well as collective 
contributions of accounting and market variables to the performance of the models while 
controlling for the macroeconomic environment. Unlike previous research works in the 
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field, this study takes into account the difficulties of interpretation of the coefficients 
obtained through multinomial logistic regressions; it posited that marginal effects, defined 
as expected instantaneous changes in the response variable as a function of a change in a 
specific predictor variable (while keeping all the other covariates constant), are a more 
appropriate measure to assess the effects of individual covariates on the probability of 
falling into one of the three pre-defined financial states/outcomes. The reported results 
confirmed this hypothesis: a part from the advantage of their direct interpretation, the 
estimation of average marginal effects yielded the correct expected signs for all the 
variables and outcomes, unlike some of the multinomial function coefficients. In practice, 
these results can be used to determine the individual effects of the different covariates on 
the probability of a firm falling into financial distress or corporate failure with a high degree 
of reliability. In other words, marginal effects are an appropriate measure to determine the 
relative importance of individual variables based on their relative magnitudes. In this 
manner, practitioners are able to rank and target the specific aspects or characteristics of a 
company that require special attention in order to avoid the high costs associated with 
financial distress and bankruptcy. Finally, as a complement to these findings as well as to 
the usefulness and robustness of the model, the study provided graphical representations of 
the vectors that reflect the changes in predicted probabilities of falling into a state of 
financial distress or corporate failure produced by changes in the levels of individual 
covariates (ranging from their minimum to their maximum possible values) while keeping 
all the other variables constant at their means. The graphical representations, in addition, 
are designed to directly compare the differences in the magnitude of the effects of an 
individual variable on the probabilities of reaching a state of financial distress and corporate 
failure, respectively. 
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6.8. Appendix. 
 
Table 6-15 Multinomial Logit Regression of 3-Level Response Variable on 
Predictor Variables - Model 4 - Comprehensive Model with Industry Effects 
This table reports results from multinomial logit regressions of the 3-level Response variable on the 
predictor variables for the comprehensive Model 3 including industry effects. The 3-level Response 
variable is composed of the following states: Non-financial distress (NFD or non-failed firms), 
financial distress (DIS or financially distressed companies), and failure (FAI or failed firms). Model 
4 was computed for two periods: using the accounting, market and macroeconomic data from the 
year prior to the observation of the relevant event (t-1), and the accounting, market, and 
macroeconomic data from two years prior to the observation of the event (t-2) in order to confirm 
the stability over time of the displayed signs as well as the magnitude of the coefficients. The 
absolute value of z-statistics is reported in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%, ** denotes 
significant at 5%-1%. 
Covariates NFD V DIS BKT V DIS BKT V NFD 
 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 
TFOTL 0.8456** 
(4.50) 
0.8327** 
(4.53) 
-0.4992 
(1.49) 
-0.2574 
(0.78) 
-1.3448** 
(4.43) 
-1.0901** 
(3.68) 
TLTA -0.3560 
(1.18) 
0.1767 
(0.62) 
0.8912* 
(2.03) 
0.5801 
(1.26) 
1.2473** 
(3.23) 
0.4034 
(1.02) 
NOCREDINT 0.00786 
(0.12) 
0.0504 
(0.78) 
-0.4238** 
(3.82) 
-0.1424 
(1.41) 
-0.4317** 
(4.45) 
-0.1928* 
(2.31) 
COVERAGE 1.6147** 
(14.42) 
1.8188** 
(15.97) 
1.2508** 
(8.53) 
1.6694** 
(10.89) 
-0.3639** 
(3.56) 
-0.1494 
(1.38) 
RPI -0.0124** 
(3.50) 
-0.0143** 
(3.75) 
0.00138 
(0.27) 
-0.0148** 
(2.79) 
0.0138** 
(3.31) 
-0.00046 
(0.12) 
SHTBRDEF -0.0978* 
(2.48) 
-0.2071** 
(3.62) 
0.0873 
(1.41) 
-0.2282** 
(2.91) 
0.1851** 
(3.52) 
-0.0212 
(0.36) 
PRICE 0.0290 
(0.95) 
0.0163 
(0.55) 
-0.2238** 
(4.68) 
-0.1943** 
(3.98) 
-0.2527** 
(6.00) 
-0.2106** 
(4.97) 
ABNRET 1.5085** 
(9.93) 
1.8356** 
(12.27) 
0.9876** 
(4.40) 
0.5981** 
(2.61) 
-0.5209** 
(2.87) 
-1.2375** 
(6.71) 
SIZE 0.3325** 
(7.77) 
0.00589 
(0.15) 
0.2025** 
(3.35) 
-0.0852 
(1.46) 
-0.1300** 
(2.75) 
-0.0911* 
(2.01) 
MCTD 1.1049** 
(5.10) 
0.0575 
(0.22) 
-0.4621  
(1.56) 
-1.1491** 
(3.22) 
-1.5670** 
(6.47) 
-1.2065** 
(4.48) 
Intercept 
 
17.0602 
(0.05) 
15.1108 
(0.05) 
0.5096 
(0.00) 
2.6550 
(0.00) 
-16.4455 
(0.04) 
-12.2937 
(0.03) 
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Table 6-16 Marginal Effects – Model 4 with Industry Effects 
This table reports the marginal effects (in percentages) for Model 4, the ‘Comprehensive model’ 
that includes industry effects in addition to the previously employed three types of variables: 
accounting, market and macroeconomic. Marginal effects are intended to measure the expected 
instantaneous changes in the response variable as a function of a change in a specific predictor 
variable while keeping all the other covariates constant. Columns 2 and 3 display the individual 
marginal effects of each accounting variable and macroeconomic indicator on the probability that 
the response variable is equal to non-financial distress (j=1) one and two years prior to the 
observation of the event (t-1 and t-2 respectively). Columns 4 and 5 present the individual marginal 
effects of each variable on the probability that the outcome variable is equal to financial distress 
(j=2) one and two years prior to the observation of the event (t-1 and t-2 respectively). Lastly, 
columns 6 and 7 display the individual marginal effects on the probability that the response 
indicator is equal to failure (j=3) one and two years prior to the observation of the event (t-1 and t-2 
respectively). The methodology used in the present study to generate the marginal effects consists 
of outputting the individual marginal effects estimated at each observation in the dataset and then 
calculating their sample average in order to obtain the overall marginal effect. Standard errors 
obtained employing the Delta-method are reported in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%, ** 
denotes significant at 5%-1%. 
 Pr (j = 1) Pr (j = 2) Pr (j = 3) 
 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2 
TFOTL  3.8465** 
(0.0065) 
3.9369** 
(0.0071) 
-1.8556** 
(0.0048) 
-2.1293** 
(0.0051) 
-1.9908** 
(0.0051) 
-1.8076** 
(0.0054) 
TLTA -2.5595** 
(0.0090) 
-0.1852 
(0.0104) 
0.5977 
(0.0072) 
-0.5868 
(0.0081) 
1.9616** 
(0.0063) 
0.7719 
(0.0071) 
NOCREDINT 0.6144** 
(0.0021) 
0.4424* 
(0.0022) 
0.0957 
(0.0017) 
-0.1020 
(0.0018) 
-0.7100** 
(0.0016) 
-0.3403* 
(0.0015) 
COVERAGE 4.3020** 
(0.0031) 
5.0110** 
(0.0037) 
-4.1370** 
(0.0031) 
-5.1260** 
(0.0034) 
-0.1653 
(0.0016) 
0.1147 
(0.0019) 
RPI -0.0481** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0368** 
(0.0001) 
0.0288** 
(0.0001) 
0.0406** 
(0.0001) 
0.0194** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0039 
(0.0001) 
SHTBRDEF -0.4858** 
(0.0012) 
-0.5091** 
(0.0018) 
0.2068* 
(0.0010) 
0.5917** 
(0.0016) 
0.2790** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0825 
(0.0011) 
PRICE 0.4170** 
(0.0010) 
0.3814** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0079 
(0.0008) 
-0.0014 
(0.0008) 
-0.4091** 
(0.0007) 
-0.3799** 
(0.0008) 
ABNRET 4.2690** 
(0.0045) 
6.8046** 
(0.0049) 
-3.8162** 
(0.0039) 
-4.9419** 
(0.0041) 
-0.4530 
(0.0029) 
-1.8629** 
(0.0034) 
SIZE 0.9619** 
(0.0012) 
0.1619 
(0.0013) 
-0.8371** 
(0.0011) 
0.0027 
(0.0011) 
-0.1249 
(0.0008) 
-0.1646* 
(0.0008) 
MCTD 4.7632** 
(0.0066) 
2.0913* 
(0.0087) 
-2.4757** 
(0.0056) 
0.0934 
(0.0075) 
-2.2875** 
(0.0041) 
-2.1845** 
(0.0050) 
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Table 6-17 Bias-Adjusted Classification Accuracy Table – 
Comprehensive Model with Industry Effects 
This table reports a biased-adjusted classification table for predicted frequencies in 
percentage for the ‘Comprehensive model’ or Model 4 that includes industry effects 
in addition to the three types of variables previously employed: accounting, market, 
and macroeconomic indicators. The results were obtained using information one 
and two years prior to the observation of the event of interest: Panel A displays the 
results for period t-1and Panel B shows the results for period t-2). The first column 
compares the observed responses with the first row of predicted outcomes. Thus, 
the diagonal line (replicated in the last column ‘Correct’) shows the three individual 
models’ correct predictions for non-financially distressed/failed (NFD), financially 
distressed (DIS) and failed (FAI) firms. In addition, this table presents overall 
classification accuracy percentages by model in order to compare their relative 
performances. 
 
Predicted 
Observed NFD DIS FAI Total Correct 
Panel A: Estimation of the model in period t-1 
NFD 85.33 5.61 9.07 100.00 85.33 
DIS 5.39 80.60 14.00 100.00 80.60 
FAI 10.98 14.23 74.80 100.00 74.80 
 Overall Classification Accuracy 84.97 
Panel B: Estimation of the model in period t-2 
NFD 82.46 5.94 11.60 100.00 82.46 
DIS 5.81 82.66 11.52 100.00 82.66 
FAI 15.27 11.51 73.22 100.00 73.22 
 
Overall Classification Accuracy 82.29 
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7. Conclusions 
 
7.1. Summary of main findings. 
 
The thesis provided evidence on the advantages, in terms of predictive accuracy 
and timeliness, of combining different types of variables (accounting ratios, market 
variables, and macroeconomic indicators) for financial distress/prediction models for listed 
companies in the United Kingdom. The first chapter offered, for the first time, historical 
evidence on the types of variables and the information sharing mechanisms employed by 
American and British investors and financial institutions to assess the creditworthiness of 
individuals, businesses and fixed-income instruments before the emergence of modern 
institutions such as the credit rating agencies (or credit reference agencies) and prior to the 
development of complex statistical models, filling thus a crucial gap in the literature. The 
main findings of the three subsequent empirical chapters, where new financial distress 
prediction models are developed, can be summarised as follows: i) the combination of 
accounting and market variables in a single model, that also incorporates macroeconomic 
dynamics, resulted in a significant increase in the overall performance (measured by the 
predictive accuracy and goodness-of-fit of the models) relative to models based exclusively 
on either accounting or market data; ii) a finance-based definition of firm distress and a 
technical definition of corporate failure proved to be appropriate solutions to the 
disadvantages stemming from juridical definitions of bankruptcy, as the ‘legal’ date of 
failure may not represent the ‘economic’ or the ‘real’ event of failure; iii) marginal effects 
are appropriate transformations to interpret the individual effects of specific variables on 
the probability of falling into the financial distress/corporate failure category in binary 
choice and polytomous response logit models, and, combined with the analyses of changes 
in predicted probabilities, provided new insights on the behaviour of the vectors of 
predicted probabilities that correspond to a change in the level of a specific covariate. 
  
7.2. Historical evidence on the types of variables and credit information 
sharing mechanisms in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
 
 Chapter 2 of this thesis provides pivotal historical evidence with regard to the types 
of variables used in order to assess the credit risk on individuals, businesses, and fixed 
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income instruments, as well as to the first institutional forms of credit information sharing 
in the United States and the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century. The novelty of this 
chapter lies in the fact that it offered, for the first time, historical evidence on the methods 
employed by investors and financial institutions in order to gain useful information for the 
assessment of creditworthiness before the emergence of the main credit rating agencies 
(and the modern forms of public and private credit reference agencies), and prior to the 
development of modern complex statistical financial distress/scoring models and credit 
ratings based on payment histories, financial statements, and accounting and/or market 
data. Thus, through a comparative approach and employing a historical framework, 
Chapter 2 studied the evolution of risk assessment and credit information sharing in two of 
the most historically relevant financial centres in the world. The choice of the period of 
study was not fortuitous, as it was shown that it is precisely in the first part of the 
nineteenth century when the first organised forms of credit information sharing as well as 
the first documents that formally registered contracted financial obligations can be found. 
This study filled thus a crucial gap in the literature: it offered historical evidence on the 
input as well as on the credit information sharing mechanisms employed by credit grantors 
in order to evaluate risk profiles in a historical period characterised by a very large increase 
in trade and credit (due to the advent of the Industrial Revolution in the United Kingdom 
and the rapid economic development in the vast geographical area of the United States), 
and when accounting information was rarely available, unreliable, and incomplete. 
 
 Given the fundamental role played by information flows in the granting and pricing 
of credit, Chapter 2 offered, additionally, theoretical support for the development of a 
study focusing on the types of credit information and the information sharing mechanisms. 
This chapter divided credit information into three main categories that interacted in the 
nineteenth century (consumer credit information, trade credit information and information 
on corporations and securities), and showed that this categorisation is appropriate to 
explain the historical interrelations and therefore their contributions to the development of 
modern forms of credit sharing organisations such as the three main credit rating agencies. 
Furthermore, through a detailed historical analysis, the chapter traced the evolution of the 
different types of credit sharing mechanisms: the traditional letters of recommendation in 
support of a borrower’s financial situation (extended by a supplier known by the borrower 
through a long-term business relationship, and based on qualitative information); the 
emergence of the first non-profit mutual societies for the protection of trade (employing 
qualitative negative information for the assessment of risk) in the United Kingdom; the 
hiring of private agents by the largest international merchant banks (using qualitative and 
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quantitative information) in the United Kingdom (where the first forms of credit ratings 
can be found) and the United States, the profit-seeking credit reference agencies in the 
United States (utilising a combination of quantitative and qualitative information), and the 
specialised business/financial press in the United Kingdom and the United States (based 
on statistical data). Finally, a central contribution of this chapter to the literature is that it 
provided an explanation of the differences in the historical evolution of risk assessment 
methods and credit information sharing mechanisms that is based not only on the 
traditional geographical arguments but also on the different stages of development of the 
respective financial systems and the legal frameworks of each country. 
 
7.3. Default prediction using accounting, market and macroeconomic 
variables. 
 
Chapter 3 develops new binary logistic models for the prediction of corporate 
default for quoted companies in the United Kingdom calibrated based on the Christidis 
and Gregory (2010) definition of financial distress. The models use widely available data 
from the London Share Price Database (LSPD). In order to provide a ‘clean’ measure of 
the outcome (or the dependent variable), a firm was classified as failed if its status was one 
of the following: in liquidation, suspension, receivership, or cancellation. This definition of 
corporate failure was based upon the types of death available in the London Share Price 
Database and represents thus the last stage of financial distress: default, which can be 
viewed as the outcome of a process. Therefore, this chapter differed from prior studies that 
employed a ‘legal’ definition of bankruptcy in that it recognises that default can be a 
lengthy legal process and that the ‘legal’ date of failure may not represent the ‘economic’ or 
the ‘real’ event of failure. Most importantly, the novelty of this chapter is that it develops 
models, for the first time, for the prediction of corporate default that combine financial 
statement data, market variables, and macroeconomic indicators. Previous studies have 
focused on demonstrating the superiority of market-based models over accounting-based 
models and vice-versa, and the relevance of macroeconomic variables to the prediction of 
corporate default has rarely been tested. To this point, the default prediction literature is 
characterised by a competing approach where there is a clear division line between market 
and accounting variables. The present study adopted a different approach where the use of 
the three types of variables is not mutually exclusive. It was tested whether the market 
variables (dependent, in some measure, upon the same financial information) and 
macroeconomic indicators add information that is not contained in financial statements 
and therefore act as complement in default prediction models.  
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The results presented in Chapter 3 clearly indicate that this is the case. Five binary 
logistic models were developed: An ‘Accounting only’ model, an ‘Accounting plus 
macroeconomic variables’ model, a ‘Comprehensive model’ that includes accounting, 
market and macroeconomic variables, a ‘Market only’ model, and a ‘Market plus 
macroeconomic variables’ model to test the differences in performance of the three groups 
of variables. The results are unambiguous: the comprehensive model yielded the best 
performance (measured through individual areas under Receiver operating characteristics 
curves, Gini rank coefficients, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, Cox and Snell’s and 
Nagelkerke’s R-squared, and Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit tests) in both periods 
t-1 and t-2 (when the model was estimated with information one and two years prior to the 
observation of the event of corporate default).  
 
On the other hand, the results from the inclusion of market variables to an 
accounting-based model (that also included macroeconomic indicators) indicated that 
market variables contain a substantial amount of information relevant to the estimation of 
the likelihood of corporate default that is not included in financial statement ratios. 
Furthermore, when the ‘Full’ model is estimated in t-2, market variables are the most 
consistent set of regressors over time for the prediction of corporate default. A comparison 
of areas under correlated ROC curves (AUC) performed using a non-parametric method 
based on the theory on generalised Man-Whitney U-statistics, and the estimation of biased-
adjusted classification tables corroborated these results. This chapter also found that, when 
employed in isolation, market variables seem to possess a higher explanatory power than 
accounting variables, as the performance of market variables closely follows the 
performance of the ‘full’ model, especially in t-2. Results are, nevertheless, less conclusive 
with regard to macroeconomic indicators, which contribute only marginally to the overall 
classification accuracy of the model. Finally, the estimation of marginal effects filled an 
important gap in the default prediction literature by presenting expected instantaneous 
changes in the response variables as a function of a change in a specific predictor variable 
while keeping all the other covariates constant. The graphical representation of changes in 
predicted probabilities also proved to be very useful to enhance our understanding of 
individual effects of individual variables included in the models. 
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7.4. Bankruptcy and financial distress prediction using accounting, market 
and macroeconomic variables. 
 
Chapter 4 offered new binary logistic models for the prediction of financial distress 
and corporate failure. This chapter contributes to the literature by offering a finance-based 
definition of firm distress for quoted companies in the United Kingdom. Financial distress 
prediction models that incorporate not only the event of bankruptcy as the primary 
outcome, but also the time when a company fails to meet its financial obligations, were 
developed and tested. Taking into account that financial distress can be costly for creditors 
and that they would wish to take timely actions to minimise or avert these costs, Chapter 4 
produces models with practical value- enhanced predictive accuracy and macro-dependent 
dynamics that have relevance for stress testing. Building on the corporate failure definition 
employed in Chapter 3, this chapter classifies a firm as financially distressed when two 
separate conditions are met: i) whenever its earnings before interest and taxes depreciation 
and amortization (EBITDA) are lower than its financial expenses for two consecutive 
years; ii) whenever the firms suffers from a negative growth in market value for two 
consecutive years. In this way, both accounting and market dimensions were accounted for 
in the analysis. Furthermore, this chapter offered a comparison of the goodness-of-fit, 
classification accuracy and predictive power of three types of variables: financial statement 
ratios, macroeconomic indicators and market variables. The results clearly showed the 
utility of combining these three types of variables in financial distress prediction models for 
listed companies. Moreover, the performance of the estimated models was benchmarked 
against models built using a neural network (multilayer perceptron) and against Altman’s 
(1968) original Z-score specification, corroborating thus the advantages of the 
methodology employed in Chapter 4 and the ascendancy of comprehensive models that 
combine accounting, market and macroeconomic data. 
 
In addition to the analysis of performance measures widely employed in the credit 
risk industry, a comparison of areas under correlated ROC curves performed using a non-
parametric method, and the estimation of biased-adjusted classification tables indicated that 
market variables contain relevant information that is not included in financial statement 
ratios. Therefore, the incorporation of market variables in accounting-based model can 
significantly enhance the predictive power of the model. Moreover, when a comprehensive 
model was estimated using data two years prior to the event of financial distress, in order 
to test the real predictive accuracy of the model, three out of four market variables retained 
their statistical significance, the same proportion as the financial ratios, which indicates that 
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the variables included in the model are consistent. Chapter 4 also found that results are less 
conclusive for macroeconomic variables, which contribute only marginally to the overall 
classification accuracy of the model. On the other hand, a comparison between the three 
main models developed in this chapter, the classic Altman (1968) model estimated using 
logistic regression, the widely used Altman (1968) Z-score and the comprehensive model 
estimated employing an artificial neural network (multilayer perceptron) confirmed the 
robustness of the models developed in this chapter. This chapter’s models displayed 
significantly enhanced prediction accuracy results relative to the original Altman’s Z-score.  
 
Through a comparative analysis of the comprehensive logit model against the 
artificial neural networks model, it could be concluded that their performances are almost 
identical, as the differences in predictive accuracy are very small, with the neural networks 
model outperforming the logit model for the prediction of failed/distressed firms, although 
by a very small margin (less than 1 percentage point approximately), which is consistent 
with the results obtained through the analysis of their  respective areas under the ROC 
curves. Nevertheless, the logit models developed in Chapter four have the advantage of 
providing a form that can be understood and transported quite easily, unlike neural 
networks, which lack transparency (seeing what the model is doing, or comprehensibility) 
and transportability (being able to easily deploy the model into a decision support system 
for new cases). Finally, Chapter 4 contributed to the literature by estimating marginal 
effects and presenting graphical representations of the changes in predicted probabilities, 
which, unlike multinomial logit function coefficients, are very useful to interpret the effects 
of individual covariates on the probability of financial distress. 
 
7.5. A polytomous response logit financial distress corporate failure model. 
 
The final empirical chapter, Chapter 5, presented new polytomous response logit 
models that include definitions of both financial distress and corporate failure. The novelty 
of the present study is that it considered corporate default as a dynamic process by 
including three possible states/outcomes in a generalised or polytomous logit regression 
model: a state that encloses on-going firms assumed to be in a financially sound position, a 
state reflecting firm Financial distress (based on a finance definition of corporate distress), 
and a state that indicates a state of Corporate failure (based on a technical definition built 
using information provided by the London Share Price Database). Given that there has 
been only a small number of prior research works that apply polytomous response models 
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to the field of financial distress/corporate default, Chapter 5 argued that the applications to 
finance of the multinomial logit methodology have not been explored enough, and that the 
literature on financial distress and corporate failure could significantly benefit not only 
from the analysis of its output in the form of prediction accuracy results (of three possible 
outcomes), but also from the new insights that can be obtained through appropriate 
transformations of the multinomial function coefficients in order to provide a direct 
interpretation of the effects of individual covariates on the likelihood of a firm falling into 
one of the three possible states or outcomes. In order to empirically test these assumptions, 
marginal effects, derived from the output of the polytomous response model, were 
estimated and interpreted in detail. Moreover, graphic representations of the changes 
produced in the vectors of predicted probabilities by a change in the level of a specific 
covariate (while keeping all other variables constant at their means) were presented to 
further analyse the individual effects of all types of variables in the models, to provide 
additional insights on their patterns of behaviour as well as additional support to the 
interpretation of the marginal effects. 
 
Chapter 5 provided evidence that indicates that marginal effects are an appropriate 
measure to assess the effects of individual covariates on the probability of falling into one 
of the three pre-defined financial states/outcomes in a multinomial logit model: a part 
from the advantage of their direct interpretation, the estimation of average marginal effects 
yielded the correct expected signs for all the variables and outcomes, unlike several 
multinomial logit function coefficients. In practice, these results can be used to determine 
the individual effects of the different covariates on the probability of a firm falling into 
financial distress or corporate failure with a high degree of reliability. In other words, 
marginal effects were found to be an appropriate measure to determine the relative 
importance of individual variables based on their relative magnitudes. In this manner, 
practitioners are able to rank and target the specific aspects or characteristics of a company 
that require special attention in order to avoid the high costs associated with financial 
distress and bankruptcy. Additionally, the study also found, through statistical measures 
used for the first time in the field of financial distress/bankruptcy models, that model 
performance and goodness-of-fit can be significantly enhanced by combining financial 
ratios and market variables in a model that also incorporates macroeconomic dynamics, 
providing thus additional support for the results obtained in Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
Moreover, Chapter 5 presented a flexible classification accuracy methodology that 
has the advantage of allowing for the inclusion of very close approximations of the actual 
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proportions of an outcome relative to the one it is being tested against, which is very 
important as they can be used as cut-off points in an unbalanced panel (such as the one 
used in the present study, that approximates the actual proportions observed in the United 
Kingdom) providing thus the researcher and practitioner with realistic and reliable results 
as well as a high degree of accuracy. The classification tables produced additional evidence 
supporting the analysis of marginal effects and changes in predicted probabilities: the 
comprehensive model yields the highest overall classification accuracy followed by the 
‘accounting only, and ‘market only’ models. 
7.6. Directions for future research.  
 
 Given the dynamic nature of the characteristics of financially distressed/bankrupt 
firms over time, it is essential for regulators, practitioners, and academics, to periodically 
test and enhance the performance of financial distress/corporate default prediction models. 
This is particularly important as the areas of application of such models have been 
broadened to include: the monitoring of the financial situation of institutions by regulators, 
the evaluation of the financial viability of corporations by auditing firms, the measurement 
of the riskiness of portfolios, the pricing of credit derivatives and other fixed-income 
securities, etc. Therefore, research on financial distress/default prediction models could be 
further enhanced by taking into account recent methodological developments in the field 
of econometrics and statistics as well as the current improvements of databases that now 
include qualitative information. With regard to the former, new longitudinal techniques 
could be applied to the financial distress field in order to test whether these technical 
refinements are capable of enhance the overall predictive accuracy of the models and/or 
provide new insights as to role of individual variables and the effect of particular types of 
variables on the probability of failing into the financial distress/corporate default category.  
 
Improvements to longitudinal discrete choice methodologies have not been tested 
in this field and it would be useful to test whether a potential gain in performance of the 
model is able to compensate for the increase in the complexity of such novel techniques. In 
fact, these advances in discrete choice modelling have alleviated questionable assumptions 
such as the independently and identically distributed errors assumption and allowed for 
unobserved heterogeneity. If these models proved to enhance the performance of 
prediction models, an additional question would be whether they could be adopted by 
practitioners given the intensiveness of resources required for their estimation. Finally, 
taking into account corporate finance theory, other qualitative variables such as directors 
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characteristics could be incorporated to prediction models to test whether they enhance 
their performance. 
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